June Ends with a Bang with DOL Moving to Amend FMLA Regulations and Three Supreme Court Employment Decisions

The end of June is traditionally a busy week for legal observers since many of the Supreme Court’s most contentious employment decisions are issued before it recesses for the year.  This year was no exception.  However, there were also a number of regulatory matters raised by the Department of Labor which were equally – and maybe more – noteworthy.  First, the DOL has proposed to amend the FMLA regulation defining spouse to require employers in states where same-sex marriage is not recognized – like Ohio -- to provide FMLA leave to employees who were legally married in another state.  Second, the DOL proposed regulations to increase the minimum wage for certain employees of certain federal contractors beginning in 2015.  Next, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Senate – not the President – gets to decide when it is in recess.  Therefore, Presidential appointments to the NLRB made during brief adjournments were not constitutional.  In addition, a divided Supreme Court found that the First Amendment rights of de factor independent contractors trumped the government’s interest in giving them union rights and requiring them to subsidize through fair share fees the political lobbying activities of unions to which the workers objected.  Finally, a divided Supreme Court found that closely held corporations can assert statutory and First Amendment rights to object to contraceptive coverage mandated by ObamaCare regulations and the government failed to show that less restrictive means existed to achieve its aims.

FMLA Rights of Domestic Partners.  On June 20, the Department of Labor announced that it would be proposing to change the regulatory definition of “spouse” in the Family and Medical Leave Act to include individuals who were legally married  in one country (like Argentina) or state, like Massachusetts, even though they currently reside in a state, like Ohio, which does not recognize that marriage.  Currently, FMLA rights only extend to individuals whose marriage is legal in the state where the employee resides.  The Act itself provides in § 2611(13) that “[t]he term “spouse” means a husband or wife, as the case may be.”    The current regulatory definition provides that: “Spouse means a husband or wife as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the employee resides, including common law marriage in States where it is recognized.” Under the proposed rule – which was published in the Federal Register last week on June 27 – same sex and common law marriages will be included in the definition of “spouse” based on the place of celebration instead of the place of residence. The DOL also revised other regulations to replace “husband and wife” with “spouse” and “mother and father” with “parent.”   The DOL will consider comments on the proposed changes which are received before August 11.   The expansion of the rule will affect spousal leave (to care for an ill/injured spouse or during a qualified exigency military leave), child care leave (to care for ill step-children even if the employee is “does not stand in loco parentis” to that child) and parental leave (to care for an employee’s step-parent in a same sex marriage).

The new definition at §825.102 and §825.122 will read as follows:

Spouse, as defined in the statute, means a husband or wife. For purposes of this definition, husband or wife refers to the other person with whom an individual entered into marriage as defined or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State in which the marriage was entered into or, in the case of a marriage entered into outside of any State, if the marriage is valid in the place where entered into and could have been entered into in at least one State. This definition includes an individual in a same-sex or common law marriage that either (1) was entered into in a State that recognizes such marriages or, (2) if entered into outside of any State, is valid in the place where entered into and could have been entered into in at least one State.

NLRB Recess Appointments.  Last week, a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. District and Court of Appeals in finding that President Obama exceeded his authority in appointing three NLRB members during a three day adjournment.   NLRB v. Noel Canning, No.12-1281 (2014).  Under the Constitution, NLRB members must be confirmed by the Senate, although the President has the right under the Constitution to temporarily appoint members when the Senate is in “recess.”  In this case, President Obama appointed three members when the Senate was on a three –day adjournment and not on a self-declared recess.  An employer which lost a case at the NLRB challenged the appointment of the three adjournment-appointed members and, thus, the Board’s quorum to conduct business and make decisions.  The Court ultimately held that Congress is presumptively in recess or in business when it  says it is and the President does not get to decide that for Congress by declaring a three day adjournment to be a recess.   The recess appointments clause was not meant as a routine alternative for the President to avoid Senate confirmation.  In addition, the Court indicated that adjournments of less than 10 days would presumptively not be recesses so that the President could avoid Senate confirmation.   Accordingly, all of the decisions made by those appointed NLRB members are invalid and, if still pending in the legal process, likely will not be enforced by the Courts.  However, there is a legal quorum on the NLRB a present and it has indicated that it intends to act quickly to reconsider (and probably reconfirm) these challenged decisions.

