Divided Franklin County Court of Appeals Finds Noose By Itself to Be Sufficiently Severe for Hostile Work Environment

Last week, a divided Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment on racially hostile work environment and retaliation claims.  Croley v. JDM Servs., L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-4762.  The Court found that the existence of a noose in a vehicle temporarily assigned to a new African-American employee on his second day of work by itself – without any racial comments or other  evidence – was sufficient to create a jury question whether it was intended to harass and intimidate him on account of his race.  Similarly, the later spontaneous shattering of  his assigned vehicle’s windshield – with a pre-existing hole in it – was also sufficient to create a jury question whether it had been shot out without any other evidence of a gun or bullet fragment.  Finally, the employer’s termination of the employee for refusing to permit a sample to be taken from the noose to compare to other rope on the worksite during its investigation of his allegations was found create a jury question of retaliation when the employer had not already gathered rope samples before the employee’s refusal based on his mistrust of the employer.  The Court conceded that there was sufficient holes in the plaintiff's case for a jury to rule in favor of the employer, but felt that the jury should make the decision instead of the trial court. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired on January 10 by the employer’s General Manager and began work on January 13. On January 14, the GM directed that the plaintiff be trained on the compacter, which he was by two different employees.  During a ride on the compacter, he grabbed a rope for stability, but did not find it helpful.  Later, while alone in the compactor, he realized that the rope was a noose hung from the rearview mirror and it made him extremely fearful.  He took the noose and hung it from the door of the employee trailer.   That night, he reported it to the employment agency and the next day, January 15, the GM questioned him about it, reiterated that the employer does not tolerate discrimination and commenced an investigation.  The plaintiff put the noose in his truck for safekeeping and refused to turn it over to the employer, although he did let them see it and inspect it.  The following week, the windshield of the vehicle he was operating had a small hole in it and then spontaneously shattered while he was in it.   He believed that the windshield had been shot out by a gun and saw the GM’s vehicle parked up the hill.   A few days later, he was again requested for the noose or a piece of it so that it could be compared to other rope at the work site during the employer’s investigation.  While he allowed the noose to be inspected in his presence, he again refused to turn it over or permit a sample to be taken and was fired for insubordination for impeding the investigation.

After the plaintiff was terminated, the owner reported him for making criminal threats against a co-worker, but the co-worker told the police that he did not feel threatened and nothing came of it.  The employee filed suit in October.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the discrimination, harassment and retaliation claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed the harassment and retaliation claims, finding sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to evaluate.

While the Court’s majority conceded that many courts would not find the noose incident – by itself – to constitute a hostile work environment, it disagreed:

The noose is a symbol of this nation’s violent legacy against African Americans and brings them “ ‘the grim specter of racially motivated violence’ that continues today.”  . . . . The noose is “among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”

Historically, the noose is forever “linked to lynching, the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”), and the murdering of thousands of African-Americans.” . . .

 . . . .

 . . . For the reasons above, we conclude the act of hanging a noose on the mirror of an African American’s vehicle is undoubtedly an unwelcome form of harassment based on race.

 . . . .

 . . .  The question becomes whether the act of hanging a noose on the vehicle assigned to an African American male, on his second day of work at the facility, is severe enough conduct to support a hostile work environment claim. We unequivocally answer this question in the affirmative.

 . . . .

 . . . Even in cases where the noose does not appear directed at a particular individual, given the noose’s dark legacy, a reasonable African American employee could be forever altered by such a visceral symbol in the workplace. African Americans who observe such a heinous symbol should not be required to explain the violent history of the noose and how it can invoke fear and anxiety. The threat of a noose is self-evident.3

The Court also believed that the window spontaneously shattering while the plaintiff was inside could also be considered by a jury as evidence of harassment even though no shell casings or bb or pellet was found afterwards that might have explained why it shattered.  It also rejected the employer’s explanation that windshields periodically shatter at the worksite because of the regular vibrations.

As the window incident occurred only a week after the display of the noose, we find, considering the evidence in a light most in favor of the nonmoving party, the incident amounts to threatening conduct that indicates a willingness to act on the statement made by the noose incident. Because the window incident amounts to a physical threat of violence, the implicit threat from the noose is heightened and, based on the close sequence of events, could reasonably be construed to have a racial animus. Finally, there is a dispute of fact as to liability as [the plaintiff] claims that [the GM’s] vehicle was in the immediate vicinity when the glass shattered.

The dissent, realizing that nooses exist for reasons other than lynching, required more evidence than the bare existence of a noose:

The dissent contends that “[o]ther than the noose, there are no credible allegations of any race-based comments or other activity involving race. The noose is not connected to any threatening intent or racial animus by [the employer].”

 . . . .

 . . . At this phase of the case, however, we are limited to determining whether a dispute of fact exists for trial. Given the line of cases that have found that the single display of a noose in the workplace can create a hostile work environment, we find it is the province of the jury to determine whether the alleged conduct in this case is severe or pervasive enough to demonstrate a hostile work environment claim. What the dissent proposes is that, as a matter of law, leaving a noose in the vehicle of an African American male does not constitute a severe enough act, without more, to create a hostile work environment. In good conscience, we cannot support such an approach. While a jury could very well find that the alleged incident was not severe enough conduct to create a hostile work environment claim, the argument that hanging a noose in the excavator that [the plaintiff] was assigned to operate could not, as a matter of law, sufficiently alter the conditions of employment for an African American is untenable.

The Court then found that the employer could be held liable for the noose incident because it was alleged (without any evidence) that the GM had put it there since he was the individual who had assigned the plaintiff to that vehicle on that date.   The Court refused to credit the employer with conducting an investigation – despite its employee interviews – because it had delayed a few hours in retrieving and safeguarding the noose and had not gathered rope samples before firing the plaintiff for refusing to permit a sample to be taken.

It is the province of the jury to resolve whether the [the employer] took reasonable steps to correct the alleged behavior. Furthermore, there is a dispute of fact whether [the plaintiff] unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. The [employer] commenced an investigation into the matter and met with [the plaintiff]. [He] agreed to show them the noose but refused to leave the noose or allow it to be cut for comparison with other rope at the worksite. [He]  explained that he did not feel comfortable turning over the noose or allowing them to cut a piece of it because he did not trust [the owner]. It is for the jury to resolve these factual disputes.

The Court rejected certain evidence submitted by the plaintiff to support his hostile work environment claim because he was unaware of the incidents until after he had been fired.  For example, he had been written up (without his knowledge) for improper operation of certain equipment.  They also rejected the police report as part of this claim because it happened after his termination.  ““ ‘Plaintiff cannot use events that happened after his termination to support his hostile work environment claim.’ ”

The Court also concluded that he had produced sufficient evidence that his termination was retaliatory for complaining about the noose incident.   While generally employees may be terminated for refusing to cooperate with a workplace investigation, there are exceptions and the Court found the plaintiff’s distrust of his employer to be sufficiently protected conduct in this situation to let a jury decide whether his distrust was justified and protected.

Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff], a jury could reasonably determine that turning over evidence to a supervisor you do not trust, or allowing that evidence to be damaged, is a reasonable nonparticipation in the investigative process. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that when [he] initially informed [the GM] of the noose’s location outside the employee trailer, [the GM] failed to [immediately] retrieve and secure the noose. Furthermore, [the plaintiff], despite his trepidations, repeatedly allowed the noose to be inspected. A jury could reasonably believe [his] explanation that his claim could be hindered if the noose was damaged or not be properly preserved. Conversely, the [employer] have represented that they wanted the noose to aid in the investigation. Given the accusation at issue, there is at least a dispute of fact that [his] fears were justified.

In addition, the plaintiff met several times with the employer and answered their questions.  His only refusal concerned preservation of the integrity and safekeeping of the noose.  Moreover, his termination came only days after his protected conduct in reporting the alleged harassment.

We find that the [the employer] have provided a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating [his] employment. A reasonable jury could find that failure to turn over the noose, or allow it to be cut, unreasonably impeded the investigation providing a legitimate reason for termination.

The Court then required the plaintiff to show that the employer’s explanation was pretext for retaliation.

[The plaintiff] can demonstrate pretext by introducing evidence that he provided the noose on multiple occasions to further the investigation. [He] had also previously allowed [the GM] to take the noose when he left it outside the employee trailer. [The owner] had not collected any samples of rope from around the worksite to compare it with the noose, did not offer to keep the noose in a neutral location, and never called law enforcement to report the incident.  .. . .  A jury could reasonably believe [the plaintiff’s] explanation for not wanting to turn the noose over to the appellees or allow them to cut a portion of the noose.

There was no discussion in the Court’s retaliation opinion about post-termination conduct of the employer in reporting the plaintiff for alleged criminal threats.  There was also no discussion of the same-actor inference since the alleged harasser was also the same individual who hired him only days earlier.  There was no also discussion of the racial composition of the workforce, which might have put more context in the plaintiff’s paranoia.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Rejects Dismissal of Racial Harassment Claim Where Black Supervisor Called Plaintiffs Monkey A--.

Last week, the Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment on a racial harassment claim brought by two former truck drivers.   Smith v. P.A.M. Transport, Inc. , No. 24-5549 (6^th Cir. 9-25-25).   The  Court found that calling the plaintiffs “monkey a__” or ANY derivative of monkey was as racially derogatory as the n-word, even if it was mostly used against them by their black supervisor.   It also refused to find problems with whether black and African-American can be used interchangeably for evidentiary purposes when comparing the plaintiffs to “white” employees.   It rejected the employers’ evidence for an affirmative defense at the summary judgment stage concerning whether it took reasonable steps to prevent harassment when it promulgated an anti-harassment policy without evidence that it was effectively enforced or followed up with management training.  The Court’s majority also found sufficient evidence of comparative treatment to sustain the disparate treatment allegations. 

According to the Court’s decision, the plaintiff truck drivers both worked out of the Nashville terminal and alleged that they were paid a day rate, but were required to drive more hours and miles per week and in damaged trucks than their white counterparts.   One was fired after two negative performance evaluations, but without prior disciplinary warning.  Both alleged that they were “regularly” called “money a__” by their black supervisor, who was otherwise respectful in communicating with white truck drivers.  They alleged that their supervisor threatened to withhold pay or fire them and regularly demeaned them.  They alleged that they complained with “liaisons” about the mistreatment, but that nothing was done to rectify or stop it.    Their supervisor reported to a white manager.   Both sued under  Title VII and Section 1981.   The trial court granted the employer summary judgment on the grounds that they had failed to produce sufficient evidence of a racially hostile work environment or disparate treatment. 

The Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that derivatives of “monkey” were not plainly racist.

We have recognized that, “[g]iven the history of racial stereotypes against African-Americans and the prevalent one of African-Americans as animals or monkeys, it is [] reasonable—perhaps even [] obvious”—to conclude that the invocation of the term “monkey” against an African American is “intended [as a] racial insult.” . . .

Consequently, circuit courts, including our circuit, have overwhelmingly held that the use of the term “monkey” against an African American employee constitutes evidence of race-based harassment sufficient to support a hostile work environment claim. For example, we have found evidence of racial harassment where, among other things, African American firefighters were assigned to workstations labeled “Monkey Island.” . . .

 . . .

 . . . The term “monkey” and its derivatives, while not overtly racial in isolation, have a long and well-understood history as racial slurs when directed at African Americans.  . . . . In this case, two African American plaintiffs have testified that their supervisors directly and repeatedly called them “monkey” and “monkey ass.” The use of the terms in that context raises a reasonable “inference of discrimination on the basis of” race.  . . . . That suffices to show race-based harassment at the summary judgment stage. The district court’s determination that Plaintiffs’ testimony about the use of these terms does not constitute “evidence of the use of race-specific and derogatory terms,” therefore, was plainly incorrect.

The Court rejected as “frivolous” the argument that being called “money a__” was somehow not racist when being called monkey was inherently racist.

[The employer] offers no reason—and we can think of none—as to why the addition of the word “ass” somehow obviates the racialized nature of the term “monkey.” To the contrary, the “use of the term ‘monkey’ or derivative terms” against African Americans constitutes compelling evidence of racial harassment.  . . .  Simply put, there is no meaningful difference between the terms “monkey” and “monkey ass” when used by a supervisor against an African American employee, as alleged here.

The Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the racist nature of the term was reduced because the speaker was also African-American.  Just as there can be same-sex harassment, there can be same-race harassment.

To be sure, in some contexts, the fact that the alleged perpetrator is within the same protected class as the alleged victim may be material. But on this record, we see no fact or reason why [the supervisor’s] race undermines the conclusion that a reasonable jury could find his (and his supervisor’s) alleged use of “monkey” and “monkey ass” to be racially derogatory.

The Court also rejected the argument that the plaintiffs were required to prove that the terms were not used against white employees.

The Court also rejected as “deeply flawed” the district court’s conclusion that African-American and “black” could not be used interchangeably, meaning that the African-American plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of proof by comparing themselves to “white” employees, who could also be African-American. 

This reasoning is deeply flawed. It starts from the erroneous premise that “African American” and “Black”—and, in turn, “non-African American” and “white”—are rigid categories of identity that can never be used interchangeably. Contrary to that assumption, our Title VII jurisprudence on race discrimination governs, and we have often used “African American” and “Black” interchangeably and compared “African Americans” with “whites.” . . . . The district court attempted to justify its additional evidentiary requirements by pointing to Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on skin color, reasoning that “discrimination based on color is distinct from discrimination based on race.”  . . . . But that distinction does not obviate our well-established caselaw recognizing “Black” and “white” as racial identities.

