Showing posts with label workers compensation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label workers compensation. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 8, 2023

Ohio Excludes Workers Compensation Coverage from Most Injuries While Working From Home

 In the better late than never category, the General Assembly amended the workers compensation statute, Ohio Revised Code §4123.01(C), to specifically exclude injuries suffered by employees who are working from home unless three factors are met, including a “special hazard.”   Effective, September 22, 2022, the new language from House Bill 447 provides in relevant part that:

(C) "Injury" includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. "Injury" does not include:

 . . .

(4) Injury or disability sustained by an employee who performs the employee's duties in a work area that is located within the employee's home and that is separate and distinct from the location of the employer, unless all of the following apply:

(a) The employee's injury or disability arises out of the employee's employment.

(b) The employee's injury or disability was caused by a special hazard of the employee's employment activity.

(c) The employee's injury or disability is sustained in the course of an activity undertaken by the employee for the exclusive benefit of the employer.

(emphasis added).  

Friday, June 11, 2010

Ohio Supreme Court Gives Employers Another Reason to Ban Moonlighting


There are several reasons why employers ban employees from holding second jobs. Some do it because the second job robs the employee of rest and vitality and creates potential scheduling conflicts. Others do it because the employee may decide to take FMLA from their "hard" job while continuing to work their "easy" job. Others do it to discourage union activities or "salters" from taking a job in order to organize their co-workers. However, a significant reason to prohibit employees from taking a second job is that the employer could become liable for paying the wages for that second job if the employee gets injured at your workplace and is unable to work either job. This is not a new concept, but it is a rule that the Ohio Supreme Court confirmed this week. State ex rel. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio- 2451. In that decision, the Court found that the Industrial Commission did not err in including the claimant's wages from his second job in his average weekly wage for purposes of his temporary total disability claim.




According to the Court decision, the claimant "began working part-time for appellant FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., in 2004. [He] generally made between $190 and $250 per week. In April 2006, [he] took a second job with Integrated Pest Control that paid considerably more than the job at FedEx. [He] was also operating a side business, Affordable Animal Removal, concurrently with the other two jobs." After he was injured at work, FedEx, a self-insured employer, set his average weekly wage and full weekly wage based solely on the wages he earned at FedEx. The Claimant appealed on the grounds that his wages from his second, higher-paying job also should have been considered. The district hearing officer agreed that special circumstances applied based on Ohio Revised Code § 4123.61, which provides in relevant part that:





The average weekly wage of an injured employee at the time of the injury or at the time disability due to the occupational disease begins is the basis upon which to compute benefits.



In cases of temporary total disability the compensation for the first twelve weeks for which compensation is payable shall be based on the full weekly wage of the claimant at the time of the injury or at the time of the disability due to occupational disease begins; when a factory, mine, or other place of employment is working short time in order to divide work among the employees, the bureau of workers' compensation shall take that fact into consideration when determining the wage for the first twelve weeks of temporary total disability.



Compensation for all further temporary total disability shall be based as provided for permanent disability claims.



. . . . .



In cases where there are special circumstances under which the average weekly wage cannot justly be determined by applying this section, the administrator of workers' compensation, in determining the average weekly wage in such cases, shall use such method as will enable the administrator to do substantial justice to the claimants, provided that the administrator shall not recalculate the claimant's average weekly wage for awards for permanent total disability solely for the reason that the claimant continued working and the claimant's wages increased following the injury.




The decision was affirmed on appeal and the employer filed suit. The Industrial Commission argued that the regular AWW benefit included wages from a second job even without special circumstances. In addition to the unfairness, FedEx argued "that inclusion of wages from other, concurrent employment discourages claimants from continuing to work at the second job if they are medically able." The Court disagreed.




"R.C. 4123.61 refers to wages earned in the year prior to injury without qualification or exclusion." Indeed, R.C. 4123.61 . . . specifically states that the AWW includes wages for the year preceding injury without qualification or exclusion." Moreover, the Court did not believe that it was unfair because "if a claimant is so severely hurt at one job as to disable him or her from both, it is not unfair to compensate the individual for that cumulative loss. Second, the inclusion of two sets of wages was not considered unfair by the General Assembly when it promulgated R.C. 4123.61." Finally, the Court found the Industrial Commission's calculation of benefits to be within its expertise and discretion.




NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, April 22, 2010

Ohio Courts: When Commuting to and From Work Arises Out of Employment

There have been a number of decisions over the last month which addressed whether an employer was liable for injuries to or caused by an employee while the employee was arguably off duty and even off the employer's premises. Therefore, it seemed to be a good time to review when an employer can find itself in legal trouble because of an employee who was not even at work at the time of the incident.

In the first case, a municipal housing inspector slipped and fell on the ice in a restaurant parking lot while he was walking back to his car following his daily, paid rest/coffee break to complete his trip from his office to a home which he had planned to inspect. Miller v. Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 2010-Ohio-1347. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the grounds that the coming-and-going rule precluded coverage for an employee with a fixed site of employment who was coming or going from work. The employee argued that he was still on duty at the time of the accident – albeit on a paid coffee break. The Court of Appeals agreed that while the coming-and-going rule might bar coverage for a similar accident during an unpaid lunch break, it might not bar coverage for paid rest breaks:

However, the same is not true of coffee breaks and other breaks taken for the employee's personal comfort, even when the employee is injured while off of the employer's work premises. . . . Unlike the unpaid lunch break, it is generally accepted that although an employee is not technically performing his work duties during a break, taking a break for personal comfort is deemed to be incidental to the employment and therefore in the course of and arising out of the employment. . . . Thus, in examining whether an off-premises break arises out of and in the course of the employment, the issue cannot be resolved solely through the mere determination of the fixed status of the employment and automatic application of the coming and going rule. The court must inquire into the specific circumstances of the injury to determine work-connectedness. Such factors could include the time of the break, whether the break is a right fixed by the employment contract, whether it is a paid break, whether there are any restrictions as to where the employee can take the break, and whether the employee's activity during the break constituted a
substantial personal deviation.

In addition, the court found that the injury occurred in the course of his employment because he "was required to leave his office building in order to satisfy the duties of his employment. Further, consistent with his employment contract, he was entitled to take a fifteen-minute coffee break at a time and location of his choosing. [He] then sustained an injury at a time when he was engaged in the permissible activities of employment. The risk of his injury was a risk inherently related to the nature of his employment and he would not have sustained the injury had he not been required to leave the office in order to satisfy his work duties." Further, the court found that the accident took place in proximity to his regular place of employment because: he "was at a place he could reasonably be expected to be at the time of injury in light of his employment duties and given that he had not deviated from his employment to engage in some activity of a purely personal nature. In addition, he was at a location that was reasonable in light of the location of the inspection site." The court also found that the employer had some degree of control over the employee because it "had control over the time and place where [he] could take his break and elected not to place any restriction upon [him]." Finally, in a mind-twisting move, the court found that the employer benefitted from the employee's rest break in that the employee would then feel renewed and re-energized to continue working.

Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the employer's summary judgment and directed entry of judgment in favor of the employee.

In the second case, Sammetinger v. Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 2010-Ohio-1500, a construction manager was injured in a single car accident when driving home after his regular shift when his son (a fellow employee) fell asleep while driving the company truck issued to the father/manager. The manager commuted to the Powell worksite from his home in Wapakoneta each day in a truck assigned to him by his employer. However, as a manager, his duties were not limited to the construction shift. He often stayed after work to conduct inventory and frequently ran errands in the company issued truck during and after the construction shift. These errands included picking up gasoline and ice for the crew during his commute and taking home company tools to be stored safely in his garage each night. He also frequently fielded cell phone calls while he was commuting to and from work. On the evening of the accident, he was too tired to drive home and asked his son – a fellow employee – to drive instead. Apparently, the son was sleepy as well, fell asleep during the drive and the father/manager was severely injured.

The father/manager brought, among other things, a claim for workers compensation benefits against his employer and sued the employer's insurance company under the UM/UIM portion of the employer's insurance policy (since their son had been driving a company-owned vehicle). The employer denied that the father/manager had been injured in the course of his employment and, thus, would not be covered by workers compensation. The son argued that he was immune from suit as a fellow employee under the workers' compensation statute. The trial court found that the father/manager's injuries were covered by workers' compensation because he was injured in the scope of his employment, and granted summary judgment to the son on the UM/UIM claim because he was a fellow employee.

To be covered by workers' compensation, the injury must occur in the course of and arise out of the employee's employment.

The phrase "in the course of employment" limits compensable injuries to those sustained by an employee while performing a required duty in the employer's service. "To be entitled to workmen's compensation, a workman need not necessarily be injured in the actual performance of work for his employer." An injury is compensable if it is sustained by an employee while that employee engages in activity that is consistent with the contract for hire and logically related to the employer's business. . . . .

