New Act Expands Servicemember and Caregiver Leave under the FMLA.

As discussed in the February 13, 2008 posting at Servicemember Leave Amendments to the FMLA: Overdue or Raising More Questions Than Answered? , on January 28, 2008, President Bush signed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, § 585 of which amended the FMLA to create two new forms of family leave: exigency leave and caregiver leave for members of the families of military servicemembers. Yesterday, President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, which amended the NDAA Amendment to the FMLA. In this very long Act, section 565 amends the FMLA in a number of respects.

In short, the new FMLA amendments delete references to “contingency operations,” replaces “active duty” to “covered active duty,” expands exigency leave coverage to members of the families of active members of the regular armed forces (instead of just members of the reserved forces and national guard) and expands coverage of the 26-week servicemember leave to families of veterans who served in covered active duty at any point in the prior five years and were injured in the line of covered active duty.

First, the new amendment deletes the “newish” subsection (16) of the amended FMLA and amends the “newish” subsections (14), (15), and (19):

(14) ACTIVE DUTY.—The term ‘active duty’ means duty under a call or order to active duty under a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10, United States Code.
(15) CONTINGENCY OPERATION.—The term ‘contingency operation’ has the same meaning given such term in section 101(a)(13) of title 10, United States Code.
(16) COVERED SERVICEMEMBER.—The term ‘covered servicemember’ means a member of the Armed Forces, including a member of the National Guard or Reserves, who is undergoing medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy, is otherwise in outpatient status, or is otherwise on the temporary disability retired list, for a serious injury or illness.
. . .
(19) SERIOUS INJURY OR ILLNESS.—The term ‘serious injury or illness’, in the case of a member of the Armed Forces, including a member of the National Guard or Reserves, means an injury or illness incurred by the member in line of duty on active duty in the Armed Forces that may render the member medically unfit to perform the duties of the member’s office, grade, rank, or rating.

These “newish” subjections have been replaced by the following language:

(14) COVERED ACTIVE DUTY.—The term ‘covered active duty’ means—
‘‘(A) in the case of a member of a regular component of the Armed Forces, duty during the deployment of the member with the Armed Forces to a foreign country; and
(B) in the case of a member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces, duty during the deployment of the member with the Armed Forces to a foreign country under a call or order to active duty under a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10, United States Code.
(15) COVERED SERVICEMEMBER.—The term ‘covered servicemember’ means—
(A) a member of the Armed Forces (including a member of the National Guard or Reserves) who is undergoing medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy, is otherwise in outpatient status, or is otherwise on the temporary disability retired list, for a serious injury or illness; or
(B) a veteran who is undergoing medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy, for a serious injury or illness and who was a member of the Armed Forces (including a member of the National Guard or Reserves) at any time during the period of 5 years preceding the date on which the veteran undergoes that medical treatment, recuperation, or therapy.
. . .
(18) SERIOUS INJURY OR ILLNESS.—The term ‘serious injury or illness’—
(A) in the case of a member of the Armed Forces (including a member of the National Guard or Reserves), means an injury or illness that was incurred by the member in line of duty on active duty in the Armed Forces (or existed before the beginning of the member’s active duty and was aggravated by service in line of duty on active duty in the Armed Forces) and that may render the member medically unfit to perform the duties of the member’s office, grade, rank, or rating; and
‘‘(B) in the case of a veteran who was a member of the Armed Forces (including a member of the National Guard or Reserves) at any time during a period described in paragraph (15)(B), means a qualifying (as defined by the Secretary of Labor) injury or illness that was incurred
by the member in line of duty on active duty in the Armed Forces (or existed before the beginning of the member’s active duty and was aggravated by service in line of duty on active duty in the Armed Forces) and that manifested itself before or after the member became a veteran.

The “newish” subsections (16) through (19) have now been renumbered as paragraphs (15) through (18), respectively. In other words, the language of “newish” subjections (17) and (18) has not changed, but they have been renumbered to (16) and (17) and “newish” subjection (16) [on contingency operations] was deleted entirely.