By relying on this narrow conception of racial identity, unadorned by legal precedent, the district court effectively imposed a heightened burden on Plaintiffs beyond what Title VII, § 1981, and the THRA require. Our circuit has never held that a plaintiff must proffer evidence of a comparator’s racial self-identification or genetic composition to survive judgment in a Title VII case. To the contrary, we have routinely accepted, at summary judgment, plaintiff testimony of disparate, race-based treatment grounded in experience and perception. . . .

The Court’s majority also found sufficient evidence of disparate treatment to also support the claims of racially harassment. 

“[F]acially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of . . . animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly . . . discriminatory conduct.”   . . . . Here, given the alleged use of racial slurs by [the supervisor and manager], a reasonable jury could infer that the accompanying (purportedly race-neutral) verbal abuse by both individuals was, in fact, also racially motivated, without regard to Plaintiffs’ testimony that non-African Americans received more favorable treatment.

The Court also rejected the district court conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to show a severe or pervasive ractially hostile work environment.

Our governing precedent, however, requires evaluation of the work environment as a whole, including the broader context in which the terms “monkey” and “monkey ass” were allegedly used.  . . . . As noted, facially neutral abusive conduct, such as screaming, cursing, and threatening, “can support a finding of . . . animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly . . . discriminatory conduct.”  . . .  By refusing to consider the use of the slurs in conjunction with the accompanying verbal abuse (or, for that matter, the unfavorable employment-related treatment) when assessing severity and pervasiveness, the district court relied on an incomplete picture of the harassment that Plaintiffs allegedly experienced.

 . . .

 . . . our circuit has recognized that even a single incident of racial harassment, including the use of an egregious racial slur like the n-word, “may be so severe as to constitute a hostile work environment.” . . .  Like the n-word, the term “monkey” is “odious” and “degrading and humiliating in the extreme” when used as an insult against African Americans.  . . . . That is particularly true in this case, where [the plaintiffs] were purportedly called the term directly by their supervisors. The utterance of a slur by a manager “greatly increase[s] its severity,” and “harassment will be more severe if offensive comments were directed at a plaintiff.”

 . . . .

  . . .  [The plaintiffs] testified that they were directly called “monkey” and “monkey ass” by their supervisors on multiple occasions over time. Plaintiffs have also proffered evidence that, at least with respect to [one plaintiff], the term “monkey ass” was used in an overtly threatening manner. For example, [he] testified that [his supervisor] once told him, “you’re going to get your monkey A-S-S out there and do the job or . . . I’m going to write you up.”  . . . . Even standing alone, the evidence of these race-specific and derogatory terms very likely suffices to show severe or pervasive racial harassment.

We do not rely on the use of the slurs alone, however, because our governing cases require consideration of the totality of the circumstances in hostile work environment cases.  . . . . As discussed, [the plaintiffs] testified not only that they were directly called egregious, degrading, and humiliating racial slurs by their supervisors on several occasions, but also that they were subjected to sustained verbal use, in the form of threats, demeaning criticism, cursing, and screaming, while non-African American TRR drivers were spared from that same abuse. Plaintiffs also testified that they were consistently forced to work longer hours, drive lengthier routes with longer wait times, and use damaged trucks, unlike their non-African American counterparts. And both testified that the harassment caused them significant anxiety and diminished morale, which made it more difficult to drive on the road.

Viewing the totality of the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as we must, we conclude that a “reasonable person would have found [their work environment] hostile [and] abusive.” Id. at 309. In turn, a reasonable jury could find, from the totality of the evidence, that [they] were subjected to recurring, severe, and humiliating racial harassment that unreasonably interfered with their employment.

The Court also found sufficient evidence of employer vicarious liability because the employer failed to produce sufficient evidence to support its affirmative defense. 

While the employer points to the fact that it gave [the plaintiffs] a copy of its Anti-Discrimination and Harassment Policy, our caselaw makes clear that the existence and provision of a harassment policy alone are insufficient to show “reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any racially harassing behavior.” . . . An employer must also show that the policy was reasonable and “effective in practice.”  . . .  [The employer] points to no evidence, and does not even attempt to argue, that it had an effective policy. It makes no mention of the policy’s “requirements” on supervisors or the “training regarding the policy”— both of which are baseline requirements for establishing the existence of a reasonable harassment policy. Id. at 349-50. The record also does not show that [the employer] took reasonable care to promptly correct the alleged harassment. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have testified that they placed [the employer] on notice of the harassment by reporting it to management-level employees, and P[it] has proffered no evidence that it acted to promptly correct the situation. On this record, we cannot say that [the employer] “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any racially harassing behavior by its supervisor[s].”

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Reverses Employer's Summary Judgment on Racial Harassment and Retaliation Claims Based On "Seemingly Neutral" Actions.

Last week, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment on a racial harassment and retaliation claim.  Jones v. Fluor Facility & Plant Services, No. 24-5249 (6^th Cir. 3/5/25).   The Court found that the plaintiff had produced enough evidence that "seemingly neutral" conduct was race related, severe and pervasive.   The plaintiff had also complained to his manager and supervisor, who took some remedial action, but his co-workers then began ostracizing him and hiding his equipment.  HR referred to his as “horseplay” that was unrelated to his race even though he was often referred to as “boy” and a ‘rapper” and “basket ball player.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been hired for the day shift, when he was harassed by a white co-worker for two weeks.  That co-worker was fired and the plaintiff was transferred to the nigh shift, where there were only five employees.  He was again racially harassed, including the n-word.  His supervisor took action within two weeks without him having to complain.  Thereafter, he was subjected to less obvious harassment, including hiding his equipment, ostracizing him, and stereotypical comments about how he must be good at basketball or be a rapper.  After he was counselled for working without his safety harness, which he alleged had been hidden from him by his racist co-workers, HR conducted an investigation which found the “horseplay” was unrelated to his race.   However, the investigation seemed to stall for several months, so he filed an EEOC Charge.  The district court also agreed that the alleged harassment, although daily, was not severe or pervasive enough to constitute actionable harassment and seemed unrelated to his race.   The Sixth Circuit reversed.

We conclude that [the plaintiff] has established, at the very least, a factual dispute as to whether this seemingly neutral conduct was race-related. We have said that “[c]onduct that is not explicitly race-based may be illegally race-based and properly considered in a hostile-work-environment analysis when it can be shown that but for the employee’s race, [he] would not have been the object of harassment.”

  . . . .

[The Plaintiff] presents evidence of two categories of incidents fairly tied to his race. The first set of incidents are verbal harassment directly linked to Jones’ race, the second set of incidents may facially present as race-neutral, but a factfinder could nevertheless infer that they were race-based.  . . .

