Wednesday, May 5, 2010

Montgomery County Appellate Court Rejects Perceived Disability Discrimination Claim Based on Prior Accommodations

Last week, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals in Dayton affirmed summary judgment for a public school, although on different grounds than the judgment granted by the trial court. In short, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Political Subdivision and Tort Liability Act (PSTLA) did not apply to bar claims for employment discrimination, but that the plaintiff failed to properly plead or prove a prima facie case for disability discrimination based on her alleged multi-chemical sensitivity allergies. Ogilbee v. Board of Education of Dayton Public Schools, 2010-Ohio-1913, 23432.

According to the Court, the plaintiff clerical assistant alleged that she suffered from multi-chemical sensitivity, which was an allergy to certain perfumes and fragrances which gave her migraine headaches and restricted her ability to breath, sleep, concentrate and walk. Her union refused to assist her when she claimed that her allergies were exacerbated by a new work assignment because it was a "personal problem." She asked HR to be relocated to an empty office or other space or even another building, but these suggestions were rejected as unreasonable. Instead, the school gave her an air purifier and a fan and arranged for a contractor to rearrange her work space. According to the School, she refused to use them without explanation. After she filed a Charge of Discrimination, the School entered into a negotiated settlement agreement and transferred her to another position in another building. The School again attempted to accommodate her by permitting her to annually explain to her co-workers her need for them to not wear perfume, but she believed that after a year that some staff purposely "doused" themselves in perfume and the principal began acting on her complaints less and less. By 2006, the principal would no longer permit her to make her annual announcement. When she arrived at work with a note from her physician indicating that she needed to work in a space free from perfumes and strong odors because they exacerbate her migraine headaches and she had exhausted her paid leave, the School responded shortly thereafter by placing her on a one-year unpaid medical leave of absence because her requested accommodation was unreasonable in that she worked "in a reception area at a public school with over 800 students, 100+ employees, and the public who visit the school on a daily basis. There is no way that a scent-free environment can be guaranteed." When the School refused to reinstate her the following year when there had been no change in her medical condition, she filed a lawsuit in state court alleging disability discrimination and harassment. The trial court found that the School had PSTLA immunity.

Generally, under the PSTLA, "political subdivisions are not liable in damages for injury, death, or loss caused by them in connection with the execution of their functions. See R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). The PSTLA however does not apply to claims by an employee that relate to any matter that "arises out of the employment relationship." R.C. 2744.09(B)." Mysteriously, the trial court concluded that an employment discrimination claim does not arise out of the employment relationship and is more akin to an intentional court. In light of contrary authority to the contrary, the appellate court had no difficulty finding otherwise.

As for her disability discrimination claim, the court construed her argument as applying on to a perceived disability claim and concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the School's HR Director perceived her allergy and migraine headaches to substantially limit any major life activities, including working. In particular, the Court rejected her argument that the School must have perceived her as disabled because it made several attempts to accommodate her allergy:

While lay people may think of an allergy as a disability, a "disability" in this context is, as we discussed above, a technical term with a very specific meaning. Also, [Plaintiff] makes much of the fact that [the HR Director], and others, tried, unsuccessfully, to accommodate her allergy, which she argues shows he thought she was disabled. But simply because an employer tries to make an employee's working-environment more comfortable by attempting to accommodate a particular physical characteristic does not mean that he thinks the employee has a "disability." As the statute makes clear, not every physical or mental impairment qualifies as a "disability." From the evidence, it appears that [the HR Director] considered [Plaintiff] to have an allergy, and he did all he thought reasonable to accommodate the allergy. No evidence suggests that [the HR Director] treated the allergy as severely limited her ability to work. [Plaintiff's] naked assertions about [the HR Director's] thoughts and motivations are not sufficient; she "'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'"

The Court does not explain how the School's placement of the plaintiff on a one-year unpaid medical leave was merely a reaction to a non-disabling allergy or how such action by the School was insufficient evidence that it perceived her as substantially limited by her allergy. It also does not explain why there was not enough of a factual dispute for a jury to consider. Perhaps the plaintiff never made the argument in her brief. In any event, the court granted summary judgment for the employer.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, April 26, 2010

Sixth Circuit: Job Applicants Did Not Knowingly Waive Limitations Period or Judicial Review of Claims


This morning, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion reversing summary judgment in favor of an employer which had required all job applicants to agree to a six month statute of limitations for all employment claims and to waive their right to file a lawsuit (in favor of non-union labor-management internal grievance review board). Alonso v. Huron Valley Ambulance, Inc., No. 09-1812 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court determined that the plaintiffs' signatures on the forms were not knowing and voluntary sufficient to waive their statutory rights under the circumstances of the case. Surprisingly, the Court did not address the substantive or procedural safeguards which existed or were lacking in the employer's dispute resolution process. Instead, it focused almost exclusively on how the information was haphazardly presented to the plaintiff employees during the application process. In particular, the plaintiffs were not given enough detail about the process until more than a month after they were hired (and had signed the agreements) and were never given the opportunity to revoke the agreements.


According to the Court's opinion, all employees were required to sign job applications which contained the following provisions:


The last page of the application contained a section preceded by the phrase, "PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING BEFORE SIGNING." The section contained, among other things, notice of an internal grievance procedure for employment related disputes, and a six-month limitations period for any employment-related claims. The internal grievance procedure provision provided:


Any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of my employment by the Company, or termination thereof, including by way of example but not limitation, disputes concerning alleged civil rights violations, breach of contract or tort, shall be exclusively subject to review by the Grievance Review Board. Any decision of the Review Board shall be binding to both parties, and enforceable in circuit court.

Additionally, the statute of limitations provision provided:



I further recognize that if employed by the Company, I agree, in partial consideration for my employment, that I shall not commence any action or other legal proceeding relating to my employment or termination thereof more than six months after the termination of my employment and agree to waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.


Once employees were hired, they were given a procedural manual during orientation. The manual describes the four-step grievance process and directs them to an internal policy, which, among other things, provides that "The Grievance Review Board's decision will be final and binding on both the employee and the company."


One of the plaintiffs was ultimately terminated for allegedly falsifying military leave and taking (prescription) drugs which put him in an altered mental state. He utilized the grievance process and then after his termination was upheld, he filed a lawsuit under USERRA, OSHA's whistleblower statute and an unnamed federal statute prohibiting retaliation for filing EEOC Charges. His wife (and co-worker) did not utilize the grievance procedure, but filed a similar lawsuit alleging harassment, and retaliation.


Although the plaintiffs challenged the employer's dispute resolution process on a number of grounds (including USERRA's absence of limitations period and waiver provisions), the Court only addressed whether the plaintiffs' waiver was knowing and intelligent:




Here, Appellants were educated and gave no indication that they did not understand the waivers they were signing, and they successfully used the grievance process on multiple occasions prior to contending that they did not knowingly and intelligently waive their right to a judicial forum. The waiver, however, did not include any information regarding the Grievance Review Board or the procedures that would be used in place of a judicial proceeding. The initial waiver, signed as part of the four-page employment application, read:


Any dispute arising out of or in connection with any aspect of my employment by the Company, or termination thereof, including by way of example but not limitation, disputes concerning alleged civil rights violations, breach of contract or tort, shall be exclusively subject to review by the Grievance Review Board. Any decision of theReview Board shall be binding to both parties, and enforceable in the circuit court.


Plaintiffs alleged "that they were not given any further information regarding the Grievance Review Board until they received an Employee Handbook at Orientation, nearly a month after they were hired. The Employee Handbook outlined the Grievance Review Board procedures in general terms as a four-step process. The Handbook instructed employees to reference Administrative Policy #415, which was located online. That Policy, in turn, provided a detailed explanation of how the Grievance Review Board operated."


