Yesterday, the EEOC announced that a “Chicago dental practice will pay $462,500 to settle a class sexual and religious harassment and retaliation lawsuit” it filed in September 2007 in federal court which alleged that “James L. Orrington, D.M.D., Ltd. discriminated against 18 employees by subjecting them to sexual harassment, including sexual propositions, comments and touching; forcing them to engage in Scientology religious practices and learn about Scientology as conditions of their employment; and/or retaliating against employees who complained about the sexual or religious harassment.” EEOC et al. v. James L. Orrington D.M.D., Ltd., No. 07 C 5317. “The consent decree resolving the case was entered by the court [yesterday] morning.”
The EEOC also announced that “[i]n addition to requiring that Orrington pay monetary relief, the three-year consent decree resolving the case enjoins Orrington from engaging in sexual or religious discrimination and prohibits the firm from conditioning any terms or conditions of employment on complying with the religious teachings or practices of Scientology or attending seminars regarding Scientology. The consent decree also requires that Orrington contract with an outside representative to receive and investigate complaints of sexual discrimination and religious discrimination; adopt and distribute a policy against sexual harassment, religious discrimination and harassment, and retaliation; provide training to employees; submit periodic reports to the EEOC about any complaints of sexual harassment, religious discrimination or harassment, or retaliation; and post a notice at its facility regarding the outcome of this lawsuit.
Insomniacs can read the full press release at
Wednesday, January 14, 2009
Tuesday, January 13, 2009
Sixth Circuit: Employee Whose Reputation Was Damaged By Publicizing Investigation Report Gets Chance To Clear Name Through a Public Hearing.
Last Thursday, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint brought in a Columbus federal court by an state engineering college department chair whose reputation had been damaged after the university, among other things, held a press conference publicizing certain investigations into plagiarism allegations in his department, blaming him and others for some of the lapses and then suspending him from advising graduate faculty students for three years. Gunasekera v. Irwin , No. 07-4303 (6th Cir. 1/8/09). The Court held that the Plaintiff had been deprived of constitutional due process when his graduate student advising status was suspended without a pre- or post deprivation hearing (which need not be public). However, the novel holding of the case is that the Plaintiff was entitled to a public name-clearing hearing in that his reputation had been damaged through a press conference publicizing a report which never contained his denials of the allegations.
According to the Court’s opinion, “[i]n 2004, [the Plaintiff] was the Moss Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the Russ College of Engineering and Technology of Ohio University (“Russ College”) and had been Chair of the Department of Mechanical Engineering for fifteen years. He had worked at Ohio University (“the University”) for more than two decades and had Graduate Faculty status at Russ College which enabled him to supervise graduate students’ thesis work. That year, a student alleged widespread plagiarism in mechanical engineering graduate-student theses. Two internal investigations uncovered plagiarism in collateral areas rather than in the analysis or conclusions. Following these probes, . . . the Provost of Ohio University, instructed . . the Dean of Russ College, to take further action. In response, [the Dean] asked an administrator and a retired faculty member to investigate the alleged plagiarism. These men prepared a report known as the Meyer/Bloemer Report and submitted it to [the Dean] and [the Provost] on May 30, 2006.”
“On May 31, 2006, [the Provost] held a press conference to publicize the Meyer/Bloemer Report. As the district court explained, the report found “rampant and flagrant plagiarism in theses” and “singled out three faculty members, including [the Plaintiff], for ignoring their ethical responsibilities and contributing to an atmosphere of negligence toward issues of academic misconduct.” Gunasekera v. Irwin, 517 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In response to this report, the University suspended [the Plaintiff’s] Graduate Faculty status for three years and prohibited him from advising graduate students.” Plaintiff filed suit a few months later alleging deprivations of his property interests in his employment and liberty interests in his reputation without due process.
Constitutional Liberty Interests and Name Clearing Hearings.
The Supreme Court has previously explained that the fourteenth amendment to the constitution protects the property and liberty interests of citizens:
In a 1972 case where the one-year employment contract of a non-tenured state college instructor was not renewed without any reason being given, the Supreme Court held that the instructor’s liberty interest in his reputation was not implicated. “The State, in declining to rehire the [instructor], did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be a different case. For “[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437). “The State, for example, did not invoke any regulations to bar the [instructor] from all other public employment in state universities. Had it done so, this, again, would be a different case. For "[t]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury.” Indeed, “[i]n such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials.” Roth, supra. “The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.” Id. at n. 12.
In Gunasekera, the Defendants conceded that the Plaintiff possessed a liberty interest. “Given this concession, [the Court did] not need to apply [its] five-factor test used to decide whether someone is entitled to a name clearing hearing due to a deprivation of his or her liberty interest” Nonetheless, the Court indicated that it would likely have done so because “[t]he accusations regarding plagiarism were connected to his suspension (and as discussed above, [the Plaintiff’s] suspension deprived him of benefits and pay); the University alleged more than simple incompetence; the allegations were public; [the Plaintiff] claims that the statements were false; and the University called a press conference to publicize its charges.” Notably, there is no indication in the Court’s opinion that the Plaintiff had ever been interviewed as part of the investigation process or that his denials or version of events was included in the publicized reports. Thus, there seems to have been no public airing or publicization of his version of events or denials when the allegations against him were publicized.
