En Banc Sixth Circuit Upholds Regular Attendance and Physical Presence Requirement and Rejects EEOC’s Telecommuting Accommodation Under ADA

On Friday, a divided en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment in an ADA case where the employee sought permission to work from home on an as needed basis as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.  EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., No. 12-2484 (6^th Cir. 4-10-15).  In doing so, the Court rejected an earlier 2014 decision by a divided Sixth Circuit panel (which was reported here) that had granted summary judgment to the EEOC and found that physical attendance at a job site was no longer generally an essential job function.  The Court found that while the ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations, “it does not endow all disabled persons with a job—or job schedule—of their choosing.”  Relying on prior case law, ADA regulations, EEOC informal guidance, and common sense, the Court concluded that “[r]egular, in-person attendance is an essential function—and a prerequisite to essential functions—of most jobs, especially the interactive ones.”  Moreover, the Court found that an employer need not engage in the interactive ADA accommodation process when the employee is unqualified for the job.  The Court also rejected the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim in very strong language.  Five judges dissented. 

Background.  According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff’s job required her to regularly meet face-to-face with other company employees, although she could communicate on some issues by telephone and email.  However, her position required her to work in the same building as certain other jobs so that they could meet “on a moment’s notice” when needed, which the employer found to be the most effective form of communication for that position.  Hired six years earlier, the plaintiff performed very well her first few years, but her performance evaluations steadily declined beginning in the fourth year until in 2009, she was not meeting the basic functions of her position.  She was informed that she” lacked interpersonal skills, delivered work late, didn’t show a concern for quality, and failed to properly communicate with the suppliers. She again ranked in the bottom 10% of her peers.”  In 2008, she missed 1.5 days/week and in 2009, she was absent more than she was present. “And when she didn’t miss work, she would often come in late and leave early.”  As is typical in these situations, everyone around her was frustrated: 

When she missed work, her teammates had to pick up the slack, including by taking on the functions that [the Plaintiff] could not perform at home. Her supervisors also had to assume her job responsibilities. Her absences caused the resale-buyer team “stress and frustration,”  . . .  further compounded [her] mistakes, and frustrated suppliers.

The Plaintiff’s chronic irritable bowel syndrome contributed to this situation since she could suffer an uncontrollable episode at work or while driving (an hour each way) to and from work.  The employer attempted to help her on several occasions.   Her first supervisor adjusted her work schedule to 4 ten-hour days and allowed her to telecommute on a trial basis as needed for two months.   However, the Plaintiff was unable to establish regular and predictable attendance and perform the core functions of her job.  A new supervisor also attempted another trial telecommuting experiment, which also failed.   Nonetheless, the Plaintiff sought to telecommute four days/week, which had been permitted for other positions at the Company.  However, the Company only permitted her co-workers to telecommute one day each week, not four as requested by the Plaintiff.  When reviewing her core job responsibilities with her while considering her telecommuting request, the Plaintiff

admitted that she could not perform four of the [ten tasks] from home, including meetings with suppliers, making price quotes to stampers, and attending some required internal meetings. [She] added, however, that she did not envision needing to stay home four days per week, only that she wanted the freedom of “up to 4 days.”

Her request was rejected on the grounds that four of the ten tasks could not be performed at all from home, four other tasks could not be performed effectively from home and the remaining two tasks were not significant enough to support telecommuting.  Although the employer rejected that specific accommodation request, it offered other accommodations, including placing her office closer to a restroom or transferring her into a job which would allow her to telecommute.   She rejected those offered accommodations, failed to identify any other potential solutions, and filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC.

The Plaintiff’s job performance did not improve and she again ranked in the bottom 10% of her peers for the second year in a row. Although she claimed the evaluation was retaliatory, she did not elaborate and was placed on a performance improvement plan.  After she still failed to complete tasks completely or on time during the plan period, she was terminated.  She filed a retaliation Charge and this litigation ensued two years later.

ADA Reasonable Accommodation Claim.  In affirming the employer’s summary judgment, the Court reviewed some basic ADA requirements.  Although an employer is required to provide a reasonable accommodation (which can include job restructuring or modified work schedules), an employer is not required to remove essential job functions.  “[T]hat is per se unreasonable.”  In addition, “the essential-job-function inquiry does not require employers to lower their standards by altering a job’s essential functions.”  Moreover, “[t]he employee bears the burden of proposing an accommodation that will permit her to effectively perform the essential functions of her job.”  