At the time the [plaintiffs] signed waivers of their rights to a judicial forum, they had no idea what the Grievance Review Board process entailed. They were never informed of their right to revoke their waiver. They were not given any documentation regarding the process until almost a month after they began their employment with HVA. Even then, the document they were given described the process in general terms, and pointed them to a website where they could find additional, more detailed information. They cannot be said to have knowingly and voluntarily waived their right to a judicial forum when they were not informed of the alternative procedures until a month after they began working for HVA. Cf. Seawright, 507 F.3d at 971 (explaining extensive efforts taken by defendant employer to inform employees of new dispute resolution procedures before requiring employees to waive all rights to a judicial forum).


The court rejected the provisions shortening the statute of limitations on the same grounds.




NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, April 22, 2010

Ohio Courts: When Commuting to and From Work Arises Out of Employment

There have been a number of decisions over the last month which addressed whether an employer was liable for injuries to or caused by an employee while the employee was arguably off duty and even off the employer's premises. Therefore, it seemed to be a good time to review when an employer can find itself in legal trouble because of an employee who was not even at work at the time of the incident.

In the first case, a municipal housing inspector slipped and fell on the ice in a restaurant parking lot while he was walking back to his car following his daily, paid rest/coffee break to complete his trip from his office to a home which he had planned to inspect. Miller v. Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 2010-Ohio-1347. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the grounds that the coming-and-going rule precluded coverage for an employee with a fixed site of employment who was coming or going from work. The employee argued that he was still on duty at the time of the accident – albeit on a paid coffee break. The Court of Appeals agreed that while the coming-and-going rule might bar coverage for a similar accident during an unpaid lunch break, it might not bar coverage for paid rest breaks:

However, the same is not true of coffee breaks and other breaks taken for the employee's personal comfort, even when the employee is injured while off of the employer's work premises. . . . Unlike the unpaid lunch break, it is generally accepted that although an employee is not technically performing his work duties during a break, taking a break for personal comfort is deemed to be incidental to the employment and therefore in the course of and arising out of the employment. . . . Thus, in examining whether an off-premises break arises out of and in the course of the employment, the issue cannot be resolved solely through the mere determination of the fixed status of the employment and automatic application of the coming and going rule. The court must inquire into the specific circumstances of the injury to determine work-connectedness. Such factors could include the time of the break, whether the break is a right fixed by the employment contract, whether it is a paid break, whether there are any restrictions as to where the employee can take the break, and whether the employee's activity during the break constituted a
substantial personal deviation.

In addition, the court found that the injury occurred in the course of his employment because he "was required to leave his office building in order to satisfy the duties of his employment. Further, consistent with his employment contract, he was entitled to take a fifteen-minute coffee break at a time and location of his choosing. [He] then sustained an injury at a time when he was engaged in the permissible activities of employment. The risk of his injury was a risk inherently related to the nature of his employment and he would not have sustained the injury had he not been required to leave the office in order to satisfy his work duties." Further, the court found that the accident took place in proximity to his regular place of employment because: he "was at a place he could reasonably be expected to be at the time of injury in light of his employment duties and given that he had not deviated from his employment to engage in some activity of a purely personal nature. In addition, he was at a location that was reasonable in light of the location of the inspection site." The court also found that the employer had some degree of control over the employee because it "had control over the time and place where [he] could take his break and elected not to place any restriction upon [him]." Finally, in a mind-twisting move, the court found that the employer benefitted from the employee's rest break in that the employee would then feel renewed and re-energized to continue working.

Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the employer's summary judgment and directed entry of judgment in favor of the employee.

In the second case, Sammetinger v. Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 2010-Ohio-1500, a construction manager was injured in a single car accident when driving home after his regular shift when his son (a fellow employee) fell asleep while driving the company truck issued to the father/manager. The manager commuted to the Powell worksite from his home in Wapakoneta each day in a truck assigned to him by his employer. However, as a manager, his duties were not limited to the construction shift. He often stayed after work to conduct inventory and frequently ran errands in the company issued truck during and after the construction shift. These errands included picking up gasoline and ice for the crew during his commute and taking home company tools to be stored safely in his garage each night. He also frequently fielded cell phone calls while he was commuting to and from work. On the evening of the accident, he was too tired to drive home and asked his son – a fellow employee – to drive instead. Apparently, the son was sleepy as well, fell asleep during the drive and the father/manager was severely injured.

The father/manager brought, among other things, a claim for workers compensation benefits against his employer and sued the employer's insurance company under the UM/UIM portion of the employer's insurance policy (since their son had been driving a company-owned vehicle). The employer denied that the father/manager had been injured in the course of his employment and, thus, would not be covered by workers compensation. The son argued that he was immune from suit as a fellow employee under the workers' compensation statute. The trial court found that the father/manager's injuries were covered by workers' compensation because he was injured in the scope of his employment, and granted summary judgment to the son on the UM/UIM claim because he was a fellow employee.

To be covered by workers' compensation, the injury must occur in the course of and arise out of the employee's employment.

The phrase "in the course of employment" limits compensable injuries to those sustained by an employee while performing a required duty in the employer's service. "To be entitled to workmen's compensation, a workman need not necessarily be injured in the actual performance of work for his employer." An injury is compensable if it is sustained by an employee while that employee engages in activity that is consistent with the contract for hire and logically related to the employer's business. . . . .

Generally, "an employee with a fixed place of employment, who is injured while traveling to and from the place of employment, is not entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Fund because the requisite causal connection between injury and the employment does not exist." MTD Products, Inc. v. Robatin (1991), 61 Ohio.St.3d 66, 68, 572 N.E.2d 661, citing Bralley, supra. However, there are exceptions to the general rule barring compensation when the injury occurs while the employee is "coming and going" to and from his place of employment: if the injury occurs in the "zone of employment;" if it was a result of a "special hazard" of the employment; or if, based upon the totality of the circumstances, there is a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the employment to warrant compensation. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has long recognized that exceptions exist to the requirement that the injury must be suffered at or near the place of employment or within the zone of employment:

(1) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment; * * * and (3) where the employee is charged while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home with some duty in connection with his employment.

In this case, the parties agreed that the father/manager had a fixed site of employment. Nonetheless, the court found that "he was acting for the benefit of his employer when he was injured and thus entitled to workers' compensation given the totality of the circumstances surrounding his injuries." The Court was particularly influenced by the amount of post-shift activities and the fact the employer had never prohibited post-shift work:

[The father/manager] closed down the masonry work on the high school and loaded up the pick-up truck that was assigned to him by [the employer] with tools and equipment belonging to [the employer] for transport to and safe-keeping in [the father/manager]'s garage at home. Every day on his way home, he stopped for gas, which was needed to operate a number of tools for the construction . . . the following day. He also stopped to purchase ice for the following day because fresh ice was required by contract to be provided by [the employer] to the workers at the site every day. [The father/manager] also refueled his work truck every other day because the truck was needed to provide him with transportation to and from the site, to provide ransportation for other workers who may have needed a ride, and to deliver [the father/manager]'s paperwork to [his boss] in Lima once a week. The truck was also assigned to [the father/manager] for use on errands such as picking up equipment from other [the employer]' job sites to be used at the high school or to make a run to a local hardware store during the day, and to transport the water containers and ice to and from the job site every day. The ice and gas purchases, which always occurred either in Russells Point or Wapakoneta, were made with a credit card provided by [the employer]

{¶31} Once he was home, [the father/manager] parked the truck in his garage in order to protect the tools and equipment in the truck from theft because a fair amount of tools had been stolen from the job site. In addition, [the father/manager] occasionally performed small repairs and maintenance on some of these tools and pieces of equipment at his home. He also cleaned the water containers and re-filled them at his home because the contract required [the employer] to supply fresh water to the workers every day. Often times, he had a significant amount of paperwork with him to complete because he was unable to finish it during the day because his attention was needed in some other function of his job. Therefore, he would complete this paperwork at home.

{¶32} Throughout the day, beginning at approximately 5:00 a.m. and continuing until approximately 10:00 p.m., [the father/manager] received phone calls on his employer-provided cellular phone. As previously noted, these calls were for a variety of work-related issues. Often times these calls occurred in the morning while [the father/manager] was going to the job site or during the afternoon while he was coming home from the job site. He also received work-related calls at his home.