The Court found that the parties’ dispute “boils down to what process is due and whether such a hearing must be public.” Procedurally, the Court was compelled to accept the Plaintiff’s allegations as true at this stage of the litigation. This is important because there was “some dispute as to whether the hearing offered by the University was public or not. . . The University asserted, and the district court agreed, that the proposed hearing was public because [the Plaintiff] would have been allowed to bring anyone, including members of the press, to his hearing. Gunasekera, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 & n.9. [The Plaintiff] counters that the hearing offered was not public because the University specifically denied his request for a hearing publicized in the same way the Meyer/Bloemer report had been. Id. However, this dispute is contained in documents outside the pleadings which we cannot properly consider on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Taking the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to [the Plaintiff] , [the Court] assume[d] that he was not offered a public opportunity to clear his name.”
In the past, the Court had held that “a name-clearing hearing need only provide an opportunity to clear one’s name and need not comply with formal procedures to be valid.” Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 206 (6th Cir. 1989).” Nonetheless, the Court had not addressed “whether a name-clearing hearing must include a public opportunity clear one’s name.” For instance, “a university disciplinary hearing need not be public.” Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005). However, “a disciplinary hearing is very different from a name-clearing hearing. A name-clearing hearing is not a venue for an employer to determine the proper punishment, but rather an opportunity for an individual to confront a public stigma that has already been imposed by an employer.”
Entitlement to a name clearing hearing depends on “(1) the nature of the private interest affected—that is, the seriousness of the charge and potential sanctions, (2) the danger of error and the benefit of additional or alternate procedures, and (3) the public or governmental burden were additional procedures mandated. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 635 (describing test instituted by Supreme Court in Mathews).” In considering the first prong of this test, the Court found it to be “clear that where, as here, the employer has inflicted a public stigma on an employee, the only way that an employee can clear his name of the public stigma is through publicity. The injury of which [the Plaintiff] complains is the fact that he was publicly associated with and perhaps partially blamed for a plagiarism scandal. As to the second prong of Mathews, publicity adds a significant benefit to the hearing, and without publicity the hearing cannot perform its name-clearing function. A name-clearing hearing with no public component would not address this harm because it would not alert members of the public who read the first report that [the Plaintiff] challenged the allegations. Similarly, if [the Plaintiff’s] name was cleared at an unpublicized hearing, members of the public who had seen only the stories accusing him would not know that this stigma was undeserved. . . . Following this conclusion [in a similar case], the Second Circuit held that: ‘Requiring the [employer] to address such risk by offering plaintiff the opportunity to publicly refute the charges made against him or publicising his refutations itself, does not place an undue burden upon the government’s interest in terminating [employees] who either are not performing to expected standards or are behaving in an unacceptable fashion.’ Id. [The Court] agreed with the Second Circuit that requiring that name-clearing hearings involve some form of publicity would not necessarily put an undue burden on the government.” (emphasis added).
“In order to determine what the name-clearing hearing should entail and what its limits might be in each case, courts should again turn to the Mathews balancing test. . . By applying this test to the facts of the case before it, a court can tailor a name-clearing hearing which allows the employee to challenge directly any public stigma while also accounting for any legitimate concerns of the employer. . . . Requiring that a name clearing hearing include a public component may be the only way to make such a hearing effective. If a name-clearing hearing has no public component, it may not be able to serve its function of curing the public stigma that necessitated the hearing. With respect to the third prong, government interests will shape the nature of the publicity required. For example, privacy concerns within the university setting might dictate the form of the publicity. Cf. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 637 n.2 (noting that the publicity attending a “full-dress judicial hearing” “might be detrimental to the college’s educational atmosphere”). Though [the Court had] few facts before [it] on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, . . . it is possible that concerns for the privacy of students [under FERPA, etc.] implicated in plagiarism would impact the precise nature of the publicity required.”
The Court held that the university would be ”required to offer [the Plaintiff] a name-clearing hearing that is adequately publicized to address the stigma the university inflicted on him. The exact nature of that publicity depends on a fact-intensive review of the circumstances attending his case,” which was left “to the district court . . . regarding the exact parameters of the name-clearing hearing.” Considering that the defendants had prematurely presented some evidence that a public hearing had already been offered to the Plaintiff, it remains to be seen whether the district court will find the prior offer to be sufficient on summary judgment or at trial. Because this was a new issue for the Court and the right to a public hearing was not established law in this Circuit, it found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this allegation.
Property Interest in Advising Graduate Students.
