Showing posts with label duty to bargain. Show all posts
Showing posts with label duty to bargain. Show all posts

Thursday, January 3, 2013

NLRB Was Busy at End of 2012

In the last quarter of 2012, the NLRB issued several significant decisions which will affect both union and non-union employers in the future.  Three decisions in particular are worth noting.  In one, a non-union, non-profit employer was found to have violated the NLRA for discharging five employees for critical statements made on Facebook about a co-worker in violation of the employer’s zero-tolerance anti-bullying policy.  In another, the Board concluded that an employer is no longer always entitled to withhold from a union witness statements gathered during a workplace investigation that leads to the termination of an employee.  Finally, the Board held that employers with a newly certified union that have not yet reached a collective bargaining agreement generally may not unilaterally demote, suspend or discharge employees without first bargaining with the union.

Non-Union Employer Terminating Employees For Criticizing Co-Worker on Facebook.  In Hispanics United of Buffalo, the non-profit, non-union employer terminated five employees under the agency’s EEO non-retaliation/anti-harassment policy for criticizing a co-worker who was critical of their client service.   One of the terminated employees knew that the co-worker intended to express her concerns to the Executive Director and, while home on Saturday, asked her Facebook co-worker friends what they thought of this criticism.  Five off-duty employees responded by objecting to any criticism of their own performance.  The criticized co-worker also responded about the “lies” and reported to the Executive Director the following Monday that the Facebook postings had upset her enough to give her a heart attack.  Following an investigation – which included reviewing copies of the postings – five of the six employees involved were terminated under the agency’s “zero tolerance” for bullying and harassment under the EEO policy.  (The Director’s secretary was not discharged even though she also participated).   The Board’s majority found the Facebook criticisms of the co-worker constituted protected concerted activity and could not be the basis of disciplinary action.   The Board rejected the employer’s argument that the Facebook criticisms constituted bullying and harassment: “legitimate managerial concerns to prevent harassment do not justify policies that discourage the free exercise of Section 7 rights by subjecting employees to . . . discipline on the basis of the subjective reactions of others to their protected activity.”

Confidentiality of Written Witness Statements Collected During Workplace Investigations.  Since 1978, the NLRB has ruled that employers do not need to provide to a union witness statements gathered during a workplace investigation of employee misconduct (because the NLRB does not itself provide copies of witness statements prior to hearings).  However, on December 15, 2012, the NLRB overruled that decision in American Baptist Homes of the West d/b/a Piedmont Gardens.  The issues in American Baptist Homes concerned whether the employer “violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act by failing to provide the Union with the names, job titles, and/or written statements of three individuals who claimed that they witnessed” a nurse sleeping on duty that resulted in the nurse’s termination.  Two of the nurse witnesses submitted their written statements to HR with assurances of confidentiality, but the third nurse slipped her statement under the HR door with only the assumption of confidentiality without being asked for a statement or promised confidentiality.  The NLRB concluded that the employer “violated the Act by failing to provide the witnesses’ names and job titles.”  As for two the witness statements, the Board decided to overrule prior precedent, but to not apply retroactively it to employer in American Baptist Homes.  Nonetheless, because the third statement had been submitted spontaneously without any assurance of confidentiality, the employer was required to produce it to the union.

 Under the Board’s new test, “if the requested information is determined to be relevant, the party asserting the confidentiality defense has the burden of proving that a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest exists, and that it outweighs the requesting party’s need for the information.” An employer “asserting the confidentiality defense may not simply refuse to furnish the requested information, but must raise its confidentiality concerns in a timely manner and seek an accommodation from the” union.  The Board majority rejected the dissent’s concern about the impact this would have on workplace investigations, particularly sexual harassment investigations governed by EEOC guidelines:  
The Detroit Edison balancing test is designed to take into account any legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest that an employer may have, which would include concerns about witness intimidation or compliance with EEOC guidelines. Where such concerns exist, the employer will not be required to provide the information, but will merely need to seek an accommodation from the union. It follows, then, that the Detroit Edison test encourages parties to a collective bargaining agreement to work together to accommodate their competing interests.

Duty to Bargain with Union Imposed on Employee Disciplinary Decisions.  In Alan Ritchey, Inc., the Board held for the first time that an employer which has not yet adopted a collective bargaining agreement with a union must first bargain with the union before imposing discretionary disciplinary actions on any employees in the bargaining unit.    The disciplinary actions at issue involved discretionary progressive disciplinary action for absenteeism, insubordination and threatening behavior.   Imposing disciplinary action was found to be a prohibited material unilateral change in the terms and conditions of employment. “[T]he employer has both a duty to maintain an existing policy governing terms and conditions of employment and a duty to bargain over discretionary applications of that policy.”