{¶33} Indisputably, with the exception of an occasional call from his wife, all of these actions by [the father/manager] were directly for the benefit of his employer . . . While the location where [the father/manager] bought the ice and gas was of his own choosing, stopping to purchase these items, bringing home the containers to clean them and fill them with fresh water, transporting the tools and equipment for safekeeping, completing his paperwork for timely delivery to [his boss] every week, and receiving and making phone calls whenever and wherever, were all performed solely for [the employer]' benefit and in an effort to further its best interests. In fact, [the father/manager] summarized it best in his deposition: "My scope of employment doesn't end at 3:30 and doesn't start at 7 o'clock. There are responsibilities that go with my position that I can't control that need to be done, and I'm good at what I do, therefore I do it." Once again, [the employer] presented no evidence to contradict this statement by
[the father/manager] or any of the foregoing evidence regarding the work-related use of the company truck by [the father/manager].

{¶34} [The employer] also presented no evidence to demonstrate that [the father/manager]'s off-site activities were prohibited by it or that [the father/manager] was ever instructed to complete his tasks in a different manner. Although the credit card receipts would have shown that the gasoline and ice were being purchased at a location over fifty miles away from the job site, as well as the undoubtedly high amount of gasoline that was being purchased to drive the truck from Wapakoneta to the high school and back every day, the record is devoid of any evidence that [the employer] told [the father/manager] to purchase these items closer to the job site and not to use its truck and gasoline for daily transportation to and from his home. To the contrary, [the employer], at a minimum, acquiesced to [the father/manager] making these purchases far from the job site and to using the truck for his daily commute.

{¶35} Further, there is no evidence that [the father/manager] was ever instructed not to deliver his paperwork to [his boss's] home, not to complete it at his home, not to work on, transport, or house any of the equipment at his home, or not to make and receive work-related calls after he left the job site. Rather, the evidence indicates that [the father/manager]'s position as a supervisor required him to shoulder a number of responsibilities, to act in the best interest of [the employer]' business, and to do what was necessary to effectively fulfill his role as supervisor, whether he was at the job site, off the job site, or en route to accomplish one of his many required tasks. Moreover, [the employer] provided him with a vehicle, which he never used for personal business, and a phone to aid him in his duties. In sum, the evidence demonstrates that in many ways, the truck, which was under [the employer]' control, was [the father/manager]'s mobile work place.

{¶36} Furthermore, at the time of the accident, [the father/manager] had not completed his work for the day. The accident occurred at a point located between the [construction site] and Russells Point. Russells Point was one of two locations where [the father/manager] always stopped for gas and ice, the other being in Wapakoneta, which [the father/manager] had yet to reach. Thus, [the father/manager] was still en route to purchase the gasoline and ice for the following day when the accident occurred. He also had yet to clean and fill the water containers for the following day. As was customary for him, he was also transporting a number of tools from the high school to his home for safe-keeping at the time he was injured. In addition, shortly before the accident, [the father/manager] received a work-related call on his cellular phone.

{¶37} In short, [the employer] provided the vehicle in which [the father/manager] was injured as an incident to his employment; at a minimum, [the employer] acquiesced to the performance of some of his job duties being conducted on his way to and from work and at his home; it benefitted from the use of his garage to safely keep the vehicle and a
number of its tools and equipment overnight; and [the employer] required [the father/manager] to handle phone calls related to its business whenever they might occur, including on his drive to and from the job site and at his home. While [the employer] may not have directly paid [the father/manager] for each minute he spent doing its business while en route to and from work and at home, as [the father/manager] admitted he never charged his employer for the time he spent after the job site closed for the day on any phone calls, getting gas and ice, cleaning and filling the water containers, or maintaining and repairing the equipment he transported, this fact is of little consequence in light of the benefit [the employer] undoubtedly received from him.

{¶38} Thus, given the broad spectrum of responsibilities that [the father/manager] had as a masonry supervisor for [the employer], as well as the undisputed fact that these responsibilities necessitated him performing some of them away from the high school, including while en route to and at his home, the only reasonable conclusion in examining the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding [the father/manager]'s injuries is that they occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment for [the employer].

Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment against the employer on the workers' compensation claim.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, April 19, 2010

Deadline for Federal COBRA Subsidy Again Extended

Last week, Congress passed the Continuing Extension Act of 2010, which among other things, extends unemployment benefits through June 2, 2010 and again extends the federal COBRA subsidy until May 31, 2010. However, the length of time (15 months) for which an individual may receive the COBRA subsidy has not been extended. In addition, the CEA maintains the new provision from the Temporary Extension Act of 2010 which provides that individuals who experience a COBRA qualifying event of a reduction in working hours (which renders them ineligible for medical insurance even though they remain employed part-time) before March 1, 2010, but are laid off after March 1, 2010 are eligible for the COBRA subsidy. The Department of Labor has not yet amended the COBRA notifications which employers must send to eligible employees (and its website still refers to the March 31 date).

The Ohio Department of Insurance reports that on February 25, 2010, Govenor Strickland also signed a bill to authorize the temporary extension of the period of time which the laid-off employees of small employers (i.e., with less than 20 employees who are not subject to the federal COBRA statute) from 12 months to 15 months for as long as a federal COBRA subsidy is available. The ODOI website also still mentions the March 31, 2010 deadline from the TEA and has not yet addressed the affect, if any, of the CEA.

More information about the COBRA subsidy and the notices employers are required to send is available at Employers Must Send Amended COBRA Notices and DOL Publishes Model Notices for COBRA Subsidy Under Stimulus Act to Be Sent by Employers Before April 18.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Friday, April 16, 2010

Sixth Circuit Puts Burden on Employer to Assure that Harassment Stops After Employee’s First Complaint.



Today, the federal Sixth Circuit of Appeals released an unanimous opinion affirming the award of $1,039,504 in compensatory and punitive damages, back pay, and front pay (but which does not yet include court costs or attorney fees) to a female plaintiff who quit her job paying less than $10/hour after only five weeks on the job because she was sexually harassed by co-workers. West v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 08-6516 (6th Cir. 4/16/10). While the amount of the verdict is enough by itself to get an employer's attention, this case is particularly instructive in watching how many times management dropped the ball despite having good policies and procedures in place because apparently no one was enforcing those policies or administering those procedures when it came to this plaintiff. Moreover, the Court found that the employer was on notice of the continuation of the sexual harassment following the employee's first complaint even though she did not complain to her supervisor again before walking off the job permanently. Therefore, this is a particularly instructive case for human resources professionals.



According to the Court's opinion, the plaintiff worked on an assembly line. She attended an employee orientation which covered the employer's sexual harassment policy twice, and was informed that all sexual harassment complaints would be investigated within two weeks and that the investigation would be kept confidential. Nonetheless, in that same first week, she was harassed verbally by a number of co-workers and within two more weeks the harassment escalated to inappropriate touching which put her in tears. When she reported the harassment to the lead lineperson and her supervisor – giving names and examples of the offending the conduct, she was advised not to take it personally because they're like that to all women and it was because she was "hot." When they saw she was not amused, they said they would look into it, asked her not to report this to HR and then later offered her a transfer to a different location. While the plaintiff thought that her supervisor would report this to HR, instead he just watched out for her for a few days. Nonetheless, the harassment continued for the next two weeks, escalated to groping and she stopped going to work after being followed out to the parking lot by the alleged harassers because she feared getting raped. The employer notified her that it was treating her absence as job abandonment and fired her.



The employer refused to give her the last paycheck until she completed an exit interview. At that point, she met with her first HR employee for 45 minutes and recounted in detail how she had been harassed, how she had reported it to her supervisor and how it had continued even after he transferred her to another location. He promised that an investigation would be conducted within two weeks in accordance with company policy. However, instead of specifically alerting someone or investigating it himself, the HR employee passed on his notes (on the exit interview form) to the inbox of an HR clerk and the form was never seen again. Yet another employee quit because of sexual harassment shortly thereafter and, again, no investigation was conducted.