The Plaintiff also alleged that he had been denied property interests without due process of law in that his graduate student advising status had been suspended for three years without a pre or post deprivation hearing.
The Supreme Court has previously explained in Roth that “the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits. These interests -- property interests -- may take many forms.” Among other things, these property interests extend to “a person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them, ” to “a public college professor dismissed from an office held under tenure provisions, to “college professors and staff members dismissed during the terms of their contracts,” and “to a teacher recently hired without tenure or a formal contract, but nonetheless with a clearly implied promise of continued employment.” Roth, supra. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.”
In Gunasekera, the Sixth Circuit noted that “[t]o prevail on the claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his property when his Graduate Faculty status was suspended, [the Plaintiff] must “‘establish three elements; (1) that [he] ha[s] a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . , (2) that [he] w[as] deprived of this protected interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (3) that the state did not afford [him] adequate procedural rights prior to depriving [him] of [his] protected interest.’” The Defendants denied that the Plaintiff had any property interest in his graduate student advising status because they retained the discretion to suspend him under the circumstances and he suffered no decrease in his salary or benefits.
Plaintiff “alleges that Graduate Faculty status is ‘a right intrinsic’ that a professor maintains so long as he or she satisfies the four criteria the University requires of its Graduate Faculty. Id. He argues that because these criteria limit the University’s discretion to name Graduate Faculty and because ‘[i]n actual practice . . . professors retain their appointment so long as they satisfy those criteria,” he has a property interest in his Graduate Faculty status.’” The Plaintiff’s “argument does not turn on the language of the [university] regulations, but rather on his ability to show that a common practice and understanding had developed which gave him a legitimate claim to Graduate Faculty status so long as he met the stated [four] conditions. At oral argument, the University admitted that there is no precedent regarding when Graduate Faculty status is retained, because it has never been revoked or suspended [before Plaintiff’s status was revoked]. Viewing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to” the Plaintiff, the Court found that “he has alleged that University custom gives him a property interest in his Graduate Faculty status.”
Moreover, because Plaintiff lost some income “(including “a summer salary research stipend that complements annual salary” for Graduate Faculty) and benefits (such as a reduced teaching load), his suspension “alter[ed] his employment enough to make Graduate Faculty status a property interest.” See also “Newman v. Commonwealth, 884 F.2d 19, 25 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“In this case, plaintiff was barred from voting on degrees and from serving on important university committees or as chair of her department. A letter of censure for an act of ‘objective plagiarism’ and ‘seriously negligent scholarship’ was placed in her permanent file, an action that undoubtedly affects her ability to secure other employment in the future. We think it obvious that this severe sanction substantially damaged plaintiff’s property interest in her position.” (emphasis added)).”
Having shown that he suffered a property loss when his graduate student advising status was suspended, the Plaintiff was then required to show that he was deprived of his property interest without due process (i.e., a pre- or post- termination hearing). In this case, the Plaintiff alleged that “he was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding “his satisfaction of the criteria for appointment to Graduate Faculty status” before or after his suspension. Moreover, “[a]t oral argument, [Defendants’] lawyer conceded that [the Plaintiff] had not been offered either a pre- or a post-deprivation hearing.” The Sixth Circuit has already “held that prior to termination of a public employee who has a property interest in his employment, the due process clause requires that the employee be given ‘oral or written notice of the charges against him or her, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his or her side of the story to the employer.’” . . . Because [the Plaintiff] asserts that he was never given any opportunity to be heard either before or after he was deprived of his property interest in his Graduate Faculty status, the district court’s dismissal of [the Plaintiff’s] property-interest claim must be reversed.”
Insomniacs can read the full court decision at http://www.ca6.usc.ourtsgov/opinions.pdf/09a0005p-06.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
According to the Court’s opinion, “[i]n 2004, [the Plaintiff] was the Moss Professor of Mechanical Engineering at the Russ College of Engineering and Technology of Ohio University (“Russ College”) and had been Chair of the Department of Mechanical Engineering for fifteen years. He had worked at Ohio University (“the University”) for more than two decades and had Graduate Faculty status at Russ College which enabled him to supervise graduate students’ thesis work. That year, a student alleged widespread plagiarism in mechanical engineering graduate-student theses. Two internal investigations uncovered plagiarism in collateral areas rather than in the analysis or conclusions. Following these probes, . . . the Provost of Ohio University, instructed . . the Dean of Russ College, to take further action. In response, [the Dean] asked an administrator and a retired faculty member to investigate the alleged plagiarism. These men prepared a report known as the Meyer/Bloemer Report and submitted it to [the Dean] and [the Provost] on May 30, 2006.”