Generally, "an employee with a fixed place of employment, who is injured while traveling to and from the place of employment, is not entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Fund because the requisite causal connection between injury and the employment does not exist." MTD Products, Inc. v. Robatin (1991), 61 Ohio.St.3d 66, 68, 572 N.E.2d 661, citing Bralley, supra. However, there are exceptions to the general rule barring compensation when the injury occurs while the employee is "coming and going" to and from his place of employment: if the injury occurs in the "zone of employment;" if it was a result of a "special hazard" of the employment; or if, based upon the totality of the circumstances, there is a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the employment to warrant compensation. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has long recognized that exceptions exist to the requirement that the injury must be suffered at or near the place of employment or within the zone of employment:

(1) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment; * * * and (3) where the employee is charged while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home with some duty in connection with his employment.

In this case, the parties agreed that the father/manager had a fixed site of employment. Nonetheless, the court found that "he was acting for the benefit of his employer when he was injured and thus entitled to workers' compensation given the totality of the circumstances surrounding his injuries." The Court was particularly influenced by the amount of post-shift activities and the fact the employer had never prohibited post-shift work:

[The father/manager] closed down the masonry work on the high school and loaded up the pick-up truck that was assigned to him by [the employer] with tools and equipment belonging to [the employer] for transport to and safe-keeping in [the father/manager]'s garage at home. Every day on his way home, he stopped for gas, which was needed to operate a number of tools for the construction . . . the following day. He also stopped to purchase ice for the following day because fresh ice was required by contract to be provided by [the employer] to the workers at the site every day. [The father/manager] also refueled his work truck every other day because the truck was needed to provide him with transportation to and from the site, to provide ransportation for other workers who may have needed a ride, and to deliver [the father/manager]'s paperwork to [his boss] in Lima once a week. The truck was also assigned to [the father/manager] for use on errands such as picking up equipment from other [the employer]' job sites to be used at the high school or to make a run to a local hardware store during the day, and to transport the water containers and ice to and from the job site every day. The ice and gas purchases, which always occurred either in Russells Point or Wapakoneta, were made with a credit card provided by [the employer]

{¶31} Once he was home, [the father/manager] parked the truck in his garage in order to protect the tools and equipment in the truck from theft because a fair amount of tools had been stolen from the job site. In addition, [the father/manager] occasionally performed small repairs and maintenance on some of these tools and pieces of equipment at his home. He also cleaned the water containers and re-filled them at his home because the contract required [the employer] to supply fresh water to the workers every day. Often times, he had a significant amount of paperwork with him to complete because he was unable to finish it during the day because his attention was needed in some other function of his job. Therefore, he would complete this paperwork at home.

{¶32} Throughout the day, beginning at approximately 5:00 a.m. and continuing until approximately 10:00 p.m., [the father/manager] received phone calls on his employer-provided cellular phone. As previously noted, these calls were for a variety of work-related issues. Often times these calls occurred in the morning while [the father/manager] was going to the job site or during the afternoon while he was coming home from the job site. He also received work-related calls at his home.

{¶33} Indisputably, with the exception of an occasional call from his wife, all of these actions by [the father/manager] were directly for the benefit of his employer . . . While the location where [the father/manager] bought the ice and gas was of his own choosing, stopping to purchase these items, bringing home the containers to clean them and fill them with fresh water, transporting the tools and equipment for safekeeping, completing his paperwork for timely delivery to [his boss] every week, and receiving and making phone calls whenever and wherever, were all performed solely for [the employer]' benefit and in an effort to further its best interests. In fact, [the father/manager] summarized it best in his deposition: "My scope of employment doesn't end at 3:30 and doesn't start at 7 o'clock. There are responsibilities that go with my position that I can't control that need to be done, and I'm good at what I do, therefore I do it." Once again, [the employer] presented no evidence to contradict this statement by
[the father/manager] or any of the foregoing evidence regarding the work-related use of the company truck by [the father/manager].

{¶34} [The employer] also presented no evidence to demonstrate that [the father/manager]'s off-site activities were prohibited by it or that [the father/manager] was ever instructed to complete his tasks in a different manner. Although the credit card receipts would have shown that the gasoline and ice were being purchased at a location over fifty miles away from the job site, as well as the undoubtedly high amount of gasoline that was being purchased to drive the truck from Wapakoneta to the high school and back every day, the record is devoid of any evidence that [the employer] told [the father/manager] to purchase these items closer to the job site and not to use its truck and gasoline for daily transportation to and from his home. To the contrary, [the employer], at a minimum, acquiesced to [the father/manager] making these purchases far from the job site and to using the truck for his daily commute.

