Showing posts with label public policy wrongful discharge claim. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public policy wrongful discharge claim. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

It’s Baaaackkk! Dohme Again Makes it to Oral Arguments Before Ohio Supreme Court

Yesterday was déjà vu all over again at the Ohio Supreme Court as the Dohme case had its second appearance before the Court in oral argument. As previously reported here in February 2008, “the Ohio Supreme Court heard oral argument about whether public policy wrongful discharge claims should be recognized when the employee did not “blow the whistle” to either a government agency or management about safety concerns, but rather, complained to a private sector insurance auditor about his paranoia of being set up to be fired in a document of fire alarm inspections.”

A law school classmate, Todd Penny, again argued the case for the employer. According to the 2007 opinion of the Montgomery County Court of Appeals, the employer’s insurance company was conducting a risk assessment in connection with developing a price quote. As had been done in the past, the employer informed staff about the inspection and directed that only certain designated employees were to communicate with the insurance company employee. (It later explained that this was to ensure that the insurance company only received information from staff who were up to date with accurate information). There was some confusion about one of the employer’s staff not coming to work that day, however, and the plaintiff ultimately greeted the insurance representative and spoke to him about a missing report which he believed would be blamed on him. The employer pointed out that the plaintiff never mentioned any safety concerns to the insurance company employee. During oral argument, it was explained that the plaintiff then told another employee at the employer that he had told the insurance employee about the missing report so that he could not be blamed for its disappearance. The plaintiff was then terminated for violating a work directive.

The Court of Appeals concluded that even though the plaintiff did not specifically mention a concern with workplace place safety to the insurance representative, the issue raised related to workplace safety. It also found inherently suspicious the employer’s direction to limit communication with the insurance representative. However, Justice O’Connor was troubled by this “leap” and suggested that it might be suspicious if only the plaintiff had been directed to not communicate with the insurance representative.

The plaintiff’s attorney attempted to argue that evidence of causation cannot be limited to simply this single conversation with the insurance representative, but argued that the Court should look back at the plaintiff’s history – going back to 2001 -- of being perceived as a safety troublemaker. Justice Lanzinger then asked how long an employee should be protected after engaging in protected whistleblowing. In response, his attorney admitted that it would typically be no more than 6 months, but that it would be longer in this case in light of the protracted disputes over fire safety at the plant.

In short, the employer argued that this case should be dismissed on summary judgment because (1) the plaintiff never mentioned a concern with workplace safety to the insurance representative (but only a concern with workplace paranoia) and (2) never complained to a government agency or internal management about any safety concerns. Otherwise, the possibility exists that an employee would be able to claim whistleblower protection just by mentioning an issue to a spouse, neighbor, drinking buddy, etc. This time around, the Court did not seem to entertain the same acceptance of the plaintiff’s case.

As mentioned, the case was previously argued before the Supreme Court, which remanded it for lack of a final and appealable order (in that the plaintiff had attempted to create an appealable order by voluntarily dismissing without prejudice a overtime wage claim). On remand, the plaintiff dismissed that claim with prejudice and the trial court reinstated his prior summary judgment in favor of the employer. Without writing a new opinion, the Court of Appeals, again, reversed and the employer, again, appealed to the Supreme Court.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, February 6, 2008

Supreme Court Hears Debate of Whether Wrongful Discharge Claim Is Valid Based on Safety Concerns Shared with Insurance Auditor

Today, the Ohio Supreme Court heard oral argument about whether public policy wrongful discharge claims should be recognized when the employee did not “blow the whistle” to either a government agency or management about safety concerns, but rather, complained to a private sector insurance auditor about his paranoia of being set up to be fired in a document of fire alarm inspections.

As reported in the July 9, 2007 FYI, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer on the wrongful discharge claim after the plaintiff was fired for insubordination for expressing concern about the employer’s fire alarm system with an insurance agent who had been present to inspect the employer’s premises and provide an insurance quote. Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 2007-Ohio-865 (3/2/07). Notably, the plaintiff had not been fired several years earlier when he reported to the fire department that one of the fire alarms had malfunctioned during a fire. Instead, he was transferred to another position which made him responsible for the fire alarm system. A few days prior to his termination for insubordination, the employer had specifically prohibited all employees from speaking with the insurance agent who was scheduled to inspect the premises. Although the plaintiff had not been specifically authorized in writing to meet with the insurance agent, he says that he had been asked to fill in for an absent employee. He then provided a report to the agent about overdue fire alarm inspections and noted that “suspiciously” one of the overdue inspections had not been included on the report. Plaintiff testified that he did not want to be blamed for the omission.