In this case, the Court agreed that “regular and predictable on-site job attendance [is] an essential function.”  The Court observed that most courts have “establish[ed] a general rule that, with few exceptions, “an employee who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise. . . . And for good reason: ‘most jobs require the kind of teamwork, personal interaction, and supervision that simply cannot be had in a home office situation.’”  The Court also cited and analyzed the EEOC’s ADA regulations governing essential job functions and found that they supported this conclusion.  

To guide the essential-function inquiry, the regulations speak in factors—seven of them.  . . . In many jobs, especially the interactive ones, all seven point toward finding regular and predictable on-site attendance essential. Take the amount of time performing that function, for example, § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii): Most of one’s work time is spent at work, and many interactive functions simply cannot be performed off site. Or take the consequences of failing to show up for work, § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv): They can be severe.  . . . Ditto for the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, § 1630.2(n)(3)(v): They certainly won’t typically exempt regular attendance. Other employees’ work practices are no different, § 1630.2(n)(3)(vi)–(vii): Other employees usually attend work at the worksite. And  so on, such that most jobs would be fundamentally altered if regular and predictable on-site attendance is removed.

The Court also rejected the EEOC’s argument that permitting any telecommuting by a co-worker meant that the employer had to grant unlimited and unpredictable telecommuting to the Plaintiff:

In addition to being legally and factually unsupported, the EEOC’s view here would cause practical harm to private employers. The ADA encourages—indeed, requires—employers to make reasonable accommodations for its employees, including allowing telecommuting under the proper circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). But if the EEOC’s position carries the day, once an employer allows one person the ability to telecommute on a limited basis, it must allow all people with a disability the right to telecommute on an unpredictable basis up to 80% of the week (or else face trial). That’s 180-degrees backward. It encourages—indeed, requires—employers to shut down predictable and limited telecommuting  as an accommodation for any employee. A “good deed would effectively ratchet up liability,” which “would undermine Congress’ stated purpose of eradicating discrimination against disabled persons.”  . . . The practical effect? Companies would  tighten telecommuting policies to avoid liability, and countless employees who benefit from currently generous telecommuting policies would suffer. A protective tool becomes a weapon if used unwisely; and telecommuting should not become a weapon.

The Court also rejected the EEOC’s “charm[ing]” argument that it was “self-evident” that technological advances had removed the requirement of physical presence at the workplace.  While this may be true of some jobs, the evidence in this case did not show that.

But technology changing in the abstract is not technology changing on this record.  . . .And no record evidence—none—shows that a great technological shift has made this highly interactive job one that can be effectively performed at home.

The technologies used by the employer were the same technologies available when other courts still found physical presence to typically be an essential job function for most jobs.  “These technologies—email, computers, telephone, and limited video conferencing—were equally available when courts around the country uniformly held that on-site attendance is essential for interactive jobs.” 

ADA Interactive Process.  The Court made some surprising observations about the interactive process.   

Our conclusion that [the Plaintiff] was unqualified for her position makes it unnecessary to consider whether [the employer] showed bad faith in the discussions to work out a reasonable accommodation while [she] was still employed. Even if [the employer] did not put sufficient effort into the “interactive process” of finding an accommodation, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3), “that failure is actionable only if it prevents identification of an appropriate accommodation for a qualified individual.”  . . .Courts thus need not consider this form of nonindependent liability “if the employee fails to present evidence sufficient to reach the jury on the question of whether she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with an accommodation.”  . . . It suffices here to hold that any failure by [the employer] does not create liability because, as we just concluded, the EEOC did not produce such evidence.

In any event, the employer did engage in the interactive process by suggesting and experimenting with multiple possible accommodations.

Summary Judgment Issues.  The Court also made some notable conclusions about burdens of proof at the summary judgment stage.   For starters, the Court made the employee’s opinion testimony about her own essential job functions practically irrelevant.

An employee’s unsupported testimony that she could perform her job functions from home does not preclude summary judgment, for it does not create a genuine dispute of fact. Neither the statute nor regulations nor EEOC guidance instructs courts to credit the employee’s opinion about what functions are essential. That’s because we do not “allow employees to define the essential functions of their positions based solely on their personal viewpoint and experience.” Mason, 357 F.3d at 1122. And for good reason: If we did, every failure-to-accommodate claim involving essential functions would go to trial because all employees who request their employer to exempt an essential function think they can work without that essential function.

In any event, the Plaintiff’s testimony did not save her case because she still admitted that she could not perform four of her essential job functions from home, did not testify that she could “the vast majority of” job functions as effectively from home as from the work site.  Because the employer is not required to lower its production standards as an accommodation and the past telecommuting experiences with the Plaintiff had shown that this accommodation would not work, the Plaintiff’s testimony was rejected by the Court.  

