Butler County Court of Appeals Alters Summary Judgment Standard in Employment Discrimination Cases

Last week, a divided Butler County Court of Appeals reversed a car dealership’s summary judgment on claims of discriminatory compensation and public policy wrongful discharge brought by a six-month employee who claimed that she had been fired for reporting COVID and rodent issues to OSHA and who had been not been paid promised bonuses.  Johnson v. Cincy Automall, Inc., 2024-Ohio-5749.  While the Court was unanimous that she could pursue her wrongful discharge claim, a divided court held that the traditional burden shifting used for decades in all employment discrimination cases no longer applied in summary judgment cases.  Rather, the plaintiff as the non-moving party with the admitted ultimate burden of proof was not required to produce evidence supporting her claim or prima facie case until the employer/moving party disproved her allegations with actual evidence of its own in its motion.    In addition, the court's majority held that she could show that she was similarly situated without reference to a comparison of job duties or terms and conditions of employment based solely on her allegation that she had not been paid her earned bonus while male employees (with different jobs and terms and conditions of employment) had been paid their earned bonuses. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been hired in July 2020 to manage the Facebook page, implement new software and develop sales leads for sales staff.  She was promised a weekly salary and monthly bonuses that were based on developed sales leads.   However, she was never paid any bonus and alleged the owner claimed that he could not afford to pay her, but he did pay the sales people (who were mostly male).  (The dissent notes that the owner apparently admitted that he owed her some unpaid bonuses).   When he ignored her concerns about non-compliance with COVID protocols and mouse feces, she reported her concerns to OSHA on December 15.  She claimed that her computer and FB access was revoked the next day and she was fired a week later.  The dealership denied this and claimed that she voluntarily resigned after being offered a transfer to an administrative position.  OSHA investigated and determined in March that she had not been fired for engaging in protected activities.  She brought suit in May, claiming unspecified sex discrimination and harassment, breach of contract, retaliation, and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.   The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on all claims, except notably, the breach of contract.   She appealed and a divided court of appeals reversed dismissal of the claims of discriminatory compensation (i.e., payment of the bonuses) and wrongful discharge.

The trial court dismissed the public policy claims on the basis that there were no clear public policies underlying the employer’s COVID practices and the rodent infestation.   Although the Court unanimously reversed this decision, this same Court had previously upheld the discharge of an HR Director on the grounds that COVID was not a workplace safety issue, but a general public health issue. The plaintiff “contend[ed] that COVID hazards and a mice infestation are matters of workplace health and safety and that an at-will employee who is fired for filing a complaint with OSHA concerning matters of health and safety in the workplace states a valid claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.”  Importantly “she invoked the OSH Act's anti-retaliation provision in 29 U.S.C. 660(c).”   Ohio’s leading Supreme Court case on wrongful discharge claims – Kulch v. Structural Fibers – recognized a claim for retaliation for filing a claim with OSHA.   Other, later cases recognized claims for similar internal complaints. 

It is crucial to emphasize that the threshold for protection under this public policy is not the ultimate validity of the complaint, but rather the employee's good faith belief in its legitimacy. As the Ohio Supreme Court observed in Kulch, to require otherwise would risk deterring employees from reporting genuine health and safety concerns, which would undermine the policy favoring workplace safety.  . . .  This principle also finds support in federal law surrounding one of the main sources of the public policy, 29 U.S.C. 660(c).

The Court distinguished its former public policy/COVID decision on the grounds that the HR Director was not expressing safety concerns, “but rather for disagreeing with her employer's COVID-response protocol. Specifically, she advised an infected employee to quarantine for ten days contrary to her employer's order that the employee return to work.”  At that time, the Court did not view the employee’s objection to the employer’s refusal to honor a quarantine direction as an OSHA retaliation concern, but here, found the employee was expressing safety concerns (which focused on handwashing, sanitizers and unpaid leave for quarantines). 

All this being said, the Court refused to address the employer’s arguments refuting causation and its good reason for any adverse employment because these arguments had not been raised in its trial court motion or addressed by the trial court in its summary judgment decision.   While its review is de novo, it indicated that appellate courts should not address issues not raised by the trial court and, instead, would limit this decision to the scope of the trial court decision.  

A divided Court reversed the pay discrimination dismissal on the grounds that she had been denied bonuses which she had allegedly earned (and was the subject of a pending breach of contract claim), but male sales people were paid their bonuses.    At core, she was claiming that that the only reason she wasn’t paid for the bonuses that she earned was because she was female and the car salespeople (all but one of whom were male) were paid their bonuses because they were mostly male.    However, the Court’s majority criticized the trial court’s description of her claim as being that she was paid less than male employees for the same work when she held an administrative position and they were sales employees.  As far as the majority is concerned, she stated a discrimination claim when she compared the fact that she was not paid her earned bonus when male employees were paid their earned bonus, even if the terms of their bonus arrangements were based on different metrics and conditions.

 This question cuts to the heart of the "similarly situated" analysis, which requires us to determine whether the male comparators were similar "in all relevant respects."  . . .

 {¶ 39} It is imperative to note that there is no rigid, predetermined list of factors that must be considered in making this determination. As the Sixth Circuit aptly noted, a court must make an "independent determination as to the relevancy of a particular aspect of the plaintiff's employment status and that of the non-protected employee" based on the facts of the case.  . . .  This aligns with the Ohio Supreme Court's case law on this issue, which recognizes that "what is relevant depends on the case."

 . . .. In the present case, the minutiae of duties, job titles, or the particulars of bonus structures are of little consequence. What matters is the simple fact of entitlement to a bonus and payment—or lack thereof.

 . . . . .

[The employer] argues that [the plaintiff] cannot be similarly situated to male employees because she managed the Business Development Center while they worked in sales. But this misapprehends the nature of the similarly situated analysis. The question is not whether employees share identical job duties across the board in the abstract, but whether they are similarly situated in the specific context that forms the basis of the discrimination claim. . . . Here, [she] alleges discrimination in the payment of contractually-promised bonuses. The relevant comparison, therefore, is whether male employees who were contractually entitled to bonus payments received them while [she] did not. [The employer] offers no explanation for why the difference between management and sales positions matters for purposes of honoring contractual bonus obligations. In the absence of evidence demonstrating the relevance of this distinction to bonus payment practices, [the employer] has failed to meet its initial burden on summary judgment to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether [she] was similarly situated to male employees who received their bonuses.

