Employer Loses Challenge to NLRB's McClaren Macomb Restrictions on Severance Agreements

Last week, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed enforcement of the NLRB’s order against an employer which had failed to negotiate with the union about the effects of a layoff and presented severance agreements to the laid off employees without first informing or negotiating with the union about the terms of those agreements.  NLRB v. McLaren Macomb, No. 23-1335/1403 (6^th Cir. Sept. 19, 2024).   Because that conduct – by itself – was sufficient to violate sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, the Court declined to consider the employer’s objections to the NLRB’s alternative conclusion that the terms of the severance agreement – concerning confidentiality and non-disparagement – constituted independent 8(a)(1) violations.   Accordingly, the employees were ordered reinstated with backpay. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

NLRB Prohibits Broad Confidentiality Clauses in Severance Agreements

On Tuesday, the National Labor Relations Board held that a hospital employer violated the NLRA in 2020 by offering laid off non-supervisory employees a separation agreement which, among other things, prohibited them from disparaging or making statements that harm the reputation of the employer.  McLaren Macomb, Case 07–CA– 263041 (2-21-23).  The Board is returning to a legal standard where “unlawful provisions in a severance agreement proffered to employees have a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce the exercise of employee rights under Section 7 of the Act.”  More broadly, “an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it proffers a severance agreement with provisions that would restrict employees’ exercise of their NLRA rights.”  The Board expanded its analysis by including within this prohibition clauses which require employees to keep confidential the terms of the separation agreement where the only exceptions were for tax advisors, attorneys, spouses and when compelled by law.  “A severance agreement is unlawful if it precludes an employee from assisting coworkers with workplace issues concerning their employer, and from communicating with others, including a union, and the Board, about his employment.”  This is not a case where the confidentiality clause also carved out statutory rights, such as reporting to or cooperating with government agencies. 

According to the Board’s opinion, the employer temporarily laid off 11 non-supervisory/management  employees when the government restricted medical services during the COVID pandemic.  Without first informing or negotiating with the union, the employer later made those layoffs permanent and offered severance agreements which provided severance pay in return for a release of claims, etc. and promises to not disparage the hospital and to keep confidential the terms of the agreements:

6.  Confidentiality Agreement. The Employee acknowledges that the terms of this Agreement are confidential and agrees not to disclose them to any third person, other than spouse, or as necessary to professional advisors for the purposes of obtaining legal counsel or tax advice, or unless legally compelled to do so by a court or administrative agency of competent jurisdiction.

7. Non-Disclosure. At all times hereafter, the Employee promises and agrees not to disclose information, knowledge or materials of a confidential, privileged, or proprietary nature of which the Employee has or had knowledge of, or involvement with, by reason of the Employee’s employment. At all times hereafter, the Employee agrees not to make statements to Employer’s employees or to the general public which could disparage or harm the image of Employer, its parent and affiliated entities and their officers, directors, employees, agents and representatives.

The Agreements also made the employees liable for injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees and damages if they violated the provisions.  The Board had no difficulty finding the employer violated the NLRA by failing to first inform or negotiate with the union about the layoffs and severance agreements.  However, the Board also found that the agreements themselves violated the NLRA.

Relying almost exclusively on prior Board precedent that employees may not waive their Section 7 rights and cases which addressed whether employers could interfere with employees’ rights to report allegations to the Board or to assist other employees in asserting their Section 7 rights, then Board then asserts that the confidentiality provision would prevent employees from reporting the employer’s alleged misconduct to the NLRB:

The provision broadly prohibits the subject employee from disclosing the terms of the agreement “to any third person.” . . . The employee is thus precluded from disclosing even the existence of an unlawful provision contained in the agreement. This proscription would reasonably tend to coerce the employee from filing an unfair labor practice charge or assisting a Board investigation into the Respondent’s use of the severance agreement, including the nondisparagement provision. Such a broad surrender of Section 7 rights contravenes established public policy that all persons with knowledge of unfair labor practices should be free from coercion in cooperating with the Board.  The confidentiality provision has an impermissible chilling tendency on the Section 7 rights of all employees because it bars the subject employee from providing information to the Board concerning the Respondent’s unlawful interference with other employees’ statutory rights.

                . . .