{¶35} Further, there is no evidence that [the father/manager] was ever instructed not to deliver his paperwork to [his boss's] home, not to complete it at his home, not to work on, transport, or house any of the equipment at his home, or not to make and receive work-related calls after he left the job site. Rather, the evidence indicates that [the father/manager]'s position as a supervisor required him to shoulder a number of responsibilities, to act in the best interest of [the employer]' business, and to do what was necessary to effectively fulfill his role as supervisor, whether he was at the job site, off the job site, or en route to accomplish one of his many required tasks. Moreover, [the employer] provided him with a vehicle, which he never used for personal business, and a phone to aid him in his duties. In sum, the evidence demonstrates that in many ways, the truck, which was under [the employer]' control, was [the father/manager]'s mobile work place.

{¶36} Furthermore, at the time of the accident, [the father/manager] had not completed his work for the day. The accident occurred at a point located between the [construction site] and Russells Point. Russells Point was one of two locations where [the father/manager] always stopped for gas and ice, the other being in Wapakoneta, which [the father/manager] had yet to reach. Thus, [the father/manager] was still en route to purchase the gasoline and ice for the following day when the accident occurred. He also had yet to clean and fill the water containers for the following day. As was customary for him, he was also transporting a number of tools from the high school to his home for safe-keeping at the time he was injured. In addition, shortly before the accident, [the father/manager] received a work-related call on his cellular phone.

{¶37} In short, [the employer] provided the vehicle in which [the father/manager] was injured as an incident to his employment; at a minimum, [the employer] acquiesced to the performance of some of his job duties being conducted on his way to and from work and at his home; it benefitted from the use of his garage to safely keep the vehicle and a
number of its tools and equipment overnight; and [the employer] required [the father/manager] to handle phone calls related to its business whenever they might occur, including on his drive to and from the job site and at his home. While [the employer] may not have directly paid [the father/manager] for each minute he spent doing its business while en route to and from work and at home, as [the father/manager] admitted he never charged his employer for the time he spent after the job site closed for the day on any phone calls, getting gas and ice, cleaning and filling the water containers, or maintaining and repairing the equipment he transported, this fact is of little consequence in light of the benefit [the employer] undoubtedly received from him.

{¶38} Thus, given the broad spectrum of responsibilities that [the father/manager] had as a masonry supervisor for [the employer], as well as the undisputed fact that these responsibilities necessitated him performing some of them away from the high school, including while en route to and at his home, the only reasonable conclusion in examining the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding [the father/manager]'s injuries is that they occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment for [the employer].

Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment against the employer on the workers' compensation claim.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, November 20, 2008

New FMLA Regulations Explain New Exigency and Servicemember Care Leave Requirements and Rights.

As mentioned in the summaries from the past two days, the DOL issued new FMLA regulations on Monday which will become effective on January 16, 2009 and will require employers to modify their employment policies and employee handbooks. Employers should consult with an employment attorney to revise and/or review their FMLA policies and forms before the new FMLA rules become effective in January. In addition to the new rules mentioned at DOL issues Final FMLA Regulations on New Servicemember and Exigency Leaves and Revises Serious Health Condition Rules, the following rules were also revised and the new military servicemember care and exigency leave provisions were explained for the first time:


13. §825.125: Healthcare Provider. The new rule expressly includes Physician Assistants.

14. §825.126: Qualifying Exigency. This leave permits employees to take a leave of absence because of a qualifying exigency associated with a call to active military duty of a family member.


a. Exigency. While exigency leave is implicated based on a call to active duty, this leave entitlement does not extend to family members of regular armed forces or military who are already on active duty or to calls to service by a state governor. The families of regular military are presumed to be accustomed to a career of being called up. Rather, exigency leave applies only when there has been a call to active duty of National Guard, Reserve or retired forces by the President and will cover the following exigencies:
(i) short notice deployment (less than seven calendar days prior to deployment);


(ii) military events and related activities (i.e., official ceremonies, programs, events related to call to active duty, family support or assistance programs, informational briefings sponsored by the military, Red Cross or other service organizations, etc.);