More than a month later, the plaintiff filed a Charge with the EEOC and the employer received it a few weeks later. At that point, an investigation commenced and a search of over 2300 files was made to find the missing exit interview form. When the form could not be found, a cursory investigation was conducted, but it did not include the HR employee who conducted plaintiff's exit interview, or the offending employees. The employer told the EEOC that it had conducted an investigation after the plaintiff's exit interview, that her complaints to her supervisor had been nonspecific and that she asked him not to report it to HR. Apparently, however, the employer disciplined a number of employees for not reporting the plaintiff's concerns to HR, but not the HR employee who conducted her exit interview.



Most of these facts did not come out, however, until litigation commenced at the end of the year and the employees and supervisors testified under oath. The Court refused to exclude evidence of the employer's post-termination investigation on the grounds that it showed how the employer failed to take prompt remedial action and had shown manifest indifference to her concerns (which was relevant to punitive damages). It also instructed the jury that it was permitted to conclude that the employer "lost" the exit interview notes because the information was favorable to the plaintiff. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff and the trial court agreed during post-trial motions.



The Supervisor's Response to the Plaintiff's Complaint Was Ineffective and He Was at Fault for Not Confirming with Her that the Harassment Had Stopped.



The Court of Appeals affirmed because "[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the jury reasonably could have found that [the employer] knew or should have known of the harassment and that [the employer's] response reflected an attitude of permissiveness." In addition,



a reasonable jury could have concluded from the evidence that [her supervisor] failed to take a number of steps that would clearly be necessary to establish a base level of reasonably appropriate corrective action under the circumstances, such as speaking with the specific individuals identified by [the plaintiff], following up with [the plaintiff] regarding whether the harassment was continuing, and reporting the harassment to others in management. [The supervisor's] failure to do these things at any time supports the conclusion that his response was neither prompt nor appropriate.



The Court had little sympathy for the supervisor when he testified that he thought the harassment had stopped because the plaintiff never complained to him again because she could have relied on his promise to "take care of it." This finding alone should trouble employers because other court decisions have protected employers from continuing harassment claims when the plaintiff failed to notify the employer that the initial remedial actions were insufficient. This case puts the burden on the employer to check back with the complaining employee to ensure that the remedial actions were effective.



The Court also rejected the employer's contention that it could not be held liable for the harassment because it did not have knowledge of it. As the court noted: "In the context of sexual harassment claims, actual notice is established by proof that management knew of the harassment." Thus, when the plaintiff told her supervisor, who had authority to receive sexual harassment complaints and to conduct an investigation, the employer was put on notice as well. To the extent that the employer's ignorance was based on the plaintiff's failure to complain a second time to her supervisor about the continuation of the harassment, "management's ignorance was the result of [the employer's] failure to respond appropriately to the original complaint by, for example, investigating the complaint, speaking to the harassers, or checking back with [the plaintiff], and such failure cannot be used as a shield against a claim of sexual harassment."



The Loss of a Key Piece of Evidence Can Be Held Against an Employer.



The Court also found that it was appropriate to instruct the jury that if it:



believe[s] that the [exit interview] notes are missing as the result of the unjustified or careless actions or inactions of [the employer], or any of its agents, then you may, but are not required to, draw an inference that the missing evidence would be favorable to the Plaintiff and adverse to the Defendant.



The Court also rejected the employer's argument that it was an abuse of trial court discretion to permit evidence about the plaintiff's complaint during her exit interview and the employer's post-termination investigation because it was not relevant to her constructive discharge claim and would confuse the jury about when liability attached for the sexual harassment. However, such evidence was relevant to the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because the employer's post-termination conduct was relevant to its good faith in responding to her complaint. Moreover, considering the significant amount of other evidence about the employer's indifference and the existence of sexual harassment, the prejudicial affect on the jury was found to be minimal.



The Plaintiff's Constructive Discharge Was Foreseeable and Caused by the Employer's Indifference.



The Court also rejected the employer's attack on the plaintiff's constructive discharge claim:



A claim of constructive discharge requires a determination that "working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982). "To determine if there is a constructive discharge, both the employer's intent and the employee's objective feelings must be examined." Logan v. Denny's Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001). An employer's intent can be shown if the employee quitting is a foreseeable consequence of the employer's actions. An employee who quits has "an obligation not to assume the worst, and not to jump to conclusions too fast."



In this case, because there was evidence that the employer tolerated "badgering, harassment, or humiliation" in that at least the plaintiff's supervisor was aware of the alleged harassment and failed to adequately address them. "The jury could have reasonably found that this evidenced a deliberate choice to allow intolerable working conditions." Moreover, the Court found it was foreseeable – even likely that the plaintiff would resign under the circumstances.



It is foreseeable that, after weeks of continuous physical and verbal harassment that goes unaddressed, an employee in [the plaintiff's] position would choose to resign. Further, it cannot be said that [she] "assumed the worst" or "jumped to conclusions." She waited beyond the two-week period from her initial complaint to [her supervisor] within which [the employer's] policy assured her an investigation would be completed, and an employee subject to continuous verbal and physical harassment is not "jumping to conclusions" when she resigns under those conditions.



Punitive Damages Were Appropriate.



Finally, the Court found that punitive damages were appropriate in light of the employer's reckless disregard for the plaintiff's civil rights. She could show that her supervisor and the HR manager who conducted her exit interview acted in the risk of violating her civil rights by not reporting her harassment complaint to HR and not conducting an actual investigation because management training had included anti-harassment training. In addition, the jury could believe that the employer attempted to mislead the EEOC by claiming that it had promptly conducted an investigation after her exit interview instead of waiting several weeks until it received her EEOC Charge. Finally, considering the different versions of events given at trial, the jury could also find that the employer was untruthful.



Although the employer could have avoided punitive damages by showing that it acted in good faith, this requires more than proof that a policy has been adopted. Instead, an employer must prove an effective implementation of its antiharassment policy. In this case,



[A]lthough there was evidence that [the employer] communicated its policy to its employees with some frequency, there was also substantial evidence that the policy was disregarded in its implementation and enforcement. There was evidence of widespread disregard of the policy by employees in engaging in harassment, by supervisors in not reporting to HR incidents of harassment or failing to conduct follow-up investigations, by co-workers in not reporting incidents of harassment, and by HR managers in not investigating reports of harassment. Further, the investigation, when it did take place, was, as the district court stated, "notably flawed." [The employer's] complete failure to follow through, twice, on complaints of harassment by [the plaintiff], followed by a deficient investigation in response to the EEOC's inquiry, does not fulfill "Title VII's objective of motivating employers to detect and deter Title VII violations."



Employers can learn from this decision by reminding its own staff – as well as front line management – of the importance of reporting sexual harassment concerns to HR and then promptly investigating them instead of hoping that they will just go away on their own. When even a new employee making just above minimum wage can win in excess of a million dollars after working just five weeks, it is time for production and HR supervisors to understand how important it is to report and fully investigate sexual harassment complaints.



NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, March 29, 2010

Unpaid Breastfeeding Breaks Now Mandated by FLSA Per the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

As some of you may recall from my August 27, 2009 post at Lactation Discrimination in Ohio: Toto: We’re Not In Kansas Anymore, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that employers were not required to provide breaks to new lactating mothers. However, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed last week by President Obama changed that for Ohio and other employers subject to the FLSA. Among other things, the PPACA amends the FLSA to provide that employers must provide an unpaid break for mothers to express breast milk for one year after the birth of the child in a location (other than a restroom) that is shielded from view and intrusion by the public or coworkers. There is an exception for small employers (with fewer than 50 employees) who can show an undue hardship by the significant difficulty or expense of providing such beaks considering the employer’s size, financial resources, nature or structure.

