Sixth Circuit Affirms Jury Award for Sexual Harassment Where Plaintiff Awarded $179K and Her Attorneys $480K.

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury and attorney’s fee award in a sexual harassment case where the jury agreed that the plaintiff had not been fired in retaliation for her complaints, but still awarded her $314 in back pay, awarded her $179K in compensatory damages (for emotional distress) and the trial court awarded her attorneys over $480K in fees (while rejecting the request for $800K in fees).  Griffin v. Copper Cellar Corp., No. 25-5786 (6^th Cir. 5/5/26).   The Court found that the $314 amount was based on the defense’s own arguments and was presumptively entitled to be awarded in a hostile work environment case to make the plaintiff whole.  It found her testimony of emotional distress sufficient to support the compensatory damage award.  Finally, it concluded that her attorneys’ rejection of the offer of unconditional reinstatement and $25K for settlement was ultimately reasonable when it obtained seven times that much at trial.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was being grossly and frequently sexually harassed by a restaurant co-worker.  Her employer failed to stop the behavior and was  unsympathetic, even laughing at her.  The employer offered her unconditional reinstatement five weeks later and $25K to resolve her complaint, but it was rejected by her attorneys.  At trial (which had been bifurcated between liability and damages), the employer apparently successfully argued that she had not been fired as alleged and at best would be entitled to no more than $314 in backpay, which is what the jury awarded to her.

The employer challenged the back pay award of $314 because the jury had determined that the plaintiff had never been fired as alleged.  Thus, if she voluntarily resigned, she was not entitled to any back pay.   The Court did not believe that this challenge was timely, but agreed that timeliness had never been raised by the plaintiff or at the trial court level.  In any event, not only did the defense fail to object to ANY award of back pay prior to the final verdict, it actually suggested in closing arguments that $314 was the most that the jury could award.   The defense also had failed to assert prior to the final verdict that only nominal damages would have been appropriate.   The Court ultimately determined that back pay is always a presumptively appropriate remedy in a hostile work environment case. 

Our cases establish that “successful Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to back pay” sufficient “to make them whole.”   . . . In deciding on an award of back pay, a jury considers “what the claimant would have received but for [the] discrimination.” . . . . We have, moreover, recently upheld awards of back pay on hostile-work-environment claims in cases that, like this one, lacked an express jury finding of discriminatory or retaliatory dismissal . . .  To be sure, an award of back pay typically flows from a jury’s finding of discriminatory, retaliatory, or constructive discharge.  . . .  But we have never held that such a verdict is required as a foundation for an award of back pay. Here, the district court determined that the evidence introduced was sufficient for the jury to find Copper Cellar’s Title VII violations “responsible for [Griffin] leaving her employment,”  . . .  and, therefore, that the award of back pay reflected “what [Griffin] would have received but for” the hostile work environment. . . .  Such an award would not, under our existing precedent, constitute a clear error of law, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion.

The Court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff was only entitled to nominal damages because simply “being upset” by the co-worker’s behavior was insufficient to justify such a large award.   The Court cited to the plaintiff’s testimony about how upset she was and her physical and mental manifestations.  “All told, a jury considering and crediting [the plaintiff’s] testimony could reasonably find that [the employer’s] hostile work environment caused her substantially more than nominal harm.”  The Court also could not find the award to be excessive in light of the harassment and isolation she suffered. “Though we are not convinced that only a “particularly sensitive” plaintiff would suffer harm from the treatment [she] described, her exact degree of sensitivity is beside the point where, as here, the record is not “devoid of any evidence of intangible emotional loss to justify a large non-economic award.”

The plaintiff’s attorneys had requested $800K in fees, but were awarded $480K.  The employer argued that they should not have been entitled to fees when they had rejected a settlement offer of $25K and unconditional reinstatement within weeks.  The Court found no abuse of discretion. 

It is true that “a spurned [settlement] offer might warrant a reduc[ed]” fee award, because “[f]ew, if any, reasonable litigants would call a monetary judgment that comes in well under the money offered to settle the case a success.”  . . .  The problem for [the employer] here is that the $179,000 in damages [she] received was not “well under the money offered.” Id. Quite to the contrary, [her] attorneys convinced a jury to award more than seven times what [the employer] was willing to settle for. Therefore, even ignoring that “a rejected settlement offer” is only one among the “broad constellation of factors a trial court may consider” in awarding fees, this is not a case in which “‘a less favorable recovery after trial’” could justify a reduced fee award.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Employee's Election to Challenge IME Abandoned Reasonable Accommodation Interactive Process

 Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on a Rehabilitation Act failure to accommodate claim because the employee abandoned the interactive process, and had always disputed that she required any accommodation to perform her job duties.  Morgan v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 25-3722 (6^th Cir. 4-14-26). Employees who are only “regarded as” disabled are not entitled to a reasonable accommodation.  Further, although she had been given the option of seeking a reasonable accommodation, she rejected that option and elected instead to challenge the IME obtained by the employer.  When she submitted such a medical evaluation, she was immediately reinstated. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff suffered from recurring TIAs.  The only accommodation that she sought was intermittent FMLA leave, requiring her to be hospitalized whenever she had a TIA episode.  After almost a decade of renewed FMLA requests, the employer placed her on paid administrative leave pending an Independent Medical Evaluation with a psychologist concerning repeated aggressive, hostile and unprofessional behavior.  The IME concluded that she was not qualified to perform her current job, would require modified duties and further medical evaluation.  The employer then gave the plaintiff four\ options: (1) disability leave; (2) FMLA leave, (3) an ADA accommodation or (4) challenge the IME.  The plaintiff disputed that she was disabled and opted to challenge the IME.  However, she only submitted two days later a return to work without restrictions statement from her treating Nurse Practitioner.    The employer clarified that she required a physician analysis of the IME and ceased her paid administrative leave.   More than a month later, she submitted a medical statement disagreeing with the IME and releasing her to return to work without restrictions.  The employer then immediately reinstated her, but she filed suit at the end of the month, claiming that she had been discriminated against on account of her disability by an alleged failure to provide an accommodation or engage in the interactive process. 

The trial and appellate courts had no trouble disposing of the failure to accommodate claim.  First, she had always denied that she required an accommodation to perform her job duties and was not entitled to an accommodation in a “regarded as” disability claim.     On the contrary, she produced a release to return to work without restrictions.    

If [her] claim is that [the employer] “regarded” her as having a disability that she did not have, her failure-to-accommodate claim is likewise barred. This circuit has held that the fact that an employee does not have a disability obviates an employer’s obligation to provide an accommodation.  . . .  Applying this precedent, if [her] claim is that [the employer] wrongly perceived or had a mistaken belief that she had a disability and treated her adversely, [it] could not at the same time have an obligation to accommodate a disability that she did not have.

Moreover, even if she had an actual disability, any failure of the interactive process was due to her decision to abandon the interactive process and challenge the IME instead of seeking further evaluation or modification of job duties, etc.    She had been given the option of seeking a reasonable accommodation and she had rejected it. 

The Court did not address her loss of paid time off while challenging the employer’s IME because of the alleged “regarded as” disability claim.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney

New Federal Government Initiatives Affect Legal Enforcement

While making changes in employment laws has not been a priority for the Trump Administration in 2026, that does not mean that there is nothing new to watch.  First, ICE announced last month that certain clerical errors in completing I-9 forms which formerly could be corrected in the future now constitute substantive violations which could result in substantial fines. Second, OSHA announced last week an increased enforcement of workplace heat hazards, starting immediately.  Finally, affirmative action requirements for veterans and the disabled remains fully in place due to the underlying statutes, but the Trump Administration has again proposed moving enforcement from OFCCP (which would be defunded) to the Office of Civil Rights. 

Last month, ICE issued enforcement guidance for employers explaining how ICE conducts I-9 form inspections and the ramifications for employers with sloppy records and/or failure to correct technical and other failures.    It is happily well written.  It confirms that employers have 3 days to produce I-9 forms requested by ICE.  “An employer may receive a monetary fine for all substantive violations and uncorrected technical or procedural failures.”  Following an inspection, the employer will receive one of three types of notices which reflect the outcome of the audit.   It also includes a list of “substantive paperwork violations,” (i.e., missing or incomplete fields) which now include the failure to fully complete certain areas of the I-9 form, such as the employee’s date of birth, the date the employee signed the form, incomplete information about the translator (if any), date of hire, date of employer certification, etc.  It also lists examples of technical failures and a description of how fines are calculated.

Last week, OSHA updated its National Emphasis Program for indoor and outdoor heat hazard prevention which provides additional guidance to avoid citations and expands the list of targeted industries.  This will be particularly important during heat waves.    Among other things, OSHA will conduct random inspections of targeted industries during heat waves to ensure compliance.  This initiative began in 2022.  The OSHA new release explained “OSHA identified industries with high rates of heat-related illness and industries with employers that have received heat-related citations or hazard alert letters.” The target lists includes farming, various manufacturers, sawmills, metal production and processing foundries, grocery and related product merchant wholesalers, department stores, air transportation, general freight trucking, couriers, messengers, and delivery services, warehouses, landscapers, community food and housing, automotive repair and maintenance, construction, greenhouses and nurseries, and restaurants.