The confidentiality provision would also prohibit the subject employee from discussing the terms of the severance agreement with his former coworkers who could find themselves in a similar predicament facing the decision whether to accept a severance agreement. In this manner, the confidentiality provision impairs the rights of the subject employee’s former coworkers to call upon him for support in comparable circumstances. Additionally encompassed by the confidentiality provision is discussion with the Union concerning the terms of the agreement, or such discussion with a union representing employees where the subject employee may gain subsequent employment, or alternatively seek to participate in organizing, or discussion with future co-workers.  A severance agreement is unlawful if it precludes an employee from assisting coworkers with workplace issues concerning their employer, and from communicating with others, including a union, and the Board, about his employment. Id. Conditioning the benefits under a severance agreement on the forfeiture of statutory rights plainly has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, or coerce the exercise of those rights. unless it is narrowly tailored to respect the range of those rights. (bolding added for emphasis).

There is no discussion in the case whether the agreements also provided that the confidentiality provision would not apply to prevent the employee from reporting or cooperating with any law enforcement or government agency, including, for instance, the NLRA or EEOC or SEC, etc.  Rather, the Board notes that: “The only exceptions are disclosure to spouse, for obtaining legal counsel or tax advice, or if compelled to do so by a court or administrative agency.”

Section 7 rights are not limited to discussions with coworkers, as they do not depend on the existence of an employment relationship between the employee and the employer, and the Board has repeatedly affirmed that such rights extend to former employees. It is further long-established that Section 7 protections extend to employee efforts to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside the immediate employee - employer relationship . . . These channels include administrative, judicial, legislative, and political forums,  newspapers, the media, social media, and communications to the public that are part of and related to an ongoing labor dispute. Accordingly, Section 7 affords protection for employees who engage in communications with a wide range of third parties in circumstances where the communication is related to an ongoing labor dispute and when the communication is not so disloyal, reckless, or maliciously untrue to lose the Act's protection.

                 . . .

             . . . Where an agreement unlawfully conditions receipt of severance benefits on the forfeiture of statutory rights, the mere proffer of the agreement itself violates the Act, because it has a reasonable tendency to interfere with or restrain the prospective exercise of Section 7 rights, both by the separating employee and those who remain employed. Whether the employee accepts the agreement is immaterial. . . .

The nondisparagement provision on its face substantially interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights. Public statements by employees about the workplace are central to the exercise of employee rights under the Act. Yet the broad provision at issue here prohibits the employee from making any “statements to [the] Employer’s employees or to the general public which could disparage or harm the image of [the] Employer”—including, it would seem, any statement asserting that the Respondent had violated the Act (as by, for example, proffering a settlement agreement with unlawful provisions). This far-reaching proscription—which is not even limited to matters regarding past employment with the Respondent . . .

The Board also ordered the employer to “compensate the employees for any other direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms incurred as a result of the unlawful furloughs, including reasonable search-for-work and interim employment expenses, if any, regard[1]less of whether these expenses exceed interim earnings. Compensation for these harms shall be calculated separately from taxable net backpay . . .”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

SEC Invalidates Severance Agreement Waivers Which Preclude Whistleblowers From Recovering Financial Bounties

In August, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a Cease and Desist Order that employers cannot require an employee in a severance agreement to waive their right to collect a financial award from a government agency because such a provision removes the financial incentive for the employee to report illegal conduct by the employer.  Such provisions are common in severance agreements because the employer is paying an employee money to which the employee is not otherwise entitled in order to buy future peace and does not wish to have to pay the employee twice if the employee later pursues a claim with a government agency.  While the SEC decision and position are based on an unusual SEC regulation that only applies to publicly traded companies, employers should remain alert to other government agencies attempting to adopt a similar position. 

Following the Great Recession, Congress enacted stronger SEC whistleblower laws in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, including provisions providing for financial bounties to be paid to individuals who report corporate wrongdoing to the SEC.  The SEC then enacted regulations, including the following provision at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17:

 Staff communications with individuals reporting possible securities law violations.

(a) No person may take any action to impede an individual from communicating directly with the Commission staff about a possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement (other than agreements dealing with information covered by § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i) and § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(ii) of this chapter related to the legal representation of a client) with respect to such communications.

In 2015, the SEC announced that it violated this regulation to require employees to first report to the Company any disclosure of confidential information before exercising their right to engage in whistleblowing to the SEC.  In August, it found that an Atlanta employer had a similar confidentiality provision in its severance agreements which stated, in part,  

Employee has not and in the future will not use or disclose to any third party Confidential Information, unless compelled by law and after notice to BlueLinx. * * * If the Employee has any question regarding what data or information would be considered by BlueLinx to be information subject to this provision, the Employee agrees to contact BlueLinx’s Legal Department in writing for written clarification.

and/or

[The Employee shall not] disclose to any person or entity not expressly authorized by the Company any Confidential Information or Trade Secrets….Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, you shall not be restricted from disclosing or using Confidential Information or Trade Secrets that are required to be disclosed by law, court or other legal process; provided, however, that in the event disclosure is required by law, you shall provide the Company’s Legal Department with prompt written notice of such requirement in time to permit the Company to seek an appropriate protective order or other similar protection prior to any such disclosure by you.