There is no “official” website for the text of the PPACA yet, but the text of Section 4207 of the PPACA (as reflected by the Senate bill later passed by the House and signed by the President) provides as follows:

Section 4207. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers.

Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 19389 (29 U.S.C. § 207) is amended by adding at the end of the following: “(r)
(1) An employer shall provide –
(A) a reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing child for 1 year after the child’s birth; and
(B) a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public, which may be used by an employee to express breast milk.
(2) An employer shall not be required to compensate an employee receiving reasonable break time under paragraph (1) for any work time spent for such purpose.
(3) An employer that employs less than 50 employees shall not be subject to the requirements of this subsection, if such requirements would impose an undue hardship by causing the employer significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s business.
(4) Nothing in this subsection shall preempt a State law that provides greater protections to employees than the protections provided for under this subsection.


A summary of the Public Law 111-148 is available on the Library of Congress website.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Obama DOL Eliminates FLSA Opinion Letters

As some of you may recall from my 3/9/09 post -- DOL Releases New FLSA Opinions from Bush Era Including Letters Addressing Mandatory Use of Vacation or PTO During Temporary Shutdowns -- on the last day of the Bush Administration, the Department of Labor attempted to issue 36 FLSA Administrator Opinion Letters, but only about half them were properly post-marked before the change in administrations. As a result, the Obama Administration published all of the letters on the DOL website, but indicated that it was withdrawing and was reserving the right to review, clarify and even reverse the 18 letters which had not been mailed before the Obama inauguration. (These letters were marked on the website with an asterix). However, the Obama Administration has not issued any FLSA Opinion Letters since that time and last week announced that it would not be issuing any more FLSA Opinion Letters for the foreseeable future (or revising any of the 19 Opinion Letters it previously withdrew pending review). Rather, it will instead be issuing Administrator Interpretations -- general statements of policy applicable to particular industries or involving particular rules:

In order to provide meaningful and comprehensive guidance and compliance assistance to the broadest number of employers and employees, the Wage and Hour Administrator will issue Administrator Interpretations when determined, in the Administrator's discretion, that further clarity regarding the proper interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue is appropriate. Administrator Interpretations will set forth a general interpretation of the law and regulations, applicable across-the-board to all those affected by the provision in issue. Guidance in this form will be useful in clarifying the law as it relates to an entire industry, a category of employees, or to all employees. The Administrator believes that this will be a much more efficient and productive use of resources than attempting to provide definitive opinion letters in response to fact-specific requests submitted by individuals and organizations, where a slight difference in the assumed facts may result in a different outcome. Requests for opinion letters generally will be responded to by providing references to statutes, regulations, interpretations and cases that are relevant to the specific request but without an analysis of the specific facts presented. In addition, requests for opinion letters will be retained for purposes of the Administrator's ongoing assessment of what issues might need further interpretive guidance.

In the past, FLSA Opinion letters involved the FLSA Administrator's detailed legal analysis of real questions by real employers and these letters could be relied upon as a reasoned legal position of the DOL in an employer was later investigated by the DOL or sued in court. General statements of policy are typically entitled to less judicial deference.

All that being said, the first Administrative Interpretation concerns the exempt status of Mortgage Loan Officers. In doing so, the Obama DOL has withdrawn prior Opinion Letters finding mortgage loan officers to be exempt from overtime wages.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, March 25, 2010

Sixth Circuit: Employer’s Summary Judgment Reversed Where Plaintiff Was Denied Deposition of Kmart Chairman and SVP of Finance


This morning, a divided Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment entered in favor of Sears Holding Corporation f/k/a Kmart Holding Corporation on an age discrimination claim brought by the former Senior Vice President of Sales/Division President because he had been denied the opportunity to depose the Chairman of the Board and Senior Vice President of Finance of the company about potentially ageist comments after establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. Marsico v. Sears Holding Corporation, No. 07-2231 (6th Cir. 3/26/10). The Court's majority found the denial of the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery to be an abuse of discretion by the trial judge because the alleged comments were equivocal and the plaintiff had shown that he had been replaced by someone who was considerably younger than him. He had been employed by Kmart for 30 years.


In particular, the Court's decision reflects that there had been deposition testimony that the new post-bankruptcy Chairman (who was 41) mentioned to the plaintiff that he had "been around here a long time" and there were some non-specified things that he did not like about store operations. He was also alleged to have said that what was "wrong with these Kmart people, that old way of thinking." Plaintiff was then demoted to a Vice President position for Super Kmart in September 2003, was replaced as SVP by and began reporting to someone who was substantially younger, and, after he make that Super Kmart more profitable than Kmart, his salary was cut. After his demotion, the president offered in November 2004 to help find him another job elsewhere. When plaintiff protested and argued that he could still help the company, the president explained that the Chairman did not "think that someone's that's been around for 30 years can fix Kmart." At the end of that month, Plaintiff was informed that his VP position was being eliminated, but the SVP felt that he could be transferred to Sears after the merger of Kmart and Sears (although the VP of HR told plaintiff he disagreed). The new SVP suggested that he look for another job because no one cared about the sacrifices and contributions he had made for the company in the past. The SVP also allegedly told him that the SVP of Finance also wanted him gone from the company. Plaintiff resigned in February 2005 because of the age discrimination he had suffered and the hostile work environment.


While agreeing that the alleged comments made by the Chairman were not necessarily indicative of discrimination, they were ambiguous enough to justify asking him to clarify and explain them in a deposition because they could indicate discriminatory intent. (The dissent noted that it was inconceivable that comments post-bankruptcy comments about the business savvy of Kmart's former officers could be construed as discriminatory as opposed to describing failed business strategies). In short:


It was through the discovery already conducted that Plaintiff obtained the evidence represented by
witnesses' comments, and given the substance of the comments, there is enough evidence of discriminatory intent such that additional discovery should have been permitted. No one but Lampert and Crowley can testify as to whether the comments cited by Marsico were motivated by age discrimination as indicated by the context and circumstances in which the comments were made. Plaintiff should have been allowed to elicit such testimony and use it in responding to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to compel the depositions and hold that Marsico may depose both Lampert and Crowley.





NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.



Monday, March 22, 2010

Deadline for Federal COBRA Subsidy Again Extended

Early in March, Congress passed the Temporary Extension Act of 2010, which among other things, extended unemployment benefits through April 5, 2010 and again extended the federal COBRA subsidy until March 31, 2010. However, the length of time (15 months) for which an individual may receive the COBRA subsidy has not been extended. In addition, the TEA added another provision which provides that individual who experience a COBRA qualifying event of a reduction in working hours (which renders them ineligible for medical insurance even though they remain employed part-time) before March 1, 2010, but are laid off after March 1, 2010 are now eligible for the COBRA subsidy. The Department of Labor has amended the COBRA notifications which employers must send to eligible employees (even though the explanation section of its website still refers to the February 28 date).

The Ohio Department of Insurance has reported that on February 25, 2010, Govenor Strickland also signed a bill to authorize the temporary extension of the period of time which the laid-off employees of small employers (i.e., with less than 20 employees who are not subject to the federal COBRA statute) from 12 months to 15 months for as long as a federal COBRA subsidy is available. The ODOI website also mentions the new March 31, 2010 deadline.

More information about the COBRA subsidy and the notices employers are required to send is available at Employers Must Send Amended COBRA Notices and DOL Publishes Model Notices for COBRA Subsidy Under Stimulus Act to Be Sent by Employers Before April 18.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Sixth Circuit: ADA Applies to Teachers in Church Sponsored Schools.

[Editor's Note: The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on this case on October 5, 2011].

This morning, the Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment which had been entered in favor of a Lutheran church and its elementary school on an ADA discrimination claim brought by a former teacher. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, No. 09-1134 (6th Cir. 3/10/10). The District Court had granted the School summary judgment on the retaliation claim on the grounds that the teacher fell within the ministerial exception to the ADA and he would not inquire into why she had been fired. The Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the primary duties of teacher showed that she was not a ministerial employee.

