Wednesday, November 18, 2026

Ohio Supreme Court Enforces Arbitration of Dispute About Interpretation and Application of Expiration and Evergreen Clauses in Juvenile Court Bargaining Agreement

Last month, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a juvenile court must arbitrate the interpretation and application of the duration clauses in its collective bargaining agreements even though the court had argued that the evergreen clause rendered the entire agreement – including the arbitration clauses --  void and unenforceable.  O’Malley v. Laborers’ Internatl. Union of N. Am., Local 860, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4192.   The court argued that the agreements ended on the last day of the contract (December 31, 2019) and the union argued that the evergreen clause in the preamble meant that the agreements – and the arbitration clauses -- never expired until the conditions were satisfied (i.e., the union withdrew or the employees decertified the union, etc.). “[T]he expiration of the collective-bargaining agreements and the application of the evergreen clauses are issues of contract interpretation that can be arbitrated under the collective-bargaining agreements. We hold that the mutual agreement to arbitrate is sufficient consideration between the parties to enforce the arbitration clauses even while the juvenile court challenges the formation of the collective bargaining agreements as a whole.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the bargaining agreements both provided that that they “shall remain in full force and effect until December 31, 2019.” However, the evergreen clauses, which were included within the preamble to the agreements, stated:

The Court and the Union recognize that nothing in this Agreement supersedes or interferes with rights and authorities granted to the Court pursuant to Ohio Revised Code (ORC) Chapters 2151 et seq. and 2153 et seq. Nothing in this Agreement abrogates the Court’s rights pursuant to ORC Chapter 4117 et seq. Notwithstanding, the Court agrees to recognize the Union and abide by the terms of this Agreement until such time as a successor agreement is negotiated between the parties, the Union disclaims interest, or the employees elect to decertify the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative upon the expiration of this Agreement.

The agreements also contained a mandatory arbitration provision in the grievance process.  When the parties were unable to reach terms on a successor bargaining agreement, the court filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the agreements had expired and were void and unenforceable as a matter of public policy because of the evergreen clause and so informed the employees that the agreement had expired.  The union responded by filing a grievance, requesting arbitration and responded to the declaratory judgment motion.  The trial court ruled primarily in favor of the court, finding only that the agreement did not actually expire until December 31, 2020 and that the remedy was for the court to pay union dues between the time that it had cancelled the contract and December 31.  Both parties appealed. The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held that the matter was arbitrable and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Although the court had argued that the entire bargaining agreement was void, the matter was subject to arbitration because there were no allegations that the arbitration clause itself had been secured by fraud. “The two collective-bargaining agreements at issue in this case explicitly provide that the parties are to arbitrate any interpretation and application disputes arising from the agreements. The parties dispute the date the collective bargaining agreements ended under the duration clauses and the interpretation and application of the evergreen clauses, and those issues are arbitrable.”

The Ohio Arbitration Act provides that an arbitration clause in “any written contract” is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” R.C. 2711.01(A). Like the Federal Arbitration Act, the Ohio Arbitration Act affects the enforcement of arbitration agreements and their initial validity.  . . .  For a party to challenge the arbitrability of a contract under the Ohio Arbitration Act, the party must challenge the arbitration clause itself.  . . . . This is “[b]ecause the arbitration clause is a separate entity”—i.e., it is a contract within a contract—and so it “remains as the vehicle by which the legitimacy of the remainder of the contract is decided.” Id. at 502. This is known as the severability rule. . . .

 . . .

The juvenile court is right that the severability rule may not always apply. Indeed, some courts have found that the severability rule does not apply when the parties challenge the existence or formation of the contract that contains the arbitration provision. . . .

And the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that a dispute over an arbitration clause’s formation is typically an issue to be decided by a court.  . . .  This is because “a court may order arbitration of a particular dispute only where the court is satisfied that the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute.” . .

Plainly, there may be circumstances in which an arbitration clause cannot be severed from the contract, like in disputes about whether the contract was ever signed or whether the signor lacked capacity to assent, see Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. at 444, fn. 1, but not all issues of contract formation concerning the underlying contract will override the severability rule. . . . we cannot state that all issues of contract formation override the severability rule and require a court to review the formation of the contract before reviewing the application of an arbitration provision within that contract.

