Showing posts with label commute. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commute. Show all posts

Monday, July 27, 2026

DOL Addresses Compensable Travel/Commuting Time and Continuous Workday Doctrine in Two Opinion Letters

Last week, the federal Department of Labor Wage and Hour Administrator issued two opinion letters concerning the compensability of time spent travelling from home to work or one’s first client assignment.  Ohio law generally follows the FLSA and employers can rely on opinion letters for a good faith defense, although these letters are not binding on courts.   The DOL explains that time spent commuting from home to work generally benefits the employee more than the employer (because the employee chose where to live) and is generally not compensable because, unless the employee is performing work during the commute, the time is spent mostly for the benefit of the employee (like lunch breaks).  “[A]s a general matter, an “ordinary” or “normal” commute represents a third category of time, in addition to off-duty time and bona fide meal breaks, that is not worktime even if it occurs during the continuous workday.”   Thus, employers who permit employees to work remotely from home need not compensate employees who (i) only work, or start working, from home in the morning before then commuting to the office or (ii) perform some work from home after travelling home in the evening as a convenience.  However,  in the next letter, the DOL found that an employee who did not have a regular work office and always commuted to directly to his first client assignment and was required to spend almost an hour before leaving each day scheduling client appointments (sometimes while driving), then the drive time and scheduling time was compensable, but not the time spent receiving pages with such assignments. 

In the first letter, FLSA2026-9,  the Administrator addressed an employer which generally required employees to spend the entire day working from home or working in the office to avoid having to pay for mid-day commuting time even though (i) some employees preferred to work from home during rush hour in order to reduce their commuting time, (ii) some employees needed to leave early because of bus schedules, but were otherwise willing to work more hours and overtime and (iii) some employees wanted to work half days from home and half days in the office.   In none of these scenarios were the employees performing any work during their travel to or from the office (which would, of course, be compensable).  Because scheduling the commute was for the convenience of the employee and benefitted the employee (who chose where to live) more than the employer, the DOL explained that the time was no more compensable than a lunch or other rest break. 

Under the Portal Act, “walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which [an] employee is employed to perform” are not compensable activities. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). However, both before and after the Portal Act, WHD and courts have long confirmed that “[n]ormal travel from home to work is not worktime.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35;  . . .  even in its pre-Portal Act decisions, the Court never held that time an employee spent traveling from his or her home to an employer’s worksite was generally compensable. This is because normal commuting travel between home and work is a “normal incident of employment” that may take more or less time depending on where an employee lives—i.e., it predominantly benefits employees by allowing them to live where they choose.  . . . Ordinary commuter travel is excludable whether an employee “works at a fixed location or at different job sites.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35.

 . . .

 . . . though ordinary commuting is not compensable work—as explained above— travel from home to work can constitute work in some instances, such as “if an employee who has gone home after completing his day’s work is subsequently called out at night to travel a substantial distance to perform an emergency job for one of his employer’s customers.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.36; see also id. § 790.7(c). Similarly, “home to work [travel] on [a] special one-day assignment in another city” is compensable worktime, though an employer may deduct the time that an employee would have otherwise spent commuting to his or her “regular work site.” Id. § 785.37;  . . .  Finally, if an employee performs any work during home-to-work travel, it would “of course be counted as hours worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.41; see also id. § 790.7(d). These types of travel are not considered “ordinary” commuting because they are not normal incidents of employment and primarily benefit the employer as opposed to the employee.

The Continuous Workday Doctrine.  The “continuous workday” doctrine or rule establishes that “once the workday starts, all activity is ordinarily compensable until the workday ends,” . . . For example, “a messenger who works a crossword puzzle while awaiting assignments” or “a factory worker who talks to his fellow employees while waiting for machinery to be repaired” is considered to be working, even if the employee is “allowed to leave the premises or the job site during such periods of inactivity.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.15. Similarly, a waiter who must wait during his shift for customers to come in is working. . . .