Public Union/First Amendment Rights for Independent Contractors.  On Monday, a divided Supreme Court limited the ability of public unions in Illinois’ to encourage unionization of home healthcare workers (who had traditionally been considered independent contractors) by precluding the unions’ ability to collect “fair share fees” from the home healthcare workers who object under the First Amendment to joining and financially supporting a union.   Harris v. Quinn, No. 11-681 (2014).   The State of Illinois had declared the Personal Assistant (home healthcare workers) to be “employees” of the state by virtue of the fact that the state paid them with Medicaid funds even though they were hired, trained, supervised and fired by individual citizens receiving Medicaid assistance.   As described by the Court’s syllabus, “[o]ther than compensating PAs, the State’s involvement in employ­ment matters is minimal. Its employer status was created by execu­tive order, and later codified by the legislature, solely to permit PAs to join a labor union and engage in collective bargaining under Illi­nois’ Public Labor Relations Act (PLRA).”   The healthcare workers do not receive other state government employee benefits and are not protected by, for instance, sovereign immunity.  Because the home healthcare workers were only partial government employees, there was little service that the union was providing them in exchange for union dues or a fair share fee (to preclude free riders) since Medicaid dictated a uniform rate of pay and the employing citizens governed virtually all other terms and conditions of employment.   Accordingly, the Court refused to extend prior Court decisions to these de facto independent contractors and, instead, applied the traditional First Amendment legal analysis to the propriety of requiring these individuals to pay a fee to a union which they did not join or support.   The Court’s majority concluded that there was no compelling government interest which could not be achieved by less restrictive means that would override the workers’ First Amendment rights.

 

First Amendment Rights of Small Businesses.  On Monday, a divided Supreme Court held that closely-held corporations could exercise First Amendment and statutory rights as “persons.”   Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.¸ No. 13-354 (2014).  The Court noted that it had previously recognized these rights when raised by non-profit corporations and by for-profit sole proprietorships.  Therefore, when the owners of these businesses objected to being required to pay for methods of contraception which interfered with fertilized eggs, they had standing to raise the claims. The Court noted that it would be impractical for a publicly held corporation to assert similar claims.  On the merits, the Court found that the government had failed to demonstrate the existence of a compelling interest to justify its regulations that could not be addressed with less restrictive measures. 

Minimum Wage for Federal Contractors. In February, President Obama issued Executive Order 13658 requiring federal contractors to increase the minimum wage paid to certain employees to $10.10/hour beginning with contracts issued in 2015. That amount will be tied to the Consumer Price Index and may be adjusted going forward.   This month, the Department of Labor issued proposed regulations to implement this Executive Order.   Importantly, not all federal contractors or hourly employees are covered.  The EO covers mostly those employees covered by the Service Contract Act, Davis-Bacon and work in federal park concessions.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

A Hodgepodge of Activity in February

There have been a few interesting decisions within the past month in the employment context, but none of them are earth-shattering (unless you are facing a factually similar situation in your workplace).   The NLRB once again dinged a non-union employer for terminating an HR employee for discussing confidential salary information with co-workers because the employer failed to show she was a statutory supervisor and employees have a right to discuss wage information.  After she declined reinstatement, the employer offered “to make the former employee whole by paying her backpay, 401(k) contributions, medical expenses and interest in the total amount of $107,000, to revise its policy to delete the prohibition on employees of discussing their salaries, and to post a Board Notice describing these actions.”  Of course, whether this decision survives is an open question since the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled last month that President Obama lacked the authority to make three recess appointments to the NLRB on January 4, 2012 and, without those recess appointments, the NLRB lacks a quorum to vote.  (Yes, here we go again).  The NLRB announced it intended to appeal the decision in that particular case and essentially otherwise ignore the decision while conducting business as usual until the Supreme Court tells it otherwise.  The Sixth Circuit also issued a few interesting decisions.

In one case, Quinn v. Griffith, No. 12-1465 (6^th Cir. 2-21-13) the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict holding an employer liable for a sexually hostile work environment created by the manager in a two-person office and the imposition of punitive damages.  The employee apparently set up a hidden camera in the office to substantiate her allegations after the employer’s internal investigation concluded that it could not substantiate her allegations. The trial court refused to permit testimony by the employer’s lip-reading expert to rebut what the jury saw on the videotape.  Even without lost wages, the plaintiff was awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages.   (Attorney fees for a prevailing plaintiff were not discussed in the opinion).  The matter was remanded for the trial court to clarify or modify the allocation of damages among the individual and corporate defendant and among the state and federal claims.  The Court had no difficulty in rejecting the employer’s argument that it should not be held liable for the manager’s conduct because it failed to preserve the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense in its answer to the plaintiff’s complaint or in its summary judgment motion.  Moreover, the employer failed to present any evidence of how it had exercised reasonable care to prevent and remedy the harassment.   (Obviously, this is difficult when it failed to distribute a sexual harassment policy, but not impossible according to the Court).   The same could be said of its argument that it could not be liable for punitive damages.  “An employer may avoid liability by showing that it engaged in good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII, which is most often shown by effective implementation of an anti-harassment policy.”