As to the first category, Jones established three uses of the n-word by his coworkers: One direct usage, when [one co-worker] referred to [the plaintiff] as a “nigger,” and two indirect usages, when [another co-worker] used the term during the November 9 meeting to argue that it should be okay to continue to refer to [him] that way. The n-word is indubitably racist, “highly offensive and demeaning,” . . .

As the district court acknowledged, [the plaintiff] also submitted evidence that [a co-worker] goaded him to make racist jokes, and [that co-worker] told racist jokes himself. Whether [his] evidence of the “content or frequency” of these occurrences was insufficient, or whether they were “mere offensive utterances,” as the district court concluded,  . . .  goes to whether the harassment Jones faced was severe or pervasive, but not to whether the harassment was race-based. A factfinder could readily conclude that “but for” [his] race, he would not have been the subject of [that] goading.  . . .  The same is true for [that co-worker’s] comment that another white coworker,  . . . , was [his] “boy” after [that person] spilled oil on himself. [He] fairly understood this comment to be racial in nature, as it allows the inference that [the co-worker] was implying a familial relationship between [the person] and [the plaintiff] after [the person’s] skin was presumably rendered black because of the oil.

. . . “facially neutral abusive conduct can support a finding of animus sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment claim when that conduct is viewed in the context of other, overtly discriminatory conduct.” . . .

For the same reasons, we can attribute racial motivation to the night crew’s ostracization of [the plaintiff]. There were “multiple instances in which [he] was ostracized” as the only African American on the night crew. . .  As [his supervisor] testified, efforts to exclude [him] were led by [two coworkers], who had previously made racist comments or used racial epithets. Further, the ostracization coincided with racist verbal harassment. This provides sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Jones’ complained-of ostracization was based on race. . . .

A rational factfinder could also find that other incidents cited by [the plaintiff] that may lack explicit racial animus may nevertheless constitute racial harassment under Title VII. For one, [he] presented evidence that his white coworkers referred to him as “boy.” We have said that although not explicitly racial, a white colleague “referring to an adult African American colleague as ‘boy,’ without ‘modifiers or qualifications’ can qualify as evidence of impermissible racial bias.” . . . . Likewise, white coworkers’ comments referencing [him] being a rapper or a basketball player may not be explicitly racial out of context. But these comments undoubtedly reflected African American stereotypes such that a rational factfinder could find that they would not have been made but for Jones’ race, as Jones recognized.  . . . . Therefore, the comments may be “properly considered in a hostile-work environment analysis.” . . .

  . . .

In the present case, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to [the employer] on the severe or pervasive prong of [his] claims because there is sufficient evidence in the record that he subjectively regarded his work environment as abusive, and that his coworkers’ racial harassment was severe or pervasive enough for a reasonable person to find his work environment hostile. The district court did not separately evaluate the subjective and objective prongs of the severe or pervasive test and appeared to proceed solely on the objective prong. Nevertheless, [the employer] argues that [he] did not subjectively perceive a hostile work environment because he stated that [a co-worker’s] use of the n-word was a “term of endearment,” and he only complained of racial harassment in March 2021, “‘saving’ his complaint” for when he faced discipline for failing to use his harness.   . . .  We reject [its] arguments inasmuch as Jones has provided sufficient evidence that he subjectively regarded his work environment as hostile.

As an initial matter, “the intent of the alleged harasser is irrelevant in the court’s subjective prong analysis.”  . . .  That [the plaintiff] perceived that [a particular co-worker] meant his use of the n-word as a term of endearment does not mean that [he] perceived the slur to be inoffensive. And [the co-worker’s] intent “is not a defense under the subjective test if the conduct was unwelcome.”  . . .  [He] provided sufficient evidence that he regarded [the co-worker’s] use of the n-word to be offensive and unwelcome. [He] characterized [that] use of the slur as a “term of endearment” because [it] “said it to [him] as if we say it to each other all the time,” as though the two were friends.  . . .  But he clarified that he was not excusing [the] utterance of the slur as harmless.  . . .  [He] further described the possibility of [his co-worker] calling him the n-word again as a “problem” that was solved when [he] was moved to another work location and was “no longer in [his] face every day.”  . . . . [He] also made clear that he perceived his coworkers’ use of racial epithets to be offensive, and he perceived their conduct to be abusive.  . . . Indeed, by March 2022, [he] felt so abused by his coworkers that he expressed suicidal and homicidal ideation because of stress at work.  . . .

“In addition, the subjective component of the prima facie case does not require that a plaintiff report a hostile work environment.”  . . . So, contrary to [the employer’s] argument, [his] failure to report racial harassment to its human resources before March 2021 does not cut against our conclusion that he provided sufficient evidence that he perceived his work environment as abusive. “A plaintiff can be subjected to [racial] harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile environment and yet, for a number of valid reasons, not report the harassment.”  . . .  For example, [he] testified that he did not immediately report [the] statement because he was afraid his coworkers would retaliate if he reported. He also questioned whether it would be “right” to report the incident, given that it would affect [his co-worker’s] career when [that person] was new to the workforce and, from [his] perspective, possibly unaware of the “mistake” he made in using the n-word.  . . .  Nevertheless, the record shows that [he] did report racial harassment multiple times before March 2021, albeit not directly to [its] human resources. [He] reported the incident with [day shift], on the day shift, to [his manager], presumably resulting in [the] firing. [He] also participated in the [his supervisor’s] November 9, 2020 meeting addressing the instances of harassment against [him] in November 2020. And, after [a co-worker] threw grease on his car, [he] immediately showed [his supervisor] evidence of [that] conduct. So, rather than “‘sav[e]’ his complaint of harassment for the proverbial ‘rainy day,’”  . . . . the record contains evidence that [he] brought his coworkers’ continual racial harassment to his superiors’ attention. At present, [he] has provided evidence, sufficient to preclude summary judgment, that he subjectively regarded his work environment as abusive.

 . . .

 . . . Viewing [his] evidence in the light most favorable to him, [he] experienced a weeks-long period of verbal hostility, . . . The verbal hostility “directly affected the day-to-day conditions of [his] work environment,” . . . so much so that his supervisor,  . . , “had enough” of the harassment and held a meeting to stop it.  . .  The verbal harassment did not stop after the meeting but continued. And, as in Schlosser, the verbal hostility escalated into a physical threat when [a co-worker] threw grease on [his] windshield.  . . .  In addition, [his] coworkers ostracized him for months, subjected him to stereotyping, and called him “boy.” This is clearly enough evidence of severe or pervasive harassment for Jones to submit his racially hostile work environment claim to a jury. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, [he] does not allege instances of “offensive utterances and social avoidance . . . alone,”  . . .. Rather, he presents evidence of persistent racial harassment that took various forms, from overt verbal harassment, to physical conduct, to persistent stereotyping, to ostracization.