“On May 31, 2006, [the Provost] held a press conference to publicize the Meyer/Bloemer Report. As the district court explained, the report found “rampant and flagrant plagiarism in theses” and “singled out three faculty members, including [the Plaintiff], for ignoring their ethical responsibilities and contributing to an atmosphere of negligence toward issues of academic misconduct.” Gunasekera v. Irwin, 517 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1002 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In response to this report, the University suspended [the Plaintiff’s] Graduate Faculty status for three years and prohibited him from advising graduate students.” Plaintiff filed suit a few months later alleging deprivations of his property interests in his employment and liberty interests in his reputation without due process.
Constitutional Liberty Interests and Name Clearing Hearings.
The Supreme Court has previously explained that the fourteenth amendment to the constitution protects the property and liberty interests of citizens:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment], . . . [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399.
In a 1972 case where the one-year employment contract of a non-tenured state college instructor was not renewed without any reason being given, the Supreme Court held that the instructor’s liberty interest in his reputation was not implicated. “The State, in declining to rehire the [instructor], did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be a different case. For “[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437). “The State, for example, did not invoke any regulations to bar the [instructor] from all other public employment in state universities. Had it done so, this, again, would be a different case. For "[t]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury.” Indeed, “[i]n such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials.” Roth, supra. “The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons.” Id. at n. 12.
In Gunasekera, the Defendants conceded that the Plaintiff possessed a liberty interest. “Given this concession, [the Court did] not need to apply [its] five-factor test used to decide whether someone is entitled to a name clearing hearing due to a deprivation of his or her liberty interest” Nonetheless, the Court indicated that it would likely have done so because “[t]he accusations regarding plagiarism were connected to his suspension (and as discussed above, [the Plaintiff’s] suspension deprived him of benefits and pay); the University alleged more than simple incompetence; the allegations were public; [the Plaintiff] claims that the statements were false; and the University called a press conference to publicize its charges.” Notably, there is no indication in the Court’s opinion that the Plaintiff had ever been interviewed as part of the investigation process or that his denials or version of events was included in the publicized reports. Thus, there seems to have been no public airing or publicization of his version of events or denials when the allegations against him were publicized.
The Court found that the parties’ dispute “boils down to what process is due and whether such a hearing must be public.” Procedurally, the Court was compelled to accept the Plaintiff’s allegations as true at this stage of the litigation. This is important because there was “some dispute as to whether the hearing offered by the University was public or not. . . The University asserted, and the district court agreed, that the proposed hearing was public because [the Plaintiff] would have been allowed to bring anyone, including members of the press, to his hearing. Gunasekera, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 & n.9. [The Plaintiff] counters that the hearing offered was not public because the University specifically denied his request for a hearing publicized in the same way the Meyer/Bloemer report had been. Id. However, this dispute is contained in documents outside the pleadings which we cannot properly consider on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Taking the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to [the Plaintiff] , [the Court] assume[d] that he was not offered a public opportunity to clear his name.”
In the past, the Court had held that “a name-clearing hearing need only provide an opportunity to clear one’s name and need not comply with formal procedures to be valid.” Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 206 (6th Cir. 1989).” Nonetheless, the Court had not addressed “whether a name-clearing hearing must include a public opportunity clear one’s name.” For instance, “a university disciplinary hearing need not be public.” Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005). However, “a disciplinary hearing is very different from a name-clearing hearing. A name-clearing hearing is not a venue for an employer to determine the proper punishment, but rather an opportunity for an individual to confront a public stigma that has already been imposed by an employer.”
Entitlement to a name clearing hearing depends on “(1) the nature of the private interest affected—that is, the seriousness of the charge and potential sanctions, (2) the danger of error and the benefit of additional or alternate procedures, and (3) the public or governmental burden were additional procedures mandated. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 635 (describing test instituted by Supreme Court in Mathews).” In considering the first prong of this test, the Court found it to be “clear that where, as here, the employer has inflicted a public stigma on an employee, the only way that an employee can clear his name of the public stigma is through publicity. The injury of which [the Plaintiff] complains is the fact that he was publicly associated with and perhaps partially blamed for a plagiarism scandal. As to the second prong of Mathews, publicity adds a significant benefit to the hearing, and without publicity the hearing cannot perform its name-clearing function. A name-clearing hearing with no public component would not address this harm because it would not alert members of the public who read the first report that [the Plaintiff] challenged the allegations. Similarly, if [the Plaintiff’s] name was cleared at an unpublicized hearing, members of the public who had seen only the stories accusing him would not know that this stigma was undeserved. . . . Following this conclusion [in a similar case], the Second Circuit held that: ‘Requiring the [employer] to address such risk by offering plaintiff the opportunity to publicly refute the charges made against him or publicising his refutations itself, does not place an undue burden upon the government’s interest in terminating [employees] who either are not performing to expected standards or are behaving in an unacceptable fashion.’ Id. [The Court] agreed with the Second Circuit that requiring that name-clearing hearings involve some form of publicity would not necessarily put an undue burden on the government.” (emphasis added).
