A Tale of Two Age Discrimination Cases in Central Ohio

Last week, a divided Franklin County Court of Appeals issued decisions in two different age discrimination cases.  One has been pending since 1999 and has been up and down the appellate process with a variety of results.  One has had several jury trials, while the other was a reversal of a bench trial.  In the first case, a nurse was terminated in 2009 for violating policies in the NICU at a local hospital after 21 years of service.  Although she appealed the case to an internal review board that recommended a lesser penalty, the president decided to sustain the termination of her employment.  The common pleas judge hearing the case ruled in her favor only to be reversed last week on appeal.  Mittler v. OhioHealth Corp., 2013-Ohio-1634.  In the second case, the plaintiff filed his lawsuit after his 1998 separation from employment.  The case was initially dismissed on summary judgment in 2001, was reversed on appeal, resulted in a jury verdict in 2002 awarding over $700,000 in compensatory (emotional distress) damages and $25M in punitive damages (as well as attorney fees), was reversed on appeal and so on.  More recently, the jury ruled against the plaintiff on his age discrimination claim, but last week a divided court of appeals remanded the case for yet another trial based on evidence it found was improperly excluded. Jelinek v. Abbott Laboratories, 2013-Ohio-1675.  This case is illustrative for a number of points, not the least of which is how unpredictable and how lengthy litigation can be.

To start with the briefer case, in Mittler, the plaintiff was fired following two incidents.  In one, she took a picture of a volunteer holding infant twins without first obtaining the permission of the babies’ mother (who later objected to volunteers holding her babies).  She had given a copy of the photo to the volunteer before obtaining permission and did not self-disclose her alleged HIPAA violation when the mistake came to light. She also mistakenly administered eye drops to the same infants and failed to submit an incident report. The HIPAA violation subjected the plaintiff to immediate termination.  On appeal, the problem review committee unanimous recommended the imposition of a less serious penalty.  However, the hospital’s president upheld the termination. 

The case was tried to the bench (instead of a jury) and the court found that the plaintiff would not have been terminated but for her age.  However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that she could not prove age discrimination because she could not show that she was replaced by a younger person.  According to the Court’s majority, no new employees were transferred to her shift after her discharge; her duties were merely redistributed among existing employees (some of whom were older than her).  The dissent noted that four older nurses had been terminated in two months and night shift nurses were hired and eight months later a day shift nurse was hired.  Therefore, the dissent agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff’s termination result in the hiring and retention of younger employees.

The plaintiff also could not show that younger employees were treated differently.  Her alleged comparators all reported their mistakes, unlike the plaintiff.  The dissent focused on alleged mistreatment of older nurses in other contexts.  In short, the dissent did not believe that the plaintiff would have been fired, but for her age.

The Jelinek case has had a long and tortured history.  The case was re-filed in 1999 alleging, among other things, that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged in 1998 on account of his age when he had been reassigned to an allegedly less desirable sales territory that included Gary, Indiana instead of to one that included Memphis, Tennessee which had been assigned to a younger peer who had previously worked in Chicago. The plaintiff had worked for the company for more than 30 years and was the oldest of the district managers when all of the district manager positions were eliminated.   The case was first dismissed on summary judgment in 2001, but was reinstated later that year on appeal (in an opinion written by Judge Tyack), on the grounds that the transfer to the smaller Indiana district instead of Tennessee could be discriminatory.  The Court also reinstated his claims for promissory estoppel and constructive discharge, but affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and retaliation.  The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and the Supreme Court declined to take his appeal.

Back at the common pleas court, the case proceeded to a jury trial in 2002.  Although the jury found for the employer on the promissory estoppel and constructive discharge claims, it found that the plaintiff had been discriminated against on account of his age, awarded him $700,000 in compensatory damages (for emotional distress), attorney fees, and $25,000,000 in punitive damages.  (This made a lot of news).   After motions for JNOV (judgment notwithstanding the verdict), a new trial and remittitur, the judge made a number of conditional orders in 2003.  First, he granted the defendants’ jnov motions.  Should that be reversed on appeal, he granted the defendants’ motion for a new trial.  Should that also be reversed, he denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial unless the plaintiff rejected a remittitur reducing the amount of compensatory damages to $100,000 and punitive damages to $4,000.000.  The trial judge also denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney fees.

On appeal, the case was remanded for another new trial on the age discrimination claim in 2005.  The Court agreed that there was enough potential of evidence of age discrimination to support the jury’s verdict and, therefore, the trial court had erred in granting the jnov motion.  However, there was insufficient evidence of intolerable working conditions necessary to show a constructive discharge.  The Court also concluded that it was within the trial court’s discretion to condition the grant of a new trial.

Again back at the common pleas court, there were two attempts at new jury trials, but both resulted in mistrials.  That judge then recused himself in 2008 and the case was assigned to a new judge who “issued a decision stating that 'the scope of the new trial is confined to the age-discrimination claim and excludes a retrial of the constructive-discharge claim, including facts or allegations that relate to that claim.'"  The plaintiff attempted to force the trial judge to permit him to again try his constructive discharge theory and filed a mandamus action for force the trial judge to do so.  The Court of Appeals agreed in 2010 that he had not prevailed on the constructive discharge as a separate claim in the last jury trial and the court had previously overruled his only objection to that verdict.   Therefore, the trial court had not manifestly erred.  On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the decision denying the mandamus was affirmed near the end of 2010.  The plaintiff remained free to pursue his argument on appeal from any future verdict based on the trial court’s ruling, just as every party has a right to do.