 . . . .

Employee further acknowledges and agrees that nothing in this Agreement prevents Employee from filing a charge with…the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other administrative agency if applicable law requires that Employee be permitted to do so; (however, Employee understands and agrees that Employee is waiving the right to any monetary recovery in connection with any such complaint or charge that Employee may file with an administrative agency. (Emphasis added.)

The SEC determined that:

by requiring its departing employees to forgo any monetary recovery in connection with providing information to the Commission, BlueLinx removed the critically important financial incentives that are intended to encourage persons to communicate directly with the Commission staff about possible securities law violations.

Restrictions on the ability of employees to share confidential corporate information regarding possible securities law violations with the Commission and to accept financial awards for providing information to the Commission, such as those contained in the Severance Agreements, undermine the purpose of Section 21F, which is to “encourage individuals to report to the Commission,” and violate Rule 21F-17(a) by impeding individuals from communicating directly with the Commission staff about possible securities law violations.

The employer resolved the dispute with the EEOC, paid a $265,000 penalty to the SEC and agreed to replace the offending paragraph with the following, which permitted departed employees to not only collect financial bounties awarded by the SEC, but to also accept financial compensation from the EEOC, NLRB, and OSHA:

“Protected Rights.  Employee understands that nothing contained in this Agreement limits Employee’s ability to file a charge or complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other federal, state or local governmental agency or commission (“Government Agencies”).  Employee further understands that this Agreement does not limit Employee’s ability to communicate with any Government Agencies or otherwise participate in any investigation or proceeding that may be conducted by any Government Agency, including providing documents or other information, without notice to the Company.  This Agreement does not limit Employee’s right to receive an award for information provided to any Government Agencies.”

One could argue that the SEC position only applies to waivers of bounties paid by the SEC, as opposed waivers of any right to receive any future or additional monies from the employer.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Flurry of Restrictive Covenant and Trade Secret Activity This Spring

There has been a number of developments affecting employment agreements, non-compete agreements and trade secrets this Spring.  First, a new federal statute was enacted last month, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 which, as discussed below, creates federal court jurisdiction over civil trade secret theft lawsuits, authorizes courts to issue ex parte seizure orders in “extraordinary circumstances” and authorizes treble damages and attorneys’ fees  only when the employer amended its confidentiality agreements and/or policies to permit confidential disclosure to government agencies, under seal in litigation, and to attorneys in whistleblower situations, but does not permit court to enjoin individuals from obtaining employment with a competitor.   In one lawsuit, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for an employer who revoked a former employee’s severance pay when he began working for a company and the severance agreement permitted the employer in its “sole discretion” to deem it a “competitor.”  In the second, the employer lost in its attempt to keep temporary employees from continuing to work for a client through a competitor supplier because the court interpreted the contract to only apply if the defendant employees had voluntarily resigned, which they had not.  Finally, in the last decision from earlier this month, the court reversed a shortening of the restrictive period from one year to six months because the hardship on the employee was not undue in light of his considerable financial resources.

 Congressed passed the DTSA in April and it was signed by the President in May.  Federal court may be invoked when a trade secret involving a product or service used in interstate or federal commerce has misappropriated within the prior three years.   In extraordinary circumstances, a court may – without prior notice to the defendant – issue an order for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the dissemination or propagation of the misappropriated trade secret.    The Court may also grant other civil remedies, but may not enjoin an employment relationship or enjoin information that the person simply knows (as opposed to misappropriated trade secrets).  In other words, Congress did not adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine and only provides a remedy when the misappropriation was through “improper means” or was acquired by someone who knew that the information was “derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret.”  “Improper means” was defined to “include[] theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means” but “does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful means of acquisition.”  The DTSA does not preempt state law or change the burden of providing that particular information is, in fact, a trade secret.