Second, the new amendment modified 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(E), which currently provides:

(E) Because of any qualifying exigency (as the Secretary shall, by regulation, determine) arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on active duty (or has been notified of an impending call or order to active duty) in the Armed Forces in support of a contingency operation.

To the following language:

(E) Because of any qualifying exigency (as the Secretary shall, by regulation, determine) arising out of the fact that the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on covered active duty (or has been notified of an impending call or order to covered active duty) in the Armed Forces.

Third, 29 U.C.S. § 2612 (e)(3) has been amended as follows:

From the current language:

NOTICE FOR LEAVE DUE TO ACTIVE DUTY OF FAMILY MEMBER.—In any case in which the necessity for leave under subsection (a)(1)(E) is foreseeable, whether because the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee is on active duty, or because of notification of an impending call or order to active duty in support of a contingency operation, the employee shall provide such notice to the employer as is reasonable and practicable.

To the new language:

NOTICE FOR LEAVE DUE TO ACTIVE DUTY OF FAMILY MEMBER.—In any case in which the necessity for leave under subsection (a)(1)(E) is foreseeable, whether because the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee is on covered active duty, or because of notification of an impending call or order to covered active duty, the employee shall provide such notice to the employer as is reasonable and practicable.

Fourth, the new Act inserts the following language for 29 U.S.C. § 2611(19):

(19) VETERAN.— The term ‘veteran’ has the meaning given the term in section 101 of title 38, United States Code.

Finally, the employee’s duties regarding foreseeable leave under 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(A) have been amended as follows:

(2) Duties of employee.
In any case in which the necessity for leave under subparagraph (C) or (D) of subsection (a)(1) or under subsection (a)(3) of this section is foreseeable based on planned medical treatment, the employee -
(A) shall make a reasonable effort to schedule the treatment so as not to disrupt unduly the operations of the employer,subject to the approval of the health care provider of the employee or the health care provider of the son, daughter, spouse, parent, or covered servicemember of the employee, as appropriate; and

Revised FMLA regulations are sure to follow at some point . . . .

Insomniacs can read the new Act in its entirety at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h2647enr.txt.pdf

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Ohio Court of Appeals: Employer Not Entitled to Self-Help By Keeping Employee’s Pay Check When He Removed Information from the Company’s Laptop.

Last month, the Ohio Court of Appeals for Richland County affirmed a trial court judgment which held that an resigning employee was entitled to his salary and final paycheck which his former employer withheld when it discovered that he had deleted information from the employer’s laptop. Bush v. Signals Power and Grounding Specialists, Inc., 2009-Ohio-5095 (9/25/09). However, the court remanded the case in order for the trial court to determine whether the employee should be liable for converting the employer’s property by wiping clean the laptop’s hard drive.

According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff was employed to train his co-workers and to design and make presentations about the defendant’s business. In doing so, he developed a library of research which he stored on the laptop issued to him by the employer. When he decided to resign, he removed and/or wiped clean the hard drive of the laptop, erased the internet history and changed his password before returning it. Upon discovering that the information was missing, the employer emailed the plaintiff complaining about these actions and stating that he would not receive his final paycheck until this was all straightened out.

The employee then sued for his unpaid wages, unpaid vacation pay and unreimbursed employment expenses. The employer brought a counter-claim for conversion. The employee was ultimately awarded over $16,000 plus interest by the trial court, which dismissed the employer’s conversion counterclaim. The employer appealed.

Conversion consists essentially of retaining another’s property after its return has been requested. The trial court concluded that the employer could not prevail in this case because it had never demanded the return of its property. The employer argued both that it was not required to demand the return of its property under the circumstances and that, in any event, it had done so. The court of appeals agreed that the employer’s demand was a necessary element of the conversion claim, but that its email complaining about the deletion of the information and threatening to withhold the final paycheck until the matter was resolved could arguably constitute a demand for the return of its property under the circumstances. Therefore, the employer’s counterclaim was remanded back to the trial court to resolve on the merits.