The case was again tried to a jury in 2011 and this time the jury ruled against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendants.  Prior to deliberations, the trial court had directed a verdict for the defendants on the issue of punitive damages. The plaintiff again appealed and the appellate court again reversed, but this time based on evidentiary rulings against the plaintiff.   In ruling on pre-trial motions in limine, the plaintiff was precluded from introducing evidence concerning his prior claims that had been dismissed:  promissory estoppels, retaliation, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and constructive discharge.  The Court again overruled the plaintiff’s objection to the exclusion of all evidence related to his constructive discharge theory.   The Court also affirmed the trial court’s directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages.

 According to the Court’s opinion from last week (coincidentally, also written by Judge Tyack),  the plaintiff “was precluded from referring to the crime rate in Gary, Indiana, the quality of the Lake County territory, and any testimony referring to a memorandum allegedly saying that all employees over 50 years old with 20 years of service should take early retirement.”  This evidence had previously been introduced to support the plaintiff’s defunct constructive discharge claim.  However, the plaintiff argued that he should still be permitted to introduce this evidence to explain why this territory was undesirable and why the employer should not be believed in contending that it was equivalent to the territory offered to younger peers.

 

Evidence that the territory was "collapsed" from twelve counties to two shortly before it  was offered to [the plaintiff] addresses both the issue of pretext, and the reason why [the plaintiff] was reluctant to accept the territory. This pretext evidence was critical to [his] ultimate burden of proof and therefore its exclusion was highly prejudicial. By taking the extreme position that any mention of the quality of the territory related only to constructive discharge, the trial court abused its discretion.

The trial court also excluded testimony by a former salesperson that the retired vice-president of sales had discussed with him in 1999 a memorandum written in 1997 that employees over the age of 50 with over 20 years of service (like the plaintiff) should retire.  No such memorandum was ever produced as evidence and the company denied that it even existed.  The defendants objected to this testimony as hearsay because the vice president had retired the year before the alleged conversation.  However, the plaintiff argued and the Court agreed that it could constitute evidence of an admission by a party-opponent because the vice-president was an individual defendant at the trial. “Since the alleged memorandum was never produced, the jury can decide how much weight, if any, to give to [the vice president’s] admission.”

 There were some other interesting evidentiary issues.  Typically (and was true in this case), it is the plaintiff and not the defendant which seeks to introduce evidence about the other party’s wealth.  In this case, however, because the plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim had been rejected in prior proceedings, his only claim for damages for related to the emotional distress of losing his substantial income and having bills to pay.   The defendants showed that he was a millionaire at the time he resigned and had just bought his wife a Mercedes automobile.  They also showed pictures of his home to the jury.  The Court found it was within the trial court’s discretion to allow this evidence because the plaintiff’s:

 

financial situation was at issue because his claim for compensatory damages was based entirely on emotional stress caused by his financial concerns.  [The plaintiff] testified that he had sleepless nights, tossing and turning, worrying about how much money he had in the bank, that he was very stressed about money, and he was concerned about making ends meet.

The defendants argued (and the jury was instructed) that the plaintiff’s position was eliminated in a reduction in force.  However, the plaintiff was denied discovery on the RIF and precluded from introducing statistics.  The company argued that statistics were irrelevant since he had not alleged a disparate impact theory. The Court overruled the plaintiff’s objection at this point as moot, but ordered that “if, when the case is retried, [the company] intends to argue that the elimination of  [the plaintiff’s] position was part of an overall reduction in force in order to receive the heightened jury instruction, [he] should be allowed to rebut [its] claim by means of statistical evidence.”

 The Court agreed that the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence to request the jury to rule on punitive damages.  At best, his evidence showed that there may have been a lack of formal EEO instruction, “but to infer that [the company] exhibited a conscious disregard for [his] right to be free from age discrimination requires a leap of logic not supported by the evidence.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

EEOC Announces $435K Settlement With Jewelry Store When HR Manager Ignored Sexual Harassment of Three Female Employees.

Last week the EEOC announced that “Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. . . . will pay $485,000 to three female victims of sexual harassment and retaliation to settle a lawsuit brought by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) [at] (EEOC, et. al. v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. No. CV08-0208 HA, United States District Court of Oregon) [based on], the company’s [alleged] practice of harassing female employees [in] 2004 through 2005 at the Fred Meyer Oregon City store. The EEOC says the sexually hostile work environment started . . . with illegal conduct by the store director and operations manager. The EEOC further asserted in the litigation that the store director and operations manager repeatedly subjected females to graphic sexual discussions, unwanted touching, and requests for sexual favors.”

In addition, the EEOC’s lawsuit alleged that the store “condoned and accepted this sexually harass­ing behavior, and the [EEOC] obtained testimony from the company’s human resources manager who witnessed the harassing conduct on several occasions and simply walked away. According to the EEOC, the same human resources manager failed to take appropriate action against the store director or operations manager. In addition, the EEOC charged that the company retaliated against the female employees when they complained about the sexual harassment.”

“Under a consent decree filed with the federal court, [the store] agreed to pay $485,000 to the three women who came forward during the EEOC’s lawsuit. The company also agreed to provide anti-discrimination training for the owner, managers, supervisors and employees; establish policies and procedures to address sexual harassment issues; provide information to the EEOC concerning any future discrimination complaints; and allow EEOC to monitor the work site for the next two years."

EEOC Regional Attorney William Tamayo explained, “The evidence in this litigation pointed to an alarming lack of recent workplace, anti-discrimination training for the high level managers involved in this case. It is unfortunate that a sophisticated employer like Fred Meyer Stores failed to recognize the importance of such training for its managers.”

Insomniacs can read the EEOC’s full press release at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/12-11-08a.html.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.