Disciplinary actions such as suspension, demotion, and discharge plainly have an inevitable and immediate impact on employees’ tenure, status, or earnings. Requiring bargaining before these sanctions are imposed is appropriate,  . . .  because of this impact on the employee and because of the harm caused to the union’s effectiveness as the employees’ representative if bargaining is postponed. Just as plainly, however, other actions that may nevertheless be referred to as discipline and that are rightly viewed as bargainable, such as oral and written warnings, have a lesser impact on employees, viewed as of the time when action is taken and assuming that they do not themselves automatically result in additional discipline based on an employer’s progressive disciplinary system. Bargaining over these lesser sanctions—which is required insofar as they have a “material, substantial, and significant impact” on terms and conditions of employment— may properly be deferred until after they are imposed.

The Board rejected concerns with the delay from a duty to bargain before imposing disciplinary action because the pre-imposition bargaining was only required for suspensions, demotions and discharges.  Moreover, “where the preimposition duty to bargain exists, the employer’s obligation is simply to provide the union with notice and an opportunity to bargain before discipline is imposed.  . . .  the employer is not required to bargain to agreement or impasse at this stage; rather, if the parties have not reached agreement, the duty to bargain continues after imposition.”  (emphasis added).  In addition, an employer could still act unilaterally where it “has a reasonable, good-faith belief that an employee’s continued presence on the job presents a serious, imminent danger to the employer’s business or personnel,” such as where “an employee has engaged in unlawful conduct, poses a significant risk of exposing the employer to legal liability for his conduct, or threatens safety, health, or security in or outside the workplace.” “Finally, an employer need not await an overall impasse in bargaining before imposing discipline, so long as it exercises its discretion within existing standards.”

Nonetheless, because this was a new Board policy, it decided to not apply the ruling retroactively to the employer, but to only apply it to disciplinary actions taken in the future.

Other Recent Board Decisions.  The Board also publicized its actions in a few other cases. In Latino Express , the Board decided to require employer to compensate employees for any extra taxes they have to pay as a result of receiving the backpay in a lump sum and to require employers paying back wages to file with the Social Security Administration a report allocating the back wages to the years in which they were or would have been earned. In Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy, the Board concluded that it had jurisdiction over an Illinois non-profit corporation that operates a public charter school in Chicago. In United Nurses & Allied Professionals (Kent Hospital) – The Board, addressed “several issues involving the rights of nonmember dues objectors under the Supreme Court’s Beck decision” and concluded that “ lobbying expenses are chargeable to objectors, to the extent that they are germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment.”  Finally, in WKYC-TV, Gannet Co. “the Board found that an employer’s obligation to collect union dues under a check-off agreement will continue after the contract expires and before a bargaining impasse occurs or a new contract is reached.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, November 8, 2012

Good News and Bad News from the NLRB in October

It often seems like only crazy news has been coming out of the NLRB these days.   You know what I mean: employers being unable to require common courtesies from their employees or to prohibit them from defaming one another.  In a recent case, the divided NLRB ruled that it violates the NLRA to not promptly respond to a union request for irrelevant information.  However, the NLRB’s General Counsel took some action to reign in some of the craziness last month.  

Responding to Requests for Irrelevant Information.  First, bad news.  In late October, the NLRB ruled that an employer violated the NLRA when it took four months to tell a union in writing that its request for information about a non-union entity was irrelevant. Iron Tiger Logistics, 359 NLRB No. 13.  The ALJ and the union ultimately agreed with the employer that the requested information was irrelevant to the union’s duties as bargaining representative and the employer did not need to produce the information.  The union did not appeal that finding.   Nonetheless, the ALJ found that waiting four months – until after the ULP charge had been filed --  to put in writing that the union’s request was for irrelevant information violated the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith with the union.  As explained by the ALJ:

[A]n employer must respond to a union’s request for relevant information within a reasonable time, either by complying with it or by stating its reason for noncompliance within a reasonable period of time. Failure to make either response in a reasonable time is, by itself, a violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Some kind of response or reaction is mandatory. Columbia University, 298 NLRB 941, 945 (1990), citing Ellsworth Sheet Metal, 232 NLRB 109 (1977).

The NLRB agreed: “an employer must timely respond to a union request seeking relevant information even when the employer believes it has grounds for not providing the information.”   Accordingly, the employer in this case “was required to timely provide [the requested] information or to timely present the Union with its reasons for not doing so.”  The Board majority rejected the dissent’s argument --  that no prior cases had ever found a statutory violation when the employer was not required to respond to a request for irrelevant information --  because the requested information was “presumptively relevant.”
 
The question here is not whether the Respondent had a duty to provide the information sought by the Union, but rather whether it had a duty to respond to the Union’s request in a timely way.