The court of appeals also affirmed the verdict in favor of the employee’s wage claim. The employer argued that it was entitled to retain the employee’s wages because he had been a “faithless servant” by deleting/keeping the information library, etc. However, the court distinguished this situation from where an employee embezzles from his employer over time and the employer recoups his unpaid wages earned during the period of criminal faithlessness in order to minimize the amount of the theft. In this situation, the employee abruptly deleted the information in the minutes before he resigned and it was not accomplished over a lengthy period of time. Thus, retaining the wages he earned over the prior month was disproportionate to an action which took only a few minutes.

Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/5/2009/2009-ohio-5095.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

EEOC Proposes New Regulations Under ADAA.

Last week, the EEOC proposed new ADA regulations to implement the Americans With Disabilities Amendment Act (ADAA) which took affect on January 1, 2009. The new regulations were published this morning in the Federal Register. The EEOC published a Q&A brochure about the new regulations on its website last week. Among other things, the new regulations indicate the existence of per se disabilities and per se non-disabilities.

Impairments. The proposed regulations indicate that certain “impairments will consistently meet the definition of disability,” and assessment of the existence of a disability can be conducted quickly and easily in these situations, such as when the individual has cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, epilepsy, HIV or AIDS, multiple sclerosis, major depression, PTSD, etc. By way of comparison, other impairments may be disabling for some and not for others. Still others will typically not be considered disabilities, such as the common cold, seasonal or common flue, sprains, non-chronic gastrointestinal disorders, etc.

Major Life Activities. As discussed in a prior summary at Congress Passes ADA Amendments Act to Abrogate Pro-Employer Supreme Court Decisions, the ADAA broadened the definition of “major life activity” and provided that disability should be broadly construed in favor of coverage. With that in mind, the new proposed regulations specify that major life activities include “concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others”, etc. and that an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity if that person is limited in any one of those activities, regardless of whether the individual is substantially limited in the ability to work or limited “in the ability to perform activities of central importance to daily life.” Rather, “an impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered a disability.” Moreover, “[t]he comparison of an individual’s limitation to the ability of most people in the general population often may be made using a common sense standard, without resorting to scientific or medical evidence.”

That being said, the EEOC still proposes a regulation on what it means to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working. An impairment will be considered to substantially limit the ability to work “if it substantially limits an individual’s ability to perform, or to meet the qualifications for, the type of work at issue” which “includes the job the individual has the individual has been performing, or for which the individual is applying, and jobs with similar qualifications or job-related requirements which the individual would be substantially limited in performing because of the impairment.”

While there is a “transitory and minor” exception to “substantially working” for impairments which are not expected to last more than six months, this exception “does not establish a durational minimum for the definition of ‘disability’” for an actual disability or record of disability. “An impairment may substantially limit a major life activity even if it lasts, or is expected to last, for fewer than six months.” Notably, “the focus is on how a major life activity is substantially limited, not on what an individual can do in spite of an impairment.” In addition, “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active. Examples may include . . . asthma, . . . psychiatric disabilities, such as depression,” etc.

Mitigating Measures. The ADAA removed the “mitigating measures” doctrine from the consideration of what constitutes a covered disability, except with respect to the use of contacts or eye glasses. As stated in the proposed regulations, an individual who would be substantially limited in a major life activity without the use of medication or other mitigating measure would be considered to be disabled. By way of example, “[a]n individual who is taking a psychiatric medication for depression, . . . has a disability if there is evidence that the mental impairment, . . if left untreated, would substantially limit a major life activity.”

Record of Impairment. An individual has a covered record of disability if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” For example, “[a]n employee who in the past was misdiagnosed with bipolar disorder and hospitalized as the result of a temporary reaction to medication she was taking has a record of a substantially limiting impairment, even though she did not actually have bipolar disorder.”

Regarded As Disabled. An individuals will have a covered disability

if the individual is subjected to an action prohibited by this part, including . .denial of any other term, condition, or privilege of employment based on an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity. Proof that the individual was subjected to a prohibited employment action e.g., excluded from one job, because of an impairment other than an impairment that is transitory and minor . . . ) is sufficient to establish coverage. . . . Evidence that the employer believed the individual was substantially limited in any major life activity is not required.