The continuous workday doctrine reflects a general presumption that an employee’s time within the workday predominantly benefits the employer—and that time outside the workday mainly benefits the employee. It thus historically benefits both employers and employees. Generally, an employee’s time during the workday is compensable, even though it may provide employees with some benefits, whereas outside the continuous workday time is generally not compensable even though it may provide employers with some benefits. . . .

Like many general principles, there are recognized exceptions to the continuous workday doctrine—both for time spent at an employer’s worksite that clearly benefits the employee more than the employer and, concomitantly, time spent away from an employer’s worksite (e.g., at a worker’s home) that benefits the employer more than the employee. The former is, therefore, excludable from compensable worktime and the latter properly counted as hours worked. Specifically, the Department has recognized off-duty time, defined as “periods during which an employee is completely relieved from duty and which are long enough to enable [an employee] to use the time effectively for his own purposes,” and bona fide meal periods as time during the workday that is nonetheless not worktime and thus need not be compensated. 29 C.F.R. §§ 785.16, 785.19. And, of course, any hours worked before or after an employee’s regular working hours constitute worktime, even if the work is performed away from the worksite, including at home. 29 C.F.R. § 785.12.

 . . . , as a general matter, an “ordinary” or “normal” commute represents a third category of time, in addition to off-duty time and bona fide meal breaks, that is not worktime even if it occurs during the continuous workday. . . .

 .. .

 . . . ,” otherwise-ordinary travel between home and work does not become worktime simply because it occurs during the workday—that is, at some point in between an employee’s first and last “principal activities.”  . . .

Rather, when an employee engages in an “ordinary” commute, the commute is simply a “normal incident of employment,” and thus is not “work.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.35.22.   We therefore confirm here that if home-to-work travel is “ordinary,” it need not be paid or recorded as worktime, and we clarify that ordinary home-to-work travel that occurs during the workday constitutes a third category of time during the workday, in addition to bona fide meal breaks and off-duty time, that is not considered “hours worked” under the FLSA.

 . . . .

 . . .  the timing of such commuter travel is genuinely voluntary, as employees might have any number of reasons to adjust the timing of their daily commutes. For example, an employee might need to remain at home for part of his or her workday due to a sick child or a visit from a maintenance worker during a scheduled appointment window. Because optional mid-day commuter travel allows employees to accommodate such personal needs, it can benefit employees as much or more than commuter travel which occurs at the beginning or end of the workday. Accordingly, voluntary commuter travel which occurs in the middle of the workday remains an ordinary commute and does not qualify as work.

In the second letter, FLSA2026-10, the employee did not have a regular office, but rather, performed maintenance and repair work on hospital MRI machines throughout the region where he lived.  He would receive pages each morning with an assignment and then would spend roughly 45 minutes before his paid shift began at 8 am calling those hospitals and scheduling appointments.  Sometimes, he would have to leave well before his 8 a.m. shift and schedule appointments on the way.  Thus, he had no “normal” commute because each day he was sent to a different location. 

The DOL found that the pages (which took approximately 15 seconds each to receive) did not constitute work time.  It also did not matter that his employer provided him with a vehicle in which to travel.   However, the time he spent scheduling appointments, consulting with engineers, and driving to appointments did constitute compensable work time.  “The “continuous workday” doctrine establishes that “once the workday starts, all activity is ordinarily compensable until the workday ends,” . . .

Compensable Travel Time. Unlike ordinary commuting time or travel time excepted by the Portal Act or ECFA, any travel that is part of an employee’s principal activity, such as travel between different worksites during the workday, is considered part of the day’s work and therefore compensable hours worked.  . . .  Additionally, because an employee must be paid for all hours worked, courts and the Division have long recognized that time spent during an otherwise non-compensable ordinary home-to-work or work-to-home commute becomes compensable hours worked when the employee is working during the commute time.  . . .  Thus, if, during a commute, an employee performs activities that are integral and indispensable to the principal activities he or she is employed to perform, or said principal activities themselves, and not incidental to the use of an employer-provided vehicle for commuting, then the time spent on those activities constitutes compensable hours worked even though the activities occur during an otherwise non-compensable commute.

 . . . .