The Court also rejected the Plaintiff’s testimony about her subjective impression of regular meetings with her supervisor about her poor attendance.  

We “look at the facts as they appear to the person making the decision to terminate [the employee],” not at “the employee’s subjective [beliefs].”  . . .Harris’s unexpressed “subjective skepticism regarding the truth of” whether [her supervisor] was actually trying to help her does not alone “raise a triable issue as to pretext.”  . . .Plus, these kinds of meetings do “not constitute harassment simply because they cause the employee distress.”

In contrast with the Plaintiff’s biased testimony, evidence about the telecommuting schedules of plaintiff’s co-workers was relevant under the ADA regulations and as evidence of the employer’s judgment.  However, it was not helpful to the Plaintiff because telecommuting had only been permitted by strong performers one set day each week with the understanding that those co-workers still had to come to work when needed.  

None of this is to say that whatever the employer says is essential necessarily becomes essential.  . . . Suppose, for instance, that a fire department regularly allows certain firefighters to refrain from driving fire trucks. But then the department denies the same accommodation to a firefighter with a known disability that prevents her from driving the trucks. A genuine fact issue might exist as to whether driving a fire truck is actually essential—it is contradicted by materially similar job practices.  . . .Our ruling does not, in other words, require blind deference to the employer’s stated judgment. But it does require granting summary judgment where an employer’s judgment as to essential job functions—evidenced by the employer’s words,  policies, and practices and taking into account all relevant factors—is “job-related, uniformly-enforced, and consistent with business necessity.”

Retaliation Claim.  The Court also rejected the EEOC’s retaliation claim. "Discrimination here means retaliation—that “but for” an employee’s statutorily protected activity the employer would not have taken the “adverse employment action.”  In this case, the EEOC could not show that the employer’s explanation for terminating the Plaintiff’s employment – her back-to-back poor performance evaluations and failure to satisfy her performance improvement plan – was pretextual. 

No reasonable jury could find that Ford terminated Harris for a reason other than poor performance. Harris’s performance and interpersonal issues have been well documented. The EEOC indeed admits they existed. Suffice it here to say that, among other problems, Harris failed to update spreadsheets, complete her paperwork, schedule her training sessions, price items correctly, and finish her work on time. Her performance issues  are why she ranked in the bottom 10% of her peer group before she made her charge.

Granted, the Court agreed with the EEOC that the timing of the Plaintiff’s termination seemed suspicious – coming a mere four months after she filed her Charge.  “But while this ‘gives us pause,’ ‘temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis for finding pretext.’”    

The Court rejected the argument that the Plaintiff’s supervisor harassed her about her attendance because her subjective distress about the meetings was not reasonable and, more importantly, her supervisor played no role in the decision to terminate her employment.  He was on vacation when she was terminated and was never consulted on the matter.  

The Court also agreed that it seemed suspicious that the first time the Plaintiff received a “lower achiever” performance rating was only a few months  after she filed her Charge when, in the past, she had always received at least an “excellent plus” rating.   However, this was adequately explained as a mere change in terminology that took place in all performance evaluations in 2009 and that her percentile ranking – bottom 10% -- had not changed in two years.  

At first glance, this looks bad for Ford. Harris received her first “lower achiever” rating post-charge, and she received only “excellent plus” ratings before her charge. The EEOC stops there. But digging deeper—and looking at the whole record—reveals two reasons why no reasonable jury could find this low rating proof of pretext. For one, 2009 was the only year that Harris could have received the lower-achiever rating. Ford overhauled its ratings system that year for all employees, ditching the default “excellent plus” category (which 80% of workers received) in favor of a more accurate description of a worker’s performance. In Harris’s case, that meant “lower achiever”—the first and only time she could receive that rating. For two, the change in name did not change Harris’s low numerical ranking. In her only performance review after the charge, she ranked in the same percentile range as she did immediately before the charge: the bottom 10%. That’s not evidence of retaliation; that’s just poor performance—both before and after the charge.

Finally, the Court rejected the Plaintiff’s speculative testimony that she was set up to fail in her performance improvement plan.   

The record shows that Harris failed two prior plans to improve her performance and attendance, similar to this one—and both before she filed her charge. The record also shows that Harris failed to achieve any of the objectives identified in post-charge plan, . . .—not just the objective the EEOC says is evidence of retaliation (eliminating her backlog of paperwork, see Dissent Op. at 38–39.). And the record shows that Ford used similar performance-enhancing plans for other employees who, like Harris, performed poorly.  . . . Harris’s testimony thus fails to create a genuine dispute of fact because it is “so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury” could believe it.