 . . . . [Her] compensation agreement, her complaint, her deposition testimony, and [the employer’s] answers to interrogatories collectively indicate that [she] and the men were entitled to bonus payments, that the men were paid, and that women (with one exception) were not paid.

In addition, the Court’s majority then ignored traditional burdens of proof in employment discrimination cases.  It faulted the employer for merely pointing out that the plaintiff had failed to sustain her burden of proving discrimination instead of producing its own independent evidence as the moving party.  Apparently, the employer had pointed out in its motion that the plaintiff did not produce any evidence, such as pay stubs, etc. and asserted that she had been an administrative assistant for months (thus, not entitled to any bonus).  Rather, Court’s majority contended that the employer “needed to point to evidence that, for example, the men were not entitled to payment or were not paid.”

The dissent pointed out that the employer in a discrimination case is not required to prove the absence of discrimination until the plaintiff produces enough evidence to show that she was treated differently.    However, the Court’s majority concluded: “This failure to discharge its initial burden is fatal to [the employer’s] motion for summary judgment on the sex discrimination claim.  It remains to be seen whether this case will be appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court based simply on the Court’s mysterious and inexplicable alteration of the burdens of proof in discrimination cases:

{¶ 45} It is crucial to emphasize that at this stage of the proceedings, the ultimate burden of persuasion has not yet shifted to [the plaintiff]. While she retains the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that [the employer] intentionally discriminated against her,  that burden is not yet operative in the context of summary judgment.

The dissent identified a lot of problems with the majority decision.  First, the plaintiff’s complaint and the summary judgment briefs barely mention, let alone discuss, wage discrimination.  Rather, the motion focused on her allegation that she had been terminated (which the employer denied) and contended that she had resigned after refusing a transfer.  The plaintiff’s response to the motion likewise focused on the termination allegation, but also identified evidence that certain men were paid the bonuses that they earned and that the employer engaged in a lot of allegedly sexist conduct.  Nonetheless, the trial court addressed wage discrimination in his decision, concluded that she had suffered an adverse employment action, but could not show that she was treated differently by being paid less for the same work since her work was not the same.   He also noted that she had admitted in her deposition that she had never reviewed actual payroll records to support her allegations.  

In other words, [her] sex discrimination claim is not an equal pay claim—sometimes called a wage discrimination or pay discrimination claim—but is instead a sex discrimination claim that, as a factual matter, relates to [the employer’s] alleged failure to pay certain compensation (bonuses) that [she] alleges were owed to her.  [She] only alleges that [her employer] has discriminated against her in failing to pay bonuses, not in the terms of her bonus plan. There is therefore no need to examine equal pay statutes . . .

Second, the dissent took exception to the majority’s evaluation of who is similarly situated:

Speaking generally, the simple fact that some employees are entitled to a bonus and a plaintiff is not paid a bonus, by itself, does not establish that those employees are similarly situated to the plaintiff. Is it the same bonus? For doing the same work? Who decides who gets paid the bonus? Do the employees have the same bonus plan? Did the plaintiff and the other employees differ in their compliance with the terms of the bonus plan? At least some commonality must be established—the same or a similar job, the same pay plan, the same supervisor, etc.

The dissent then pointed out that the plaintiff had a very different job from the men to whom she was comparing herself.   She did not and could not produce any evidence that the men’s bonus plan was similar to her bonus agreement.

Finally, the dissent pointed out that for decades the plaintiff has been required in opposing a summary judgment to produce or identify evidence to support her burden of proof, but in this case, the majority was faulting the employer for not producing evidence to dispute the plaintiff’s burden. 

Next, the majority states that "[the employer] needed to point to evidence that, for example, the men were not entitled to payment or were not paid." In making this statement, the majority seems to imply that a court faced with a summary judgment motion must assume that employees identified as similarly situated by a plaintiff are in fact similarly situated, and that the burden is on the employer (the moving party) to disprove that the employees are similarly situated. I am aware of no case law supporting the majority's view of what McDonnell Douglas requires.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

To Succeed, Plaintiffs Need Comparative Evidence and Not Just Subjective Opinions

Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on an employee’s claims for FMLA retaliation, disability discrimination, sexual harassment and unequal pay.   Santiago v. Meyer Tool, Inc. No. 22-3800 (6^th Cir. 6/8/23).   The Court ultimately found that the plaintiff failed to identify any employees who were both similarly situated and treated differently because she had significant attendance and performance issues, unlike employees who only had one or the other.  It also found that she could not show FMLA retaliation when she was given her requested FMLA leave, failed to mention FMLA leave when calling off during the attendance infractions and never claimed when given the pre-litigation opportunity that her absences were covered by the FMLA.  She also did not provide sufficient comparative evidence – about skills, responsibility, effort, etc.,  to show that she was paid less on account of her gender merely because other men were paid more.  Finally, the Court found her sexual harassment EEOC Charge was filed 58 days too late and could not relate back to her original timely ADA Charge when she never indicated any continuing violations and had focused only on the date of her termination.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was fired in 2017 as a machinist after 19 years of employment.  She had informed the Company of her HIV diagnosis in 2015 and was given intermitted FMLA leave to seek medical treatment, etc. in 2016 and 2017.  Nonetheless, both before and after her HIV diagnosis, she was frequently disciplined for excessive absenteeism, including a suspension a month before her termination.  Prior to the litigation, she never claimed that her attendance infractions were covered by her FMLA entitlement, even when given the opportunity on the disciplinary action form to protest the disciplinary action.  She also was occasionally disciplined for poor performance for creating deviated parts (that did not meet the customer’s specifications).  Her last such incident was on May 17, when she created 4 deviated parts that were ultimately rejected by the customer after her termination.   In contract, she had similarly created deviated parts in February 2017 without disciplinary action.  She was fired in July 2017 after her suspension for poor attendance and creating the deviated parts on May 17.