“In order to determine what the name-clearing hearing should entail and what its limits might be in each case, courts should again turn to the Mathews balancing test. . . By applying this test to the facts of the case before it, a court can tailor a name-clearing hearing which allows the employee to challenge directly any public stigma while also accounting for any legitimate concerns of the employer. . . . Requiring that a name clearing hearing include a public component may be the only way to make such a hearing effective. If a name-clearing hearing has no public component, it may not be able to serve its function of curing the public stigma that necessitated the hearing. With respect to the third prong, government interests will shape the nature of the publicity required. For example, privacy concerns within the university setting might dictate the form of the publicity. Cf. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 637 n.2 (noting that the publicity attending a “full-dress judicial hearing” “might be detrimental to the college’s educational atmosphere”). Though [the Court had] few facts before [it] on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, . . . it is possible that concerns for the privacy of students [under FERPA, etc.] implicated in plagiarism would impact the precise nature of the publicity required.”
The Court held that the university would be ”required to offer [the Plaintiff] a name-clearing hearing that is adequately publicized to address the stigma the university inflicted on him. The exact nature of that publicity depends on a fact-intensive review of the circumstances attending his case,” which was left “to the district court . . . regarding the exact parameters of the name-clearing hearing.” Considering that the defendants had prematurely presented some evidence that a public hearing had already been offered to the Plaintiff, it remains to be seen whether the district court will find the prior offer to be sufficient on summary judgment or at trial. Because this was a new issue for the Court and the right to a public hearing was not established law in this Circuit, it found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this allegation.
Property Interest in Advising Graduate Students.
The Plaintiff also alleged that he had been denied property interests without due process of law in that his graduate student advising status had been suspended for three years without a pre or post deprivation hearing.
The Supreme Court has previously explained in Roth that “the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits. These interests -- property interests -- may take many forms.” Among other things, these property interests extend to “a person receiving welfare benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility for them, ” to “a public college professor dismissed from an office held under tenure provisions, to “college professors and staff members dismissed during the terms of their contracts,” and “to a teacher recently hired without tenure or a formal contract, but nonetheless with a clearly implied promise of continued employment.” Roth, supra. “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.”
In Gunasekera, the Sixth Circuit noted that “[t]o prevail on the claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his property when his Graduate Faculty status was suspended, [the Plaintiff] must “‘establish three elements; (1) that [he] ha[s] a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . , (2) that [he] w[as] deprived of this protected interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (3) that the state did not afford [him] adequate procedural rights prior to depriving [him] of [his] protected interest.’” The Defendants denied that the Plaintiff had any property interest in his graduate student advising status because they retained the discretion to suspend him under the circumstances and he suffered no decrease in his salary or benefits.
Plaintiff “alleges that Graduate Faculty status is ‘a right intrinsic’ that a professor maintains so long as he or she satisfies the four criteria the University requires of its Graduate Faculty. Id. He argues that because these criteria limit the University’s discretion to name Graduate Faculty and because ‘[i]n actual practice . . . professors retain their appointment so long as they satisfy those criteria,” he has a property interest in his Graduate Faculty status.’” The Plaintiff’s “argument does not turn on the language of the [university] regulations, but rather on his ability to show that a common practice and understanding had developed which gave him a legitimate claim to Graduate Faculty status so long as he met the stated [four] conditions. At oral argument, the University admitted that there is no precedent regarding when Graduate Faculty status is retained, because it has never been revoked or suspended [before Plaintiff’s status was revoked]. Viewing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to” the Plaintiff, the Court found that “he has alleged that University custom gives him a property interest in his Graduate Faculty status.”
Moreover, because Plaintiff lost some income “(including “a summer salary research stipend that complements annual salary” for Graduate Faculty) and benefits (such as a reduced teaching load), his suspension “alter[ed] his employment enough to make Graduate Faculty status a property interest.” See also “Newman v. Commonwealth, 884 F.2d 19, 25 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“In this case, plaintiff was barred from voting on degrees and from serving on important university committees or as chair of her department. A letter of censure for an act of ‘objective plagiarism’ and ‘seriously negligent scholarship’ was placed in her permanent file, an action that undoubtedly affects her ability to secure other employment in the future. We think it obvious that this severe sanction substantially damaged plaintiff’s property interest in her position.” (emphasis added)).”
Having shown that he suffered a property loss when his graduate student advising status was suspended, the Plaintiff was then required to show that he was deprived of his property interest without due process (i.e., a pre- or post- termination hearing). In this case, the Plaintiff alleged that “he was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding “his satisfaction of the criteria for appointment to Graduate Faculty status” before or after his suspension. Moreover, “[a]t oral argument, [Defendants’] lawyer conceded that [the Plaintiff] had not been offered either a pre- or a post-deprivation hearing.” The Sixth Circuit has already “held that prior to termination of a public employee who has a property interest in his employment, the due process clause requires that the employee be given ‘oral or written notice of the charges against him or her, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his or her side of the story to the employer.’” . . . Because [the Plaintiff] asserts that he was never given any opportunity to be heard either before or after he was deprived of his property interest in his Graduate Faculty status, the district court’s dismissal of [the Plaintiff’s] property-interest claim must be reversed.”