(iii) childcare and school activities (to arrange for alternative childcare or school/daycare for children who are under 18 or incapable of self-care, to attend meetings with school/daycare staff, etc.);


(iv) financial and legal arrangements (i.e., to make or update financial or legal arrangements to address the covered military member’s abence, such as preparing and executing financial and healthcare powers of attorney, etc.);


(v) counseling (i.e., to attend counseling);


(vi) up to five days of rest and recuperation (i.e., to spend time with a cover military member who is on short-term, temporary, rest and recuperation leave during the period of deployment);


(vii) post-deployment activities (i.e., to attend arrival ceremonies, reintegration briefings and events, etc. and to address issues which may arise from the death of a covered military member while on active duty status); and


(viii) additional activities (when the employer and employee agree that such leave qualifies as an exigency and agree to both timing and duration).

b. A covered military member means the employee’s spouse, son, daughter, or parent on active duty or call to active duty status.

c. A covered call to active duty includes a “contingency operation” when it is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force or when it result in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services

15. §825.127: Servicemember care leave. This new rule allows “an eligible employee who is the spouse, son, daughter, parent, or next of kin of a ‘‘covered servicemember’’ to take 26 workweeks of leave during a 12-month period to care for the servicemember. Unlike exigency leave, the covered servicemember may be an active member of the regular armed forces, but does NOT cover former members of the Armed Forces or members on the permanent disability retired list. In particular, this leave covers servicemembers who are “(1) undergoing medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy [from any medical provider]; or (2) otherwise in outpatient status; or (3) otherwise on the temporary disability retired list.” The servicemember will NOT be covered if the injury or illness does not manifest itself until AFTER the servicemember has retired from active forces, although there is no other temporal requirement. Unlike a serious health condition in the regular FMLA, a serious injury or illness for servicemember care leave means an injury or illness incurred by the servicemember in the line of active duty that may render the servicemember medically unfit to perform the duties of his or her office, grade, rank or rating. (A later rule permits the employer to require certification for military caregiver leave, through “ a certification that is completed by any one of the following health care providers: (1) A DOD health care provider; (2) a VA health care provider; (3) a DOD TRICARE network authorized private health care provider; or (4) a DOD non-network TRICARE authorized private health care provider. As part of a sufficient certification, these health care providers may be asked to certify that the servicemember is undergoing medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy for a serious injury or illness.”).

There are a few new wrinkles to how the period of leave is calculated:


(i) Unlike regular FMLA leave, the “twelve month period” begins as soon as the employee is eligible for leave, regardless of what kind of FMLA year the employer utilizes. (This makes sense to the extent that the employee may want to leave to care for the servicemember as soon as learning about the injury).


(ii) If the employee does not take the full 26 weeks available in that twelve month period, the unused amount is forfeited and cannot be used again another time for the same injury or illness suffered by that servicemember. The leave is available per injury and per servicemember.


(iii) The employee would be entitled to another 26 weeks of leave in a different twelve-month period if the same servicemember incurs a different covered injury or illness or if another servicemember is injured or ill as covered by the FMLA. However, to the extent that there is any overlap in a single twelve-month period, the employee is still limited to 26 weeks of leave in a single twelve-month period. . “For example, if a covered servicemember incurs a serious leg injury and a serious arm injury in an accident, an eligible employee would not be entitled to separate 26-workweek entitlements for each serious injury. Additionally, if a covered servicemember experiences a later aggravation or complication of his or her earlier serious injury or illness for which an eligible employee took 26 workweeks of leave, the employee would not be entitled to an additional 26 workweeks of leave for the aggravation or complication of the initial serious injury or illness. Finally, if an eligible employee is caring for a covered servicemember whose serious injury or illness extends beyond the employee’s 26-workweek leave entitlement, the employee is not eligible for an additional 26-workweek entitlement to continue to care for the covered servicemember.”


(iv) The employee may use some of the 26 weeks for his or her own FMLA qualifying reason (i.e., birth, adoption, serious health condition), but is still limited to 26 weeks in a single twelve-month period. In other words, the employee may spend 14 weeks caring for an injured servicemember and 10 weeks on the employee’s own serious medical condition. In no event may an employee take more than twelve-weeks of FMLA leave for a regular reason (i.e., birth, adoption, serious medical condition) in a single twelve-month period regardless of how much servicemember care leave the employee takes or has available.


(v) The employer remains responsible for designating leave as qualifying under the FMLA. When leave simultaneously qualifies as servicemember care leave and leave to care for the serious medical condition of a family member, the employer should first designate it as servicemember care leave.