(emphasis added).

“[C]overage can be established whether or not the employer was motivated by myths, fears, or stereotypes. . . an individual is regarded as disabled when an [employer] takes some action prohibited by the ADA . . . because of an actual or perceived impairment” or symptoms or “mitigating measures, such as medication that an individual uses because of an impairment.”

Proof that the individual was subjected to a prohibited employment action . . . is sufficient to establish coverage under the ‘regarded as’ definition . . . Evidence that the employer believed the individual was substantially limited in any major life activity is not required.

Employers are not required to provide reasonable accommodations to employees who are merely regarded as disabled, but are to employees who are actually disabled or have a record of disability.

Defenses. Employers may still defend accusations of disability discrimination by showing that the employee did not establish that he or she was otherwise qualified for the position based on a “qualification standard” that is “job related and consistent with business necessity,” or that she or she poses “a direct threat to health or safety based on the best available objective medical evidence and an individualized assessment of the risk if any, posed.” Employers may also argue that the impairment was both transitory and minor.

The EEOC will accept written comments on the proposed rules until November 23, 2009.

Insomniacs can read the proposed regulations at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-22840.pdf and the EEOC’s Questions and Answer brochure at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_adaaa_nprm.html.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

EEOC Obtains $4.5M Settlement Based on ADEA Disparate Impact Claim When Insurance Company Adopted Year-Long Hiring Freeze

On Friday, the EEOC announced “a major settlement of an age discrimination class lawsuit against Allstate Insurance Company, one of the nation’s largest insurers, for $4,500,000 to be paid to approximately 90 older former employees, in addition to significant remedial relief.”

The EEOC filed a lawsuit under the ADEA against Allstate in October 2004alleging “that in the year 2000 Allstate adopted a hiring moratorium for a period of one year, or while severance benefits were being received, that applied to all its employee-sales agents who were part of its Preparing For The Future Reorganization Program. The program was part of Allstate’s reorganization from employee agents to what the company considered independent contractors. The EEOC alleged that the policy had a disproportionate impact on Allstate’s employees over the age of 40 because more than 90 percent of the agents subjected to the hiring moratorium were 40 years of age or older. Allstate denies that its hiring moratorium violated the ADEA.” Disparate impact claims were recognized by the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson.

The terms of the settlement, which is “pending approval by U.S. District Judge E. Richard Webber in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (Civil Action No. 4:04CV01359 ERW), Allstate will pay former employees who sought employment -- or would have sought employment with the company in the absence of its policy -- a total of $4.5 million to be divided among the class via a settlement fund. The order, in effect for three years, also provides for discrimination prevention training, posting of notices, reporting and monitoring, and other relief designed to educate Allstate managers in order to prevent future violations of the ADEA.” A 2007 settlement for $250,000 of disparate treatment claims under ADEA brought by two individual employees is not part of this larger settlement agreement.

Insomniacs can read the full press release at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-11-09a.html.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth and Third Circuits Address Employment Discrimination Against Gay and Lesbian Employees.

At the end of August, the federal Sixth and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal both addressed the same issue: whether gay and lesbian employees could pursue religion discrimination claims under Title VII against employers who discriminated against them on account of their sexual orientation. In both cases, the Courts refused to permit the employees to pursue religion discrimination claims under Title VII on the grounds that they were not being discriminated against because of their religious or other voluntary beliefs, but rather, because of who they were. However, in both cases, the Court found possible alternative theories of relief for the plaintiffs. In the Sixth Circuit, the Court found the plaintiffs could maintain a constitutional First Amendment claim against the non-profit employer on account of legislative appropriations to that specific agency. Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptists Homes for Children, Inc., No. 08-5583 (6th Cir. 8/31/09). In the Third Circuit, the court found the plaintiff could pursue a sex-stereotyping claim on the grounds that he was being discriminated against for not being a stereotypical macho, blue-collar man. Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., No. 07-3997 (3rd Cir. 8/28/09).

