Last month, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on a breach of employment agreement claim after the employer fired the plaintiff a year before his employment agreement expired. Stedke v. Hume Contracting, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-323. The Court found that even though there was no provision in the agreement describing the circumstances under which the employer could terminate the employee before the conclusion of the three-year term, it was implied that an employer can always lawfully terminate an employee for just cause. In this case, the employer provided evidence that the plaintiff had threatened a co-worker with physical violence and the plaintiff’s brief, “self-serving” denial without elaborating on any details from personal knowledge was insufficient to prevent summary judgment.
According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired
after selling most of the assets of his business to the defendant
employer. He then signed an employment
agreement providing him with employment for three years. The agreement did not contain any provisions
governing how or whether it could be terminated prior to the conclusion of the
three year term. However, it contained a
non-disparagement clause which prohibited the plaintiff from disparaging the
employer’s business during the term of his employment and thereafter,
regardless of whether he was terminated “for any or no reason.” Two years into his agreement, he was fired
for allegedly disparaging the employer, removing its equipment without
authorization and threatening a co-worker.
Litigation ensued on a wide variety of issues. The trial court found that the employer
failed to produce any evidence of disparagement, but provided three affidavits
regarding the threats of physical violence.
The plaintiff merely denied those allegations, but did not provide any
details to support his denial.
“Unlike an at-will employment relationship, an employer who
is a party to an employment contract of definite term may properly discharge
the employee only for ‘just cause.’”
Because the contract did not define just cause, the court looked to “common
sources” for its definition.
“Conduct which gives rise to ‘just cause’ for
termination is that kind of conduct which an ordinarily intelligent person
would regard as a justifiable reason for discharging an employee.” . . .
.
“To justify the discharge of an
employee for just cause, ‘it is sufficient for the employer to show that the
employee was guilty of a default in duty whose natural tendency was to injure
[its] business, and actual injury thereto need not be shown.’ . . . “Negligence, neglect of duty, misconduct,
injury to the employer’s business, dishonesty, or disloyalty are all grounds
for termination for just cause regardless of the existence of an employment
contract.”
The employer presented three affidavits about the plaintiff
coming onto the property, attempting to remove some of the employer’s equipment
and threatening a co-worker with physical violence for objecting and reporting
his conduct. In response, the plaintiff
provided an affidavit merely denying the allegation in fifteen words without
any elaboration. The dissenting judicial
opinion found this affidavit sufficient to create a material dispute of fact,
but the majority found it to be an inadmissible self-serving statement.
“‘Generally, a party’s unsupported
and self-serving assertions, offered by way of affidavit, standing alone and
without corroborating materials under Civ.R. 56, will not be sufficient to
demonstrate material issues of fact.’” .
. . “‘Otherwise, a party could avoid summary judgment under all circumstances
solely by simply submitting such a self-serving affidavit containing nothing
more than bare contradictions of the evidence offered by the moving party.’” .
. .
In this case, the plaintiffs failed
to corroborate Stedke’s self-serving affidavit with any evidence and Stedke’s
affidavit does not include any specific facts (made on personal knowledge)
which would create a triable issue.
. . . .
. . . a self-serving affidavit can be used to
defeat an opponent’s motion for summary judgment if it contains factual
assertions that are made on personal knowledge. . . .
. . . . That is, there is no evidence in the
record before this court showing that Stedke responded to the defendants’
motion for summary judgment with any specific details (based on his personal
knowledge) about his conversation with Eisert to create a genuine dispute.
Accordingly, there is no doubt that Stedke’s words are self-serving and lack
corroborating evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. . . .
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert
you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does
not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.