(vi) Spouses who work for the same employer may be limited to a single unit of 26-weeks of servicemember care leave in the twelve-month period when they are caring for the same servicemember. It is irrelevant that they work at different worksites.


16. §825.200: Amount of Leave. This rule remains substantially unchanged, although additional examples of how to calculate a rolling leave year are provided and new provisions concerning exigency and servicemember care leave were inserted. In addition, the DOL “clarified” how to count holidays which fall within FMLA leave workweeks. When the employee was on FMLA leave during the entire workweek, the holiday will count against the employee. However, when the employee only takes a partial workweek for FMLA leave, the holiday may NOT be counted against the employee’s FMLA entitlement when the employee would not otherwise have been required to report to work on that day. In other words, if “an employee is using FMLA leave in increments of less than one week, the holiday will not count against the employee’s FMLA entitlement unless the employee was otherwise scheduled and expected to work during the holiday.”


17. §825.201: Leave to care for parent. This rule was reorganized, but no otherwise substantive changes were made.

18. §825:202: Intermittent or reduced schedule leave. The DOL explains that it only reorganized the rule and made no substantive changes from the prior rule.

19. §825.203: Scheduling intermittent or reduced schedule leave. This rule was also reorganized, but the DOL inserted a “clarification” that “employees who take intermittent leave for planned medical treatment when medically necessary have a statutory obligation to make a ‘‘reasonable effort’’ to schedule such treatment so as not to disrupt unduly the employer’s operations.” Nonetheless, the “scheduling of planned medical treatment is ultimately a medical determination within the purview of the health care provider. While the employee must make a reasonable effort in scheduling the leave, if the health care provider determines that there is a medical necessity for a particular treatment time, the medical determination prevails. If it is just a matter of scheduling convenience for the employee, the employee must make a reasonable effort not to disrupt unduly the employer’s business operations.”

20. § 825:204: Transferring employee during intermittent or reduced schedule leave. This provision was also merely reorganized, although the DOL received many requests to revise it in order to permit employers to transfer employees who take intermittent leave on a regular, but unforeseeable, basis because of a chronic medical condition. The DOL felt that the statutory language did not permit this modification even though it acknowledged that “this standard may seem to discount the fact that some employees may take intermittent leave regularly, frequently, and predictably— even if unforeseeably—and do so on the advice or recommendation from their physician, which some would argue is akin to planned medical treatment.”


21. §825.205: Increments of leave. In addition to reorganizing this rule, the DOL made extensive, employer-friendly changes. The prior rule required employers to keep track of FMLA leave in minimal increments (of as small as 6 minutes or .1 hours) based on how they calculated other absences and based on the ability of their payroll systems. Employers have long objected to a system which would permit an employee to take off one day each week (without prior notice) and still have FMLA leave left to use at the end of the year.

The new rule provides that an employer should account for the use of intermittent or reduced schedule leave “using an increment no greater than the shortest period of time that the employer uses to account for the use of other forms of leave provided that it is not greater than one hour and provided further than an employee’s FMLA leave entitlement may not be reduced by more than the amount of leave actually taken.” Presumably, employers may not account for FMLA leave in 15 or 30 minute increments based on how it calculates other leaves of absences or tardiness. In no event may an employer charge an employee with FMLA leave when the employee was actually working. “The Department has also modified the final rule to recognize policies which account for use of leave in different increments at different points in time, thus, permitting employers to maintain a policy that leave of any type may only be taken in a one-hour increment during the first hour of a shift (i.e., a policy intended to discourage tardy arrivals).”

Physical Impossibility. “Where it is physically impossible for an employee using intermittent [or reduced schedule leave] to commence or end work mid-way through a shift, such as where a flight attendant or a railroad conductor is scheduled to work aboard an airplane or train, or a laboratory employee is unable to enter or leave a sealed ‘clean room’ during a certain period of time, the entire period that the employee is forced to be absent is designated as FMLA leave and counts against the employee’s FMLA entitlement.”