In order to obtain an ex parte seizure order, the plaintiff needs to show that a TRO (i.e., temporary restraining order) would be inadequate because the defendant ‘would evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply with such an order and the plaintiff would suffer immediate and irreparable injury if the property were not seized.  The plaintiff need also show that the harm to the defendant and third parties is outweighed by the plaintiff’s harm, that the defendant has possession of the trade secret and property to be seized, and that it is likely that information is in fact a trade secret which was misappropriated through improper means (or through such a conspiracy).  Finally, the plaintiff needs to show that the application for a seizure order has not been publicized and, if it were, that the defendant (and/or his/her co-conspirators) would move or destroy or make inaccessible the property to be seized.  The property seized is then placed in the custody of the court.  The defendant could have an action for wrongful seizure against the plaintiff.

In order to obtain treble damages or attorney’s fees following the successful prosecution of a trade secret theft action, the employer must have first provided notice of the DTSA’s statutory immunity to defendant through “any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information”  which is signed or modified after May 11, 2016 or through “a cross-reference to a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of law.”   “Employees” includes contractors and consultants.  This statutory immunity protects individuals from being held criminally or civilly liable under any federal or state trade secret law if the individual’s otherwise unlawful disclosure was made in confidence to a federal, state or local government official or any attorney solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected legal violation, or was disclosed in a complaint or other document filed under seal in a lawsuit or, if the individual  files a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit for retaliation against his or her employer, was disclosed to the individual’s own attorney  or used in the court proceeding if the information is filed under seal and only disclosed pursuant to a court order.

As for non-competition agreement cases, the first case involves a non-competition provision inserted in a severance agreement.  Saunier v. Stark Truss Co., Inc., 2016-Ohio-3162.  The non-competition clause was not very strict.  The employee agreed to not work for any competitor for a year, but even if he did, he would only lose his severance pay.  In addition, the Agreement permitted him to work for a competitor in certain non-sensitive positions (i.e., maintenance), but again, if he did so, his severance pay would cease.  The determination of what entity was a “competitor” was left to the “sole discretion” of the employer without any reasonableness standard.   The employee obtained a job shortly thereafter and, wouldn’t you know it, the employer deemed that entity to be a competitor and cut off his severance pay.  The employee sued and lost because the Court found that the Agreement gave the employer the “sole discretion” to deem the entity a competitor.

In the second case, the employer lost in attempting to keep its temporary employees from continuing to work for its client through a competitor.  Drone Consultants, L.L.C. v. Armstrong, 2016-Ohio-3222.  The plaintiff employer provided temporary employees to a client.  Those employees were required by contract to provide two weeks advance notice of resignation so that their replacements could be recruited and trained and then precluded from returning to their temporary assignment with that client through a competitor.   After the client terminated its contract with the plaintiff employer, the employer notified the six defendant employees that their employment was being terminated and they could collect unemployment.  Instead, they were hired by a competitor who placed them right back in their previous assignments with that client and the plaintiff employer sued.  The Court interpreted the contract to only require the employees to provide notice if they voluntarily resigned, which they had not.  Similarly, the restriction against returning to their previous assignments through a competitor also only applied in the event of their voluntarily resignation and, therefore, did not apply in the event of their involuntary termination.    Although the court ultimately did not discuss or apply it, the plaintiff employer’s contract to provide contingent workers to that client provided that it was required to waive any restrictive covenants that would preclude those workers from continuing to work for the client in the event the plaintiff employer’s contract was terminated by the other party without cause (which it had been).

The final case from earlier this month reversed the trial court’s shortening of the non-compete period from one year to six months.   AK Steel Corp. v. Arcelormittal USA, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-3285.  In that case, a senior executive with knowledge of the plaintiff employer’s strategic plans for the future was subject to a one-year world-wide non-competition agreement and was recruited to the be the COO of a larger competitor.   The trial court reduced the restrictive period to six months on the grounds that it constituted an undue hardship to the defendant employee without a corresponding benefit to the plaintiff employer.  The appeals court found the restrictive period to be reasonable in light of his confidential knowledge of strategy, business plans, manufacturing processes for current and next generation products, future plant locations, pricing and awarding of contracts, etc.

To be sure, there is no allegation that Howell has in any way attempted to steal confidential or trademarked information for the benefit of ArcelorMittal. Furthermore, it is acknowledged among the parties that certain information available to Howell, such as highly complex and detailed manufacturing processes and patented technology, are simply not capable of reproduction from memory. Rather, the pertinent concerns related to confidential information involving company strategy and information that is relied upon at such a fundamental level that makes non-disclosure nearly impossible. Although there is no evidence to suggest any malicious intent on the part of ArcelorMittal, as competing multibillion dollar companies operating worldwide, there is a certain amount of information, in particular strategic decisions, that the companies have a legitimate interest in remaining confidential. The record establishes that AK Steel has a legitimate interest in restricting Howell, the fourth-highest executive within the company, from accepting employment from a competitor for a one-year period.

