This morning, the Ohio Supreme Court heard oral argument on whether the Ohio Civil Rights Commission exceeded its authority by requiring Ohio employers to provide a reasonable amount of maternity leave to new employees even when similar leaves are not provided to new male employees. In particular, an employee was fired by an Ohio nursing home when she required maternity leave before she had been employed at least one year as required by the employer's uniformly applied leave policy. No employees are given a leave of absence under the policy until they have been employed at least one year.
Certain provisions of the Ohio Civil Rights Act mirrors the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which prohibits discriminating against women on account of pregnancy. There is no provision under the federal or state statute explicitly requiring a leave of absence for female employees that is not also provided to male employees; it merely prohibits discrimination. Some courts have ruled that the PDA does not require maternity leave unless males are given similar leaves of absence; thus the FMLA was created. The OCRC determined, however, that women would never be able to keep jobs if they got pregnant under such policies and has required Ohio employers to provide a reasonable amount of maternity leave even if they did not otherwise provide any leaves to other employees. In doing so, the OCRC relies on a single federal court decision.
An argument was made that the OCRC exceeded the Ohio constitution by creating a rule which lacks explicit statutory support. To the extent that the OCRC is attempting to create public policy, the argument goes, that should be left to the Ohio General Assembly. Citation was made to three other states which have enacted such laws.
The Attorney General's office also tried to draw an analogy to the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA and Title VII's religious discrimination clause. However, unlike the PDA, those statutes explicitly require employers to provide a reasonable accommodation. Thus, merely because an employer is required by statute to provide a leave as a reasonable religious or disability accommodation does not mean that the PDA (or corresponding Ohio statute) requires the same in the absence of similar statutory language.
The Ohio Supreme Court was provided with an earlier opportunity this year to address whether the Ohio statute requires reasonable accommodation of lactating mothers in Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp, but it declined to address this issue at that time.
Insomniacs can watch the oral argument in Nursing Care Management of America, Inc., d.b.a. Pataskala Oaks Care Center v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, No. 2009-0756 here or on the PBS Ohio Channel.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Showing posts with label ohio supreme court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ohio supreme court. Show all posts
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
Wednesday, June 10, 2009
Ohio Supreme Court: Ohio Legislature Can Prohibit Local City Residency Requirement for Own Employees.
This morning a divided Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the Ohio General Assembly can prohibit political subdivisions and municipalities – including those organized under home rule charters – from requiring city employees to reside within city limits. Lima v. State, 2009-Ohio-2597. In that case, the challenged state statute -- Ohio Revised Code § 9.481(B)(1) -- states that “no political subdivision shall require any of its employees, as a condition of employment, to reside in any specific area of the state.” The cities of Lima and Akron challenged the constitutionality of the statute, which conflicted with local ordinances. However, the Court’s majority upheld the constitutionality of the statute: “R.C. 9.481 was enacted pursuant to Section 34 and that it prevails over conflicting local laws, because no other provision of the Constitution can ‘limit or impair’ laws enacted pursuant to Section 34.”
Insomniacs can read the Court’s full opinion at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-2597.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Insomniacs can read the Court’s full opinion at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-2597.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Ohio Supreme Court: All State Age Discrimination Claims Are Governed by § 4112.14(C)’s Deference to Arbitration Procedures and Cannot Be Re-Litigated.
This morning, the Ohio Supreme Court held in Meyer v. United Parcel Service, Inc., that the prohibition in § 4112.14(C) on pursuing an age discrimination lawsuit when an arbitration remedy is otherwise available to the plaintiff applies to all age discrimination claims brought under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 4112. If this seems complicated, that is because it is.
In Meyer, the plaintiff was fired – for a third time – by UPS after 25 years of employment. Having been reinstated twice before by using the grievance process in the collective bargaining agreement, he again filed a grievance, but it was denied and his discharge was upheld – by a panel of union members and management -- for being due to just cause under the bargaining agreement. He also filed a lawsuit alleging workers compensation retaliation and later amended his complaint to add claims for age discrimination (in that he was replaced by an employee decades younger than himself) under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.99 and public policy. Both claims were tried to a jury and he was awarded $336,208 in back pay, punitive damages and pre-judgment interest and $135,147 in attorney fees and court costs. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the workers compensation claim should not have been tried to a jury, but rejected the employer’s argument that the §4112.99 age discrimination claim should have been barred by the arbitration prohibition provision in §4112.14(C) and remanded the case to the trial court. The employer appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed only to resolve the dispute involving the age discrimination claim.
Under Ohio law, plaintiffs may chose between a variety of age discrimination statutes. Section 4112.02(N) provides that an
This provision authorizes compensatory and punitive damages for successful plaintiffs. However, a plaintiff who files a lawsuit under §4112.02(N) “is barred, with respect to the practices complained of, from instituting a civil action under section 4112.14 of the Revised Code and from filing a charge with the commission under section 4112.05 of the Revised Code.”