In any event, the Court also concluded that the EEOC failed to prove ‘but-for” causation as part of the prima facie burden of proof – i.e., that the Plaintiff would not have been fired but for filing her Charge of Discrimination.

In addition to Harris’s past failings, she admitted that she would not be able to attend work on-site in a regular and predictable manner in the future. And this attendance was an essential element of her job. No reasonable jury could find that Ford—a for-profit corporation— would continue to pay an employee who failed to do her job well in the past, and who, by her own admission, could not perform the essential elements of her job in the  future. The EEOC thus cannot demonstrate that Harris’s charge was the but-for cause of Ford’s decision to fire her, which means that Ford was entitled to summary judgment for that reason as well.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Retaliation Claims Even Though Supervisor Terminated Plaintiff In Part for Disloyalty for Threatening to Sue Him

Last Thursday, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for a Central Ohio employer on retaliation claims brought under the FMLA and state law based on complaints of gender discrimination and attendance management practices.   Fields v. Fairfield County Bd. Of Develop. Disabilities, No. 12-3005 (6^th Cir. 12/6/12). In that case, the plaintiff complained about men being promoted more often and held to a lower behavioral standard than female employees, like her.  She also complained about a new attendance management practice whereby the employer notified employees about their absenteeism.  Her employer reacted unfavorably to both of her complaints, which helped her to prove a prima facie case of retaliation.  However, she failed to discuss, let alone rebut, the employer’s other concerns with unprotected issues of poor performance.  Therefore, the Court ultimately found that she failed to prove that her termination was the result of her protected activities instead of the uncontested incidents of poor performance.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was unhappy with a number of facets in her employment.  First, when questions were raised about her supervision of the office receptionist, those concerns were investigated and the duty was removed from her based, in part, on her tone of voice with the receptionist.  However, the new male supervisor was similarly disrespectful to the receptionist (who apparently had some significant performance issues), but was never investigated or addressed. This incident adversely affected her relationship with her supervisor and she was subsequently disciplined for unrelated performance problems involving neglect of her direct duties.  After being bypassed for a potential promotion, she complained to a co-worker about hearing the decisionmaker wanted a male.  She also complained to this co-worker about age discrimination when a disrespectful younger employee received a raise.   She then sought and obtained information about filing a Charge of Discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.  Her supervisor and HR Director heard about her concerns.  He began reviewing all of her emails and HR requested the decisionmaker to document all interactions with her.

The employer attempted to address an attendance problem at the agency.  Excepting FMLA leave, employees were notified when they utilized a certain amount of sick leave each year.  If they received three or more such notices, they could face disciplinary action.  The plaintiff objected to receiving these notices, even though she was told her notices were not disciplinary in nature.  She also apparently filed attendance reports given to other employees in the disciplinary action section of their personnel files and advised them that they constituted disciplinary actions.

The plaintiff’s neglect of her job duties continued and she failed to perform several tasks in a timely manner and disclosed embarrassing information about her supervisor when she was confronted.  Accordingly, she was placed on administrative leave and told that her contract would not be renewed.  She simultaneously received a performance evaluation which discussed her neglect, indiscretions about him and other employees, her repeated and willful miscommunications to co-workers about the attendance management policy, her stubborn insistence on treating attendance notices as disciplinary infractions when she filed attendance notices in employee personnel files (which caused problems for at least one employee while under investigation) and the lack of trust between him and her.   In particular, he objected to her loyalty after hearing that she planned to sue him and the Board for harassment. As stated by the Court:

As to the second point, [the supervisor] claimed to question [the plaintiff’s] “confidentiality and loyalty” in part because “[s]he has been heard to communicate to other staff that she is suing the Board and me for ‘harassment.’”

The Court easily dismissed her FMLA retaliation claim.   She received more than the FMLA leave she had been entitled to and her stubborn insistence on mischaracterizing the agency’s attendance management policy did not constitute protected conduct. Nonetheless, even assuming that she could prove a prima facie case, she could not show that her supervisor’s concern with her performance problems was insufficient to justify her termination.

The Court, however, found that her complaints about being bypassed for a promotion and being held to a higher standard constituted protected conduct even if they were discussed with a co-worker. “[A]n employee may complain about discrimination to anyone.”  The employer did not complain that her complaints were unreasonable, and thus, unprotected.  Her supervisor and HR found out about her complaints within days and took adverse action against her.  Her supervisor specially stated that her threat to sue him was a basis for his distrust of her. “Because lack of trust was one basis for refusing to renew [the plaintiff’s] contract, a causal connection between the two exists.”