Receiving assignments remotely is a minor consequence of driving an employer-provided vehicle to and from home. Otherwise, an employee would have to report to a central work location to receive assignments, which would frustrate the convenience of a program allowing employees who work at multiple job sites per day to drive an employer-provided vehicle directly to and from home. . . . .

On the other hand, time spent calling clients to schedule and arrange the details of appointments, including scheduling other field service engineers, constitutes compensable hours worked. These activities are required by, and primarily benefit, your employer; therefore, they constitute work. Furthermore, they are a critical element of your primary responsibilities, and consequently are not incidental to your commute or otherwise preliminary but rather integral and indispensable to your principal activity of installing and servicing medical equipment at your employer’s clients’ locations. Unlike simply receiving pages, communicating with clients to schedule appointments is a necessary step to performing the services requested by them.  . . .  The same is true of calling other field service engineers to ensure that clients’ service requests are fulfilled. Similarly, unlike receiving pages, which is specifically necessary for you to receive assignments from home, one must call clients to schedule appointments in any event if clients’ requests are to be fulfilled. This activity is thus intrinsic to the services you perform for clients, and you cannot dispense with such work.  . . . .

 . . . .

Under the facts described above, we conclude that this travel is not an ordinary commute, but rather compensable travel. We reach this conclusion based on the application of longstanding FLSA principles to the totality of the circumstances. Here, not only are both the time and manner of the travel based primarily on the employer’s needs rather than the employee’s choice, but your employer is also requiring you to engage in substantial work both immediately before the travel, when you spend most of an hour engaged in phone calls, and immediately after your travel, when you work at your first worksite of the day. This bears few, if any, of the hallmarks of an ordinary commute between an employee’s home and worksite. Indeed, under the circumstances described, you lack virtually any of the types of freedom and flexibility that typically accompany an ordinary home-to-work commute time, such as the choice of the mode of transportation, the choice of departure time, and the ability to spend time on personal tasks before or during breaks in the travel. For these reasons, we conclude that your travel is not, in fact, an “ordinary” commute that is non compensable regardless of when it occurs. To be clear, the Division would consider this sort of travel to work to be explicitly excluded from compensability under the Portal Act if it were to occur before or after the workday. . . .

 . . .

 . . . . you are sometimes required (and accordingly must regularly plan) to spend the substantial majority of the hour before your travel making calls to clients, and to other engineers as necessary, to fulfill clients’ service requests, with any personal activities you undertake limited to those you can perform simultaneously with (or in very short breaks between) your work duties, before you immediately travel to your first worksite at the time and in the manner directed by your employer. . . .

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, January 6, 2021

DOL Clarifies that Employees Need Not Be Paid for Time Spent Commuting To and From Work Even if Employee Worked from Home Part of the Same Day

 

At the end of the year, the DOL issued a number of FLSA opinion letters of interest to employers.  One involves the common situation where an employee works from home part of the day and works from the office for several hours.  Admn Op. No. FLSA2020-19.  In some scenarios, the situation arises because the employee has a personal appointment (i.e., medical or school or childcare) in the morning or early afternoon and the employer gave permission for the employee to work from home before and/or after the personal appointment.   The employee performs no work while commuting between locations and sets her own schedule. The employer inquired whether it was required to compensate the employee for his or her commuting time to or from the office on those days. “[W]hen an employee (a) chooses to perform some work before traveling to the office or (b) chooses to perform work at home after leaving the office, and in either case has sufficient time in between her telework and office work periods to use effectively for her own purposes, the time she spends traveling between home and office is not compensable.”

It is well known that an employer need not compensate an employee for time spent commuting to and from work before and after his or her workday. An employer also need not pay an employee for time spent on personal pursuits.  The question becomes whether the activity is primarily for the benefit of the employer or the employee.   However, it is also known that employees are supposed to be paid at least the minimum wage for their workday.