Title VII Claims

The Pedreira plaintiff was terminated from her position with the non-profit children’s home “because her admitted homosexual lifestyle is contrary to Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children core values.” After her termination, the employer announced a policy of refusing to employ any homosexuals. She brought a claim under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, which was analyzed as a Title VII claim. The Court, however, found that she failed to state a claim for relief: “Pedreira does not allege that her sexual orientation is premised on her religious beliefs or lack thereof, nor does she state whether she accepts or rejects Baptist beliefs. While there may be factual situations in which an employer equates an employee’s sexuality with her religious beliefs or lack thereof, in this case, Pedreira has “failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” See also Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (Title VII does not encompass discrimination on account of sexual orientation). In short, the plaintiff did not allege that her sexual orientation was a voluntary decision akin to religious beliefs and practices. Another plaintiff brought a failure to hire claim on the grounds that she did not apply for a social worker opening because of the employer’s homophobic policy. The court surprisingly dismissed that claim on the grounds it was speculative (in that she never applied for a job) instead of on the grounds that such discrimination is not actionable under either Title VII or the KCRA. Thus, the possibility remains that the Sixth Circuit could recognize a case of sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII under a different factual situation.

The Prowell plaintiff was involuntarily laid off after he complained about workplace harassment on account of his sexual orientation. He filed suit, claiming that he was unlawfully discriminated against in violation of Title VII on account of his sex and religion. Like the Pedreira case, the Third Circuit dismissed the religion discrimination claim because his testimony showed that he was discriminated against on account of his sexual orientation, not his beliefs or the religious beliefs of others. Like the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit had previously determined that Title VII did not encompass discrimination on account of sexual orientation. Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir.2001).


However, the Third Circuit found that the Prowell plaintiff could pursue a sex stereotyping claim to the same extent that a woman could. The plaintiff described himself as an “effeminate man” and claimed he did not fit in with his other male co-workers because he did not conform to gender stereotypes. Because the facts of the harassment showed that the plaintiff had been harassed about his non-macho mannerisms and lifestyle even before his sexual orientation became public knowledge, he could show that his discrimination was related to the fact that he did not conform to societal stereotypes about how a “real” man is supposed to act. Title VII has for some years now prohibited discrimination against women who did not fit societal stereotypes of “ladies.”

First Amendment Claims

In Pedreira, the plaintiffs also brought a taxpayer suit challenging state support of a non-profit with a religious mission on the grounds that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. “In their amended complaint, they refer to the Kentucky statutes authorizing the funding of services such as KBHC. However, nowhere in the record before the district court did the plaintiffs explain what the nexus is between their suit and a federal legislative action. The district court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations were more akin to those in Hein, which raised a general Establishment Clause challenge to federal agencies’ use of federal money to promote the President’s faith-based initiatives.” In the end, the Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing as federal taxpayers, but not as state taxpayers.

“As with federal taxpayer standing, the plaintiffs must demonstrate “a good-faith pocketbook” injury to demonstrate state taxpayer standing . . . . The plaintiffs point to the alleged $100 million received by KBHC from Kentucky as the requisite “pocketbook” injury . . . . the Kentucky legislature also appropriated sums of money specifically to KBHC. 2005 Ky. Laws Ch. 173 (HB 267) (H)(10)(5), available at http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/05RS/HB267.htm. Unlike in the federal taxpayer analysis,the plaintiffs have alleged a “concrete and particularized” injury.”

In addition, “the plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated a link between the challenged legislative actions and the alleged constitutional violations, namely that Kentucky’s statutory funding for neglected children in private childcare facilities knowingly and impermissibly funds a religious organization. As discussed above, the plaintiffs have pointed to Kentucky statutory authority, legislative citations acknowledging KBHC’s participation, and specific legislative appropriations to KBHC. Through these specifications, the plaintiffs have demonstrated a nexus between Kentucky and its allegedly impermissible funding of a pervasively sectarian institution.”

Insomniacs can read the full court decisions at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0316p-06.pdf and http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/073997p.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.