Showing posts with label OCRA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OCRA. Show all posts

Thursday, January 14, 2021

Ohio Modifies Ohio Civil Rights Act and Shortens Limitations Periods

 

What a long strange trip it has been.  Yesterday, Governor DeWine signed H.B. 352 into law.  While it is a scaled down version of what passed the Senate before Christmas, it addresses long-standing concerns with Ohio employment discrimination legal procedures and makes them more consistent and often still more generous than exist under federal law. Among other things, it generally shortens the limitations period for 4112 claims and some federal statutory claims to two years, requires exhaustion of remedies, incorporates specific federal defenses, and makes damages subject to tort cap limits, etc.  It still retains the right of employees to bring certain age discrimination and injunctive relief claims directly in court.

First, it shortens the limitations period for claims under O.R.C. § 4112, and federal claims under §§1981a, 1983 and 1985 to two years (from the existing six years), which is still twice as long as the federal limitations period under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA, etc.  (The limitations periods for those federal statutes vary from state to state because they “borrow” the analogous state limitations period).  The limitations period begins to run from the date when “the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice was committed.”  This period will be tolled for Chapter 4112 claims as long as a Charge is pending at the OCRC, except that if the Charge was not filed until less than 60 days before the limitations period was about to lapse (i.e., on day 670), then the tolling will last another 60 days after the Charge is no longer pending at the OCRC.

Second, similar to federal law and with a few exceptions, it requires employees to first file a Charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, before filing a lawsuit.   The time period for filing a Charge is the same as for filing a lawsuit: two years.   Employees may still request a right to sue letter from the OCRC prior to the conclusion of any OCRC investigation, but the OCRC may not issue the right to sue unless the Charge has been pending at least 60 days.

Third, with certain exceptions, employees cannot file suit unless they have a Right to Sue letter, have waited at least 45 days after requesting a RTS letter and 60 days since filing a Charge, or have received a letter where the OCRC found probable cause of discrimination to have occurred.   These conditions do not apply if the employee is only seeking injunctive relief or if the employee filed a timely charge with both the OCRC and EEOC and the EEOC has issued a right to sue letter (or if filing a lawsuit for age discrimination under §4112.14).   But, if the employee initially sought only injunctive relief from a court and later amends his or her complaint to include a claim for damages, the employee must have filed a timely OCRC Charge and comply with the right-to-sue letter requirements.   

Fourth, as with federal law, it eliminates individual liability of managers and supervisors under the statute.  The legislation notes that it intends to overrule the Ohio Supreme Court’s Genaro decision and to instead follow long-standing federal law on this issue.  

Fourth, it explicitly adopts the federal standard and affirmative defense from Faragher, for sexual harassment claims. 

Sixth, it makes verdicts for Chapter 4112 claims subject to the tort caps for non-economic damages.  

Seventh, it makes Chapter 4112 the sole and exclusive remedy for employment discrimination, which is similar to federal law.  In other words, there cannot be a common law wrongful discharge claims for violation of public policy against employment discrimination.

Finally, while it retains under §4112.14 the existing right of employees not subject to an arbitration agreement to file suit for age discrimination claims seeking only reinstatement, back pay, costs and attorney’s fees and the existing election of remedies, it added a few wrinkles.   The employee must still elect remedies (i.e., bring this direct action without being able to sue for compensatory or punitive damages or being required to file an OCRC Charge).   These direct actions are still subject to the new two year statute of limitations as described above.   Like other 4112 claims, that limitations period may be tolled if the employee filed a Charge with the OCRC making the same allegations. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

Monday, July 7, 2014

Ohio Court of Appeals Reverses Directed Verdict on Perceived Disability

Late last month – just a few days after the Franklin County Court of Appeals rejected a perceived disability claim – the Ohio Court for Harrison County reversed an employer’s directed verdict on a perceived disability claim and found a reasonable jury could conclude that the employer’s perception might have motivated the employee’s termination, but rejected the employee’s argument that the employer’s offered reasonable accommodation could – by itself -- constitute evidence that it perceived him as disabled.  Roghelia v. Hopedale Mining, L.L.C., 2014-Ohio-2935.  The Court found that the trial court improperly elevated the plaintiff’s burden of proof in a perceived disability case by requiring him to show that the employer perceived his impairment – an amputated thumb -- to be substantially limiting of a major life activity.  Moreover, an email sent by a manager about “be[ing] careful”  with “his background injury wise” created a question of fact as to whether the employer was motivated by the impairment or was trying to conscientiously follow the law in terminating the employee for poor attendance.  Finally, the Court concluded that the jury was entitled to decide whether the attendance issue was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.