She filed an EEOC Charge in October 2017 alleging that non-disabled employees had also created deviated parts and not been fired.   In July 2018 – 358 days after her termination – she filed a second EEOC Charge alleging that her supervisor sexually harassed her for years and that she was paid less than other male machinists.  After filing suit, the trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, which was affirmed on appeal.

The Court found that the employer articulated a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for her termination on account of her poor work performance and chronically poor attendance.  She failed to produce evidence disputing that she created four deviated parts on May 17, even if her performance at other times had been satisfactory.  She also failed to produce evidence that her attendance had been satisfactory or that she had complied with the employer’s call-off policies.   She could not simply rely on her own opinion to satisfy her burden of proof.

The Court also rejected her evidence of pretext based on statistics showing that all machinists who took FMLA leave between 2014 and 2017 were eventually terminated.  While that might be sufficient evidence to satisfy a prima facie case, it was insufficient without additional circumstantial evidence to show pretext or that discrimination/retaliation more likely than not motivated the decision in her case when it was rebutted by evidence showing the basis for the termination decision in this case – i.e., that she created four deviated parts and had repeatedly violated the attendance policy.  “Her statistical evidence, standing alone, is not so significant to indicate that her termination was more likely than not retaliation for her FMLA leave, particularly in light of her documented disciplinary history.”

The plaintiff also could not “show by a preponderance of the evidence that ‘other employees, particularly employees not in the protected class, were not fired even though they were engaged in substantially identical conduct to that which the employer contends motivated its discharge.’”  None of the other employees to whom she vaguely referred had both performance and attendance issues.  “First, she points to no employee with a disciplinary record that demonstrates the employee engaged in “substantially identical conduct” to her own.” One employee had been suspended for three days because of deviated parts, but had no attendance or other misconduct issues.  While the plaintiff asserted that there were nine other employees with more egregious performance issues, she failed to identify them or explain how their situations were comparable to hers.   Finally, while she was not personally aware of any other employees being terminated for poor performance, the employer had produced records showing that it had previously fired employees for creating too many deviated parts.

The Court also rejected her wage discrimination claim.  She produced evidence that male employees were paid more on average than female machinists.  She also showed that male employees with similar tenure to her – and some that she trained --  were given larger raises than her year after year.  However, she failed to produce any evidence of their respective skills, experience, responsibility, effort or job titles so that an effective comparison could be made to her.

The Court also rejected her sexual harassment claim as being filed too late with the EEOC and too unrelated to her timely ADA charge regarding her termination.  Charges must be filed within 300 days.  She did not indicate any continuing violations in her original, timely charge, but rather focused only on her termination date.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Rejects Plaintiff's Discrimination Claims Because Honest Belief Rule, Employee Handbook Rules and Vague Allegations Prevented Showing of Pretext

Yesterday, as I was participating in a webinar on the Honest Belief Rule, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment in part because of – you guessed it – the Honest Belief Rule.  Okakpu-Mbah v. Postmaster, No. 21-2811 (6^th Cir. 2022).  The plaintiff had been fired at the conclusion of her 90-day probationary period for not working fast enough in sorting the mail.   The Court agreed that she could not show that the employer’s explanation was pretextual in light of documents showing that her efficiency had previously been rated as unacceptable, that she did not improve and, according to all of the other supervisors, was still working too slow by the time of her 80-day evaluation.  The Court also refused to find pretext from the use of a subjective standard for efficiency because there was no evidence that the employer had manipulated or abused the standard to single her out. It also refused to compare her to co-workers whose performance deficiencies were different and improved over time.  

According to the Court’s opinion, mail sorters receive 30, 60 and 80 day evaluations during their 90-day probationary period.  The Employee Handbook states that they will be separated during orientation as soon as it becomes evident that they are unable to meet the requirements of the position.  The plaintiff received a satisfactory 30-day probationary evaluation, except that her productivity was rated unacceptable. She denied receiving a 60-day evaluation (which was disputed).  However, as her 80-day evaluation approached, her supervisor reached out to other supervisors for their opinion.  One emailed that the plaintiff was very slow, did not grasp the concept, demonstrated no sense of urgency and sometimes had to be reassigned to a different task.  The local postmaster recommended that she be terminated.  She was terminated following her 80-day evaluation for inefficiency and brought suit alleging age, race and national origin discrimination and retaliation.  The district court granted the employer summary judgment.

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the employer’s explanation was pretextual because the rationale was insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.  She pointed to the fact that no other employee had ever been fired for working too slowly.  However, the Court summarily rejected her argument on the grounds that the Employee Handbook:

says that employees “should be separated as soon as it becomes evident that they are unable to meet the requirements of their positions.” Handbook § 584.35. Working inefficiently is sufficient to motivate the firing.

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that her termination lacked a basis in fact based largely on the Honest Belief Rule.   The employer produced her 30-day evaluation showing that her productivity had been rated “unacceptable” and indicated that she never improved.  The employer also produced an email from one of her supervisors indicating that she worked very slowly and could not keep up with her co-workers.   Although the employer did not use objective metrics to measure productivity, the plaintiff’s own subjective view of her performance was insufficient to create a disputed issue of fact about whether the employer’s explanation was reasonably based on facts.   Her supervisor’s “belief about [the plaintiff’s] performance was reasonable. Not only was the belief based on [her] own observation, but also on the observations of other supervisors who all agreed she was working slowly.”  Because the supervisor’s conclusion was reasonable, the plaintiff “cannot show pretext by showing it was wrong.”

            [A]n employer’s use of subjective reasons in terminating an employee, without more, “does not raise an inference” of discrimination. . . . And [plaintiff] “has offered no evidence from which a reasonable juror could infer that the [employer] manipulated, abused, or misapplied that criteria to affect” her chances of being retained at the end of the probationary period. . . . . So even when an employer uses an “evaluation process [that] was haphazard” that alone cannot create a “reasonable inference” of discrimination.  . . . . And an employer’s “unwise business judgments” or “faulty evaluation system” does not establish an inference of discrimination either.