Insomniacs can read the full court decision at http://www.ca6.usc.ourtsgov/opinions.pdf/09a0005p-06.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Monday, January 12, 2009
USCIS Agrees with Chamber of Commerce to Delay Mandatory E-Verify Implementation For Federal Contractors Until February 20, 2009
As summarized here on December 9, 2008, the federal government published its final regulation in November which will require many federal contractors and subcontractors to begin using the e-verify program to confirm the employment eligibility of many existing and newly-hired employees as federal service and construction contracts and solicitations are issued or amended after January 15, 2009 (i.e., this Friday). In other words, federal agencies have been directed to insert a new clause into procurement contracts and solicitations requiring contractors and subcontractors to enroll and utilize the e-verify program. This regulation implements Executive Order 12989 which was amended in June 2008.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a federal lawsuit in December 2008 seeking to invalidate the new federal regulation. In the meantime, on Friday, January 9, 2009, the Chamber of Commerce announced that USCIS had agreed in the interim to delay mandatory implementation of the e-verify system for federal contractors until February 20, 2009. (This information is similarly, but less overtly, confirmed on the USCIS website). Contractors remain free to utilize the e-verify system and USCIS points out that more than 100,000 employers have registered for the program. In response to the Chamber’s protests about e-verify, USCIS contends that e-verify is not mandatory because employers are not mandated to become federal contractors.
Insomniacs can read the Chamber’s full press release at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2009/january/090109_everify.htm and confirm USCIS’s agreement to the postponement at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=75bce2e261405110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=75bce2e261405110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a federal lawsuit in December 2008 seeking to invalidate the new federal regulation. In the meantime, on Friday, January 9, 2009, the Chamber of Commerce announced that USCIS had agreed in the interim to delay mandatory implementation of the e-verify system for federal contractors until February 20, 2009. (This information is similarly, but less overtly, confirmed on the USCIS website). Contractors remain free to utilize the e-verify system and USCIS points out that more than 100,000 employers have registered for the program. In response to the Chamber’s protests about e-verify, USCIS contends that e-verify is not mandatory because employers are not mandated to become federal contractors.
Insomniacs can read the Chamber’s full press release at http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2009/january/090109_everify.htm and confirm USCIS’s agreement to the postponement at http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=75bce2e261405110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=75bce2e261405110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Friday, January 9, 2009
DOL Explains that Training Program for Exempt Managers Does Not Destroy FLSA Exemption During Training Period Because “Holistic” Approach is Taken.
Yesterday, the federal Department of Labor released a number of administrative letter opinions from last month, one of which concerned a training program for long-time retail store managers who wished to be promoted to regional store managers. (FLSA 2008-19). Both the store managers and the regional managers constituted exempt managerial positions. The question posed was whether the store managers lost their exemption during the training period because the store managers would perform little or no exempt work during about half of the seven week training period (while they shadowed the regional managers).
According to the inquiry, “[d]uring the training period, each of the store managers accompanies an area sales manager on visits to area stores, reviews store paperwork, addresses issues with the managers of the stores visited, investigates inventory shortages and violations of company policy, and attends sales meetings. At the beginning of the training period, the trainee simply “shadows” the area sales manager, but as the training progresses, the area sales manager delegates more and more duties to the trainee. By the end of the training period, it is the area sales manager who “shadows” the trainee.” During the training period, “trainees analyze sales figures, product returns, and inventory data to determine store performance; review data with the store manager and suggest improvements; review the hours worked by employees; approve payroll; determine whether the store manager allocates labor hours effectively and, if not, suggest improvements; audit lottery ticket sales; and work with the store manager to control losses.” Thus, for the first few weeks, the trainee performs little or no exempt work. After the training period ends (or if the trainee fails to complete the program), the trainee returns to a store manager position until a potential regional manager position opens and the manager successfully applies for it.
The employer was concerned about the trainee’s exempt status because “29 C.F.R. § 541.705 states, “exemptions do not apply to employees training for employment in an executive . . . capacity who are not actually performing the duties of an executive . . . employee.” In addition, “exemptions normally apply on a workweek by workweek basis.” However, there is also a federal district court case in which the plaintiff was found to be exempt during a period of training that was between two periods in which he qualified as an exempt systems engineer. Booth v. EDS Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1086, 1093 (D. Kan. 1992). (“[The plaintiff] has pointed to no evidence in the record that indicates that he or EDS considered phase two of the [training] program to be a separate employment position.”).