Trump’s proposed budget again intends to defund OFCCP entirely, which will require amendments to the underlying statutes for Section 503 and VEVRAA, as well as the applicable regulations, which assign enforcement to OFCCP.  This was also proposed in last year’s budget, but was not adopted by Congress.   Employers should remember that although Executive Order 11246 (women and minorities) was rescinded in January 2025, the affirmative action obligations for the disabled and veterans remain fully in place.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Franklin County Appeals Court Affirms Employer’s Summary Judgment on Sex, Race, Harassment and FMLA Retaliation Claims

Last month, the Franklin County Appeals Court affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on FMLA retaliation and sex and race discrimination allegations following the plaintiff’s demotion. Fields-Arnold v. Cent. State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 2026-Ohio-826. The Court found that the plaintiff waived certain arguments about direct evidence, race discrimination and hostile work environment by failing to provide any substantive argument before the trial or appeals courts.  The plaintiff also failed to show replacement outside the protected class or to show that the employer’s explanation for her demotion was pretextual, dooming her sex discrimination and FMLA retaliation claims.  While she was not given a specific reason at the time of her demotion, she admitted that her job performance had previously been criticized and she failed to dispute the reasons given in the employer’s summary judgment motion.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was encouraged by the university president to apply for a certain promotion, which she eventually received.  However, in their first post-promotion meeting, their relationship soured when she requested a higher salary than offered.  Although she prevailed in receiving a $5K increase, the president allegedly said that she talked too much and reminded him of his wife.   He later criticized her performance in a few meetings and she was demoted back to her prior position a few months later.  In the meantime, she had applied for and, after submitting additional documentation, FMLA leave. She was replaced by a white female and resigned the following year after filing this lawsuit.   The court of claims granted summary judgment on all claims to the employer.

The Court found that she had abandoned her race discrimination claim by failing to make any substantive arguments in her appellate brief when challenging the trial court’s rejection of this claim for failing to show pretext.  Indeed, she apparently only used the word “race” three times in her entire brief.

Similarly, it rejected any claims of direct evidence of sex discrimination because she never raised this argument in opposing the summary judgment brief at the trial court level.  Moreover, the three alleged comments were not directly related to the issue of her demotion, and thus, were not direct evidence since it still required an inference as to the speaker’s intent. 

[His] comments, while disrespectful and perhaps based on stereotypes, do not satisfy the requirements to constitute direct evidence of discrimination. “ ‘Direct evidence is proof which speaks directly to the issue, requiring no support by other evidence.’ ”  . . .  It “ ‘does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group.’ ”

In addition, she failed to identify anyone outside her protected age or sex class who was similarly situated, failed to meet the employer’s performance expectations and was treated better than her. 

The Court also rejected her appeal dismissing her hostile work environment when the trial court found that three alleged comments over a four month period were insufficiently pervasive or hostile.   As with her direct evidence argument, she failed to even mention “hostile work environment” when opposing the employer’s summary judgment motion at the trial court. 

As for her FMLA retaliation claim, the trial court had found that it failed because she received all of the FMLA leave she requested and her demotion did not deter her from seeking additional FMLA leave.  The Court’s majority reversed that determination, but found she still could not prevail because she failed to present evidence showing that the university’s dissatisfaction with her performance was pretext for retaliation. She admitted that the university president had criticized her performance to her face several times and did not try to show that those and other criticisms lacked a factual basis or were insufficient to motivate her demotion, etc.   Therefore, the fact that she was not told at the time of her demotion the specific performance reasons for it, she had previously been informed about dissatisfaction with her performance and failed to show those and other criticisms were pretextual.

Even if an employer approves an employee’s FMLA requests, the employer could still go on to impose an adverse employment action against the employee for exercising her rights under the FMLA. . . .  And that is exactly what [plaintiff] alleged in her complaint—that she was demoted because she took FMLA leave. We find the court of claims erred in concluding [she] “failed to identify an adverse employment action that was taken against her because she used FMLA leave.”

. . . .

Although [Plaintiff] did not receive specific examples of her unsatisfactory performance at or around the time of the demotion  . . . , she was aware of Dr. Thomas’s dissatisfaction before the demotion occurred. In her deposition, [she]recounted two meetings where [he] criticized her performance. . . .