The plaintiff’s efforts to show that her inefficiency did not actually motivate her terminations failed largely from lack of specificity.  She did not show how other events were “’logically or reasonably tied’ to the adverse action against her, that the same “bad actors” were involved, or that the conduct was in close temporal proximity, among other factors.”   Among other things, she incorrectly claimed that four employees had been fired and could not show that her supervisor was involved in the termination of the fifth.    Her attempt to show better treatment of white coworkers failed because their negative evaluations related to their attendance and not to their productivity.  Thus, “[s]uperficial similarities between a disciplined employee and his colleagues” are not enough to make them comparators.”  Further, some of her alleged comparators improved their performance while the plaintiff did not.  The third comparator had a valid excuse for her absences. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Mostly Affirms $5M FLSA Verdict

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals mostly affirmed an approximately $5M verdict in a FLSA collective action for unpaid overtime and liquidate damages due to 156 employees.  Pierce v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts Inc., No. 18-5258 (6^th Cir. 4-29-19).   After a 14-day bench trial with over 50 witnesses, the trial court determined that three categories of sales employees worked on average 52 hours per week, but were denied overtime pursuant to a practice and policy which was supported by testimony and exhibits from some management employees.  The employer attempted to dispute that it had a consistent policy by pointing to various reasons that employee time sheets were changed (i.e., failing to record time, working from home, leaving work early, etc.), but this evidence was used to reduce the alleged number of work hours and not to reject the existence of the policy and practice.  The divided Court determined that one category of sales employees should not have been included in the same class as the others because they had different functions, started work two hours later, were not required to attend the same events and meetings, and only had one representative testify, who did not support that his experiences and working hours were the same as other employees, etc. Instead, at the least, there should have been a separate sub-class with evidence supporting a verdict.  The case was remanded to recalculate damages.


According to the Court’s opinion, the employer had four locations in Tennessee involving the sale of time-share vacation properties.   It had three types of sales employees: front-line selling time-shares, inhouse selling upgraded timeshares to existing owners and discovery employees handling leases (but not time shares).  All of them were primarily paid on commissions, but were paid minimum wage draws based on hours worked.  In 2009, it began paying overtime.  The lawsuit was filed in 2013 alleging that the employer had a practice and policy of not paying overtime to the sales force by, among other things, directing employees to not record overtime and by modifying their time cards if they did so.

All of the testifying plaintiffs consistently said that Wyndham required them to underreport their time or altered their recorded time.  They all provided an average of the number of hours they worked each week, ranging from 50 to 80 hours per week, and their basis for that number:  the mandatory morning meeting, tours throughout the day, frequent late-night work and special events, and six- or seven day work weeks.  But, through it all, they didn’t worry about keeping an accurate account of their hours because the company told them it would recoup any overtime pay from their commissions.  

The administrative manager at the Nashville location testified that upper management instructed that sales employees could not be paid overtime and that managers should alter employees’ timecards to show no more than 40 hours per week.  The vice president of sales and marketing at the two Smoky Mountain locations acknowledged that Wyndham performed an audit that showed that salespeople worked off the clock.  Several emails from managers also mentioned Wyndham’s no-overtime-pay policy.  The evidence thus showed that Wyndham executed an across-the-board time-shaving policy that failed to compensate the employees for the hours they worked.

The trial court concluded that the employees worked on average 52 hours/week, awarded $2,512,962 in unpaid overtime and an equal amount in liquidated damages.  Attorney fees for the prevailing employees were not mentioned, but will not be insignificant.


The Court rejected the employer’s challenge to the class certification, with one exception.  It agreed that the discovery employees were not similarly situated because they did not sell time-shares like the other employees, were not required to attend all of the same events or work the same hours or work the same days.  In addition, they were not required to report to work until approximately two hours after the other employees and the testimony was unclear about when they could leave. While they may have stayed later, there was no evidence on that point.   “At the least, the court should have created a separate subclass for the discovery employees.”


“To determine whether plaintiffs are similarly situated, we consider (1) ‘the factual and employment settings of the individual[ ] plaintiffs,’ (2) ‘the different defenses to which the plaintiffs may be subject,’ and (3) ‘the degree of fairness and procedural impact of certifying the action as a collective action.’” The trial court had treated them as one class because they were subjected to the same alleged overtime policy.   While the front-line and inhouse sales employees sold the same product (to different types of customers), they also reported to work at approximately the same time for the same meeting, gave tours, attended events, worked the same days, were compensated the same and recorded time in the same payroll system.  As mentioned, the discovery sales employees had different working hours.


The Court rejected the employer’s attempt to argue that there was not a consistent policy of avoiding overtime because of all of the different reasons that employee time cards were modified.  In light of the evidence introduced, that claim was rejected.  Instead, the Court found that these various explanations could be part of the same policy and practice.  In addition, this evidence was used to reduce the number of alleged overtime hours.


The Court also rejected the employer’s attempt to discredit the employee testimony because it was permitted to depose and call any witnesses it wanted and almost 30% of the employees testified (which is a far greater percentage than in prior successful lawsuits).


The Court also rejected the employer’s expert (who was the only testifying expert) because the expert relied heavily on employee time sheets, which the employees testified were meaningless in light of the employer’s direction to not record overtime and the practice of modifying time sheets that reflected overtime.


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Reminds Employees that Unfairness is not the Same as Discrimination