The district court came to its erroneous conclusion because it failed to consider all of [his] evidence of racial harassment, and failed to consider [his] evidence holistically. It erroneously discounted [his] evidence, other than “the use of racial epithets and the incident where [the co-worker] poured grease on his windshield,” id., for two reasons. First, it concluded that [his] evidence paralleled that in Reed v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., in which we found that a plaintiff’s allegations of an isolated racist gesture and racist remarks did not amount to severe or pervasive harassment when the plaintiff failed to tie his other allegations of harassment, including that he was the “subject of unfriendly treatment from some colleagues,” to his race.  . . .  Second, it concluded that “the majority of [his] claims [we]re simply too vague to support the notion that his coworkers’ conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive.”

But [his] evidence of ostracization, as well as his evidence that he was subjected to pervasive racial comments, stereotyping, and called “boy,” are fairly considered as contributing to the totality of severe or pervasive racial harassment. The cases on which [the employer] and the district court rely for the proposition that [his] complained-of workplace exclusion did not contribute to a pattern of severe or pervasive racial harassment, particularly Reed, are distinguishable.

The Reed plaintiff complained only of social isolation, not the ostracization that affected his work like in this case.

The district court also erred in removing many of [his] allegations of harassment from the severe or pervasive calculus on the grounds that the evidence was too vague. The court characterized [his] evidence of ostracization, stereotyping, and being called “boy” as insufficiently specific to contribute to the totality of the circumstances of severe or pervasive racial harassment. But we have “noted that when a victim makes allegations of ongoing harassment, the ‘inability to recount any more specific instances goes to the weight of her testimony, a matter for the finder of facts.’”

The Court also found that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence of retaliation by his co-workers to survive summary judgment.

However, the Court remanded the harassment claim for the court to consider whether the employer had sufficient knowledge of the alleged racial harassment to impose vicarious liability because the trial court had not addressed that issue in its opinion.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Winning the Battle, But Losing the War: Sixth Circuit Affirms Jury Verdict Finding Harassment but No Discrimination or Retaliation.

Last month, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict finding that the employer had not discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff, but had subjected her to a hostile work environment on account of her gender.  Schlosser v. VRHabilis, LLS, No. 23-6019 (6^th Cir. Aug 26, 2024).  The Court rejected the employer’s attempt to restrict to the harassment claim to verbal abuse and concluded that the discrete acts of discrimination – upon which the jury had refused to impose liability – could also be considered to support the harassment verdict. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired as the only female diver to retrieve unexploded ordinance from the sea bed.  There was evidence that her first supervisor repeatedly denigrated her, subjected her to different conditions of employment and held her to a higher performance standard than her male co-workers.   She was verbally coached by the COO after her first week, but did not see the formal document until litigation commenced which contained a number of issues which she disputed.  She was restricted from diving and driving by her first supervisor.  When she made a formal complaint to their site manager, he did nothing about any of it.  She then complained to HR, which was investigated by the COO and Project Manager.  This investigation confirmed that she was been singled out and treated differently on account of her gender.  She was then transferred to a different dive team, although it was disputed if this was because of the investigation or because her first supervisor demanded that she be removed from his team.  In any event, her first supervisor was never disciplined or trained regarding sexual and gender-based harassment.

Although HR had attempted to follow up on the plaintiff’s formal complaint, the plaintiff never responded.  Instead, after her transfer, she emailed HR that all of her issues had been promptly resolved and exceeded her expectations.  The plaintiff’s performance improved following her transfer and she outperformed several male colleagues.  Nonetheless, the Project Manager instructed that she again be prevented from diving based her performance evaluation from her first – discriminatory – supervisor as the least productive diver.  However, at trial, they acknowledged that she was not the least productive diver, who was never prevented from diving as she was.

On her new team, one of her co-workers routinely denigrated her, often calling her the B***h word.  Three times this was done within earshot of her second supervisor, who did nothing about it.  When the co-worker complained about her and an investigation commenced, the plaintiff refused to cooperate with it, even to describe his offensive behavior.  Instead, she resigned, complaining about the rampant sexual harassment she experienced on almost a daily basis in the 10 weeks she worked there.  Instead of investigating her new allegations, the company was relieved that she had left.  Shortly thereafter, she filed a Charge of Discrimination and filed suit.  While the jury found that she had not been discriminated or retaliated against, it found in her favor on her sexual harassment claim and awarded her almost $60K in back pay.  The company appealed.

The Court refused to confine the harassment claim to the verbal abuse the plaintiff suffered.  Instead, it agreed that the supervisor’s overall treatment of her could be considered, including the restrictions on diving and driving, etc. “Although discrete acts of discrimination are not independently actionable as a hostile work environment claim, the jury may certainly consider such acts in its evaluation of the overall working environment.”

While there was evidence of mere personality conflicts, the Court found that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict that the harassment was related to her gender and not just her personality or job performance.  First, she was subjected to different terms, conditions and performance expectations than her male co-workers.  Second, her first supervisor and a later co-worker repeated referred to her as “B***h”.  “Such a term is indubitably sexually degrading and gender specific.”    This was also corroborated by her male co-workers during the COO’s investigation of her initial harassment complaint.

Overall, the multiple instances in which [the plaintiff] was ostracized while her male counterparts were not, coupled with the gender-specific epithets used, provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the complained of harassment was based on [her] gender or sex. Of course, the evidence could also support the conclusion that the harassment was tied to personal conflict, rather than gender; however, this Court may not reweigh the evidence to override the jury’s reasonable determination.

The Court also found sufficient evidence of severe and pervasive harassment: “not a day of her ten weeks at [the employer] passed without some type of sexual harassment or ostracization. Accordingly, the totality of the circumstances could reasonably indicate that [she] suffered pervasive harassment that altered her job environment, conditions, and performance.”

                  The jury fairly concluded that [she] did not endure “simple teasing” or “isolated incidents.”  . . .  Instead, as the lone female diver, [she] faced daily threats to her employment, derogatory comments, verbal harassment, foul language, and constant changes to her pay and position “to which members of the opposite sex were not exposed.” . . . . And this harassment occurred daily throughout a compressed period of ten weeks. For these reasons, a reasonable juror could find that a hostile work environment existed.

The Court also found that the employer could be held liable for the harassment because some of it was by her first supervisor and the rest was by a co-worker with knowledge of her second supervisor.  The first supervisor’s restriction on her diving resulted in a reduction in her compensation – a tangible employment action.