Section 4112.05 permits individuals to file Charges of Discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission within six months of the alleged discrimination.
Section 4112.14 (formerly codified at § 4101.17) prohibits age discrimination in hiring and firing, permits the filing of a lawsuit by an aggrieved employee or applicant, and provides reinstatement, back pay and attorneys fees to successful plaintiff. However, plaintiffs who file under § 4112.14 may not file a Charge of Discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission or file a lawsuit under § 4112.02(N). This section also provides that the remedies available “are coexistent with remedies available pursuant to sections 4112.01 to 4112.11 of the Revised Code,” but it seems unlikely that plaintiffs under §4112.14 may obtain compensatory or punitive damages. In addition, when this statute was codified at § 4101.17, the statute of limitations for these age discrimination claims were held to be six years. Since this statute was recodified at § 4112.14, it is no longer clear whether the limitations period for claims brought under § 4112.14 are still six years, but the Supreme Court has refused to confirm this or limit the claims to 180 days as in §4112.02(N). Importantly for the Meyer case, § 4112.14(C) provides that § 4112.14 lawsuits and other lawsuits brought
Notably, § 4112.14(C) does not specifically address claims brought under § 4112.99 (but, rather, addresses only claims brought under §§ 4112.01 to 4112.11).
Section 4112.99 provides that “Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.” This is a general statute and must be paired with a more specific statute, like §4112.02(N) or § 4112.14. In any event, this general provision authorizes compensatory and punitive damages regardless of whether it is paired with more specific statutes like § 4112.02(N) or § 4112.14. This is important because there is an argument that §4112.14 does not otherwise authorize compensatory or punitive damages. Plaintiffs who bring an action under § 4112.99 need not specify which more specific statute supports their claims.
In Meyer, the Court held that age discrimination lawsuits may not be brought “where the employee has available to the employee the opportunity to arbitrate the discharge or where a discharge has been arbitrated and has been found to be for just cause.” Therefore, even if the employee filed a lawsuit within 180 days under §4112.02(N) and even thought that statute does not mention arbitration proceedings, that age discrimination lawsuit is still governed by § 4112.14(C). In addition, even though Meyer’s grievance was not arbitrated by a single arbitrator, the bargaining agreement’s grievance procedure was equivalent to an arbitration and, thus, was covered by § 4112.14(C) arbitration clause.
Friends of the court filed briefs in the Meyer case urging the Court to address other questions posed by §4112.14, such as the length of its limitations period and whether it authorizes compensatory and punitive damages. However, the Court declined to do so. Instead, the reasoning of the Court was that all age discrimination claims brought under §4112.99 are subject to §4112.02(N) and §4112.14 and because §4112.14(C) prohibits age discrimination claims where the plaintiff had arbitration available to him or her, no age discrimination claims can be brought under §4112.99 if an arbitrator – or effective equivalent – upheld the discharge under a just cause standard. This might indicate that plaintiffs should only file claims under §4112.02(N) and not mention § 4112.99, but the syllabus of the Court’s opinion – which states the law of the case – does not limit its holding to §4112.99 claims. Rather, the syllabus refers to all age discrimination claims.
Insomniacs can read the full court opinion at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-2463.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
In Meyer, the plaintiff was fired – for a third time – by UPS after 25 years of employment. Having been reinstated twice before by using the grievance process in the collective bargaining agreement, he again filed a grievance, but it was denied and his discharge was upheld – by a panel of union members and management -- for being due to just cause under the bargaining agreement. He also filed a lawsuit alleging workers compensation retaliation and later amended his complaint to add claims for age discrimination (in that he was replaced by an employee decades younger than himself) under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.99 and public policy. Both claims were tried to a jury and he was awarded $336,208 in back pay, punitive damages and pre-judgment interest and $135,147 in attorney fees and court costs. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the workers compensation claim should not have been tried to a jury, but rejected the employer’s argument that the §4112.99 age discrimination claim should have been barred by the arbitration prohibition provision in §4112.14(C) and remanded the case to the trial court. The employer appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed only to resolve the dispute involving the age discrimination claim.
Under Ohio law, plaintiffs may chose between a variety of age discrimination statutes. Section 4112.02(N) provides that an
aggrieved individual may enforce the individual’s rights relative to discrimination on the basis of age as provided for in this section by instituting a civil action, within one hundred eighty days after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice occurred, in any court with jurisdiction for any legal or equitable relief that will effectuate the individual’s rights. (italics added).
This provision authorizes compensatory and punitive damages for successful plaintiffs. However, a plaintiff who files a lawsuit under §4112.02(N) “is barred, with respect to the practices complained of, from instituting a civil action under section 4112.14 of the Revised Code and from filing a charge with the commission under section 4112.05 of the Revised Code.”