The Sixth Circuit has also heard and rejected a few appeals involving firefighters suing the City of Columbus.   Yesterday’s decision in Arnold v. City of Columbus likewise found no evidence of race discrimination.  This case involved a series of external and internal investigations over a few years into the conduct of the inspections section/fire protection bureau of the fire department.  Employees complained, in particular, about how the internal investigations were conducted and alleged that they were treated differently than white employees in terms of the presence of union officers in interviews, whether certain interviews were tape recorded and whether they could object to the presence of union officers in interviews, etc.   Ultimately, the Court found that the plaintiffs were not treated differently on account of their race.   In the Fullen case, the Court upheld disciplinary action when a plaintiff refused to be interviewed in the presence of a union representative.

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Supreme Court Invalidates Decisions of Two-Member NLRB

This morning, in one of the most highly-anticipated decisions of the year, the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the NLRB does not have the legislatively required quorum to act when it only has two members. New Process Steel v. NLRB, No. 08-1457. Under the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act, the NLRB is supposed to have five members. However, for a variety of reasons – mostly related to the partisan Congress – it only had two members between January 1, 2008 and March 27, 2010 (when President Obama made two recess appointments after it became clear that his appointees would not receive Senate confirmation). During that 27 months, the NLRB had issued approximately 600 decisions when the two remaining members could agree. Two of those decisions involved the employer who appealed enforcement to federal court. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the NLRB could act with only two members, but the Supreme Court reversed in an opinion written by outgoing Justice Stevens. Although the THA permitted the five-member Board to delegate decisions to a three-member panel, that panel could not act with only two members present.

The Board's quorum requirements and delegation procedure are set forth in §3(b) of the NLRA, 49 Stat. 451, as amended by 61 Stat. 139, which provides: "The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . . A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof." 29 U. S. C. §153(b).

It is undisputed that the first sentence of this provision authorized the Board to delegate its powers to the three member group effective on December 28, 2007, and the last sentence authorized two members of that group to act as a quorum of the group during the next three days if, for example, the third member had to recuse himself from a particular matter. The question we face is whether those two members could continue to act for the Board as a quorum of the delegee group after December 31, 2007,when the Board's membership fell to two and the designated three-member group of "Members Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow" ceased to exist due to the expiration of Member Kirsanow's term. Construing §3(b)as a whole and in light of the Board's longstanding practice, we are persuaded that they could not.

The Court construed the first clause "as requiring that the delegee group maintain a membership of three in order for the delegation to remain valid" for three reasons.

First, and most fundamentally, reading the delegation clause to require that the Board's delegated power be vested continuously in a group of three members is the only way to harmonize and give meaningful effect to all of the provisions in §3(b). . . . . Interpreting the statute to require the Board's powers to be vested at all times in a group of at least three members is consonant with the Board quorum requirement, which requires three participating members "at all times" for the Board to act. The interpretation likewise gives material effect to the three-member requirement in the delegation clause. The vacancy clause still operates to provide that vacancies do not impair the ability of the Board to take action, so long as the quorum is satisfied. And the interpretation does not render inoperative the group quorum provision, which still operates to authorize a three member delegee group to issue a decision with only two members participating, so long as the delegee group was properly constituted. Reading §3(b) in this manner, the statute's various pieces hang together—a critical clue that this reading is a sound one.

. . . .

Second, and relatedly, if Congress had intended to authorize two members alone to act for the Board on an ongoing basis, it could have said so in straight forward language. Congress instead imposed the requirement that the Board delegate authority to no fewer than three members, and that it have three participating members to constitute a quorum. Those provisions are at best an unlikely way of conveying congressional approval of a two member Board. Indeed, had Congress wanted to provide for two members alone to act as the Board, it could have maintained the NLRA's original two-member Board quorum provision.

. . . .

Furthermore, if Congress had intended to allow for a two-member Board, it is hard to imagine why it would have limited the Board's power to delegate its authority by requiring a delegee group of at least three members. Nor do we have any reason to surmise that Congress' overriding objective in amending §3(b) was to keep the Board operating at all costs; the inclusion of the three-member quorum and delegation provisions indicate otherwise. Cf. Robert's Rules of Order §3, p. 20 (10th ed. 2001) ("The requirement of a quorum is a protection against totally unrepresentative action in the name of the body by an unduly small number of persons").

In sum, a straightforward understanding of the text, which requires that no fewer than three members be vested with the Board's full authority, coupled with the Board's longstanding practice, points us toward an interpretation of the delegation clause that requires a delegee group to maintain a membership of three.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.