What is clear from the caselaw on these issues is that a court must determine whether a challenge to a contract’s formation is also a challenge to the formation of its arbitration clause. And here, the juvenile court’s challenge to the formation of the collective-bargaining agreements is not a challenge to the formation of the arbitration clauses.

It is indisputable that the juvenile court intended to enter into collective-bargaining agreements with Local 860, as shown by the signatures on the agreements. Within each of those agreements, the parties included an arbitration clause, and no party disputes the existence of those clauses. It is well settled that “a mutual promise to arbitrate constitutes sufficient consideration to form an enforceable arbitration provision only where it is binding on both parties,” . . . . because “the promise of one serves as consideration for the promise of the other, . . .

The juvenile court’s assertion that a particular interpretation and application of the evergreen clauses renders the collective-bargaining agreements without consideration and void ab initio does not affect the arbitration clauses within the intended collective-bargaining agreements, nor does it undercut the sufficient consideration between the parties necessary to enforce the arbitration clauses as separate contracts. Therefore, we hold that the arbitration clauses in this case are enforceable, even when the overall consideration of the collective bargaining agreements is being challenged.

 . ..

As we have noted, when an arbitration provision is in a contract, that provision applies to any issues that the parties agreed to arbitrate.  . . .  A court may deny a motion to compel arbitration “only if the arbitration clause cannot reasonably be read to cover the dispute in question.”  . . .  Here, the arbitration clauses cover the disputes in question and the trial court therefore erred in failing to order the parties to proceed to arbitration.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Ohio Court of Appeals Denies Statutory Immunity to Sergeant at Pleadings Stage Based on Allegations of Bad Faith and Lack of Requirement to Anticipate Affirmative Defenses in Complaint

 Last week, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of statutory immunity to a Sheriff’s Sergeant on a motion for judgment on the pleadings of a claim of workplace harassment and denial of due process.  Little v. Cuyahoga Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 2026-Ohio-4485.  The Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged malice and bad faith when the Sergeant allegedly blamed the plaintiff for his own violation of policy, resulting in a suspension and denial of a promotion, meaning that the Sergeant was plausibly not entitled to statutory immunity. “[I]n reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant should not be fatal to the complaint.”  . . . .  There is no heightened pleading requirement,  . . . that would require the plaintiff to allege specific exceptions to immunity when bringing suit against a political subdivision and such a plaintiff is under no obligation to prove his or her case in the initial pleadings and need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff received positive performance reviews for eight years.  Then, in 2019, the Sergeant created a hostile work environment and “unlawful discipline” by accusing the plaintiff of causing the mis-release of an inmate by falsely accusing the plaintiff of violating policy when it was the Sergeant who violated the policy.  The plaintiff was then suspended and denied a promotion based on the Sergeant’s false information.  The Complaint alleged that the Sergeant’s “conduct was “unlawful, reckless, and [constituted] a deliberate disregard of [his] rights.”  The Sergeant answered the Complaint and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings alleging that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the Sergeant had statutory immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.07. The Court denied the motion and the Sergeant appealed only the denial of statutory immunity.

The Court found that the Sergeant was not entitled to subdivision immunity under O.R.C. § 2744.09, which only applied to political subdivisions.   The plaintiff argued that the exception to political subdivision immunity for employment-related claims barred immunity to the Sergeant.  However, the Ohio  Supreme Court had previously held that this statute applied only to political subdivisions and not its employees, meaning that the exception also did not apply to employees like the defendant sergeant.

Rather, the applicable statutory immunity for the Sergeant was O.R.C. § 2744.03

Generally, an employee of a political subdivision is immune from tort liability, subject to three exceptions set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). The exceptions are as follows:

(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities;

(b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;

(c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code.

In this case, the Court found that based on the pleadings alone (at this stage of the litigation), the Complaint had sufficiently alleged that the Sergeant’s actions were malicious and in bad faith. 

The allegations were not merely unsupported legal conclusions. For example, [Plaintiff] alleges that Sgt. . . . , not he, violated policy that led to the erroneous release of an inmate and then provided false information about the release, leading to Little’s suspension and other ensuing negative consequences.

Malicious conduct is defined as conduct “‘indulging or exercising malice; harboring ill will or enmity.’”  . . .  Malice has also been defined as “the willful and intentional design to do injury, or the intention or desire to harm another . . . through conduct which is unlawful or unjustified.” . . . .  

Bad faith indicates a “dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.” . . . .  Wanton misconduct is “the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.”  . . . .  And reckless conduct is characterized by “the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.”  . . .