According to the Court’s opinion, the teacher spent about 45 minutes of each class day in religious activities with her students. After she developed narcolepsy and took an approximately 7-month leave of absence, the School refused to reinstate her in part because of a concern for the safety of her students and because it had already made arrangements with a substitute teacher. Indeed, it decided on its own that she was physically unable to return and offered to pay a portion of her medical insurance for the next ten months if she resigned even though her doctor had released her to return to work without restrictions. Because she appeared for work the day after her physician released her and made clear that she would sue the School after she was told that she would likely be fired, the School indicated that she would be terminated for being disruptive and insubordinate and that she had damaged her relationship beyond repair by threatening to sue the School. When her attorney explained how the School’s actions violated the ADA and that she would file a Charge with the EEOC if the matter were not resolved, the School fired her. Two years later, the EEOC filed suit on her behalf against the School.

The ministerial exception permits “preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion” and to “require that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenants of such organization.” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d). However, although based on the First Amendment, this exception is very narrow and is not meant to obviate the ADA. According to legislative history, “However, a religious organization may not discriminate against an individual who satisfies the permitted religious criteria because that individual is disabled. The religious entity, in other words, is required to consider qualified individuals with disabilities who satisfy the permitted religious criteria on an equal basis with qualified individuals without disabilities who similarly satisfy the religious criteria.”

“The question of whether a teacher at a sectarian school classifies as a ministerial employee is one of first impression for this Court. However, the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that parochial school teachers such as Perich, who teach primarily secular subjects, do not classify as ministerial employees for purposes of the exception.” In general, “an employee is considered a minister if “the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.” In this case, the teacher’s “employment duties were identical when she was a contract teacher and a “called” teacher and that she taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music using secular textbooks.” Her duties were also virtually identical to those of the teachers who were not entitled ministers. That she teaches at a religious school does not necessarily convert a teacher to a ministerial employee. That the School “has a generally religious character–as do all religious schools by definition–and characterizes its staff members as “fine Christian role models” does not transform [her] primary responsibilities in the classroom into religious activities.”

Similarly, it did not matter that she had specialized religious training and a religious title. “The governing primary duties analysis requires a court to objectively examine an employee’s actual job function, not her title, in determining whether she is properly classified as a minister. In this case, it is clear from the record that Perich’s primary duties were secular, not only because she spent the overwhelming majority of her day teaching secular subjects using secular textbooks, but also because nothing in the record indicates that the Lutheran church relied on Perich as the primary means to indoctrinate its faithful into its theology.”

While the Court did not want to intrude on church theology, it noted that the School’s employee manual included an EEO policy and that the focus of the court would be on the plaintiff’s disability and whether the School violated the ADA, not church theology (except as whether church theology was a genuine defense). In this case, however, the School did not identify church doctrine as a reason for firing the teacher in her termination letter.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, March 3, 2010

Ohio Supreme Court Dismisses Criminal Indictment Based on Prosecutorial Misuse of Information From Garrity Statement.

This morning the Ohio Supreme Court issued a decision dismissing a criminal indictment against a police officer because the prosecutors reviewed the information gathered from a Garrity statement obtained during an internal investigation even though no information from the statement was presented to the grand jury or during any trial. State v. Jackson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-621. In short, the Court held that no one involved in an internal investigation (which involves obtaining a Garrity statement) may testify before the grand jury and neither the grand jury prosecutor nor the trial prosecutor may review the Garrity statement in preparation for trial even if no evidence or witnesses obtained from the Garrity statement is presented to a jury.

According the Court’s opinion, a police officer had been placed on administrative leave and then was involved in a bar fight, where one of the patrons informed the responding patrol officer that the suspended/fighting officer had possessed a firearm inside the tavern (in violation of Ohio law). The suspended/fighting officer was then investigated by Internal Affairs. Under Garrity v. New Jersey (1967), 385 U.S. 493, as a public employee, he could not be compelled to cooperate with the internal investigation in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by being told to choose between his maintaining his employment and incriminating himself. Rather, he was given a “Garrity” warning: nothing he said during the internal investigation would be used in a criminal prosecution, but failing to respond completely and truthfully to the questions could lead to disciplinary action. After receiving the warning, he answered the questions of the Internal Affairs investigating officer and identified a witness who was otherwise unknown to the police.

The Prosecutor’s Office then presented evidence to the grand jury about the officer’s unlawful possession of a firearm in a tavern. This evidence did not include any admissions or other information from the accused officer, including any evidence about the new witness. It did, however, include testimony from the Internal Affairs investigating officer limited to whether an officer should carry a firearm while on administrative leave and to the fact that he had interviewed the officer as part of an internal investigation. He did not disclose any information obtained from the officer during the Internal Affairs investigation (although the grand jury could conceivably presume the content of the statement from the fact that the officer was being prosecuted following the interview).

A new prosecutor was assigned to handle the trial and somehow both the grand jury and trial prosecutors came into possession of the officer’s Garrity statement before the commencement of a criminal trial. In fact, it was unclear whether the grand jury prosecutor came into possession of the statement before the grand jury returned the indictment. When the officer learned this, he moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the government had improperly used his Garrity statement to assist his criminal prosecution. The trial court agreed, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court determined that the trial preparation of the prosecuting attorney should not benefit from a review of the Garrity statement, but that the indictment had not been tainted because the Internal Affairs officer did not reveal any information from the Garrity statement to the grand jury. Thus, the proper remedy was to purse the prosecutor’s file of the Garrity statement, reassign the case and recommence the process from the time of the indictment. The Supreme Court reversed and held:


In a criminal proceeding against a public employee, the state may not make direct or derivative use of the employee’s statement that was compelled under
threat of the employee’s removal from office (“Garrity statement”) — The state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement when the prosecutor presents to the grand jury testimony from a witness to a Garrity statement — The state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement when the prosecutor reviews a Garrity statement in preparation for trial — When the state fails to prove that it did not make any use of a Garrity statement in obtaining an indictment, the indictment must be dismissed.


Rather, the Court concluded that the prosecution must be able to prove that its evidence was independently derived of the Garrity statement:


[T]he Kastigar court established a two-prong test that the
prosecution must satisfy where a witness makes the claim that his or her immunized testimony was used: (1) the government must deny any use of the accused’s own immunized testimony against him or her in a criminal case; and (2) the government must affirmatively prove that all of the evidence to be used at trial is derived from sources wholly independent of immunized testimony.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Conrad (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 552 N.E.2d 214.


Thus, in this case, the prosecution violated Garrity by utilizing a witness from the internal investigation: ”The state makes derivative use of a Garrity statement when the prosecutor presents to the grand jury testimony from a witness to the statement.” No harm which results from a broken Garrity promise can be harmless. Thus, the only proper remedy is dismissal of the indictment. “When the state fails to prove that it did not make any use of a Garrity statement in obtaining an indictment, the indictment must be dismissed.” On the other hand, if the misuse had only occurred after the indictment had been obtained, the proper remedy would be limited to suppressing the improper evidence during the criminal trial (even if the trial prosecutor had knowledge of the Garrity statement).

Although Court recognized that this will create a hardship for small departments and entities (which might not have enough qualified personnel to both conduct the internal investigation and the criminal investigation), it suggested delaying the internal investigation until after the conclusion of the criminal investigation (which would then permit the accused employee to continue working and drawing a public salary following a legal breach). The Court did not suggest, but should be consider, retaining another entity or department to conduct the internal investigation.

The Court further explained:


Although the issue of liability for turning over a compelled statement is not before us, we note that a public employer can ensure that it does not violate the defendant’s right against self-incrimination only by refraining from providing a compelled statement to the prosecutor when a criminal proceeding ensues. A bright-line prohibition against providing a compelled statement to a prosecutor is both workable and practical. First, because a prosecutor is not permitted to make any use of a compelled statement, denying the prosecutor the opportunity to view the statement will not hinder the prosecutor’s ability to prepare for trial. Second, when a defendant cannot allege that the prosecutor has made use of the statement, there is no need to conduct a time-consuming Kastigar hearing. Finally, when there is no threat that a prosecutor will eventually see the contents of a compelled statement, public employees will be more willing to comply with internal investigations.