Section 4112.05 permits individuals to file Charges of Discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission within six months of the alleged discrimination.
Section 4112.14 (formerly codified at § 4101.17) prohibits age discrimination in hiring and firing, permits the filing of a lawsuit by an aggrieved employee or applicant, and provides reinstatement, back pay and attorneys fees to successful plaintiff. However, plaintiffs who file under § 4112.14 may not file a Charge of Discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission or file a lawsuit under § 4112.02(N). This section also provides that the remedies available “are coexistent with remedies available pursuant to sections 4112.01 to 4112.11 of the Revised Code,” but it seems unlikely that plaintiffs under §4112.14 may obtain compensatory or punitive damages. In addition, when this statute was codified at § 4101.17, the statute of limitations for these age discrimination claims were held to be six years. Since this statute was recodified at § 4112.14, it is no longer clear whether the limitations period for claims brought under § 4112.14 are still six years, but the Supreme Court has refused to confirm this or limit the claims to 180 days as in §4112.02(N). Importantly for the Meyer case, § 4112.14(C) provides that § 4112.14 lawsuits and other lawsuits brought
pursuant to sections 4112.01 to 4112.11 of the Revised Code shall not be available in the case of discharges where the employee has available to the employee the opportunity to arbitrate the discharge or where a discharge has been arbitrated and has been found to be for just cause. (italics added).
Notably, § 4112.14(C) does not specifically address claims brought under § 4112.99 (but, rather, addresses only claims brought under §§ 4112.01 to 4112.11).
Section 4112.99 provides that “Whoever violates this chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.” This is a general statute and must be paired with a more specific statute, like §4112.02(N) or § 4112.14. In any event, this general provision authorizes compensatory and punitive damages regardless of whether it is paired with more specific statutes like § 4112.02(N) or § 4112.14. This is important because there is an argument that §4112.14 does not otherwise authorize compensatory or punitive damages. Plaintiffs who bring an action under § 4112.99 need not specify which more specific statute supports their claims.
In Meyer, the Court held that age discrimination lawsuits may not be brought “where the employee has available to the employee the opportunity to arbitrate the discharge or where a discharge has been arbitrated and has been found to be for just cause.” Therefore, even if the employee filed a lawsuit within 180 days under §4112.02(N) and even thought that statute does not mention arbitration proceedings, that age discrimination lawsuit is still governed by § 4112.14(C). In addition, even though Meyer’s grievance was not arbitrated by a single arbitrator, the bargaining agreement’s grievance procedure was equivalent to an arbitration and, thus, was covered by § 4112.14(C) arbitration clause.
Friends of the court filed briefs in the Meyer case urging the Court to address other questions posed by §4112.14, such as the length of its limitations period and whether it authorizes compensatory and punitive damages. However, the Court declined to do so. Instead, the reasoning of the Court was that all age discrimination claims brought under §4112.99 are subject to §4112.02(N) and §4112.14 and because §4112.14(C) prohibits age discrimination claims where the plaintiff had arbitration available to him or her, no age discrimination claims can be brought under §4112.99 if an arbitrator – or effective equivalent – upheld the discharge under a just cause standard. This might indicate that plaintiffs should only file claims under §4112.02(N) and not mention § 4112.99, but the syllabus of the Court’s opinion – which states the law of the case – does not limit its holding to §4112.99 claims. Rather, the syllabus refers to all age discrimination claims.
Insomniacs can read the full court opinion at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-2463.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
Supreme Court: Outside Attorney's Confidential Investigation Report is Exempt from Ohio's Public Records Law
Today, a per curiam Ohio Supreme Court dismissed a mandamus action brought by the Toledo Blade seeking the investigation report written by a private attorney on behalf of a governmental body on the grounds that the report was exempt from Ohio’s public records laws because of the attorney-client privilege. State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Toledo-Lucas Cty. Port Auth., Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-1767. The report had been prepared after the Toledo mayor alleged that the port authority’s president was having an extramarital affair with the port authority’s chief outside lobbyist in violation of authority rules, etc. The port authority retained its outside law firm to conduct an investigation, which included reviewing documents and interviewing employees and other witnesses. The attorney prepared a report, which was distributed to each member of the authority’s board. “The board members were informed that the report was confidential and could not be shown or disclosed to any third party. Following a subsequent special session, copies of the report were returned to the law firm.” The authority then fired the president.
In response to the newspaper’s public records request, the authority provided copies of all documents reviewed by the attorney in the course of her investigation, but did not produce a copy of the report itself, claiming attorney-client privilege. According to the Court, “R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excepts ‘[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record.’ ‘The attorney-client privilege, which covers records of communications between attorneys and their government clients pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice, is a state law prohibiting release of these records.’”