 Ohio is a notice-pleading state.  . . . .  As such, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” Civ.R. 8(A)(1). “Ohio law does not ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with particularity.”  . . .  Thus, “in reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant should not be fatal to the complaint.”  . . . .  There is no heightened pleading requirement, as there is for certain types of cases, that would require the plaintiff to allege specific exceptions to immunity when bringing suit against a political subdivision and such a plaintiff is under no obligation to prove his or her case in the initial pleadings and need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage.  . . . .  

Having reviewed the complaint and construing all material allegations and all reasonable inferences in favor of [Plaintiff], we are unable to find that he could prove no set of facts that would support an exception to Sgt.[‘s] claimed immunity. That is, we find that Sgt.[‘s] immunity cannot be resolved in his favor at the pleading stage.

Therefore, this exception to general statutory immunity applied to permit the litigation to proceed to the discovery and summary judgment motion phase.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, November 16, 2026

NLRB Upholds Most of Arbitration Policy's Confidentiality Obligation

Last August, the National Labor Relations Board concluded that an employer violated the NLRA when its arbitration policy precluded employees from disclosing that their employment-related dispute was resolved through arbitration, but that it did not violate the NLRA by prohibiting employees from disclosing the content and outcome of the arbitration proceeding or from requiring arbitration of all employment-related disputes with a specific exemption for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.   Ralphs Grocery Company, 375 NLRB No. 25 (Aug 10, 2026).

According to the Board’s opinion, the employer required all employees to abide to a pre-dispute arbitration policy, which provided that employees must use mandatory single-party arbitration to resolve

any and all . . . employment-related disputes that exist or arise between Employees and Ralphs . . . that would constitute cognizable claims or causes of action in a federal, state or local court or agency under applicable federal, state or local laws. . . .

There was specific exemption for charges filed with the EEOC and NLRB.  Employees were also required to maintain confidentiality:

Except and only to the extent it may be required by ap plicable law, the parties and the Qualified Arbitrator shall maintain the existence, content, and outcome of any arbitration proceeding held pursuant to this Arbitra tion Policy in the strictest confidence and shall not dis close the same without the prior written consent of all the parties.

The plaintiff security guard filed a class action in federal court in 2009 under the FLSA and California state law against the employer, which then moved to enforce the arbitration policy.  The plaintiff then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, which found the policy to be unlawful for prohibiting class actions and requiring confidentiality.   The employer appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but while the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements could require single-party proceedings.  The Ninth Circuit then remanded the dispute back to the NLRB, which recognized the FAA was equal to the NLRA and reversed all but one of its prior holdings. 

In California Commerce Club, 369 NLRB No. 106 (2020), the Board held that “provisions in an arbitration agreement requiring that arbitration be conducted on a confidential basis, including provisions precluding the disclosure of evidence, award, and/or decision beyond the arbitration proceeding, do not violate the Act and must be enforced according to their terms pursuant to the FAA.” . . .

 . . . .

We find that the portions of the confidentiality provision restricting the disclosure of the content and outcome of the arbitration are limited to the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted and are therefore lawful under California Commerce Club and subsequent cases in which we applied that precedent. The provision prohibiting disclosure of the content of the arbitration is function ally equivalent to the provision that “all arbitration proceedings . . . shall be confidential” at issue in Dish Network. Similarly, the provision’s requirement to maintain the confidentiality of “the outcome” of the arbitration is lawful because it is consistent with the finding in California Commerce Club that parties may lawfully agree that there shall be no disclosure of the “award/decision beyond the arbitration proceeding.” . . .

We reach a different result, however, with respect to the portion of the confidentiality provision that prohibits disclosure of the existence of the arbitration. As the Board has held, “confidentiality requirements beyond the scope of the arbitration proceeding and ‘the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted’ receive no protection from the FAA.”  . . . Applying this principle, the Board found that a provision requiring that settlements be kept confidential was not shielded by the FAA in Dish Network,  . . .  We reach the same result here with respect to the prohibition on disclosing the existence of the arbitration. Prohibiting the disclosure of the fact that the arbitration ever happened long after it ended is a perpetual gag order against disclosing, outside the arbitral forum, that the arbitration ever occurred. It has nothing to do with the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted.