Last month, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Title VII discrimination and constructive discharge claims even though the plaintiff was treated unfairly because she could not show that she had been treated differently than a comparable male.  Gosbin v. Jefferson County Commissioners, No. 17-3441  (2/23/18).   The plaintiff had been publicly reprimanded and suspended for “insubordination” even though she had never been explicitly told to take a particular course of action.   The employer’s law firm had also been told to cease working with her or telling her why.  Realizing that she might be fired, she resigned and was replaced almost a year later by a male subordinate who lacked her qualifications.   While the Court agreed that she may have been treated unfairly, that unfairness was not discriminatory in the absence of evidence that she was treated differently than a comparable male.   Her efforts to compare herself to her male predecessor and successor were futile because the employer was unaware of the predecessor’s adoption of the challenged practice and he was paid more than her because he possessed additional professional licenses and responsibilities.  Her successor actually resolved the employer’s concerns taking bids for the hauling work and paying the lowest bidder.  Without a more favorable comparator, she could not prove her prima facie case.  In any event, while she may not have been technically insubordinate in the absence of a specific directive, the employer was still entitled to the honest belief defense because for two months she had continued a practice that they had informed her was legally inappropriate and needed to be corrected by placing the matter out for competitive bidding.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been promoted to department director in 2010 shortly after the long-time director retired.  A few years later, following a complaint and her investigation, the board of county commissioners learned that her predecessor had a verbal hand-shake deal with a local hauler to dump  septic waste at the sewage treatment plant at half-price in return for cleaning up emergency septic spills throughout the county.  While this might be acceptable in the private sector, public sector contracts must be bid so that everyone can compete for the business and opportunities.  She was directed to put the work and opportunities out for public bid.  While she took a few steps towards doing so, she did not discontinue the private arrangement or actually put the emergency septic work out for bid.  Upon learning this two months later, the Board explicitly directed her to cease permitting any haulers to dump until they had approved a policy.   She explained that she thought that they had merely directed her to put the arrangement out for bid, but until the bidding process was complete, that they current arrangement could continue.  Nonetheless, she terminated the arrangement the next day.   The Board then suspended her for 30 days for insubordination.  Following her suspension, her male subordinate took bids for the emergency septic work, and then paid the lowest bidder – the same company as before – for the work instead of letting him dump at half price.  The Board then directed its law firm to cease working with her and not tell her why.    The plaintiff resigned a few months later, was replaced by her male subordinate almost a year later, and brought suit for discrimination and constructive discharge.

The Court initially observed that the employee could not prove a prima facie case of discrimination because she could not identify any comparable male employees who were treated better than her.

In the end, whether deserved or not, there is no proof that the suspension was based on Plaintiff’s gender . . .  Plaintiff must show that the adverse action was not simply unfair, but a pretext for discrimination.  Absent any comparators, the only other evidence is [Commissioner] Gentile’s comment in early 2010 denying that he wanted Plaintiff out of management and his subsequent explanation that “it’s not because you’re a woman.”  But an isolated stray comment, three and one-half years before she was suspended, does not create an inference of discrimination. . . .

Even if Plaintiff had made out a prima facie case,  she has not shown that the Board’s reason for suspending her had no basis in fact, was not the actual reason, or was insufficient to explain the Board’s action.   . . .  Although the Commissioners did not issue a direct “cease and desist” order, they clearly asked Plaintiff to begin a public bidding process to replace the unbid hauling arrangement tout de suite; thus they had an “an honest belief” that Plaintiff did not follow their orders.

The Court also rejected the constructive discharge claim on the grounds that she could not prove any hostility was related to her gender and because the public reprimand and suspension were an insufficient basis for resigning.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Reversed Columbus Employer’s Summary Judgment on Employment Discrimination Claim, But Affirmed Dismissal of Constructive Discharge Claim.

Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit reversed a Columbus employer’s summary judgment on an employment discrimination claim, but affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim.   Henry v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 15-4165 (6^th Cir. 6-10-16). The plaintiff alleged that she had been denied the opportunity for promotion and was retaliated against when she protested and ultimately filed an OCRC Charge.  The Court concluded that she could rely on similarly situated employees (who had similar qualifications and much less tenure) who reported to different supervisors to show both discrimination and pretext.   The Court also agreed that she could prove that she suffered increased scrutiny and adverse employment actions (through negative performance evaluations and performance plans) after she filed her Charge which could be attributed to her protected activity, but denied that her subjective belief that she was being forced to resign was sufficient to show constructive discharge without evidence that the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing her to quit. 

The plaintiff had worked as a customer service representative since 1999 and in 2008 and 2009, she received “achieved expectations” evaluations.  To be promoted, she needed that level of annual evaluation, one year of experience and a favorable “readiness” rating by the quality assurance staff.  The last time she had been evaluated by the QA staff was in 2006 and it had not been favorable.  However, her supervisor did not survey the QA staff after her performance evaluations improved or refer her for additional training to make her eligible for promotion.  When the plaintiff inquired about her being overlooked for promotion, her supervisor told her that tenure was not important.   The plaintiff complained to HR in April 2010 when other new employees were then promoted instead of her.  When HR did not respond within the week, she filed an OCRC Charge in May, alleging employment discrimination.

HR questioned about her promotability and competence surveys were sent to the QA staff outside the regular schedule a month after the OCRC Charge had been received.  They were not favorable and were shared with the plaintiff.   The plaintiff rejected the feedback, so a quality coordinator was assigned to sit with her more frequently than normal in June.  Her scores plummeted and she complained to HR that she was being harassed.   Later that year, she had trouble acclimating to the adoption of SalesForce and made a significant security error in November, which resulted in her being placed on a two week disciplinary suspension.  There was a discussion about putting her on a performance improvement plan, but her managers were concerned that this would appear retaliatory.  Instead, they gave her a poor performance evaluation (which made her ineligible for promotion) in early 2011 and gave her scores which were depressed considering her objective statistics (because the latter months had been given greater weight than her earlier months).

The OCRC found probable cause of discrimination in April 2011 because she had been passed over for promotion in favor of co-workers outside her protected class with similar performance evaluations who had much less experience and tenure.   The next day, a manager said that he wanted to take the next step with her, but felt paralyzed.  Instead, two months later she was placed on a 60-day performance improvement plan.  The plaintiff took a two month stress leave of absence and announced her retirement upon her return because she felt that she was being forced to resign.  She then filed suit.  The district court ruled against her on all claims.  The Sixth Circuit reversed on the discrimination and retaliation claims, but affirmed denial of the constructive discharge claims.

While she had not received a favorable survey result from the QA staff (which was a requirement for being promoted),  no survey had been sought when she started receiving favorable performance evaluations.  This meant that the survey could not be a disqualifying reason.  Moreover, not every employee who had been promoted had been the subject of the survey.    When a survey was finally sought on her performance, it was done outside of cycle, which made it suspicious to the staff and was ignored by some of them.   The Court also concluded that she was permitted to compare herself to employees with different supervisors because they were similar in relevant respects and their supervisors reported to the same manager.

