Showing posts with label insubordination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label insubordination. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 12, 2021

Sixth Circuit Refuses Employee Claim for Age Discrimination and to Award Attorneys Fees to Prevailing FMLA Plaintiff

This morning, the Sixth Circuit issued a few employment decisions that may be of interest to employers and employees.  In the first case, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim where she had been fired for insubordination.   Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.,  No. 20-3511 (6th Cir. 1-12-21, amended 2-19-21).  The Court reiterated that the Supreme Court has held the ADEA does not permit mixed-motive cases, unlike Title VII.  Further, her evidence of stray remarks by the Bank’s president about an employee who was 40 years older than her were too vague and unrelated to her situation to constitute direct evidence that she had been fired because of her age.    In the second case, the plaintiff physician was denied prevailing party attorney fees in his FMLA claim by the arbitrator because he had failed to educate the arbitrator that the statute prevailed over contrary language in the arbitration clause and because he failed to submit any definitive evidence of the fees he was claiming.

In the first case, the plaintiff teller was fired by her long time banking employer for insubordination for refusing to submit a written request for time off until the day before her day off even though such requests were due a month in advance.  She argued that this was pretext for age discrimination.  The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and she appealed.

The plaintiff attempted to argue that she had proved age discrimination with direct evidence based on a few inflammatory statements that the Bank’s president made about another employee who was 40 years older than the plaintiff and that he wanted to hire younger tellers.  The Court disagreed.  “In reviewing direct evidence, we look for “evidence from the lips of the defendant proclaiming his or her . . . animus.”  . . .Inferences are not permitted.”

“Direct evidence is evidence that proves the existence of a fact without requiring any inferences” to be drawn.  . . . In other words, direct evidence is “smoking gun” evidence that “explains itself.”

                . . .

In determining the materiality of allegedly discriminatory statements, we consider four factors, none of which are dispositive: “(1) whether the statements were made by a decisionmaker . . . ; (2) whether the statements were related to the decision-making process; (3) whether the statements were more than merely vague, ambiguous or isolated remarks; and (4) whether they were made proximate in time to the act of termination.”

             . . . None of the statements were related to [the plaintiff]’s termination. In fact, they were not made in relation to any termination decision and were about an entirely different employee. Additionally, nothing in the record suggests that the statements were more than isolated remarks. Here, it appears as though these statements were only made once or twice to certain higher-level management employees.

                . . . Hiring younger tellers does not require the termination of older employees.

 . . ., in terms of timing, the comments in question come from late 2015 or early 2016, more than six months before her termination. We have previously suggested that time spans of six or seven months can be temporally distant.

That being said, such statements could be considered as circumstantial evidence to argue pretext if the plaintiff attempted to prove her case through burden shifting and to raise a “plausible inference of discrimination.”     Nonetheless, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the employer’s explanation for her termination – that she was insubordinate – was pretext for age discrimination.

First, the plaintiff could not prove that the explanation had no basis in fact.  She argued that she was not insubordinate because she had submitted a written request one day in advance and had obtained verbal approval a month in advance.  However, the Court pointed out that she had been required by her manager’s policy to submit the written request a month in advance and she had admittedly told her manager that she refused to do so because she disagreed with the policy.  She did not ultimately submit her written request until the day before her took time off.  Her “late completion of the form could not cure her original refusal to follow Sonderman’s directive.”

She also could not prove pretext with the isolated and sparse comments that the Bank president had made about another situation. Those comments “were not directed towards Pelcha, not directed towards anyone near Pelcha’s age, and not made in connection with any termination decision at all.”

She also could not show that her employer changed its explanation for her termination by also later documenting issues with her negative attitude and contribution to a negative work environment.  Prior decisions have held that “providing “additional, non-discriminatory reasons that do not conflict with the one stated at the time of discharge does not constitute shifting justifications”.

In addition, she could not show pretext by arguing that the employer failed to comply with its own progressive disciplinary policy.   The policy was clear of the typical steps in the process and clarified that some offenses would justify skipping some or all of the steps.  In conclusion, “an ‘employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.’”

Ultimately, she also could not satisfy the prima facie case because she could not prove that she was treated more harshly than another, younger employee because the fact that a younger co-worker may have neglected to turn in the form is not the same as insubordination in refusing to turn in the form. “Neglecting to complete a time off form and defiantly refusing to do so upon being asked by a superior are significantly different actions.”