Having found that the portion of the confidentiality provision prohibiting disclosing that the arbitration existed is not shielded by the FAA, we next determine whether the maintenance of this provision violates the Act. We find that it does. By its terms, the Arbitration Policy covers “any and all . . . employment-related disputes that exist or arise between Employees and Ralphs . . . that would constitute cognizable claims or causes of action in a federal, state or local court or agency under applicable federal, state or local laws. . . .” It therefore encompasses, among other things, disputes arising under the Act. Moreover, the events giving rise to all claims covered by the Arbitration Policy would concern wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment; employees’ conversations with one another concerning those events do implicate the Act; and nothing in the Agreement’s settlement-confidentiality provision limits its scope.

 . . .

The second issue presented in this case is whether the Arbitration Policy violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by interfering with employees’ ability to access and use the Board’s processes. As explained below, we find that it does not. . . .

 . . .

In Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023), the Board overruled Boeing and adopted a new standard for determining whether facially neutral workplace rules and policies violate the Act. Under Stericycle, the Board analyzes the Policy under the “reasonably could” standard. That is, the agreement would be presumptively lawful if employees could not reasonably interpret it to interfere with their right to file charges with the Board.  . . .

We find that the arbitration agreement meets the standard set forth in Stericycle. The Arbitration Policy, a three page document, includes a prominent stand-alone paragraph addressing employees’ ability to pursue administrative remedies. That paragraph expressly states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Arbitration Policy, all Employees retain the right under the National Labor Relations Act (‘NLRA’) to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board (‘NLRB’) . . . .” Under Stericyle, the provision is presumptively unlawful only if “an employee could reasonably interpret” it to restrict or prohibit Section 7 activity. As the Board held in Anderson Enterprises, with respect to the provision at issue in this case, “objectively reasonable employees would understand that the inclusion of such language in a legal document is intended to, and does, describe their legal rights in precisely the manner that the text explicitly states: employees have the right to file charges with the Board.” Consistent with this holding, a reasonable employee could not interpret the Arbitration Policy to restrict their right to file charges with the Board.  

Further, we find that, as in Anderson Enterprises, the Policy does not give employees the impression that filing charges would be futile, does not require employees to file an arbitral claim either before or at the same time as they file a charge with the Board, and does not “’necessarily’ interfere with employees’ statutory right to the Board” by requiring individual employees to arbitrate their employment-related disputes.

The holding in Anderson Enterprises is clear. Where an arbitration agreement contains prominent language in a savings clause expressly stating that employees retain their ability to file charges with the Board, that specific language is deemed to resolve any ambiguity created by the more generalized language in the agreement. As a result, no reasonable employee could understand the agreement to prevent them bringing their employment-related disputes to the Board. Anderson Enterprises also establishes that the savings clause at issue in this case is sufficiently prominent and clear. Applying that clear holding here, we find that no reasonable employee could understand the Arbitration Policy as interfering with their ability to access the Board and its procedures, and we find that the Policy does not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

All that being said, this turned out to be a tempest in a teapot because the parties all agreed that the employer had rescinded the Policy and offending language back in 2012 after it first lost the case.  So, no rescission remedy was required by the NLRB.   The employer was merely required to post notices about the prior offending language and promising to not include it again if it reinstituted the other, valid portions of the arbitration policy.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.


Monday, November 9, 2026

Ohio Court of Appeals Stays Entire Litigation Pending Arbitration Despite Clause Carve-Out Exception for Injunctive Relief for Alleged Breaches of Non-Compete and Non-Disclosure Clauses

At the beginning of the month, the Portage County Court of Appeals affirmed a stay pending arbitration of litigation involving alleged breach of non-disclosure and non-competition covenants despite the common carve-out exception for injunctive relief in the parties’ arbitration clause for those types of disputes.  RoviSys Co. v. MRS Instrumentation & Controls, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-4339.   The Court held that the entire proceeding – both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims as well as injunctive and non-injunctive relief and even claims against non-signatories – would be referred to arbitration on the grounds that if any of the claim are arbitrable, then all claims must be first referred to arbitration.  Therefore, the entire lawsuit filed by the plaintiff employer against a former employee and his new employer involving breaches of a non-competition and non-disclosure clauses (and other tort claims) was referred to arbitration even though the new employer never signed the arbitration clause and the agreement contained a carve-out for injunctive relief sought to enforce those clauses.   Every employer should review their existing arbitration agreements to determine how to proceed. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff employer filed a lawsuit against a former employee and his new employer alleging, among other things, that he violated the non-disclosure and non-competition provisions in his employment agreement both before and after resigning his employment.  It sought injunctive relief and damages against the employee and his new employer and the parties agreed to a 90-day preliminary injunction, after which the defendants obtained counsel and then moved to stay the entire proceeding pending arbitration of the entire dispute prior to filing an answer or engaging in discovery.    The relevant 2004 employment agreement contained a broad arbitration clause, which created an exception: “provided, however, the Company shall be entitled to seek injunctive relief, without resorting to Arbitration, for any breach of Paragraphs 4, 5 or 6 [i.e., the non-compete and non-disclosure provisions].   The new employer obviously had never signed the employment agreement or agreed to arbitrate any dispute with the plaintiff employer.  The court stayed the entire litigation pending arbitration and the plaintiff employer appealed.