The Court also found sufficient evidence of pretext without slurs or other negative comments about her protected class.   She pointed out that no one in her protected class had been promoted since 2002.  Also, the explanations about her performance seemed pretextual because they directly contradicted the favorable comments written in her performance evaluations.   She clearly met the objective criteria to be promoted and management could not identify any employees who had met the objective criteria (i.e., performance scores) and had NOT been promoted (even though some of them had not worked there for even a year).    The employees who had been promoted did not have markedly supervisor qualifications which could also have explained the discrepancy.   A jury need not accept a subjective evaluation of the plaintiff’s performance to find pretext.

As for her retaliation claim, the Court found that the increased scrutiny of her performance within a month of receiving her OCRC Charge, poor performance evaluation eight months later (which rendered her ineligible for promotion), a performance improvement plan two months after a probable cause finding from the OCRC and being kept on the training line would dissuade a reasonable person from exercising her protected rights.  Multiple incidents over a year’s period can combine to form a materially adverse employment action. “A reasonable jury could also find that the other actions, although occurring later in time, also would not have occurred in the absence of Henry’s protected activity.”   It did not help the employer that the HR notes indicate that several managers were advocating for poor performance evaluations and concern about the OCRC Charge. Indeed, the day after the OCRC finding was received, a “note in an employee relations file” stated that they planned to wait “a reasonable amount of time” before “plac[ing] her on a formal coaching plan.”  This could reflect a pre-determined scheme to discipline her regardless of her actual job performance.  While the employer argued that her falling performance scores justified her rating, the jury could also attribute her falling scores to the increased scrutiny as a result of the OCRC Charge.   Indeed, her 2010 evaluation was markedly below her evaluations from 2003 through 2009, which, again, could be inferred was the result of retaliation instead of her actual job performance.

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Finds Female Plaintiff Similarly Situated to Male Co-Workers Who Were Not Fired

Last month, the Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment decision on a sex discrimination lawsuit.  In that case, the plaintiff was the only female Mental Health Technician (out of fourteen) in the defendant psychiatric hospital.  Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hospital, No. 15-1802 (6^th Cir. 2-23-16).   She was terminated after only outstanding performance evaluations following her first violation of a major disciplinary offense even though two male MHTs were not discharged even though they had violated the same rule and/or a similar major disciplinary offense, and had prior disciplinary records and/or were on last chance agreements.  The Court found that the plaintiff was similarly-situated to both male MHTs despite slight differences in the circumstances and consequences in their violations.  It also rejected the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons that her offense could have resulted in more harm to the patient and that she had that morning received training about the rule that she violated.  The Court also rejected that it was relevant that the decisionmaker was female.

According to the Court’s decision, the plaintiff and other MHTs had received training in the morning about the importance of the nurse and the MHT both checking a patient’s identification band before discharging the patient.   That same afternoon, the plaintiff was instructed by a nurse to discharge a particular patient and she did so without checking the patient’s wrist band because she relied on the nurse and had been busy that morning.  The wrong patient was discharged, having just admitted himself the night before because of suicidal thoughts.  Luckily, the patient readmitted himself a few hours later.   The plaintiff was fired for committing a major infraction that jeopardized the safety of patients or staff even though she had only received positive performance evaluations and no record of disciplinary violations.  She filed suit that she was treated more harshly than male MHTs who committed the same or similar offenses.

One of the comparator MHTs had committed several major disciplinary offenses, been given a final warning and placed on a last chance agreement (whereby he could be terminated for even minor offenses).  Nonetheless, he was not discharged after walking out the wrong patient without first checking the patient’s identification band on the direction of a nurse even though the patient required crutches and he did not give those crutches to the patient upon discharging him.   The manager determined that he had been entitled to rely on the direction of the nurse because he had been busy at the time tending to other patients.  The other comparator had been disciplined for discharging a patient on the instructions of a social worker (instead of a nurse) and admitting a patient without first searching him (and confiscating three knives he had been carrying).  Even though these were similarly serious violations, he has only suspended and placed on a final warning.

The Court found these comparators to be similarly situated to the plaintiff despite slight differences in their infractions.  The Court also rejected the employer’s explanation that the plaintiff’s violation was more egregious because the potential consequences of incorrectly discharging a suicidal patient were not necessarily much more severe than discharging the incorrect patient without his necessary crutches or admitting a patient who was carrying lethal weapons.  Speculation about the potential, likelihood and comparative severity of the various infractions should be left to the jury.   The Court also rejected the employer’s argument that the plaintiff’s infraction was more severe because she had just been trained on that standard the same morning because the same standard had been in place when the comparators also violated the rule.   While the jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff had been terminated in order to make an example of her, it could also conclude that she should have been treated more leniently in light of her lengthy tenure and spotless performance record in comparison to the male comparators.

The Court also rejected the employer’s argument that different discipline was warranted for the slightly different offense of failing to search a newly admitted patient because the rule was identically severe in its treatment in the employer’s policies.

Several facts in the record can be used to draw the inference that DRH considered Jackson’s and Little’s infractions substantially identical in terms of severity of potential consequences. That their mistakes were cited as violating the same two major infractions indicates that those mistakes were substantially identical in terms of potential disciplinary consequences: DRH’s discipline policy defines major infractions by the potential for immediate termination. Similarly, that Jackson’s and Little’s mistakes were cited as violations of major infraction “k,” which is defined as “[a]ny action or conduct that endangers or may be detrimental to the well being of a patient, co-worker, physician, contractor or visitor” . . . suggests that DRH considered the potential harm resulting from those mistakes to be similar. Indeed, Leorea Heard provided “[t]he patient getting an improper search” as an example of an “incident that might have put the unit in danger.”