The employer argued that no public policy was jeopardized or implicated by the plaintiff’s termination as required by Ohio law. “Moreover, Plaintiff's statements did not indicate a concern for work place safety. The plain language of his comments only indicates his own suspicion that the missing inspection report is an attempt by Defendant to set him up for a deficient job performance.” However, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument: “[T]he employee's intent is largely irrelevant in an analysis of the clarity element of a wrongful discharge claim. What is relevant is whether [plaintiff] did in fact report information to the inspector that encompassed a public policy favoring workplace safety. If [plaintiff] did so, then the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.” Under state and federal law, “[t]here is a clear public policy favoring workplace fire safety. Therefore, retaliation against employees who raise concerns relating to workplace fire safety contravenes a clear public policy. . . . An employee who reports fire safety concerns to the employer's insurance inspector, regardless of the employee's intent in doing so, is protected from being fired solely for the sharing of the safety information.”

The Court of Appeals also rejected the employer’s argument that the plaintiff had failed to report his concerns to a government agency and chose, instead, an insurance agent. The Court determined that this argument “ignores the fact that an insurer's requirements may function to avoid fire safety defects. When such requirements are imposed, or higher premiums are the alternative, an employer . . . is motivated to cure safety defects. The market thus plays a role different from that of government, which may issue citations, but perhaps more immediate and compelling. And, making the insurer aware of defects through its representative furthers the public interest in effective fire safety measures.”

The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that an “employee must make some formal announcement that his statements are being made for the purpose of protecting the public policy favoring workplace safety. Employers are presumed to be sophisticated enough to comply with the workplace safety laws. When an employer directs employees to not speak to an insurance representative inspecting a premises, an implication arises that the employer wishes to cover up defects, including those that create a danger to employees. Supporting the employer's conduct endorses its efforts to conceal potential dangers. As the Jermer court recognized, the Supreme Court views employee complaints as critical to the enforcement of the State's public policy. We would be minimizing the importance of these complaints and the State's public policy were we to concentrate on the employee's intent in raising the safety concern rather than on whether the employee's complaints related to the public policy and whether the employer fired the employee for raising the concern.”

During oral argument, the Supreme Court was told that there was no authority supporting the appellate court’s holding that whistleblowing claims can exist even when the whistleblower did not share his or her concerns with a government agency or with management. Some of the justices’
questions indicated that they were skeptical of drawing a bright line for whistleblowing claims which would limit them to government agents or management. Rather, a suggestion was made that public policy might be better served if whistleblower claims were recognized when the concerns were shared with anyone with power to remedy an unsafe situation. The employer’s attorney suggested that such a rule could lead to whistleblower claims being brought when employees merely reported their concerns to co-workers or to their spouses. Questions then focused on whether the insurance auditor could have improved an allegedly unsafe condition such that public policy would be served by recognizing a whistleblower claim when the concerns are shared with an insurance company. Apparently, the trial court record had not been sufficiently developed on that point.

Insomniacs can watch the oral argument at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/videostream/archives/2008/

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.

Thursday, December 27, 2007

Ohio Supreme Court: Although Employers Still Cannot Retaliate, They Can Terminate Employees Receiving Workers’ Compensation for Other Reasons

On December 20, 2007, the Ohio Supreme Court “clarified” (although some may say partially reversed) its 2003 decision in Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141, 2003-Ohio-5357. The Court now holds that that “an employee who is terminated from employment while receiving workers’ compensation has no common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.90, which provides the exclusive remedy for employees claiming termination in violation of rights conferred by the Workers’ Compensation Act” and limits the Coolidge decision to teachers who are both receiving workers compensation and are covered by O.R.C. § 3319.16. Bickers v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2007-Ohio-6751.

In Bickers, the at-will plaintiff had not been provided with a light duty assignment and, instead, had been terminated while receiving temporary total disability payments as a result of a workers’ compensation injury. She did not file a claim for workers’ compensation retaliation under O.R.C. § 4123.90 (which has a short limitations period), but instead, filed a public policy wrongful discharge claim. In essence, she argued that even if she wasn’t fired in retaliation for seeking workers’ compensation, it violated the public policy of the state of Ohio to fire an employee while receiving workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court dismissed her claim, but the appellate court reversed. After all, the Ohio Supreme Court had previously held in the Coolidge syllabus that “[a]n employee who is receiving temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 may not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism or inability to work, when the absence or inability to work is directly related to an allowed condition.”

After acknowledging the receipt of much criticism for Coolidge, the Ohio Supreme Court now holds that the Coolidge decision involved only the narrow issue of just cause for terminating teachers (receiving workers compensation) under O.R.C. § 3319.16. Moreover, the workers’ compensation retaliation statute precludes the need for a common law remedy involving the termination of employees while receiving workers compensation. Therefore,”R.C. 4123.90 . . . provides the exclusive remedy for employees claiming termination in violation of rights conferred by the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Because O.R.C. § 4123.90 prohibits only retaliatory discharges, it is no longer unlawful for an employer to terminate a non-teaching employee for non-retaliatory reasons (such as inability to work or indefinite absence) even if the employee is receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/0/2007/2007-ohio-6751.pdf.



NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.