Arbitration is a matter of contract.   The Court easily (and properly) rejected the plaintiff employer’s argument that the arbitration clause applied only to claims brought by the employee and not to any claims brought by the employer.  If that had been true, then there would be no need for the carve-out clause at the end of the arbitration clause making an exception for when the employer sought injunctive relief:

 . . .  the plain text of the full clause indicates that the parties agreed to arbitrate any claims that involve [his] employment, except as otherwise specified in the carve-out. This is because the agreement uses the term “any claim or dispute” and contains no limitation as to which party must assert it. As one court has explained, the purpose of this type of carve-out is to enjoin a party “from continuing to allegedly breach the employment agreement until the two parties [can] obtain arbitration.”  . . .  By contrast, if Appellant’s reading were correct, then there would be no need for the carve-out.

Further, the carve-out did not exempt all claims involving breaches of the non-compete and non-disclosure – it only carved out one particular remedy:  injunctive relief.  Ohio courts have described “injunctive relief” as “a remedy, not a cause of action.”  Therefore, “Appellant is permitted to seek the remedy of injunctive relief in court for [his] alleged breaches of paragraphs 4-6; however, Appellant is not permitted to seek other remedies in that forum.”  If the plaintiff had wanted to exempt any claim it would make involving breaches of those provisions, it should have used the term “action” or “lawsuit” instead of merely exempting “injunctive relief.”

More problematic is that the Court stayed the entire action, not merely the arbitrable claims. “Pursuant to R.C. 2711.02, when an action involves both arbitrable and non arbitrable claims, the entire proceeding must be stayed until the issues that are subject to arbitration are resolved.”

However, it seems questionable whether R.C. §2711.02 commands that result:

(A) As used in this section and section 2711.03 of the Revised Code, "commercial construction contract" means any written contract or agreement for the construction of any improvement to real property, other than an improvement that is used or intended to be used as a single-family, two-family, or three-family detached dwelling house and accessory structures incidental to that use.

(B) If any action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement, provided the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration.

(C) Except as provided in division (D) of this section, an order under division (B) of this section that grants or denies a stay of a trial of any action pending arbitration, including, but not limited to, an order that is based upon a determination of the court that a party has waived arbitration under the arbitration agreement, is a final order and may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.

(D) If an action is brought under division (B) of this section upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration that is included in a commercial construction contract, an order under that division that denies a stay of a trial of the action pending arbitration, including, but not limited to, an order that is based upon a determination of the court that a party has waived arbitration under the arbitration agreement, is a final order and may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.

The Court also rejected the argument that the defendants had waived the arbitration clause by initially agreeing to the 90-day preliminary injunction because they had been unrepresented by counsel, had never filed an answer (i.e., defaulted) and had never engaged in pre-trial discovery.

[Defendants’] only substantive participation in the lawsuit over its four-month duration consisted of consenting to the preliminary injunction while they were unrepresented by counsel. As soon as counsel filed his notice of appearance, however, [Defendants] consistently sought to enforce the arbitration clause. In addition, [Defendants’] execution of the consents was not inconsistent with the arbitration clause. As explained, the arbitration clause expressly permitted [plaintiff employer] to seek injunctive relief regarding [his] alleged breaches of paragraphs 4 and 6 of the agreement. Thus, [the employer] was not prejudiced.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Sixth Circuit Rejects FLSA and Contract Claims of Overworked Computer Professional