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

EEOC Proposes New ADEA Rule to Address “Reasonable Factor Other Than Age”

Last week, the EEOC began soliciting comments on a proposed rule defining the “reasonable factor other than age” defense available to employers under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Both the ADEA and Title VII contain a “business necessity” defense, but only the ADEA also has a defense for RFOA. Interestingly, the Equal Pay Act also has a defense for “factor other than sex,” but does not limit the defense to “reasonable” factors. In addition, even though Congress narrowed the “business necessity” defense in Title VII in 1991 following the Wards Cove Packing v. Atonia, 490 U.S. 692 (1989) decision, it did not similarly amend the ADEA (probably because there had been an open question whether disparate impact liability even existed before 2005). The EEOC concluded that a new rule was necessary following the Supreme Court decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), which found that the scope of an employer’s potential “disparate-impact liability under the ADEA is narrower than under Title VII'' because of the additional RFOA defense. In particular, the Court found that the employer could legitimately adopt a pay plan which did not benefit older employees to the same extent as younger employees if the employer had a reasonable basis – such as recruitment and retention of employees -- for doing so which was not based on the age of the employees. Moreover, the Supreme Court also held that employers bear both the burden of production and persuasion under the RFOA affirmative defense. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab, 128 S. Ct. 2395 (2008).

The new rule will be located at 29 CFR §1625.7(b) and will provide as follows:

Whether a differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age (``RFOA'') must be decided on the basis of all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each individual situation.
(1) Reasonable. A reasonable factor is one that is objectively reasonable when viewed from the position of a reasonable employer (i.e., a prudent employer mindful of its responsibilities under the ADEA) under like circumstances. To establish the RFOA defense, an employer must show that the employment practice was both reasonably designed to further or achieve a legitimate business purpose and administered in a way that reasonably achieves that purpose in light of the particular facts and circumstances that were known, or should have been known, to the employer. Factors relevant to determining whether an employment practice is reasonable include but are not limited to, the following:
(i) Whether the employment practice and the manner of its implementation are common business practices;
(ii) The extent to which the factor is related to the employer's stated business goal;
(iii) The extent to which the employer took steps to define the factor accurately and to apply the factor fairly and accurately (e.g., training, guidance, instruction of managers);
(iv) The extent to which the employer took steps to assess the adverse impact of its employment practice on older workers;
(v) The severity of the harm to individuals within the protected age group, in terms of both the degree of injury and the numbers of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the employer took preventive or corrective steps to minimize the severity of the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such steps; and
(vi) Whether other options were available and the reasons the employer selected the option it did.\1\
------

\1\ This does not mean that an employer must adopt an employment practice that has the least severe impact on members of the protected age group. ``Unlike the business necessity test, which asks whether there are other ways for the employer to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class,
the reasonableness inquiry includes no such requirement.'' Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005). Instead, this simply means that the availability of other options is one of the factors relevant to whether the practice was a reasonable one. ``If the actor can advance or protect his interest as adequately by other conduct which involves less risk of harm to others, the risk contained in his conduct is clearly unreasonable.'' Restatement (Second) of Torts 292, cmt. c (1965).
-------------------------------------------------------

(2) Factors Other Than Age. When an employment practice has a significant disparate impact on older individuals, the RFOA defense applies only if the practice is not based on age. In the typical disparate impact case, the practice is based on an objective non-age factor and the only question is whether the practice is reasonable. When disparate impact results from giving supervisors unchecked discretion to engage in subjective decision making, however, the impact may, in fact, be based on age because the supervisors to whom decision making was delegated may have acted on the bases of conscious or unconscious age-based stereotypes. Factors relevant to determining whether a factor is ``other than age'' include, but are not limited to, the following:
(i) The extent to which the employer gave supervisors unchecked discretion to assess employees subjectively;
(ii) The extent to which supervisors were asked to evaluate employees based on factors known to be subject to age-based stereotypes; and
(iii) The extent to which supervisors were given guidance or training about how to apply the factors and avoid discrimination.


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Employers Must Send Amended COBRA Notices

In December, President Obama signed the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2010 (the “DDAA”). In addition to prohibiting mandatory arbitration agreements which cover Title VII claims brought by employees of defense contractors, it also extended and expanded the COBRA premium subsidy established last year as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (and reported last year here). The DDAA extends the duration of the COBRA subsidy had been scheduled to expire on December 31, 2009. Now, individual will be eligible for the COBRA subsidy if they are experienced a qualifying event (like termination) between September 1, 2008 and February 28, 2010 and the duration of the subsidy has been extended from 9 months to 15 months. Last month, the Department of Labor issued new model COBRA notices which employers are required to send out to newly eligible individuals, individuals who were receiving the subsidy and individuals whose eligibility period expired prior to December 19, 2009. Likewise, the Ohio Department of Insurance issued updated notices for small employers who are not covered by COBRA so that they are consistent with the new federal law. Employers should send out the notices within 60 days of when the individual became eligible for COBRA and no later than February 17, 2010.

There are three new notices (two federal and one state notice). The

Friday, February 5, 2010

Sixth Circuit: A Tale of Two RIFS With Different Endings

This week, the Sixth Circuit released two opinions in two days addressing claims that the plaintiff was selected for a reduction in force in violation of federal employment laws. In one, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer and in the other it reversed it and sent the case back for trial. In one case the plaintiff claimed she was selected for the RIF because of her age; in the other the plaintiff claimed that she was selected because of medical leave. In one case, the managers may have violated the employer’s RIF policy which they claimed they were following; in the other the managers likely violated the employer’s RIF policy, which they blamed on ignorance. This comparison highlights how even the slightest difference in facts can lead to much different results.

In the first case, Cutcher v. KMart Corporation, No. 09-1145 (6th Cir. 2010), six employees were selected to be laid off from a particular store as part of a nationwide layoff. According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was selected for the RIF a few weeks after beginning FMLA leave and her duties distributed among the remaining sales associates. In the selection process, the employer considered her most recent performance evaluation and then conducted an updated evaluation (measuring the same competencies as the annual evaluations and containing a space for additional comments). The plaintiff had received an “exceeds expectations” or “exceptional” overall evaluation rating in the prior three years and then began a six-week medical leave involving surgery a few days after her last performance evaluation. A few weeks into her medical leave, the employer announced the RIF and selected plaintiff and five other employees to be laid off.

The employer’s updated evaluation form prohibited managers from considering a medical leave of absence as a factor, and required the manager to specifically explain if the employee had been downgraded since the last annual evaluation. It also required managers to base the updated evaluations on objective, observable performance. Notwithstanding these instructions, the plaintiff’s managers downgraded her updated performance evaluation rating even though they admittedly could not identify any performance issues in the 20 days between her annual evaluation and the updated evaluation conducted for the RIF. Rather, they explained that they felt her prior evaluation had been inflated and she possessed undocumented poor customer service and teamwork skills. In addition, they mentioned her poor customer service and teamwork skills and wrote “LOA” in the comments section when asked to explain on the form the difference in the ratings. Nonetheless, the managers denied that the plaintiff’s medical leave of absence affected their decision and claimed that the notation was simply to remind them to delay the date of her layoff. The depressed evaluation rating the plaintiff received after beginning her medical leave put her in the bottom six of the employees’ ranking and caused her to be selected for layoff.