While [her] deposition testimony reflects her general belief that she satisfied the job duties as listed in the job description  . . . , she did not contest the specific assertions [he] made about her purportedly unsatisfactory work. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Ohio Appeals Court Entertains New Questions About Shortening OCRA Limitations Period By Contract

Last month, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment dismissing the former employee’s OCRA sex discrimination and retaliation complaint as untimely under the shortened limitations period in her employment agreement.  Toth v. Rocket Mtge., L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-926.    The Court found that the trial court had failed to assess whether Michigan or Ohio law applied and whether the most recent amendments to Chapter 4112 would affect the enforceability of the shortened limitations period if Ohio law applied.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff alleged that she had always worked from home in Cuyahoga County and had been terminated in September 2021 on account of her sexual orientation and prior complaints.  She filed a Charge of Discrimination with the OCRC in May 2023 and her lawsuit in February 2024.   The employer moved to dismiss and converted it to a summary judgment motion on the grounds that her offer letter required her to report and visit its Detroit headquarters and employment agreement contained a Michigan choice of law and venue provision and contained a provision limiting her to bringing claims within one year.   The trial court agreed that the complaint was untimely and dismissed it. She appealed.  While agreeing that such shortened limitations periods have traditionally been enforced, when reasonable, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded it to the trial court to make choice of law and venue findings.

The relevant employment agreement provided that claims must be filed within one year in the county where the employee was employed:

Limitation Period and Venue. You must assert any claim against the Company or its current or former employees, officers, owners, or agents, within 1 year after your claim arises or within the applicable statutory limitations period provided by law, whichever occurs first. Your failure to do so shall act as a bar to any claim that you may have. Claims must be asserted in the state court located in, or the federal court that has jurisdiction over, the county in which you are or were employed by the Company.

The Agreement also provided that the Agreement would be interpreted under Michigan law.

Assuming that the trial court believed the limitations period was enforceable whether Ohio or Michigan law applied, it dismissed the claims as untimely without conducting a choice of law analysis.   The appeals court found this to be premature and engaged in an extensive discussion about choice of law principles.   While the agreement required it to be interpreted in accordance with Michigan law,  this provision “does not evidence an intent to subject tort claims or other types of claims between the parties to Michigan law.”   Employment discrimination claims are more like tort claims.  This means that Michigan law may not be applicable since its choice of law provision only applied to contract interpretation and not statutory or tort claims.

In this case, the trial court failed to conduct a choice-of-law analysis to determine whether [the plaintiff’s] statutory employment-discrimination claims were properly brought under R.C. 4112.052 or instead governed by Michigan’s analogous employment-discrimination statute. The trial court’s failure to perform this analysis is significant. Without this threshold determination, the trial court could not definitively say whether the one-year contractual-limitations period contained in [her] Employment Agreement was enforceable.

Materially different considerations apply to the enforceability question depending on which state’s substantive law governs [her] claims. If Ohio law governs [her] employment-discrimination claims, the trial court will have to consider how recent amendments to R.C. Ch. 4112 — known as the Employment Law Uniformity Act (“ELUA”) — affect the enforceability of the statute-of-limitations clause, if at all. Prior to the ELUA, this court upheld contractual provisions shortening the limitations period for employment-discrimination claims brought under R.C. Ch. 4112.  . . . . However, the ELUA materially altered the statutory scheme. Among its most consequential changes, the ELUA (1) imposed an administrative-exhaustion requirement, mandating that claimants first file a charge of discrimination with the OCRC and exhaust administrative remedies before initiating a civil action for damages, see R.C. 4112.052(B)(1)(a), and (2) established a two-year statute of limitations for employment-discrimination claims, which tolls during the pendency of the OCRC process, see R.C. 4112.052(C)(1). Ohio courts have not yet assessed the impact, if any, of these changes on the enforceability of contractual limitations periods. But see Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 828-829 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that the contractual provision setting a six-month limitations period was unenforceable as applied to the plaintiff’s federal-discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII which, like the ELUA, imposes a mandatory administrative process and includes a limitations period directly in the statute). (bolding added for emphasis).

On the other hand, if Michigan law governs [her] employment discrimination claims, as the Michigan Supreme Court recently explained, contractual provisions in employment agreements that impose reduced limitations periods are enforceable only if they are reasonable.  . . .  Under Michigan law, the reasonableness of a contractually shortened limitations period is assessed by considering three factors: (1) whether the reduced limitations period in the contract affords the claimant a sufficient opportunity to investigate and file an action; (2) whether the time limitation is so short as to effect a practical abrogation of the right of action; and (3) whether the action would be barred before the loss or damage can be ascertained. . . .

The appeals court rejected the plaintiff’s argument regarding venue and the trial court had never ruled on it. “We do, however, note that on remand if it is determined that venue is not proper in Cuyahoga County but is proper in Michigan, then the Michigan court has authority to make the choice-of-law determination, using that law that applies to that forum.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.