[The employer] attempts to skirt liability for [the co-worker’s] actions by arguing that [the plaintiff] refused to report the harassment or provide a written statement regarding the second incident in which [he] screamed profanities at [her], including calling [her] a “slimy bitch.” This may be true, but it is not dispositive for the employer-notice inquiry, which asks whether [the employer] knew about the harassment.  . . . . . . Throughout each described incident of sexual harassment, [the second supervisor] knew of the charged sexual harassment but failed to take any corrective action at all. . . .\

                   . . . [The second supervisor] heard [the co-worker] berating [her] on multiple occasions, calling her a “bitch,” and being aggressive towards her. Yet [the supervisor] never reprimanded [the co-worker] or took any action to correct this pattern of behavior. . . . . . A reasonable jury could find that [the supervisor] knew of the harassment and made no attempt to correct the problem of the sexually harassing behavior, thus establishing the required negligence on [the employer’s] part. Because [it] does not dispute that [he] may properly be considered a supervisor, this inaction may be reasonably imputed to [the employer].

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Significantly Alters Burden of Proof for Hostile Work Environment Claims

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of an age discrimination claim, but reversed dismissal of the companion hostile work environment claim brought by a former police officer.    McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, No. 23-3180 (6^th Cir. 9/23/2024).  The Court agreed that the plaintiff officer could not show that his termination – or the underlying disciplinary actions – were discriminatory or pretextual.  However, he could possibly show a hostile work environment based on the cumulative effect of closer scrutiny and supervision than his younger co-workers received, a denigrating assignment that could be designed for him to fail and his supervisor’s “glee” in imposing disciplinary actions against him.   The Court’s opinion suggests that hostile work environments need not be severe or subjectively hostile when discriminatory employment actions need not be significant in order to be actionable: “Because hostile-work- environment claims arise out of the same statutory language as disparate-treatment claims, Muldrow’s holding that Title VII does not require plaintiffs to show “significant” harm applies to both types of claims. . . Thus, when we consider whether a hostile-work environment was severe or pervasive enough to violate Title VII, we effectively ask whether it left an employee “worse off respecting employment terms or conditions.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff worked for 33 years as a police officer and was the oldest officer in the department.  After his supervisor was promoted to his role, the plaintiff claimed that he was subjected to closer scrutiny.  For instance, after he challenged his 2015 performance evaluation, he was assigned to conduct a traffic study which had never been assigned to a patrol officer before and which he lacked qualifications to conduct.  He alleged that it was both retaliatory for his performance evaluation challenge and based on his age.   He then received progressive disciplinary actions over the next two years for infractions, such in April 2016 for failing to turn on his microphone during traffic stops (after he had first been informally counselled when he had been identified as a primary offender of that policy).   In June 2018, the plaintiff and another officer violated a number of policies when responding to a medical emergency, including failing to use lights and sires, failing to notify that they were not using lights and sirens, and speeding without lights and sires, etc.  

When the individual died from the medical emergency, an investigation was conducted into the police response.  The investigation revealed that the plaintiff had previously violated the same policies.  When the investigators checked his prior traffic stops, they discovered that he had not used his audio (which he had received formal disciplinary action for in 2016).  As they checked his prior traffic stops, they discovered that he only turned on his audio in 8 stops that year (out of 38) and that he had never checked his video equipment in his109 shifts so far that year as required by departmental policy.  When he claimed that he generally turned on his audio and checked his equipment, they concluded that he was being intentionally dishonest, which by itself, is a terminable offense.   He was given the option of retiring or submitting to a pre-disciplinary hearing.  He rejected both offers and was terminated.  His grievance was rejected in arbitration.    He then filed suit.    The trial court granted the City and individual defendants summary judgment on all claims. 

The Court agreed that the plaintiff could not show that he was terminated on account of age discrimination.   The ADEA requires that age be the determinative factor in his termination:  that he would not have been fired but for his age.  In this case, assuming that he could show a prima facie case of discrimination, he could not show that his employer lacked a legitimate basis for his termination based on his misconduct and prior disciplinary history.  The plaintiff conceded that he could not disprove the factual basis of any of his prior disciplinary actions or his termination.

The Court rejected his argument that his termination was pretextual because it did not actually motivate the decision to terminate his employment: 

Even if it is true that the Department generally scrutinized the performance of older officers to a greater degree than younger officers, [the plaintiff] has not presented sufficient evidence that the reasons given for his termination—an extensive list of disciplinary infractions that included untruthfulness—were not the true reasons. [He] does not contest, for example, that the Department would be required to disclose his untruthfulness to defendants at trial, rendering him unable to perform an essential job duty. Nor does [he] dispute that the Department was legitimately concerned that his pervasive failure to follow the recording policies jeopardized the Department’s ability to gather evidence and limit its exposure to liability. Because the ADEA requires plaintiffs to show that age is the “but-for” cause of the disciplinary action—not simply a motivating factor—[he] cannot proceed if his termination was at least partly caused by Defendants’ non-discriminatory reasons.  . . .  He does not meet this burden on the second prong.

The Court also rejected the argument that his conduct was insufficient to warrant his termination, mostly because the other responding officer was treated similarly to him and given the same option to voluntary retire or submit to a pre-disciplinary hearing.  For that matter, the plaintiff did not address the dishonesty issue at all in his briefs.

That being said, the standard for proving a hostile work environment is much less than proving discrimination.  However, “allegations of discrete discriminatory acts otherwise actionable as independent disparate-treatment claims do not by themselves constitute harassment supporting a hostile-work-environment claim.” (italics added for emphasis).  Thus, it was conceded that his suspensions and termination could not be considered as evidence of a hostile work environment.   Rather, a hostile-work-environment claim is “based on the cumulative effect of individual acts,” many of which are not actionable on their own.”

an adverse employment action can affect employment terms or conditions on two registers. By definition, an adverse action can cause a change in the terms or conditions of employment. But an adverse action deployed strategically as harassment can also add to a climate of hostility that represents a different change in the terms or conditions of the job. To use the Supreme Court’s words, a discrete discriminatory act may have “occurred” on one day and thus be actionable, but it also may be part of a separate harm that “occurs over a series of days or perhaps years.”  . . . . In the hostile-work-environment context, we exclude adverse actions that operate only on the first register, but consider the ones that operate on the second. (emphasis added). 

In this case, the plaintiff “cited testimony that older officers were regularly subjected to greater scrutiny, and highlighted examples showing that younger officers did not face discipline for their policy violations.”    He also alleged that he was the only officer whose performance was investigated over an entire year (when the investigators reviewed each of his traffic stops).   “We focus on the harassing effect of these incidents to assess whether the ongoing monitoring created a climate of hostility in the aggregate (and combined with other actions), not whether each incident alone changed [his] employment status. Therefore, [his] evidence of higher and disproportionate scrutiny may be used to support his hostile-work-environment claim.”  In addition, a number of officers provided evidence that he was disciplined for infractions that other officers violated with impunity. 