The Court was also influenced by the fact that “[i]n a majority female workplace, the fact that Jackson was the only female out of fourteen MHTs supports her contention that DRH preferred males for that particular position.”  Nonetheless, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that this factor was outweighed by the fact that the decisionmaker was also female and the plaintiff had always received positive performance evaluations because the evaluations might have warranted more leniency and the Supreme Court's decision in 

Oncale does not prohibit any consideration of the fact that the decision-maker was the same sex as the plaintiff. See id. But that case makes clear that a mere conclusory assertion to that effect does not, on its own, render unreasonable an inference of discriminatory intent. We find this maxim especially true here, where the primary inference Jackson attempts to draw from the record is that Crisis Center management preferred males for the position of MHT, perhaps “because they thought females could not physically handle unruly patients.” (Pl.’s Br. At 1.) Jackson’s case is thus largely unaffected by the fact that her managers were female.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Reverses Employer’s Summary Judgment Where Plaintiff Was Fired Following Altercation But White Co-Worker Was Not Fired Until After Charge of Discrimination Was Filed

Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment on a race discrimination claim where the plaintiff had been fired for his role in an altercation but his white co-worker was not (until after the discrimination charge was filed).  Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank, No.13-4199 (6^th Cir. 5-4-15).  The Court found that the plaintiff had stated a prima facie case of discrimination and produced enough evidence of pretext to put the case to a jury.  In particular, the Court found the plaintiff could show that he was similarly situated to the white co-worker in relevant respects even though they had slightly different job duties and behaved differently in the investigatory interview.  What was relevant for comparative purposes was their behavior during the argument.  In addition, the Court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the Bank’s decision to terminate the plaintiff had no basis in fact, did not motivate its termination decision, or was insufficient to warrant termination.   In so holding, the Court emphasized the different manner in which the Employee Relations employee conducted the interviews of the white and black participants and the conclusions she reached from ambiguous comments by the plaintiff.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff got into a brief and unprofessional confrontation with a white co-worker.   After the plaintiff returned to his work area, the co-worker then proceeded to the plaintiff’s desk and resumed the disagreement, which was then taken into the hallway at the suggestion of another co-worker. Their physical contact was limited to a swat by the white employee.  A supervisor separated them and Human Resources was brought in to take action.  The plaintiff was still angry, was unprofessional during the interview and refused to answer certain questions.  He felt that no one asked his side of the story and asked him only questions to confirm that he was guilty of initiating the altercation.  At one point, he threw his employee badge on the table, but took it back and denied he was resigning because he felt that he had not done anything wrong.  After he indicated without further elaboration that “Monday would be a big day,” he was directed to go home and not return until called.  The white employee was then called to the conference room, asked his side of the story, told to go home only for the rest of the day and was requested to return to work the following Monday.  He explained that they were just having a bad day.    The HR employee explained that the plaintiff posed a threat of workplace violence, but the white employee did not. That Monday, the plaintiff was terminated for violating the workplace violence and harassment policies.  The white employee was given only a written disciplinary action, being deemed the non-aggressor, which stated that he “did nothing wrong and the next time just go straight to management.”  His supervisor told him that he was “absolutely fine.”    

The Bank conducted a second investigation of the incident after receiving the plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination.   The white employee claims that he provided the same version of events as during the first interview and again reiterated that he was the one that had reinitiated the argument after the plaintiff had left and that he was the one who had swatted the plaintiff in the hallway.   The Human Resources employee found his second version to be materially different and then fired him for violating the workplace violence policy and being dishonest in the first interview.  Following its investigation, the EEOC found probable cause of discrimination, but could not settle the plaintiff’s Charge.    This lawsuit followed.

The district court had concluded that the plaintiff could not show that a similarly situated employee who was treated differently from his white co-worker.   The Bank argued that the plaintiff had a different job, was the aggressor during the altercation and was rude and inappropriate in the post-altercation interview.   Based on the testimony of the plaintiff and his supervisor, however, the Court concluded that the plaintiff and the white co-worker were performing different aspects of the same job and, thus, were similar enough for comparison.  For evidentiary purposes, a ““plaintiff need not demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving more favorable treatment” to be considered “similarly situated.” Instead, a plaintiff need show only that he and his comparator were “similar in all of the relevant aspects.””

 

More fundamentally, the identity of job responsibilities is not truly relevant here to the question of whether Wheat and Hatfield were similarly situated for Title VII purposes. Rather, because Wheat’s termination was spurred by a verbal, and potentially physical, altercation, the relevant comparison between Wheat and Hatfield should involve only the two men’s roles and actions in the contretemps.

Similarly, the Court rejected the Bank’s argument about plaintiff being the aggressor because there were disputed issues of fact as to who was responsible for prolonging the altercation and initiating any physical contact. “Such divergent explanations of the unfolding of the relevant events creates an obvious dispute of fact that should preclude the grant of summary judgment to the defendant at the prima-facie-case stage of the litigation.”

 

The Court also rejected the argument that they were different in how they behaved during the interview because there was a factual dispute about how the HR employee conducted the interviews, which may have created some justification for the plaintiff to refuse to answer certain questions.  Moreover, his comments -- which the HR employee found to be threatening -- were ambiguous and were not found to be threatening by his supervisor (who was present during the interview).  

The Court also found that the plaintiff had produced evidence to cast doubt on the Bank’s explanation for his termination sufficient to rebut its explanation as a mere pretext for discrimination.  

“Pretext can be shown by offering evidence that (1) the employer’s stated reason had no basis in fact, (2) the stated reason did not actually motivate the employer, or (3) the stated reason was insufficient to warrant the adverse employment action.”

The Court addressed each of the Bank’s termination explanations.  It found there was sufficient evidence to question whether the plaintiff’s behavior in the investigatory interview was sufficient to warrant his termination.  The plaintiff claimed that the HR employee’s questions were irrelevant and she never asked for his version of events, although she did so of the white employee.  Similarly, his vague statements about Monday being a “big day” and him “taking care” of himself were too ambiguous to warrant termination, particularly when the plaintiff denied making any threats.

The Court also rejected the Bank’s concern that the plaintiff would initiate more violence upon return to work because evidence had been produced that the white employee had been the aggressor, not the plaintiff.  In light of the fact that the white employee maintains that he had always told the Bank the truth about what happened, the HR employee’s credibility was in question as to whether she could genuinely have believed that the plaintiff was the aggressor before he was fired.

A jury could reasonably conclude that each of the rationales proposed by the defendant for its decision to fire Wheat either had no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the defendant’s decision, or was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.