Last week, the Sixth Circuit rejected the overtime compensation challenge of an exempt computer professional under the Fair Labor Standards Act and contract law.  Bennink v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company LLC, No. 26-3150 (6th Cir. 10/29/26).   The Court found that there was sufficient evidence that he was an exempt computer professional and did not examine whether he satisfied the administrative or executive exemptions.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the exemption required any formal training or degree because “the statute’s lack of an explicit educational requirement “reflects the reality that someone [could] learn[] such skills through work experience or self study.”  More interestingly, the Court found that the letter offering him employment at $75/hour was not a binding contract because the letter explicitly said it was not a contract.  Therefore, the employer’s failure to pay $75/hour and to instead pay him a $3,000 weekly salary was not a breach of contract even though he regularly worked more than 15 hours/day. “The mere mention of a rate of pay similar to his previous rate as a contractor, without any assurances as to whether that rate was to be on an hourly or salaried basis, is insufficient to show that the parties agreed to a $75 hourly rate.”  Less controversially, the Court also found that the plaintiff had implicitly agreed to the terms of his actual compensation by accepting $3K/week for almost seven years without complaint.  Such a course of conduct during at-will employment constitutes agreement to the terms of employment because under Ohio law, the terms and conditions of at-will employment can be changed prospectively at any time.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been a long time engineer working with the employer developing its interactive voice response technology (IVR) system, first with outside contractors and then, starting in 2016 as a W-2 employee, to be paid $75/hour but treated as an exempt computer professional.  On his resume, he “described his position  . . .  as an “Ops/IT Solutions & Services Engineer” and  . . .  that he “design[ed], implement[ed], and maintain[ed] IT solutions and services, such as IVR call flow designs, dial plans, and various end user support applications.”  . . .  He highlighted that he “leveraged in depth knowledge of contact center technologies, platforms, and tools,” and accomplished “successful contact center infrastructure migrations (both on premise and Cloud based solutions).”  After regularly working 18 hour days and not receiving more assistance despite his complaints, he resigned in 2023.  He later filed suit because he claimed that he was not paid $75/hour, but only $3000/week and claimed that this both violated the FLSA and breached his contact of employment. 

The FLSA exempts from the statute’s overtime protections “any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker” with one of the specified “primary dut[ies].” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17). In particular, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B) exempts employees who have the primary duty of “design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs . . . based on and related to user or system design specifications.”1 Computer employees “who [are] compensated on an hourly basis” must be “compensated at a rate of not less than $27.63 an hour” to be exempt. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17). Although the parties dispute whether [the plaintiff] was paid on an hourly or salary basis, both agree he was paid at a rate well over the statutorily required hourly rate of $27.63. So we focus on the responsibilities targeted by the statute.

 .. . .

First, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B) requires that the relevant responsibilities—“design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification”—concern “computer systems or programs.” Here, much of Bennink’s work revolved around Cincinnati Bell’s IVR system. Although the statute does not define “computer system or program[],” 29 U.S.C. § 213; 29 C.F.R. § 541.400, we have little trouble concluding that an IVR system is one. An IVR system is complex and technical. It automatically routes a user’s call based on a programmed menu, pulling in information from various databases and other systems. In fact, even while disputing that his role involved working on a computer system, Bennink himself describes “the various computer systems that contributed to IVR’s functionality” and how part of his role was working with others to ensure the requested IVR updates “were even feasible within the computer systems.”  . . . . This description corroborates our assessment of the IVR system. After all, a program made up of smaller computer systems is still a computer system.

Many of [the plaintiff’s] responsibilities regarding the IVR system fell within several of the duties described in 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B), namely, “documentation,” “design,” and “development.” For one, [he] extensively documented the IVR system, mapping out where and how the system routed callers based on their needs. He worked in collaboration with others in IT, updating the map to reflect changes made by programmers or giving the programmers direction on what should be updated to make the system more effective. Although [he] insists that this responsibility was little more than creating “complicated flowcharts,”  . . . , his documentation was essential to helping others in the company understand how the current system worked, and therefore how it could be successfully changed in the future. . . .

[The plaintiff’s] documentation responsibilities also bled over into “design” and “development.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B). In a system like IVR, which exists solely to route customers to the relevant assistance, “the design is the flow.”  . . . . [He] met with the team members who would be using or supporting the IVR, taking their feedback and determining how the system should be structured to meet user needs while complying with technical demands. By gathering these inputs and proposing the flow of the IVR, Bennink was designing and developing the system.