He also cited the traffic study that he had been assigned:

Thus, the evidence supporting a hostile-work-environment claim is not the unfavorable assignment itself but the fact that the Department allegedly engaged in conduct designed to (1) frustrate, demean, and embarrass him in front of his coworkers; (2) justify more disciplinary action against him when he inevitably fell short of the unreasonable expectations; and (3) force him further under the microscope by requiring him to report to two supervisors on his progress weekly. The significance of the traffic study for hostile-work-environment purposes is that the Department allegedly used the assignment strategically in a broader effort to discredit [the plaintiff].

                   . . .

                  The [Supreme] Court has held that a hostile-work-environment claim is “based on the cumulative effect of individual acts” occurring over the span of weeks, months, or years.  . . .  An individual act within a hostile-work-environment claim “may not be actionable on its own,”  . . . —but there is no requirement that the act not be independently actionable. As the Court recently explained, a hostile-work-environment claim “includes every act composing that claim, whether those acts are independently actionable or not.”  . . .  Thus, “even if a claim of discrimination based on a single discriminatory act is time barred, that same act could still be used as part of the basis for a hostile-work-environment claim.”  . . . That conclusion makes good sense. Whether a given act contributes to a hostile work environment does not turn on whether that act might support a separate claim.

To reconcile Ogbonna-McGruder with Morgan and Green, we read Ogbonna-McGruder to bar a plaintiff from including in a hostile-work-environment claim only those discrete acts that result in a separate discriminatory harm to the terms and conditions of employment that does not “contribut[e]” to the alleged environment of harassment. (emphasis added).

The plaintiff also claimed that most of his prior disciplinary actions were part of this campaign of harassment against him:

even if some of these disciplinary incidents were separately actionable, we would still consider whether the incidents were also weaponized as tools of harassment in the “same actionable hostile work environment practice.”  . . .  Here, there is evidence indicating that the Department imposed discipline as a vehicle to target and belittle [the plaintiff]. Notably, [he] points to testimony that [the Chief] was “grinning from ear to ear,” “smiling,” and “giggling” when discipline was meted out to [him]. . . . .  [The Chief] reportedly asked about [his] reaction to some discipline with excitement and enthusiasm, as though “he [was] getting off, he [was] enjoying the fact that an employee of his [was] being messed with.”

At any rate, these disciplinary incidents would not be independently actionable. Only discipline causing “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment” is actionable on its own.  . . .  For example, this court previously held that “[a] written reprimand, without evidence that it led to a materially adverse consequence such as lowered pay, demotion, suspension, or the like, is not a materially adverse employment action.”  . . .  Here, [the plaintiff] was disciplined in several ways that likely do not meet the definition of an “adverse employment action,”  . . . , including “documented counseling,” an “oral reprimand,” and a “written reprimand.”  . . .  When considering the facts in the light most favorable to [him], none of these incidents is actionable on its own in a disparate-treatment claim.

The Court also lowered the evidentiary bar on proving “severe” harassment:

Because hostile-work-environment claims arise out of the same statutory language as disparate-treatment claims, Muldrow’s holding that Title VII does not require plaintiffs to show “significant” harm applies to both types of claims.  . . .  Instead, the employer’s discriminatory action—or, as is the case here, the work environment—needs to produce “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.”  . . . .  Thus, when we consider whether a hostile-work environment was severe or pervasive enough to violate Title VII, we effectively ask whether it left an employee “worse off respecting employment terms or conditions.” . . .

                   . . . [The plaintiff] is not required to show that the harassment “seriously affect[ed] [his] psychological well being” or caused him to “suffe[r] injury”—only that the environment “would reasonably be perceived . . . as hostile or abusive.”  . . .  Importantly, [he] does not need to show that “each incident of harassment standing alone is sufficient to sustain the cause of action,” but that the incidents, taken together, make out such a case.  . . . . Because the facts here present a close call regarding severity, we decline to do the jury’s job for it: [he] cites enough evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude he was subjected to a hostile work environment.

                   . . . .

Here, a jury could reasonably conclude that McNeal’s conditions of employment were altered. For example, if a jury agrees that McNeal was uniquely targeted for minor policy violations and subject to significant surveillance, he would have had a different level of discretion than other officers.

(emphasis added)

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Co-worker Harassment Leads to $150K Jury Verdict and $69K in Attorney Fees Despite Only $3K Wage Loss.

 Last month, the Loraine County Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict of over $150K in compensatory and punitive damages for co-worker sexual harassment, constructive discharge and negligent supervision claims as well as almost $69K in attorney fees.  Morgan v. Consun Food Industies, Inc., 2024-Ohio-2300.   The plaintiff proved that she was treated differently when her complaints were ignored and when she was disciplined for misconduct while male employee misconduct on the same evening was ignored.  “[H]arassing conduct that is simply abusive, with no sexual element, can support a claim for hostile-environment sexual harassment if it is directed at the plaintiff because of his or her sex.” Further, management’s indifference to her complaint and failure to address incidents with the harassing employee destroyed its affirmative defense.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired in September 2011 and was subjected to harassment by a male co-worker.  She complained to management and resigned in May 2012 when insufficient action was taken.  During the nine-day jury trial, she testified how this male co-worker terrorized her, other female employees and female guests.  For example, she became extremely upset after an incident when she looked over at him, and he responded: ““what the fuck are you looking at, you fucking bitch[.]” She complained to the supervisor and he said it was just how he was.  He also elbowed her, followed her around making mocking comments, and threw hot food at her, burning her hands.  He also “made comments about “breasts,” “cow udder tits,” and aborting babies, which were all comments directed toward women and not men.”  The store manager told her that he did not have time to discuss her complaint about the co-worker.  In April, shortly after the co-worker had left for the day, she found a large knife stabbed into the box of cleaning gloves that she used.  The shift leader was unconcerned, but she called the police and reported the incident.  The next morning, she was written up and put on a performance plan for failing to refrigerate hot food the prior evening, which the store manager noticed when he reviewed surveillance film.  He said nothing about the knife incident, which should also have been on the film.  The following month, the co-worker continued to follow her in the store and she resigned without first having found another job.  Two female co-workers corroborated her accounts and added that the store manager laughed at the co-worker’s behavior.

                  The Court held that the two-year limitations period for torts would not be applied to the negligent supervision claim because the underlying facts were closer to the discrimination and harassment claims, which were then subject to a six year limitations period.

                  The Court also agreed that the plaintiff had shown discriminatory treatment when she was disciplined for failing to refrigerate hot food on the same night that her male co-worker had stabbed her box of cleaning gloves, prompting her to call the police and report it.  (The employer did not refute any of her allegations or put on any witnesses to dispute testimony of the plaintiff or her witnesses).   The Court found additional evidence of disparate treatment when the store manager addressed a male employee’s complaint about that employee, but accepted his denial at face value without any other investigation when female employees complained about him and failed to take any corrective action. 

The plaintiff showed that his harassment was unwelcome:

Not only did [the plaintiff] testify that [her co-worker’s] behavior was unwelcomed, she also demonstrated it was unwelcomed by avoiding  [him], complaining to her co-workers, complaining to [the store manager], contacting  . . .  the corporate office, and calling the police.