According to the Acting Wage and Hour Administrator, “[t]he fact that, during at least some of the weeks of training, the store managers do not perform significant amounts of exempt work, in and of itself, does not cause the store managers to lose their exempt status because the primary duty test for executives need not be met each and every workweek in all cases. In its 2004 revisions to 29 C.F.R. Part 541, the Department included this discussion in the preamble to the final regulations:
“As stated in the 1949 Weiss Report at 61, the search for an employee’s primary duty is a search for the ‘character of the employee’s job as a whole.’ Thus, both the current and final regulations ‘call for a holistic approach to determining an employee’s primary duty,’ not ‘day-by-day scrutiny of the tasks of managerial or administrative employees.’ Counts v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 317 F.3d 453, 456 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Nothing in the FLSA compels any particular time frame for determining an employee’s primary duty”). To clarify this ‘holistic approach,’ the Department has reinserted in subsection (a) the language from current 541.304 that the determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case ‘with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.’ 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,186 (Apr. 23, 2004) (emphasis in original).”
In this situation, the DOL found that “there is no reason to believe that the seven-week training program itself is an employment position in the company. Nor is it reasonable to conclude that the store managers’ primary duty changes during the seven weeks of training. These employees, who we are to assume have been employed as bona fide exempt store managers for years, remain exempt during the seven weeks of management training because their primary duty continues to be that of an exempt store manager. The training provided is of limited duration and does not consist of the performance of work that would otherwise be performed by nonexempt workers. The managers return to their normal exempt store manager duties following the training. Under these circumstances, where the trainees are employed in exempt positions and are temporarily reassigned to training for a different exempt position, it is our opinion that the exemption is not lost during the training period.”
Insomniacs can read the full letter opinion letter at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/opinion/FLSA/2008/2008_12_19_19_FLSA.htm.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
According to the inquiry, “[d]uring the training period, each of the store managers accompanies an area sales manager on visits to area stores, reviews store paperwork, addresses issues with the managers of the stores visited, investigates inventory shortages and violations of company policy, and attends sales meetings. At the beginning of the training period, the trainee simply “shadows” the area sales manager, but as the training progresses, the area sales manager delegates more and more duties to the trainee. By the end of the training period, it is the area sales manager who “shadows” the trainee.” During the training period, “trainees analyze sales figures, product returns, and inventory data to determine store performance; review data with the store manager and suggest improvements; review the hours worked by employees; approve payroll; determine whether the store manager allocates labor hours effectively and, if not, suggest improvements; audit lottery ticket sales; and work with the store manager to control losses.” Thus, for the first few weeks, the trainee performs little or no exempt work. After the training period ends (or if the trainee fails to complete the program), the trainee returns to a store manager position until a potential regional manager position opens and the manager successfully applies for it.
The employer was concerned about the trainee’s exempt status because “29 C.F.R. § 541.705 states, “exemptions do not apply to employees training for employment in an executive . . . capacity who are not actually performing the duties of an executive . . . employee.” In addition, “exemptions normally apply on a workweek by workweek basis.” However, there is also a federal district court case in which the plaintiff was found to be exempt during a period of training that was between two periods in which he qualified as an exempt systems engineer. Booth v. EDS Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1086, 1093 (D. Kan. 1992). (“[The plaintiff] has pointed to no evidence in the record that indicates that he or EDS considered phase two of the [training] program to be a separate employment position.”).
According to the Acting Wage and Hour Administrator, “[t]he fact that, during at least some of the weeks of training, the store managers do not perform significant amounts of exempt work, in and of itself, does not cause the store managers to lose their exempt status because the primary duty test for executives need not be met each and every workweek in all cases. In its 2004 revisions to 29 C.F.R. Part 541, the Department included this discussion in the preamble to the final regulations:
“As stated in the 1949 Weiss Report at 61, the search for an employee’s primary duty is a search for the ‘character of the employee’s job as a whole.’ Thus, both the current and final regulations ‘call for a holistic approach to determining an employee’s primary duty,’ not ‘day-by-day scrutiny of the tasks of managerial or administrative employees.’ Counts v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 317 F.3d 453, 456 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Nothing in the FLSA compels any particular time frame for determining an employee’s primary duty”). To clarify this ‘holistic approach,’ the Department has reinserted in subsection (a) the language from current 541.304 that the determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case ‘with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.’ 69 Fed. Reg. 22,122, 22,186 (Apr. 23, 2004) (emphasis in original).”
In this situation, the DOL found that “there is no reason to believe that the seven-week training program itself is an employment position in the company. Nor is it reasonable to conclude that the store managers’ primary duty changes during the seven weeks of training. These employees, who we are to assume have been employed as bona fide exempt store managers for years, remain exempt during the seven weeks of management training because their primary duty continues to be that of an exempt store manager. The training provided is of limited duration and does not consist of the performance of work that would otherwise be performed by nonexempt workers. The managers return to their normal exempt store manager duties following the training. Under these circumstances, where the trainees are employed in exempt positions and are temporarily reassigned to training for a different exempt position, it is our opinion that the exemption is not lost during the training period.”