In general, the period between the commencement and completion on the same workday of an employee’s principal activity or activities is considered compensable, a principle known as the continuous workday doctrine.  An employee is generally not considered to be on duty, and the continuous workday doctrine does not apply, until she has performed her first principal work activity of the day – that is, her first task that is integral and indispensable to the duties that she was hired to perform.  Unlike ordinary commuting time, travel that is part of an employee’s principal activity, such as travel between different worksites between the start and the end of the workday, is considered to be part of the day’s work and is compensable.

The DOL found that the employee’s travel time in the hypothetical scenarios was not compensable because the employee was either off duty or engaged in normal commuting.  Even though, for instance, the employee left work early to attend a school conference and re-commenced work from home after the school conference, the employee spent the time during her commute and attending the conference for personal reasons.  “Though the off-duty regulation speaks of an employee who has been ‘definitely told in advance that . . . [she] will not have to commence work until a definitely specified hour,’ it applies with equal force here where the employee may freely choose the hour at which she resumes working.”

Similarly, when an employee works from home prior to a personal appointment and then takes a break to visit her physician before driving to work, she has been off duty for the time that she spent driving and visiting her physician.   “Her time remains noncompensable until she reaches the office and resumes working.”

The DOL also concluded that travel time between home and office is not compensable under either the worksite to worksite doctrine or under the continuous workday doctrine.   While employees must be compensated for the time spent commuting worksite-to-worksite, commuting from home to worksite and visa versa is not the same activity, regardless of when it occurs because the employer is not requiring the employee to travel to or from home as part of her job.  Rather, she is travelling for her own purposes during off-duty time.

Off duty time is also not compensable under the continuous workday doctrine whether it occurs in the break room, off site or commuting while conducting personal errands.  The employee was also free to determine her own stop and starting times and was not required to commence work at a particular time during that day.  If the rule were otherwise, the employer could conceivably be required to pay for time that the employee spent napping for more than an hour, etc.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Sixth Circuit: ADA Does Not Require Employer to Accommodate Employee’s Commute to Work During Lighter Traffic by Modifying Shift or Lunch Break


This morning, the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of an employer on an ADA failure-to-accommodate claim. Regan v. Faurecia Automotive Seating, Inc., No. 11-1356 (6th Cir. 5-10-11). The employee objected to a change in her shift that would require her to drive in heavier traffic during her commute to and from work. The Court concluded that the ADA only requires an employer to eliminate barriers in the workplace and not external barriers. It was the employee’s choice to move 79 miles away from her employer and commute an extreme distance to work every day. Moreover, it found that the employer’s refusal to permit her to work through lunch – like male employees – so that she could leave an hour earlier was merely inconvenient and not material enough to constitute an actionable adverse job action.

In that case, the plaintiff suffered from narcolepsy and objected when her shift starting time was adjusted from 6 a.m. to 7 a.m. because she was driving 79 miles from home, this would put her in heavier traffic and she had trouble staying awake while driving in heavy traffic. The employer pushed back the shift because the materials needed for her to perform work did not arrive until after 6 a.m. Her supervisor told her to obtain FMLA leave or to resign. HR gave her FMLA forms to complete and said that it would discuss possible accommodations with her after she submitted the completed paperwork. The plaintiff obtained a note from her physician that he recommended a minimal commute and working hours of 6 a.m. to 3 p.m. The plaintiff never submitted the FMLA forms, but claims that she submitted the doctor’s note. When her shift starting time was changed, she resigned and filed suit.

The district court found that her narcolepsy did not constitute a disability and that the employer was not required to reasonably accommodate her commute. As stated by another court: “While an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an employer is not required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside the work environment.” The Sixth Circuit agreed:

[T]he Americans with Disabilities Act does not require [the employer] to accommodate [the employee’s] request for a commute during more convenient hours. Under the facts present here, her proposal of a modified work schedule for purposes of commuting during hours with allegedly lighter traffic is not a reasonable accommodation.
The plaintiff also alleged sex discrimination because the employer had permitted male employees to work through lunch in order to leave early, but refused her permission to do the same. The Court found the denial of this request was a mere inconvenience that did not rise to the level of a materially adverse job action. It also rejected her allegation that she was constructively discharged.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.