In reversing the summary judgment which had been entered for the employer, the Court noted that the unique facts of this case created factual dispute on the plaintiff’s FMLA claims (for interference with her medical leave and retaliation for taking medical leave) which could only be resolved by a jury in that a jury could disbelieve the employer’s explanation and find it pretextual based on the circumstantial evidence that had been provided:

The jury could also conclude that [Plaintiff’s] termination was based on her FMLA leave, because none of Kmart’s asserted reasons for her lower RIF appraisal scores were documented, and Kmart admitted that nothing in her performance changed during the twenty-day period between her last annual appraisal and the RIF appraisal. Although Kmart contends that variations between annual appraisal scores and the RIF appraisal scores were common, that [Plaintiff’s direct supervisor] inflated the annual appraisal scores, and that [Plaintiff’s] performance had been declining, a reasonable jury could reject Kmart’s contentions. Given [Plaintiff’s] prior annual appraisal scores, the minimal amount of time that passed between her most recent annual appraisal and the RIF appraisal, Kmart’s admission that [Plaintiff’s] performance did not change during that short period of time, the inclusion of the “LOA” notation on the Associate Performance Recap Form, and the lack of any documented evidence demonstrating a prior concern with her job performance, a jury could infer that her leave status impacted her RIF appraisal ratings, thus leading to her termination.


. . ..

[Plaintiff] also argues—and the jury could conclude—that the same circumstantial evidence supporting the causal connection between her FMLA leave and her termination demonstrates that Kmart’s proffered non-discriminatory reason was pretextual. Specifically, the following facts could show pretext: the temporal proximity between her leave and termination; the lack of documentation to corroborate her lower RIF appraisal scores; the lack of temporal proximity between the events that Kmart alleges justified her lower RIF appraisal scores and her termination; her documented favorable work history; the discrepancy between her prior annual appraisals and her RIF appraisal, and the “LOA” notation next to [Plaintiff’s] name on the Impacted Associates Form.



In the second case, Schoonmaker v. Spartan Graphics Leasing, No. 09-1732 (6th Cir. 2010), the employer laid off the two oldest employees on the third shift (both over 55) and kept the third employee, age 29. One of the employees was admittedly laid off because she was less than a year from retirement. Even though the plaintiff had more seniority than the younger employee who was retained, and even though the younger employee had been disciplined in the prior year for poor attendance, management felt that he got along better with the two supervisors than the plaintiff did. Management also felt the younger employee was more productive, but never documented that belief.

The Company’s RIF policy favored retaining the plaintiff over the younger employee and provided:

Business circumstances may result in a temporary or permanent reduction in the size of the work force. Making such decisions is not easy. However, the Company will attempt to identify employees who are the most qualified to perform the work available based on qualifications, productivity, attendance, general performance record and other factors the Company considers relevant in each case. When the Company considers these factors to be relatively equal, decisions will be guided by relative length of service.


Summary judgment was granted to the employer because the plaintiff could not show that she had been replaced, as the remaining, younger employee assumed her former duties in addition to continuing to perform his own regular duties. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals recognized that the plaintiff might be able to show that she had been replaced if she could show that her qualifications were superior to the younger employee who had been retained. However, her subjective belief of superior performance and her admittedly better disciplinary history were insufficient to meet this prima facie burden. Moreover, although she would arguably be entitled to rely on statistical evidence to satisfy her burden (in that the two oldest employees of the three person department were laid off), the Court found the sample size to be too small to be statistically significant. While the district court believed that it would have been relevant if management had deliberately ignored the RIF policy; their ignorance of the policy was insufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden of proof.


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

EEOC Releases Statistics Showing Busy FY 2009 Which Favored Employers

Earlier this month, the EEOC released its Fiscal Year 2009 statistics which showed a slight decrease in the number of discrimination charges filed with the agency compared to the prior fiscal year. In terms of the type of allegations, 36% alleged race discrimination, 36% retaliation, 30% sex discrimination, 24% age discrimination and 23% disability discrimination.(Obviously, some Charges alleged more than one factor). Interesting, the EEOC disclosed that it dismissed over 60% of all charges filed after an investigation as lacking reasonable cause of discrimination. Almost 20% of Charges are closed administratively because the Charging Party ceases cooperating or could not be located, etc. Ten percent of cases were closed with settlement and almost 6% of cases resulted in a withdrawal of the Charge with benefits to the Charging Party. Only 4.5% of all charges filed were found to show probable cause of discrimination following an investigation. Nonetheless, the EEOC obtained almost $300M in benefits through settlement, mediation, and litigation for successful Charging Parties, an increase over FY 2008.

Insomniacs can read more about the statistics at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-6-10.cfm.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, January 25, 2010

Franklin County Court: Summary Judgment Reversed When Peer Review Privilege Might Not Apply to Protect Hospital

Last month, the Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of Mount Carmel Hospital on a wrongful discharge claim brought by an Emergency Room physician on the grounds that the trial court improperly assumed that relevant evidence which the hospital refused to produce during discovery was protected by Ohio’s peer review privilege.

Thus, documents created by a peer review committee or exclusively for a peer review committee would be protected by the privilege. However, the Court concluded that a hospital could not shield documents it created itself by simply circulating them among the peer review committee.


If a health care entity itself is the original source, it cannot shield documents from disclosure just by circulating them during peer review proceedings. In other words, a health care entity must produce documents responsive to a document request if it created the document, the document was not generated by and/or exclusively for a peer review committee, and the document is available outside of any peer review committees' records (i.e., employees, affiliates, officers, or directors of the health care entity can access the document for non-peer review purposes).


Ultimately, the Court concluded that the trial court had failed to analyze whether the withheld documents were created by the hospital or the peer review committee and whether they would be covered by the privilege. “Absent evidence that the requested documents were created by and/or exclusively for a peer review committee, or generated by an original source and produced or presented to a peer review committee, the party asserting the R.C. 2305.252 privilege has not met its burden.” Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court to evaluate the hospital’s privilege claim and to permit the plaintiff physician to complete discovery and revise his response to the hospital’s summary judgment motion if the hospital ultimately produced additional relevant evidence.


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, January 13, 2010

Ohio Supreme Court Hears Arguments On Mandatory Maternity Leave

This morning, the Ohio Supreme Court heard oral argument on whether the Ohio Civil Rights Commission exceeded its authority by requiring Ohio employers to provide a reasonable amount of maternity leave to new employees even when similar leaves are not provided to new male employees. In particular, an employee was fired by an Ohio nursing home when she required maternity leave before she had been employed at least one year as required by the employer's uniformly applied leave policy. No employees are given a leave of absence under the policy until they have been employed at least one year.

Certain provisions of the Ohio Civil Rights Act mirrors the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which prohibits discriminating against women on account of pregnancy. There is no provision under the federal or state statute explicitly requiring a leave of absence for female employees that is not also provided to male employees; it merely prohibits discrimination. Some courts have ruled that the PDA does not require maternity leave unless males are given similar leaves of absence; thus the FMLA was created. The OCRC determined, however, that women would never be able to keep jobs if they got pregnant under such policies and has required Ohio employers to provide a reasonable amount of maternity leave even if they did not otherwise provide any leaves to other employees. In doing so, the OCRC relies on a single federal court decision.

An argument was made that the OCRC exceeded the Ohio constitution by creating a rule which lacks explicit statutory support. To the extent that the OCRC is attempting to create public policy, the argument goes, that should be left to the Ohio General Assembly. Citation was made to three other states which have enacted such laws.

The Attorney General's office also tried to draw an analogy to the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA and Title VII's religious discrimination clause. However, unlike the PDA, those statutes explicitly require employers to provide a reasonable accommodation. Thus, merely because an employer is required by statute to provide a leave as a reasonable religious or disability accommodation does not mean that the PDA (or corresponding Ohio statute) requires the same in the absence of similar statutory language.

The Ohio Supreme Court was provided with an earlier opportunity this year to address whether the Ohio statute requires reasonable accommodation of lactating mothers in Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp, but it declined to address this issue at that time.

Insomniacs can watch the oral argument in Nursing Care Management of America, Inc., d.b.a. Pataskala Oaks Care Center v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, No. 2009-0756 here or on the PBS Ohio Channel.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.