Finally, the Court rejected the trial court’s concern with hardship on the defendant employee because every employee suffers some hardship from these covenants, but they can only be modified or eliminated when the hardship is undue:

 . . the trial court failed to consider that "sole means of support," as noted by the Raimonde decision is not limited to employment income. The record here supported a finding that Howell was a highly sought after senior executive of a major steel company, and was recruited by an even larger competitor. Although there was testimony that Howell had a family that depended on his income, there was also testimony that Howell had a large, vested retirement plan from AK Steel, and his new employment with ArcelorMittal would include a $900,000 signing bonus. In resolving the issue of "undue hardship," we find the trial court erred by failing to consider the additional resources in determining whether the noncompete provision deprived Howell of his sole means of support.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

NLRB Snags Another Non-Union Employer with Confidentiality Provision in Employment Agreement.

Late last month, the NLRA concluded that a temporary agency twice violated the National Labor Relations Act when it discharged an employee for breaching an unlawful term in his employment agreement requiring him to maintain the confidentiality of the terms of his compensation. Northeastern Land Services, Ltd. d/b/a The NLS Group and Jamison John Dupuy, Case 1–CA–39447 (NLRB 6/27/08).

The employer temporary agency leased employees to third parties. There is no indication that either the temporary agency employer or its client employers were unionized. The temporary agency employer allegedly violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA “by maintaining in its employment contracts an overbroad confidentiality provision and by terminating [the complaining] employee . . . for breaching that confidentiality provision.” In particular, the temporary agency required its employees to sign an employment which contained the following clause: “Employee also understands that the terms of this employment, including compensation, are confidential to Employee and the NLS Group. Disclosure of these terms to other parties may constitute grounds for dismissal.” The clause did not limit the confidentiality obligation to disclosing the information to competitors or clients, and thus, could unlawfully encompass unions.

After he began work, the employee began to experience problems with getting paid in a timely manner. After complaining to the temporary agency, he also complained to the leasing employer. In addition, the leasing employer had promised him a daily stipend for using his personal laptop at work, but when the temporary agency indicated that it planned to reduce this stipend, the employee objected to both the leasing employer and the HR Coordinator of the temporary agency. He also asked the leasing employer to retain him through another temporary agency if these problems could not be resolved and then refused to bring his laptop to the job site any longer.

The temporary agency CEO then notified the employee that they felt that they had done enough to accommodate him, that nothing would make him happy and that he was being terminated. When he objected (on the grounds he had engaged in protected conduct by filing a complaint with a state agency), the CEO responded that the employee had “not lived up to [his] end of the bargain” in that he had failed “to comply with his contractual agreement—i.e., the confidentiality provision in the temporary employment agreement—not to disclose the terms of his employment to outside parties.”

The NLRB articulated its standard for determining the validity of work rules under the NLRA. “If the rule explicitly restricts Section 7 activity, it is unlawful. If the rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity, it is nonetheless unlawful if (1) employees would reasonably construe the language of the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights. In applying these principles, the Board refrains from reading particular phrases in isolation, and it does not presume improper interference with employee rights.” (citations omitted).

In this case, the confidentiality provision in the temporary agency’s employment agreement “is unlawful because employees reasonably would construe it to prohibit activity protected by Section 7. Specifically, . . . the provision, by its clear terms, precludes employees from discussing compensation and other terms of employment with ‘other parties.’ Employees would reasonably understand that language as prohibiting discussions of their compensation with union representatives.” Therefore, “the confidentiality provision is unlawfully overbroad at least in this respect, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).”

“Under extant Board precedent, an employer’s imposition of discipline pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad policy or rule constitutes a violation of the Act.” Because the employee was fired to violating “an unlawfully overbroad” rule, his termination was also a separate violation of the NLRA.

The Board then ordered the temporary agency to rescind the confidentiality provision from its employment agreements and other publications, to re-hire the employee to the same or substantially similar job with full back pay and benefits, to eliminate any references in its records to the discharge of the employee, to post a standard notice of its NLRA violation and to mail a notice “to all current and former employees employed by the [temporary agency] under its temporary employment agreement (including but not necessarily limited to its right-of-way agents) since July 23, 2001, the date from which the complaint alleged and we have found that the [temporary agency] maintained the overbroad confidentiality provision in its temporary employment agreement.”

Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.nlrb.gov/research/decisions/board_decisions/template_html.aspx?file=http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Board%20Decisions/352/v35289.htm&size=147.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.