She proved that it was harassment based on sex through various comments that he made which were directed only at women and the fact that his harassment was directed only at female employees and guests.   For instance, “one elderly woman asked her where the restroom was [and he] overheard the exchange and told the elderly woman she could “piss outside by the dumpsters.”” 

Another witness testified that he

 “would say things like women are meant to be in the back and guys are in the front, and women are only good for sex[.]” She also testified Mr. Wise “would always talk about our breasts, or our butts. Anything sexual, he said[,]” and added the comments were “[t]hings that typically you shouldn’t say to women * * * [but were] laughed at by [assistant store manager] Mark and [store manager] Rich.” Ms. Green added that “the guys were allowed to say whatever they wanted. * * * There were no consequences for derogatory statements with any of my managers to my knowledge.”

The plaintiff also proved that the harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to affect her ability to work:

[The plaintiff] testified to the toll that [his] daily harassment and abuse took on her and how Consun’s management’s failure to take any action to stop or acknowledge her complaint made the situation worse for her. [She] testified to three separate incidents where [his] harassing conduct was directed at specifically her, the incidents were reported to her shift lead or management, and no further action was taken by store management. [She] testified to the incident where [he] called her a ”fucking bitch” and she was “shaking” and “frightened[.]” After the incident, [her] friend brought her medication to the store to help calm her down. [She] also testified [he] threw a five-pound bag of steaming hot mashed potatoes at her, causing burns to her skin. Additionally, [she] testified to finding the long knife stabbed into her box of gloves during an evening where [he] was only one of two other employees left in the store.

Finally, the Court rejected the employer’s defense that it did not know about the harassment when she only complained one time to the store manager.  At that time, the manager said he did not have time to deal with her and refused her request to be scheduled away from the hostile male employee.   She had also complained to her shift supervisors and to the corporate office.

                  The Court also agreed that it was proper to admit an expert to testify as to the standard of care that an employer should take when an employee complains about harassment and the type of anti-harassment training and policies employers should utilize.

                  The Court also found no abuse of discretion when the trial court rejected the plaintiff’s attorney fee request from over $248K in hourly fees to $69K based on the 45% contingency fee agreement with the plaintiff and the fact that the attorney took five years to try a case that could and should have been tried in 2016.

                  The Court also affirmed the denial of prejudgment interest on the grounds that the employer engaged in good faith discovery and was not required to offer more than $15K in settlement if that is how it reasonably evaluated its potential liability.    For instance, the plaintiff only lost less than $3,000 in wages after immediately finding a new job.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Rejects Conclusory Allegations in Complaint of Racial and Retaliation Discrimination and Harassment

 Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation claim against a university. Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State University, No. 23-5557 (6^th Cir. Jan. 30, 2024).   First, the Court found that discrete acts of discrimination rarely constitute a hostile work environment claim.  Second, it found that four acts over more than 30 months were not sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to constitute harassment.  Third, her retaliatory harassment claims failed for the same reasons, even if the burden of proving retaliation is lower than discrimination.  Fourth, her discrimination claims failed because she failed to allege that they were motivated by her race or that she was treated differently than anyone who was similarly situated from her. “[O]ur circuit has repeatedly held that a retaliatory hostile work environment claim must include evidence that the harassment was severe or pervasive.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff taught university classes for more than a decade when the university decided to divide her department.  She was unhappy with a number of decisions made about her reassignment, including her classes, her performance evaluations and the location of her office, etc.  When she appealed some of these decisions, she was told that a decision had been wrong, but denied that they were not racially motivated.  She filed an EEOC Charge and later filed suit for discrimination, harassment and retaliation.  The trial court dismissed her complaint for failure to state an actionable claim.

The Court agreed that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently allege severe or pervasive harassment based on a number of employment actions taken against her over a 30 month period:

First, the district court correctly found that the allegations of discrete acts of discrimination could not be characterized as part of the hostile work environment claim. The Supreme Court has explained that under Title VII, a plaintiff may bring a claim alleging that either (1) an employer engaged in “discrete discriminatory acts” such as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire”; or (2) the employer’s “repeated conduct” created a hostile work environment. . . . Because the two claims are “different in kind,” we have consistently held that allegations of discrete acts may be alleged as separate claims, and as such “cannot properly be characterized as part of a continuing hostile work environment.” . . .

 . . . . Her allegations that she was denied the opportunity to draft a grant proposal and teach summer courses, received low evaluations, was replaced by a white adjunct professor, and was reassigned to teach public management courses represent discrete acts that could perhaps support separate claims of discrimination or retaliation under Title VII.

 . . .

But even viewing those allegations [of four incidents] as a whole, [Plalintiff] did not sufficiently allege facts from which we may infer that the harassment she experienced was severe or pervasive. Courts consider the totality of circumstances in determining the severity and pervasiveness of alleged harassment, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it [was] physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfere[d] with an employee’s performance.”  . . . Notably, the alleged harassment must be both objectively and subjectively severe and pervasive to be actionable. Id. at 21–22. Allegations of “simple teasing, . . . offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)” do not suffice. . ..

             . . . As an initial matter, those events occurred over a period of approximately two and a half years—that is too infrequent to demonstrate that her workplace was “permeated with” ridicule and insult. . . . And defendants’ comments about her teaching abilities and qualifications, while undoubtedly offensive, are not sufficiently serious to constitute severe harassment.  . . .  Moreover, she did not allege that the harassment was physically threatening. Her conclusory assertions that defendants’ actions “unreasonably interfered with [her] work performance,” without alleging supporting factual allegations, is insufficient for purposes of a motion to dismiss.  . . . Because she failed to plausibly allege severe or pervasive harassment, the district court did not err in dismissing her race-based hostile work environment claim.

While the Court agreed that there was a lower standard of proving retaliation compared to discrimination, this did not save her retaliatory harassment claim because, as discussed above, she failed to allege sufficiently severe or pervasive behavior necessary for the harassment part of her claim.  “[O]ur circuit has repeatedly held that a retaliatory hostile work environment claim must include evidence that the harassment was severe or pervasive.”

When the employer argued that her discrimination claim was untimely -- because the alleged acts took place more than 300 days before her EEOC charge was filed -- she apparently did not make any legal argument to the contrary.  Accordingly, her claim was deemed abandoned on appeal.  Nonetheless, the Court also observed that she failed to allege that any of the discrete acts were motivated by racial animus and to allege that she was treated worse than anyone similarly situated to her.  “]H]er conclusory statement that [the employer] treated her poorly “because of her race” is insufficient for purposes of a motion to dismiss.”

Similarly, when the employer challenged her retaliation claim as untimely, she made no legal arguments in opposition.  Accordingly, her claim was deemed abandoned.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.