 

[A] reasonable inference from the timing is that [his] concern regarding [the plaintiff’s] trustworthiness increased after e-mail monitoring revealed that [she] complained of gender discrimination. Importantly, the day after [she] sent the e-mail complaining about discrimination, [HR] “heard through the grapevine” that [she] might sue the Board for discrimination and asked [another supervisor] to document his interactions with [the plaintiff]. The timing of these actions, coupled with [her supervisor’s] statement in the performance evaluation, is sufficient to establish a causal connection.

While there was some evidence to support an argument that the employer’s explanation for termination was pretextual, the plaintiff surprisingly failed on appeal to address entirely the issue of her job performance.  Therefore, those issues were deemed to be undisputed.

[A]t this final stage, [the plaintiff] must show pretext. Instead, she ignores the legitimate reasons offered concerning her job performance and fails to demonstrate that they were not the true reason for the employment decision, but rather a pretext for discrimination. Though [she] offered evidence that satisfies the causal connection step of her prima facie case, that evidence is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact that the job performance reasons offered by the Board are pretext for discrimination. [She] failed to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Board’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Ohio Appeals Court: Unemployment Compensation Was Properly Denied When Employee Could Not Satisfactorily Perform Difficult Job.

The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of unemployment compensation to an employee who failed to successfully complete his 9-month probationary period and attributed this to unreasonable job expectations and lack of sufficient job training. Lyons v. Director, Ohio Job and Family Services, 2008-Ohio-3547 (7/17/08). Although the employee was successful in his first three months and received a 10% raise, his performance was severely criticized thereafter and, like half of the employees who started work with him, was terminated for poor performance. The employee blamed the lack of adequate job training and unreasonable job expectations, but the court found that “[u]nsuitability [for employment] may be found where the requirements of the job are extremely stringent.”

By way of background, the employee was hired as a research analyst by a medical market research firm. His duties included conducting “epidemiology research and examining various products and their comparative differences.” The employer contended that it provided intensive training for the first three weeks, including showing “him company guidelines, protocols and worksheets but, according to [his supervisor], training was on-going.” In contrast, the employee testified that his training only lasted a few days. In any event, after his first three-month probationary evaluation, he scored well and received a 10% raise. However, his next three-month evaluation was negative and, despite being given additional time to improve, he was terminated after insufficient improvement was observed. In particular, “his analysis was not sufficiently detailed and he did not request guidance.” As evidence, emails from his supervisor’s boss were produced during the administrative hearing showing pre-existing criticism of his “work for lack of depth and content.”

His supervisor “acknowledged that, of the four people who were hired with him, only two are still with [the firm]. She also noted that [the employee] was frequently tardy but she could not say whether this interfered with his ability to perform the work. Rather, it seemed to show a loss of interest in the job. . . . . Finally, she explained that the job is extremely challenging, the company only hires "way above average workers" and it is difficult for the company to find appropriate employees. Extremely talented individuals, including a doctor, have had difficulty holding the position.” Indeed, the employee himself testified about preparing numerous drafts of reports which never met management’s expectations.

The court found that “[u]nsuitability for a position constitutes fault sufficient to support a just cause [for termination] determination.” Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the court noted that an “employer may properly find an employee unsuitable for the required work, and thus to be at fault, when: (1) the employee does not perform the required work, (2) the employer made known its expectations of the employee at the time of hiring, (3) the expectations were reasonable, and (4) the requirements of the job did not change since the date of the original hiring for that particular position.” The primary issue of contention in evaluating the employee’s entitlement to unemployment compensation was whether the employer’s job expectations were reasonable.

“The evidence demonstrated that the position is extremely challenging. It is undisputed that the company only hires "way above average workers" and it is difficult for the company to find appropriate employees. Extremely talented individuals including a doctor have had difficulty holding the position. Only two of the four people hired with [the employee] were still employed at [by the employer] at the time of the hearing. Moreover, the evidence demonstrated that the employee, although the claimant is extremely intelligent and well-educated, could not complete many of the assignments to the employer's satisfaction. The stringent job requirements do not bar the determination of unsuitability. . . . In addition, the employer's expectations were made known to [the employee] at the time he was hired, the expectations, though high, are reasonable in light of the nature of the position and the requirements of the job did not change.”

Although the employee argued that the job expectations were unreasonable in light of the amount of job training provided, the court disagreed because the employee “held the position for approximately eight months, his work was critiqued in a detailed way and personnel was available to answer questions.” In other words, permitting a suitable time for on-the-job learning, providing formal feedback and having personnel available for questions is sufficient job training.

Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/8/2008/2008-ohio-3547.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.