According to the Court’s opinion, the employee was terminated for poor attendance even though he had submitted a medical excuse prior to taking the time off.  He did not, however, call in to speak with his supervisor before taking off work and his supervisor had decided to assign him to light duty after receiving the medical statement.  He had prior attendance problems.  Once, he submitted a medical statement, which gave no medical reason for his absence, and got married during his two week absence.  He had been placed on probation for poor attendance before his termination. 
Under the Ohio Revised Code and the current ADAA, “a plaintiff must show that the employer regarded her as having a mental or physical impairment, but without regard to whether the employer regarded her as substantially limited in her daily life activities as a result.” 

Shortly after the plaintiff lost his thumb, the employer transferred the employee to a position which would not cause as much pain in his injured hand.  Nonetheless, it believed that he could perform all of his job duties.  The Court noted that Ohio Courts have refused to consider reasonable accommodations as evidence of a perceived disability.   

To find otherwise would mean that any time any sort of work place accommodation is made for the employee this automatically results in a conclusion that is perceived as disabled for purposes of disability discrimination. Therefore, merely showing that an employee was accommodated is not sufficient to prove that the employer regarded the employee as disabled.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Friday, February 15, 2008

New Ohio Law Makes “Military Status” a Protected Category Under the Ohio Civil Rights Act.

Late last year, Governor Strickland signed the “Ohio’s Veteran Package” (otherwise lovingly known as Substitute House Bill 372), which -- beginning next month on March 24, 2008 -- amends Ohio’s Civil Rights Act at Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 et seq. to include “military status” as a protected category along with race, sex, age, disability, etc.


Interestingly, “military status” seems to indicate the person’s current status (rather than veteran status) and is defined in the statute as “a person's status in ‘service in the uniformed services’ as defined in section 5903.01 of the Revised Code. Such status is defined at Ohio Revised Code § 5903 as “the performance of duty, on a voluntary or involuntary basis, in a uniformed service, . . . and includes active duty, active duty for training, initial active duty for training, inactive duty for training, full-time national guard duty, and performance of duty or training by a member of the Ohio organized militia pursuant to Chapter 5923 of the Revised Code” and also includes “the period of time for which a person is absent from a position of public or private employment for the purpose of an examination to determine the fitness of the person to perform any duty described in this division.” “The ‘uniformed services’ means the armed forces, the Ohio organized militia when engaged in active duty for training, inactive duty training, or full-time national guard duty, the commissioned corps of the public health service, and any other category of persons designated by the president of the United States in time of war or emergency.”


Ohio’s Veteran Package seems to have created some unintended consequences. Among them, employers may no longer be able to prefer members of the military for employment since Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(E) prohibits an employer from asking any job applicant -- on an application or in an interview – about his or her military status “[e]xcept where based on a bona fide occupational qualification certified in advance by the [Ohio Civil Rights] [C]omission.” The same is true of making any records of the military status of applicants. Employers are similarly prohibited from expressing a preference for members of the military in help-wanted ads.


New Ohio Revised Code § 4112.023 specifically incorporates the decision of Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2001) by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals “which held that if a person's civilian job is inherently military, the person must pursue military, rather than civilian, channels when pursuing employment discrimination claims, shall be applied when construing the prohibitions contained in this chapter against discrimination on the basis of a person's military status.”

As of today’s posting, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission had not made a new poster available for employers which includes the new statutory language. (Free posters are generally available online from the Commission at http://crc.ohio.gov/pdf/OCRCFEPPoster04-07.pdf). However, the Commission’s delay should not stop employers from amending their own internal employment policies to reflect the new change in the law.

Insomniacs may read the new legislation in full at : http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/bills.cfm?ID=127_HB_372

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.