Congressed passed the
DTSA in April and it was signed by the President in May. Federal court may be invoked when a trade secret
involving a product or service used in interstate or federal commerce has
misappropriated within the prior three years.
In extraordinary circumstances, a court may – without prior notice to
the defendant – issue an order for the seizure of property necessary to prevent
the dissemination or propagation of the misappropriated trade secret. The
Court may also grant other civil remedies, but may not enjoin an employment
relationship or enjoin information that the person simply knows (as opposed to
misappropriated trade secrets). In other
words, Congress did not adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine and only
provides a remedy when the misappropriation was through “improper means” or was
acquired by someone who knew that the information was “derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the
person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the
use of the trade secret.” “Improper
means” was defined to “include[] theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electronic or other means” but “does not include reverse engineering,
independent derivation, or any other lawful means of acquisition.” The DTSA does not preempt state law or change
the burden of providing that particular information is, in fact, a trade
secret.
In order to obtain an ex
parte seizure order, the plaintiff needs to show that a TRO (i.e.,
temporary restraining order) would be inadequate because the defendant ‘would evade, avoid, or
otherwise not comply with such an order and the plaintiff would suffer
immediate and irreparable injury if the property were not seized. The plaintiff need also show that the harm to
the defendant and third parties is outweighed by the plaintiff’s harm, that the
defendant has possession of the trade secret and property to be seized, and
that it is likely that information is in fact a trade secret which was
misappropriated through improper means (or through such a conspiracy). Finally, the plaintiff needs to show that the
application for a seizure order has not been publicized and, if it were, that
the defendant (and/or his/her co-conspirators) would move or destroy or make
inaccessible the property to be seized.
The property seized is then placed in the custody of the court. The defendant could have an action for
wrongful seizure against the plaintiff.
In order to obtain treble damages or attorney’s fees
following the successful prosecution of a trade secret theft action, the
employer must have first provided notice of the DTSA’s statutory immunity to
defendant through “any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the
use of a trade secret or other confidential information” which is signed or modified after May 11, 2016
or through “a cross-reference to a policy document provided to the employee
that sets forth the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of
law.” “Employees” includes contractors
and consultants. This statutory immunity
protects individuals from being held criminally or civilly liable under any
federal or state trade secret law if the individual’s otherwise unlawful
disclosure was made in confidence to a federal, state or local government
official or any attorney solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a
suspected legal violation, or was disclosed in a complaint or other document
filed under seal in a lawsuit or, if the individual files a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit for
retaliation against his or her employer, was disclosed to the individual’s own
attorney or used in the court proceeding
if the information is filed under seal and only disclosed pursuant to a court
order.
As for non-competition agreement cases, the first case
involves a non-competition provision inserted in a severance agreement. Saunier v. Stark Truss Co., Inc., 2016-Ohio-3162. The non-competition
clause was not very strict. The employee
agreed to not work for any competitor for a year, but even if he did, he would
only lose his severance pay. In
addition, the Agreement permitted him to work for a competitor in certain
non-sensitive positions (i.e., maintenance), but again, if he did so,
his severance pay would cease. The
determination of what entity was a “competitor” was left to the “sole
discretion” of the employer without any reasonableness standard. The employee obtained a job shortly
thereafter and, wouldn’t you know it, the employer deemed that entity to be a
competitor and cut off his severance pay.
The employee sued and lost because the Court found that the Agreement
gave the employer the “sole discretion” to deem the entity a competitor.
In the second case, the employer lost
in attempting to keep its temporary employees from continuing to work for its
client through a competitor. Drone Consultants,
L.L.C. v. Armstrong, 2016-Ohio-3222. The plaintiff employer provided
temporary employees to a client. Those
employees were required by contract to provide two weeks advance notice of
resignation so that their replacements could be recruited and trained and then
precluded from returning to their temporary assignment with that client through
a competitor. After the client
terminated its contract with the plaintiff employer, the employer notified the
six defendant employees that their employment was being terminated and they
could collect unemployment. Instead,
they were hired by a competitor who placed them right back in their previous
assignments with that client and the plaintiff employer sued. The Court interpreted the contract to only require
the employees to provide notice if they voluntarily resigned, which they had
not. Similarly, the restriction against
returning to their previous assignments through a competitor also only applied
in the event of their voluntarily resignation and, therefore, did not apply in
the event of their involuntary termination.
Although the court ultimately did not discuss or apply it, the plaintiff
employer’s contract to provide contingent workers to that client provided that
it was required to waive any restrictive covenants that would preclude those
workers from continuing to work for the client in the event the plaintiff
employer’s contract was terminated by the other party without cause (which it
had been).
The final case from earlier this month reversed the
trial court’s shortening of the non-compete period from one year to six months. AK Steel Corp. v.
Arcelormittal USA, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-3285. In that case, a senior
executive with knowledge of the plaintiff employer’s strategic plans for the
future was subject to a one-year world-wide non-competition agreement and was
recruited to the be the COO of a larger competitor. The
trial court reduced the restrictive period to six months on the grounds that it
constituted an undue hardship to the defendant employee without a corresponding
benefit to the plaintiff employer. The appeals
court found the restrictive period to be reasonable in light of his confidential
knowledge of strategy, business plans, manufacturing processes for current and
next generation products, future plant locations, pricing and awarding of
contracts, etc.
To be sure, there is no allegation that Howell has in any way
attempted to steal confidential or trademarked information for the benefit of
ArcelorMittal. Furthermore, it is acknowledged among the parties that certain
information available to Howell, such as highly complex and detailed
manufacturing processes and patented technology, are simply not capable of
reproduction from memory. Rather, the pertinent concerns related to
confidential information involving company strategy and information that is
relied upon at such a fundamental level that makes non-disclosure nearly
impossible. Although there is no evidence to suggest any malicious intent on
the part of ArcelorMittal, as competing multibillion dollar companies operating
worldwide, there is a certain amount of information, in particular strategic
decisions, that the companies have a legitimate interest in remaining confidential.
The record establishes that AK Steel has a legitimate interest in restricting Howell,
the fourth-highest executive within the company, from accepting employment from
a competitor for a one-year period.
Finally, the Court rejected the trial court’s concern with
hardship on the defendant employee because every employee suffers some hardship
from these covenants, but they can only be modified or eliminated when the
hardship is undue:
. . the trial court
failed to consider that "sole means of support," as noted by the Raimonde
decision is not limited to employment income. The record here supported a
finding that Howell was a highly sought after senior executive of a major steel
company, and was recruited by an even larger competitor. Although there was
testimony that Howell had a family that depended on his income, there was also
testimony that Howell had a large, vested retirement plan from AK Steel, and
his new employment with ArcelorMittal would include a $900,000 signing bonus. In
resolving the issue of "undue hardship," we find the trial court
erred by failing to consider the additional resources in determining whether
the noncompete provision deprived Howell of his sole means of support.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and
alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and
does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead
to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without
notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If
you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or
retain an employment attorney.