Employment at Will Disclaimers.  Now, the “good” news. In the last year or so, the NLRB has taken the position that employee handbook provisions – for both union and non-union employers -- violate the NLRA if they “explicitly prohibit NLRA-protected union or concerted activity, such as joining a union or discussing terms and conditions of employment with coworkers. Even if not explicit, a rule can be unlawful if employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit such activity.”  It’s the “reasonably construe” language which has generated derision because there has been nothing reasonable about some of the construction being done.   The NLRB General Counsel has advised that:  

Rules that are ambiguous as to their application to Section 7 activity, and contain no limiting language or context that would clarify to employees that the rule does not restrict Section 7 rights, are unlawful.  In contrast, rules that clarify and restrict their scope by including examples of clearly illegal or unprotected conduct, such that they could not reasonably be construed to cover protected activity, are not unlawful.

 In February, an ALJ ruled that it violated the NRLA for a Red Cross employee handbook in Arizona to contain an employment-at-will disclaimer which provided, among other things, that ““I further agree that the at-will employment relationship cannot be amended, modified or altered in any way.”   According to the ALJ,
 
there is no doubt that “employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity . . . the signing of the acknowledgement form is essentially a waiver in which an employee agrees that his/her at-will status cannot change, thereby relinquishing his/her right to advocate concertedly,  whether represented by a union or not, to change his/her at-will status. For all practical purposes, the clause in question premises employment on an employee’s agreement not to enter into any contract, to make any efforts, or to engage in conduct that could result in union representation and in a collective-bargaining agreement, which would amend, modify, or alter the at-will relationship. Clearly such a clause would reasonably chill employees who were interested in exercising their Section 7 rights.

The employer settled the case rather than appeal it to the NLRB. 

 Employment at will disclaimers are standard in order to explain to employees that they do not have a contractual right to a job for a definite period of time unless certain contingencies are satisfied (like, for instance, a contract signed by the CEO or Board President, etc.).  Without the disclaimer, employers often found themselves being sued by terminated employees claiming that their discharge was unfair and they had been orally promised lifetime employment, etc.  Fortunately, the bad press generated by this ALJ decision and settlement woke up the NLRB General Counsel’s office, which published a memorandum requiring “all Regional Offices to submit cases involving employer handbook at-will provisions to the Division of Advice for further analysis and coordination”  purportedly  “because Board law in this area remains unsettled.”

The General Counsel also publicized that most employment at-will disclaimers do not violate the NLRA. Merely highlighting that “that the employer’s representatives are not authorized to change” the employees’ employment at will relationship does not violate the NLRA.   In particular, the General Counsel specifically approved the employee handbook used by two employers:

·        Employment with Rocha Transportation is employment at-will. Employment at-will may be terminated with or without cause and with or without notice at any time by the employee or the Company. Nothing in this Handbook or in any document or statement shall limit the right to terminate employment at-will. No manager, supervisor, or employee of Rocha Transportation has any authority to enter into an agreement for employment for any specified period of time or to make an agreement for employment other than at-will. Only the president of the Company has the authority to make any such agreement and then only in writing.

·        The relationship between you and Mimi's Cafe is referred to as employment at will." This means that your employment can be terminated at any time for any reason, with or without cause, with or without notice, by you or the Company. No representative of the Company has authority to enter into any agreement contrary to the foregoing "employment at will" relationship. Nothing contained in this handbook creates an express or implied contract of employment.

 The General Counsel acknowledges the utility of the employment at will disclaimers and their prior approval by the Board and courts:
 
It is commonplace for employers to rely on policy provisions such as those at issue here as a defense against potential legal actions by employees asserting that the employee handbook creates an enforceable employment contract. See NLRB v. Ace Comb Co., 342 F.2d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 1965) ("It must be remembered that it is not the purpose of the Act to give the Board any control whatsoever over an employer's policies, including his policies concerning tenure of employment, and that an employer may hire and fire at will for any reason whatsoever, or for no reason, so long as the motivation is not violative of the Act"); Aeon Precision Company, 239 NLRB 60, 63 (1978) (same); Aileen, Inc., 218 NLRB 1419, 1422 (1975) (same).
Accordingly, it rejected the argument that the NLRA was violated by a handbook which provided that no representative had authority to modify the employment at will relationship as long as the disclaimer and/or signed acknowledgement “does not require employees to refrain from seeking to change their at-will status or to agree that their at-will status cannot be changed in any way.”  Notably, the NLRB General Counsel’s office is still taking the position that it could violate the NLRA for an employee handbook provision to “require employees to refrain from seeking to change their at-will status or to agree that their at-will status cannot be changed in any way.” 


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.