Overtime and Variable Workweeks. The DOL also received many comments about the difficulty of tracking intermittent or reduced schedule leave when the employee’s work schedule varied considerably or s/he worked a significant amount of overtime. Employers also objected to employees using FMLA to avoid working any mandatory overtime. “If an employee’s schedule varies from week to week to such an extent that an employer is unable to determine with any certainty how many hours the employee would otherwise have worked [without FMLA leave], a weekly average of the hours scheduled over the 12 months prior to the beginning of the leave period (including any hours for which the employee took leave of any type) would be used for calculating the employee’s leave entitlement.” With respect to overtime issues, “[i]f an employee would normally be required to work overtime, but is unable to do so because of a FMLA qualifying reason that limits the employee’s ability to work overtime, the hours which the employee would have been required to work may be counted against the employee’s FMLA entitlement.” Only mandatory – and not voluntary – overtime may be counted in such a case.


22. §825.207: Substitution of Paid Leave. The DOL made significant changes to this rule. First, the new rule “clarifies” that ‘‘substitution’’ of paid leave for FMLA purposes means that the unpaid FMLA leave and the paid leave provided by an employer run concurrently.” The DOL believed that the FMLA itself intended “to emphasize the limits on the situations in which an employer must allow the substitution of paid sick or medical leave, but does not preclude requiring compliance with the normal procedural rules pursuant to which the leave was accrued for paid personal or vacation leave. For example, it clarifies that an employer is not obligated to allow an employee to substitute paid sick leave for unpaid FMLA leave in order to care for a child with a serious health condition if the employer’s normal sick leave rules allow such leave only for the employee’s own illness. . . . . The legislative history of the substitution provision indicates that Congress understood that employers commonly restrict the situations in which employees may take paid sick, medical, and family leave.”

Employer may apply procedural rules of paid leave. “An employer may limit substitution of paid sick, medical or family leave to those situations for which the employer would normally provide such paid leave (e.g., such policies may restrict the use of paid leave only to the employee’s own health condition or to specific family members). Employers must allow substitution of paid vacation, personal leave, or ‘‘paid time off’’ for any situation covered by the FMLA. In all cases, however, the normal procedural rules subject to which the leave was accrued apply—unless waived by the employer—regardless of the type of paid leave substituted. For example, if an employer’s paid sick leave policy prohibits the use of sick leave in less than full day increments, employees would have no right to use less than a full day of paid sick leave regardless of whether the sick leave was being substituted for unpaid FMLA leave. Similarly, if an employer’s paid personal leave policy requires two days’ notice for the use of personal leave, an employee seeking to substitute paid personal leave for unpaid FMLA leave would need to provide two days’ notice. Employers, of course, may choose to waive such procedural rules and allow an employee’s request to substitute paid leave in these situations, but they are not required to do so.”

“Where an employer’s paid leave policy requires the use of such leave in an increment of time larger than the amount of FMLA leave requested by an employee, if the employee wishes to substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, the employee must take the larger increment of leave required under the paid leave policy unless the employer chooses to waive that requirement. The employer is not required to permit the employee to substitute paid leave for the smaller increment of unpaid FMLA leave.” However, when “an employee chooses to take a larger increment of leave in order to be able to substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, the entire amount of leave taken shall count against the employee’s FMLA entitlement.”

New Notice Requirement. The new rule “requires that employers notify employees of any additional requirements for the use of paid leave” and “this information must be included with the rights and responsibilities notice required under § 825.300(c). At the employer’s option, this information may be included in the text of the rights and responsibilities notice itself, or the employer may attach a copy of the paid leave policy to the notice, or provide a cross-reference to a leave policy in an employee handbook or other source available to employees, where paid leave policies are customarily set forth.”

Disability/Workers Compensation. The new rule also “clarified” that “[e]mployees on paid disability leave due to a FMLA-protected condition are not on unpaid FMLA leave and therefore the statutory provision for the substitution of paid leave does not apply.” Nonetheless, “employers and employees may agree, where state law permits, to have paid leave supplement the disability plan benefits, such as in the case where a plan only provides replacement income for two-thirds of an employee’s salary.” Similarly, employees on workers’ compensation leave are not on unpaid FMLA leave and the leaves do not run concurrently. “However, if the workers’ compensation benefits cease for any reason and the employee is still on leave, the substitution provision may become applicable at that time.”

Less Stringent Rule Eliminated. The new rule no longer requires employers to follow the less stringent policy/plan procedures when “paid leave is substituted for unpaid FMLA leave and the employer’s procedural requirements for taking paid leave are less stringent than the requirements of the FMLA, employees cannot be required to comply with the higher FMLA standards.” As a result, when paid sick leave is substituted for unpaid FMLA leave, employers can now require an FMLA medical certification for absences of less three days even if – as is typical-- its paid leave policy does not similarly require a medical statement. Similarly, the employer can require that the notice requirement of the paid policy be complied with by the employee if s/he wants to substitute paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave.