Insomniacs can read the full letter opinion letter at http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/opinion/FLSA/2008/2008_12_19_19_FLSA.htm.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Monday, January 5, 2009
Delaware County Court of Appeals Reverses Employer’s Summary Judgment on Age Discrimination Claim of Fired Salesman With History of Declining Sales.
Last month, a divided Delaware County Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment on an age discrimination claim which had been entered in favor of an employer and against a salesman who had been terminated for poor performance. Peters v. Rock-Tenn Co., 2008-Ohio-6444. According to the court, the plaintiff alleged that he had been set up to fail by his employer when it doubled his sales quota and required him to sell new products. The employer showed that his sales had declined in each of the prior four years. Problematic for the employer, however, was evidence that the sales goal of the plaintiff’s significantly younger replacement was no greater than the plaintiff’s actual sales.
According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff alleged that he had been terminated from his sales job in January 2007 after 25 years of employment based on his age. In particular, he alleged “that he had been assigned additional duties without adequate support and training, as a pretext for terminating his employment.” In the year before his termination, his new supervisor both doubled his sales goals and required him to begin selling new products in territories already covered by existing sales agents. However, the sales goal of his significantly younger replacement was less than the plaintiff’s goal; the replacement was apparently only required to match what the plaintiff had sold in his last year of employment.
The employer contended that the plaintiff had been discharged for unsatisfactory performance. According to the employer, the plaintiff’s sales had actually decreased in each of the prior four years and he had only successfully solicited one new client in the last three year (which brought in less than $1,000 in sales commission). His supervisor testified that he was among the poorest performing salespeople. In essence, he was “coasting” on his existing client base and was no longer effective at generating new sales – or even maintaining his existing sales level.
However, the plaintiff produced evidence that he had received a large bonus for 2006, and that he had been commended by his supervisor for receiving a perfect satisfaction score from his largest customer. He also argued that by doubling his sales quota and assigning him new products to sell, the employer was setting him up to fail and shared the blame for his declining sales performance. Surprisingly, the court of appeals found this argument to be sufficient to create a material issue of disputed fact which could only be resolved by a jury trial and not by a judge on summary judgment.
The court indicated that it was rejecting supposed evidence of discriminatory intent -- based on a comment by a non-decisionmaker (a plant general manager) that he and the plaintiff were the “old” company – because it was isolated and ambiguous.
In his dissent, one judge noted that the plaintiff had admitted that the employer wanted all of its salespeople to meet his new goal and “the median age of the company’s salesmen was 55; all were over the age of forty, and half were older than” the plaintiff. Moreover, merely because the plaintiff was good at certain aspects of his job should not have obviated the employer’s concern with his inability to generate new sales in the last three years. Nonetheless, the case was remanded to a jury trial.
Insomniacs can read the court’s decision in full at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/5/2008/2008-ohio-6444.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff alleged that he had been terminated from his sales job in January 2007 after 25 years of employment based on his age. In particular, he alleged “that he had been assigned additional duties without adequate support and training, as a pretext for terminating his employment.” In the year before his termination, his new supervisor both doubled his sales goals and required him to begin selling new products in territories already covered by existing sales agents. However, the sales goal of his significantly younger replacement was less than the plaintiff’s goal; the replacement was apparently only required to match what the plaintiff had sold in his last year of employment.
The employer contended that the plaintiff had been discharged for unsatisfactory performance. According to the employer, the plaintiff’s sales had actually decreased in each of the prior four years and he had only successfully solicited one new client in the last three year (which brought in less than $1,000 in sales commission). His supervisor testified that he was among the poorest performing salespeople. In essence, he was “coasting” on his existing client base and was no longer effective at generating new sales – or even maintaining his existing sales level.
However, the plaintiff produced evidence that he had received a large bonus for 2006, and that he had been commended by his supervisor for receiving a perfect satisfaction score from his largest customer. He also argued that by doubling his sales quota and assigning him new products to sell, the employer was setting him up to fail and shared the blame for his declining sales performance. Surprisingly, the court of appeals found this argument to be sufficient to create a material issue of disputed fact which could only be resolved by a jury trial and not by a judge on summary judgment.
The court indicated that it was rejecting supposed evidence of discriminatory intent -- based on a comment by a non-decisionmaker (a plant general manager) that he and the plaintiff were the “old” company – because it was isolated and ambiguous.
In his dissent, one judge noted that the plaintiff had admitted that the employer wanted all of its salespeople to meet his new goal and “the median age of the company’s salesmen was 55; all were over the age of forty, and half were older than” the plaintiff. Moreover, merely because the plaintiff was good at certain aspects of his job should not have obviated the employer’s concern with his inability to generate new sales in the last three years. Nonetheless, the case was remanded to a jury trial.
Insomniacs can read the court’s decision in full at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/5/2008/2008-ohio-6444.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
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