In the second case, the Court denied the appeal of a physician who was denied in arbitration attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on his FMLA claim.  Gunasekera v. War Memorial Hospital, No. 20-1340 (6th Cir. 1-12-21).   The physician asserted (correctly) that attorneys’ fees are awarded under the FMLA statute to prevailing plaintiffs.  However, the arbitrator reasoned that the arbitration agreement provided that each party would pay its own fees and, in any event, his attorney had failed to submit evidence of the attorneys’ fees accrued to that point during the hearing.    The Sixth Circuit found that a mere error of law by the arbitrator does not constitute the necessary manifest disregard of the law (if that standard even still applied) as required to overturn an arbitration award.  This was particularly true when the arbitration briefs failed to argue that the FMLA provision overrode the terms of the parties’ agreement.    More importantly, the physician failed to submit any evidence to the arbitrator of the amount of his fees. “In that brief, Dr. Gunasekera merely asserted that he was entitled to receive ‘all of his legal fees,’ which exceeded $35,000.”  Without concrete evidence upon which to base an award of a specific sum, the arbitration could not have erred in failing to award fees to a prevailing party under the FMLA.  

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

Thursday, April 19, 2012

Divided Sixth Circuit Dismisses Age Discrimination Claim of News Anchor Who Objected to Assignment and Walked Out

This morning, a divided Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an age discrimination claim brought by a former news reporter who walked out of the station after he said that he planned quit following a suspension for objecting to an assignment. Sander v. Gray Television Group, Inc., No. 10-6120 (6th Cir. 4-19-12). This is yet another case in which the majority of the Court found it to be non-discriminatory to ask older employees about their retirement plans for succession planning purposes. The majority found that the plaintiff could not show that he was terminated on account of his age because he had resigned when he walked out after telling people he planned to quit. They also found the employer had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason to fire him based on his refusal to perform an assignment within his job duties and then telling co-workers he planned to quit over it. Management was justified in concluding that it would undermine his supervisor to permit the anchor to object like this to routine assignments. However, the dissent noted that his resignation had been ambiguous and the management admitted that they knew he did not really intend to quit. Moreover, there was evidence that his direct supervisor had previously made derogatory comments about his age and that other older anchors had potential claims for age discrimination as well. The majority dismissed those comments because the supervisor was not the decisionmaker.


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Friday, January 2, 2009

Ohio Appeals Court Denies Unemployment Compensation To Supervisor Who Was Fired for Challenging His Managers About His Subordinates.

Last month, the Summit County Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of unemployment compensation to a manager who had been fired for insubordination in challenging his managers on behalf of his employees and for violating company policies and procedures. Curtis v. InfoCision Mgt Corp., 2008-Ohio-6434. Moreover, the employee had been ordered by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review to repay $7,000 in unemployment compensation he had received before the employer’s appeal had been upheld.

As reported by the court, the fired manager had been taken through progressive discipline and was involved in three incidents of insubordination and/or policy violations before being fired. The first incident – on May 27, 2005 – took place after the supervisor’s manager questioned him about several of his employees leaving early for, and others returning late from, lunch. The supervisor “yelled across the room to [his manager] asking him what he was going to do about the employees returning late. In response to this, [the manager] asked [the supervisor] to step outside of the room and into the hallway where their conversation would not be overheard by other employees. [The supervisor] refused multiple requests to leave the room and speak with [the manager and] was issued a written warning for insubordination a few days later.

Later in October 2005, the supervisor sent an inappropriate email to another manager accusing him of lying and being unprofessional in the actions he took involving the termination of one of the supervisor’s most productive subordinates by a customer. The manager indicated that he only agreed to speak with the customer liason about the problem, but the supervisor insisted that he had promised to do more on behalf of the subordinate: "Let's be perfectly honest with each other. You DID indeed say last week that you were going to speak to [them] BOTH. I understand that we will just go on from here and [the employee] will be OK with that. But please do not lie straight to my face and tell me that you never said that you were going to talk to [them]. That is not professional or acceptable to me personally and/or morally."

Just a few days later, the supervisor then violated company policy by permitting his employees to call customers off a suspended call list because they otherwise had nothing to do. The supervisor was aware that the customer had suspended the particular program and had not yet been given a direction that the suspension had been lifted. He was then fired a few days later. The Court agreed with the UCBR that the supervisor had been fired with just cause and was not, therefore, eligible for unemployment compensation.

Insomniacs can read the decision in full at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/9/2008/2008-ohio-6434.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.