Interestingly, there was no discussion in the opinion about the honest belief rule where the defendant acts based on mistaken assumptions after a good faith investigation.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Supreme Court Creates New Legal Standard For Pregnancy Discrimination Claims

This morning, a divided Supreme Court reversed the employer’s summary judgment in a disparate treatment pregnancy discrimination case, but rejected the legal and statutory interpretation arguments submitted by the government, EEOC, employer and plaintiff.  Instead, the Court created a new standard which applies only to pregnancy discrimination claims.  Young v. UPS, No. 12-1226 (3-25-15).  The issue confronting the Court was how an employer must treat a pregnant employee who requires an accommodation offered to some, but not all, other non-pregnant employees with similar physical restrictions.  The Court rejected most-favored-nations status for pregnant employees based simply on the grounds that accommodations have been offered to only some employees. It also rejected the employer’s argument that pregnant employees only need to be treated the same as other non-pregnant employees.  Instead, the Court slightly relaxed the similarly-situated standard in the prima facie case, rejected certain business justifications, and expanded what could constitute pretext for discrimination. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the employer requires delivery drivers to carry up to 70 pounds.  During her pregnancy, the plaintiff was medically restricted to carrying only 20 pounds.  The employer refused to waive the lifting requirement, to temporarily transfer her to an alternative position or to permit her to work.  She took unpaid leave and ultimately lost her medical coverage.  This lawsuit followed. 

The employer defended its refusal to waive its lifting requirements or to transfer her to a light duty position on the basis that it only accommodated employees with workers’ compensation injuries, who lost their DOT certifications, or who were covered by the ADA (which, should be noted, does not include pregnancy as a disability or require an employer to eliminate an essential job function, but could require a transfer to another, open position).  The plaintiff contended (over the employer’s objection) that it also accommodated other employees with physical limitations.  A union steward testified that the only physical limitations that the employer did not accommodate with a transfer were pregnant employees.   The employer was given summary judgment (on the basis that the plaintiff did not identify similarly situated employees who were treated better), which was affirmed on appeal.  Those courts would only permit the pregnant plaintiff to compare herself to employees injured off the job.

The Court noted that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act has two provisions at issue in the litigation:  the incorporation of pregnancy into the definition of Title VII’s sex discrimination and a duty to treat pregnancy physical limitations “the same . . . .as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or in­ability to work.” 

The Court rejected the employer’s argument that the second clause in the PDA merely clarifies the meaning of sex discrimination because the clarification would render the first clause superfluous.  Therefore, the Court rejected the employer’s proposed analysis that “courts would compare the accommodations an employer provides to pregnant women with the accommodations it provides to others within a facially neutral category (such as those with off-the-job injuries) to determine whether the em­ployer has violated Title VII.”  That analysis would exist even in the absence of the second clause: “If the second clause of the Act did not exist, we would still say that an employer who disfa­vored pregnant women relative to other workers of similar ability or inability to work had engaged in pregnancy discrimination.”

The  Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that an employer must accommodate every pregnant employee’s restrictions if it accommodates any other employee’s restrictions.  The Court found that this granted pregnant employees  “most favored nation” status which would discourage an employer from accommodating the physical restrictions of long-time employees, those employees with special, extraordinarily hazardous and/or necessary skills or elderly employees.  Indeed, seniority is a enumerated defense to a Title VII claim.

The language of the statute does not require that unqualified reading. The second clause, when referring to nonpregnant persons with simi­lar disabilities, uses the open-ended term “other persons.” It does not say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the “same” as “any other persons” (who are similar in their ability or inability to work), nor does it otherwise specify which other persons Congress had in mind.

Moreover, disparate-treatment law normally permits an employer to implement policies that are not intended to harm members of a protected class, even if their imple­mentation sometimes harms those members, as long as the employer has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, nonpre­textual reason for doing so.

The Court refused to give any significant weight to last year’s EEOC PDA guidance which advised employers to provide the same accommodations to pregnant employees that it provides to employees with work injuries. Both before and immediately after the passage of the PDA, the EEOC guidelines required only that pregnancy be treated the same as other medical conditions:

“Disabilities caused or contributed to by preg­nancy . . . for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the same as disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions.”

  In rejecting the recent EEOC guidance, the Court cited concerns with its

timing, “consistency,” and “thor­oughness” of “consideration.” The EEOC promulgated its 2014 guidelines only recently, after this Court had granted certiorari in this case. In these circumstances, it is fair to say that the EEOC’s current guidelines take a position about which the EEOC’s previous guidelines were silent. And that position is inconsistent with positions for which the Government has long advocated. . . . Nor does the EEOC explain the basis of its latest guidance. Does it read the statute, for example, as embodying a most-favored-nation status?   Why has it now taken a position contrary to the litigation position the Government previously took?   Without further explanation, we cannot rely significantly on the EEOC’s determination.

The Court observed that the PDA was enacted to overrule the Court’s prior decision in General Elec. Co. v. Gil­bert, 429 U. S. 125 where the employer provided sickness and accident insurance to non-pregnant employees and the Court found no sex discrimination because women received the same coverage that men did.  Simply including pregnancy into Title VII would not have changed the result in Gilbert, which was the intent of the second clause in the PDA.

While pregnancy discrimination claims are to be treated similarly to any other sex discrimination claims, they will differ in three material respects.  For instance, the similarly-situated standard must be relaxed:

an individual plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by ‘showing actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under’ Title VII. . . . Nei­ther does it require the plaintiff to show that those whom the employer favored and those whom the employer disfa­vored were similar in all but the protected ways.

In particular, the Court laid out the shifting burdens of proof as follows:

First, the plaintiff must show:

a) that she belongs to the protected class,

b) that she sought accommodation,

c) that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “simi­lar in their ability or inability to work.”

Second, the employer would need to provide a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to provide the requested accommodation.

 

But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (“similar in their ability or inability to work”) whom the employer accom­modates. After all, the employer in Gilbert could in all likelihood have made just such a claim.

Third, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s reason is pretextual.

We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on preg­nant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondis­criminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large per­centage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommo­date a large percentage of pregnant workers. Here, for example, if the facts are as Young says they are, she can show that UPS accommodates most nonpregnant employ­ees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations. Young might also add that the fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate preg­nant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.

In response to the dissent’s concern that the  Court was imposing liability under a disparate impact theory, it notes that it intends for “continued focus on whether the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”

Ultimately, the Court reversed the employer’s summary judgment, but left open the possibility that the employer’s explanation could ultimately prevail on summary judgment because it was expressing no opinion as to whether the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence to show pretext.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.