Showing posts with label school district. Show all posts
Showing posts with label school district. Show all posts

Monday, March 30, 2015

Ohio Supreme Court: No Abuse of Discretion to Order Disclosure of Names of Replacement Teachers Months After Strike Had Ended Without Evidence of Continuing Threats

Last week, a divided Ohio Supreme Court  ruled that, after a labor strike has ended, a public school must disclose as requested the names of replacement teachers hired during the strike. State ex rel. Quolke v. Strongsville City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2015-Ohio- 1083 (3/25/15).  However, the court acknowledged that the school may have been justified in withholding the names of the replacement teachers during the strike when there had been harassment, violence and threats of violence against the replacement teachers during the strike.  Nonetheless, the school was still ordered to pay the attorney fees of the successful plaintiff incurred in pursuing the mandamus action to obtain the records because the school still had not produced the records months after the strike ended and had not proven that the replacement teachers would suffer any harm from the delayed disclosure.   

According to the Court’s per curiam opinion, the replacement teachers suffered harassment, violence and threats of violence as a result of the teacher’s strike:   

·        On March 3, a crowd of 75 to 100 people outside the city council building (where the interviews and hiring was taking place) chanted, jeered, and cursed at the applicants as they entered and exited the building to apply for jobs. The crowd took pictures of applicants and screamed obscenities at one applicant who entered the building with her two small children.
·        During the strike, acts of harassment and intimidation aimed at the replacement teachers continued. Replacement teachers discovered notes left in classrooms containing offensive messages. Signs were distributed in neighborhoods where some replacement teachers lived identifying the teacher by name and disclosing his or her address. SEA posted a “wall of shame” on its website with the pictures of some replacement teachers; the posting was accompanied by derogatory and offensive comments. Picketers continued to harass and intimidate replacement teachers during the strike.
·        It was reported that a striking teacher was arrested by the Strongsville Police Department for reckless driving when he allegedly cut off a van transporting replacement teachers to work. The replacement teachers reported to the police that the other driver nearly caused a collision with the van. The replacement teachers described the incident as “harrowing” and “outrageous” and stated that they “feared the worst” and were “frightened.” 
·        A replacement teacher reported to the police that she was driving home after work when a car pulled up next to her and the passenger yelled “scab” and threw an object at her windshield, breaking the glass. 

The teachers’ union immediately requested the names of the replacement teachers and again a month later.  However, the school refused to produce them, citing a concern with their safety.  “In particular, the board asserted that the names of the replacement teachers were not considered public record because of the threat of harm to those teachers.”    The Supreme Court has previously recognized a “good sense” exception to the state public records law when releasing the names of certain employees (such as undercover police officers and children) would result in their harm. “The case law does establish a right to privacy in circumstances in which a person might be at substantial risk of serious bodily harm if personal information is disclosed. . . . . Some cases also indicate that even when imminent bodily harm is not threatened or a potential risk, disclosure is nevertheless precluded because of the potential for nonphysical harm.” 
 
Upon considering the case in August --  months after the strike had ended on April 28--  the appellate court concluded that the school had not proven that the replacement teachers still suffered any “threat of harm after the strike had ended.”  Concerns that that the replacement teachers would suffer retaliation for the remainder of their career was insufficient to make their names non-public.  

Although the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]here may have been a genuine threat to the replacement teachers’ physical well-being from supporters of the strike” and that the school board “reasonably” concluded that the disclosure during the strike could place the replacement teachers at “substantial risk of serious harm,”  it nonetheless affirmed the order to disclose the records in August (when the appellate court considered the mandamus lawsuit) because the school had “presented little or no evidence that once the strike was over, there was any remaining threat to the replacement teachers.”  Accordingly, the appellate court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the disclosure of the replacement teachers’ names.  The Court specifically rejected the school’s concern with a single threat that the replacement teachers would suffer retaliation that would follow them their entire careers.

 
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

Supreme Court: School Administrators Entitled to Board Hearing Upon Request Before Dismissal

This morning, a unanimous Ohio Supreme Court reversed two lower courts and held that “after an administrator has been informed that her contract will not be renewed, upon the administrator’s request for a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract, R.C. 3319.02(D)(4) requires the board to meet in executive session with the administrator to discuss the reasons for nonrenewal.” State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., No. 2012- Ohio-1484.

According to the Court’s opinion, the principal had been accused of wrongdoing by staff (whom she claimed were merely disgruntled) and placed on paid administrative leave in May 2007. In the meantime, however, based on an internal investigation, the Assistant Superintendent informed the principal in June 2007 that she would remain on administrative leave during the next academic year and he would be recommending that her contract not be renewed for 2008-09. When the principal had been informed in June 2007 of the Assistant Superintendent’s recommendation, she requested her hearing before the Board, but was never informed in advance of when the Board would be voting and was never given the opportunity to meet with the Board before the vote was taken. In her December 2007 and February 2008 performance evaluations, the Assistant Superintendent reiterated that he would be recommending that her contract not be renewed. The Board accepted the Assistant Superintendent’s recommendation in March 2008 without ever giving her notice of the agenda or meeting with the principal as she requested in June 2007. The State Department of Education ultimately found in November 2008 that nothing significant had been proved against the principal.