 . . .

To be sure, not all of Bennink’s work fell cleanly within the exemption. Bennink relied on other team members to carry out the actual programming of the system and ensure that the necessary data would be pulled in accordance with the goals laid out by his document. He also often acted as a project manager, coordinating across teams, negotiating deadlines and budgetary requirements, or preparing for the launch of a new IT solution. But it is not surprising that a job like Bennink’s was multi-dimensional. On this record, Bennink’s responsibilities concerning documentation, design, and development of the IVR system were the “main” or “most important” part of his job, making them his “primary duty.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). Although the parties do not present an exact breakdown of how much time Bennink spent on his various responsibilities, the evidence demonstrates that Bennink’s IVR related responsibilities were key to his role at Cincinnati Bell. Bennink himself believed he was brought on as an employee at Cincinnati Bell in large part because of his IVR expertise. These skills later made him an integral part of the efforts to migrate and update Hawaii Telecom’s IVR system, a task he admitted was sensitive, complex, and time-consuming. Because these responsibilities were so central to Bennink’s initial hiring and his workload, we conclude that they were his primary duty.

The Court also rejected the breach of contract claim based on his offer letter’s promise to pay him $75/hour when the employer “only” paid him $3,000/week despite him regularly working more than 15 hours per day.  As a contractor, he had been paid $75/hour for all hours worked, but he was not paid more when he worked more than 40 hours in a week after he became a W-2 employee.   To his detriment, despite his complaints about his working hours, he never complained about his compensation until he filed the lawsuit.

Even drawing all inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, [he] cannot show that his offer letter created a valid contract between him and [the defendant employer]. Two facts are insurmountable. First, [his] offer letter, which he signed, stated twice that it “does not constitute an employment contract.” . . . . Second, in his deposition, [he] himself stated that he “d[idn’t] think there was a meeting of the minds” when the parties exchanged the offer letter. . . . . . To find that the offer letter itself constituted a valid contract here, where one party clearly stated that it did not intend to enter into a contract and the other party admits to understanding that lack of intent, would require us to ignore the fundamentals of contract law.

It is true that despite the lack of an initial contract, [the plaintiff] went on to work as an at-will employee for [the defendant employer] for several years. And Ohio recognizes that at-will employment is generally “contractual in nature.”  . . . But even if at-will employment necessarily creates some sort of contractual relationship, enforcing any contract provision requires sufficiently definite terms.  . . .  Ohio courts allow the trier of fact to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding at-will employment, including the custom and course of dealing between parties, to determine whether “implied or express contractual provisions . . . alter[ed] the terms” of employment.  . . . So the ultimate question is whether [he] can demonstrate that a $75 hourly rate (including hours beyond forty per week) was a term the parties agreed upon.

In contrast to cases where employees have alleged that specific conversations or company documents provided guarantees about their employment,  . . .  [the plaintiff] argues only that he was being paid $75 per hour as a contractor before joining [the defendant employer as an employee]. So, he believed the offer was intended to be under “precisely the same terms.”  . . . . But the offer letter containing the $75 per hour rate did not say whether this would be on an hourly or salary basis, nor did it provide any details regarding overtime pay or hours to be worked per week. And [he] does not provide any evidence of other, later assurances made by [the employer] on such matters. The mere mention of a rate of pay similar to his previous rate as a contractor, without any assurances as to whether that rate was to be on an hourly or salaried basis, is insufficient to show that the parties agreed to a $75 hourly rate.

And regardless of the parties’ initial understanding regarding Bennink’s compensation, in at-will employment relationships, either party “may propose to change the terms of their employment . . . at any time.”  . . .  Here, [the plaintiff] was paid $6,000 per pay period, or $3,000 per week (the equivalent of $75 x forty hours), no matter how many hours he worked since October 2016. Although [he] argued below that he did not assent to any change in the terms, this argument is unavailing. [He] reviewed his paychecks, which stated he was being paid “$3,000 weekly.”  . . . [He], moreover, knew he was unable to log more than 40 hours per week and that he was categorized as an “exempt” employee. For its part, management knew that [he] was working many hours, partly because of [his] own complaints about his schedule—complaints where he did not mention any issues concerning his compensation. So even if [he] and [the employer] had initially agreed to a $75 hourly rate for all hours worked, we conclude on these facts that [he] agreed to continued employment on a salary basis.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.