Compensatory time. The new rule permits public employees to substitute compensatory time for unpaid FMLA leave.


I will continue to summarize additional significant changes in the new FMLA regulations throughout the month on this blog. Additional rules are summarized in Friday's posting at New FMLA Regulations Contain Many Employer-Friendly Revisions. Until then, eager beavers and insomniacs can read the 201 pages of single-spaced, 9-point font new rules and explanatory comment in full at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-26577.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, August 26, 2008

Ohio Appeals Court: Workers Compensation Does Not Bar Negligent Hiring Claim When Co-Worker Rapes Employee, Which Was Not Foreseeable.

Yesterday, the Butler County Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a negligent hiring claim against a residential facility for the mentally disabled. Prewitt v. Alexson Servs., Inc., 2008-Ohio-4306 (8/25/08). In that case, an employee raped a co-worker, who then argued that the employer was negligent in its hiring and supervision of the rapist. Although the trial court dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that her claim was covered and barred by the workers compensation statutes and his crime was not foreseeable based on the rapist’s prior criminal history, the Court of Appeals affirmed only on the grounds that the rape was not reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances.

The plaintiff employee argued that the employer was negligent in hiring and supervising the rapist and that her rape was reasonably foreseeable because the rapist had been convicted of disorderly conduct (for exposing himself in a public park) before he had been hired. He had also been investigated (and cleared) by the county MR/DD department and the local police after he was hired for assaulting a client by striking her with pillows. He had also been investigated twice by the local police for sexually assaulting patients. During these investigations, the rapist informed the police (who, in turn, informed the employer) that he suffered from bi-polar, was borderline schizophrenic and was not taking his medication. Moreover, he took a two-month FMLA leave of absence for his mental health issues and was cleared to return to work without any restrictions by his physician. Finally, another co-worker had privately claimed to the plaintiff that she had been raped twice by the rapist at work, but had never reported it because she did not want her family to know.

While the employer conducted pre-employment background and criminal checks of applicants, it relied on the employee’s honor to self- report any criminal convictions after the employee was hired. Nonetheless, the court found that this fact to be irrelevant in this case because the rapist had not been convicted of any similar crimes after being hired. Further, the pre-employment criminal check did not reveal the circumstances of the rapist’s disorderly conduct (which, in any event, was not – in the court’s opinion -- necessarily indicative of his predisposition to rape a co-worker in that it did not involve a physical assault). Because the employee had been returned to work by his physician after his FMLA leave without any restrictions, the court did not find that the rapist’s mental health issues were indicative of his future proclivity to rape a co-worker. In totality, the court found that there was no evidence that the employer possessed any knowledge which would indicate that it was reasonably foreseeable that the rapist would sexually assault a co-worker during working hours.

Nonetheless, the court reversed the trial court’s finding that the negligent supervision/hiring claims were barred by the workers compensation laws because the rape did not occur within the scope of the rapist’s duties, and therefore, was not an “accident.” Ohio Revised Code § 4123.74 provides, in pertinent part, "Employers who comply with section 4123.35 of the Revised Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury, * * * received * * * by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment * * *." The employer argued that a prior Supreme Court decision (which held that the workers compensation laws did not bar sexual harassment claims) applied to bar this negligent hiring claim because the employee’s injury in this case was physical – not emotional as in sexual harassment cases.

However, the Court of Appeals disagreed: “Regardless of the nature of appellant's injuries suffered as a result of the rape, the controlling inquiry is whether the injury was "accidental" or occurred "in the course of or arising out of the employment." Under Ohio Revised Code § 4123.74, “an employer is not immune from liability for injuries not taking place in the course of or arising out of employment. "For an accident to 'arise out of' the employment as required under Workers' Compensation Act, it is necessary that the conditions or obligations of the employment put the employee in the position or at the place where the accident occurs; the accident need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence . . . The controlling test of whether an injury arises out of the employment is whether the injury is a natural and probable consequence of the nature of the employment. . . . . A similar analysis in this case demonstrates that the rape did not occur "in the course of" or "arise out of" appellant's employment as a rape is not a "natural and probable consequence" of the nature of the employment. Moreover, the rape does not constitute an ‘accident’ included in the definition of ‘injury.’"

Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/12/2008/2008-ohio-4306.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.