A mandamus action was filed with the common pleas court where the principal sought reinstatement. It granted summary judgment for the school, which was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court found that her June 2007 request was premature because it was months before her performance evaluations and before the Board was scheduled to meet to discuss and vote on the superintendent’s recommendation. The Supreme Court found that there was nothing in the statute which supported the lower court’s imposition of these burdens on a school administrator.

R.C. 3319.02(D)(4) states:


Before taking action to renew or nonrenew the contract of an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator under this section and prior to the last day of March of the year in which such employee’s contract expires, the board shall notify each such employee of the date that the contract expires and that the employee may request a meeting with the board. Upon request by such an employee, the board shall grant the employee a meeting in executive session. In that meeting, the board shall discuss its reasons for considering renewal or nonrenewal of the contract. The employee shall be permitted to have a representative, chosen by employee, present at the meeting.
Thereafter, R.C. 3319.02(D)(5) states:


Nothing in division (D) of this section shall prevent a board from making the final determination regarding the renewal or nonrenewal of the contract of any * * * administrator. However, if a board fails to provide evaluations pursuant to division (D)(2)(c)(i) or (ii) of this section, or if the board fails to provide at the request of the employee a meeting as prescribed in division (D)(4) of this section, the employee automatically shall be reemployed at the same salary plus any increments that may be authorized by the board for a period of one year, except that if the employee has been employed by the district or service center as an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator for three years or more, the period of reemployment shall be for two years.
. . . .
[N]othing in the language of the statute, which clearly contemplates the context of contract renewal, requires that the request for a meeting occur after the board makes a final evaluation and informs the administrator that the contract will not be renewed, and after the board gives the administrator notice of her right to request a hearing. Rather, R.C. 3319.02(D)(4) plainly and simply states that notice must be given “[b]efore taking action to renew or nonrenew the contract.” There is no temporal restriction that requires the request for a meeting to occur at any given time, and no proper basis from which to conclude that the request for a meeting may not be made until after final evaluation. Had the General Assembly intended for the request for a meeting to be dependent on any temporal specificity, it would have included that specificity in the statute itself, as it did in other sections of this statute.


The Court rejected the argument that an administrator could play games by always prematurely requesting a hearing the hope the School would forget because “R.C. 3319.02(D)(4) requires the board to meet in executive session with the administrator to discuss the reasons for nonrenewal only after an administrator has been informed that her contract will not be renewed, and only after being so informed may an administrator request a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Friday, August 28, 2009

Sixth Circuit: School Violated FMLA By Placing Employee on Involuntary, Unpaid Leave in Part Because FMLA Leave

On Wednesday, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment entered in favor of an Ohio school district employer on an employee’s FMLA claim. In Hunter v. Valley View Local Schools, No. 08-4109 (6th Cir. 8/26/09), the School District placed the employee on an involuntary and unpaid leave of absence for two years when she attempted to return to work with significant medical restrictions following an FMLA medical leave of absence. In doing so, the School’s superintendant testified that the decision was motivated both by the plaintiff’s excessive absenteeism (which consisted almost entirely of her FMLA medical leave of absence) and medical restrictions placed by the employee’s physician. The plaintiff brought suit in state court alleging violations of the FMLA and Ohio’s disability discrimination statute. The district court in Dayton found that the employer would have treated the plaintiff the same regardless of her FMLA leave, granted summary judgment to the school on the FMLA claim and refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state law disability discrimination claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that that the school employer illegally discriminated against the plaintiff in violation of the FMLA by placing her on involuntary and unpaid leave in part because of her protected use of the FMLA.

As noted by the Sixth Circuit: “An employer may not discriminate or retaliate against an employee for taking FMLA leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). In particular, an employer is prohibited from “us[ing] the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) . . . . Employers who violate the FMLA are liable to the employee for damages. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) . . . There are two theories of recovery under the FMLA: an interference (or entitlement) theory and a retaliation (or discrimination) theory.” Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348-49 (2009), the Court determined that Title VII’s burden-shifting approached remained applicable to mixed-motive FMLA retaliation claims.

Further, the Court recognized that FMLA regulations prohibit employers from taking FMLA leave into account when making adverse employment decisions: “employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions; nor can FMLA leave be counted under “no fault” attendance policies.29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (emphasis added). . . . . The phrase ‘a negative factor’ envisions that the challenged employment decision might also rest on other, permissible factors.”

The school superintendent’s testimony that she considered the plaintiff’s FMLA absences as a negative factor in placing her on an involuntary and unpaid leave of absence was found to constitute direct evidence of impermissible motive because employers are not permitted under FMLA regulations to use FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment decisions. Further, when the superintendent denied that she would have placed the plaintiff on unpaid leave solely because of her medical restrictions – which might have created an issue of disability discrimination and unlawful failure to accommodate -- the court had no difficulty in finding the illegal consideration of FMLA leave was a motivating factor.

Insomniacs may read the full opinion at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0311p-06.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.