The Court rejected the newspaper’s argument “that the factual portions of the investigative report are not covered by the attorney-client privilege, because they do not constitute legal advice.” The common law attorney-client privilege “protects against any dissemination of information obtained in the confidential relationship. . . . In fact, most courts that have expressly addressed the issue of whether an attorney’s factual investigations are covered by the attorney-client privilege have determined that such investigations may be privileged. . . . For example, in Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 390-39, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the “first step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through facts with an eye to the legally relevant.” “[T]he Upjohn pronouncement hardly stands alone. Courts have consistently recognized that investigation may be an important part of an attorney’s legal services to a client.” The Court concluded that “the relevant question is not whether [an attorney] was retained to conduct an investigation, but rather, whether this investigation was ‘related to the rendition of legal services. . . . The attorney-client privilege “does not require the communication to contain purely legal analysis or advice to be privileged. Instead, if a communication between a lawyer and client would facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice, the communication is privileged.”
In short, “[t]he [attorney-client] privilege applies when legal advice of any kind is sought from the legal advisor in that capacity and the client’s confidential communication relates to that purpose.”
Insomniacs can read the full opinion at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-1767.pdf
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
In response to the newspaper’s public records request, the authority provided copies of all documents reviewed by the attorney in the course of her investigation, but did not produce a copy of the report itself, claiming attorney-client privilege. According to the Court, “R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excepts ‘[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law” from the definition of “public record.’ ‘The attorney-client privilege, which covers records of communications between attorneys and their government clients pertaining to the attorneys’ legal advice, is a state law prohibiting release of these records.’”
The Court rejected the newspaper’s argument “that the factual portions of the investigative report are not covered by the attorney-client privilege, because they do not constitute legal advice.” The common law attorney-client privilege “protects against any dissemination of information obtained in the confidential relationship. . . . In fact, most courts that have expressly addressed the issue of whether an attorney’s factual investigations are covered by the attorney-client privilege have determined that such investigations may be privileged. . . . For example, in Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 390-39, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the “first step in the resolution of any legal problem is ascertaining the factual background and sifting through facts with an eye to the legally relevant.” “[T]he Upjohn pronouncement hardly stands alone. Courts have consistently recognized that investigation may be an important part of an attorney’s legal services to a client.” The Court concluded that “the relevant question is not whether [an attorney] was retained to conduct an investigation, but rather, whether this investigation was ‘related to the rendition of legal services. . . . The attorney-client privilege “does not require the communication to contain purely legal analysis or advice to be privileged. Instead, if a communication between a lawyer and client would facilitate the rendition of legal services or advice, the communication is privileged.”
In short, “[t]he [attorney-client] privilege applies when legal advice of any kind is sought from the legal advisor in that capacity and the client’s confidential communication relates to that purpose.”
Before the attorney-client privilege applies to communications relating to investigative services, the client for whom the investigation was conducted must show that other legal advice or assistance was sought and that the investigation conducted was integral to that assistance.” After applying this test to the facts here, it is manifest that the factual investigation conducted by attorney Grigsby was incident to or related to any legal advice that the attorneys hired by the port authority would give concerning the mayor’s allegations of misconduct by the port authority president. More specifically, the attorney’s investigation required her to draw upon her legal training and experience as well as her knowledge of the law governing the port authority and its policies and personnel. Both the port authority and its outside counsel knew that the investigation was replete with various legal issues and consequences that would be better resolved by the port authority employing its long-time attorney to conduct the investigation and prepare the report. Legal issues included interpretation of Hartung’s employment contract, an analysis of ethics law and criminal law, potential tort claims by Hartung and Teigland, and the construction of a confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement concerning a previous port authority investigation. Legal analysis facts in the investigation is integrated throughout the report.
Insomniacs can read the full opinion at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2009/2009-ohio-1767.pdf
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Ohio Supreme Court Limits Federal Civil Rights Claims to Two Years.
Yesterday, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10’s two year statute of limitations applied to federal civil rights claims – such as § 1983 claims -- which lack a federal statute of limitations. Nadra v. Mbah, 2008-Ohio-3918. Section 1983 claims are frequently brought against government entities, agencies, employees and officers by government employees and regular citizens alleging that the plaintiff’s federal civil rights were violated under color of state law.
In Nadra, Franklin County Children Services employees and the Columbus Police investigated plaintiff’s home and found her “nine-year-old son locked in the basement. On January 3, 2002,” defendant FCCS employees “filed a complaint alleging that Nadra punished her son by locking him in the basement, chaining him to a pole at times, withholding food from him, and making him use a bucket as a toilet. Consequently, the complaint asserted that Nadra’s son was abused, neglected, and dependent.” Custody was eventually awarded to the child’s father and a jury acquitted plaintiff of criminal charges filed in the matter. Thereafter – more than two years after the child had been removed from her home, the plaintiff filed suit against the children services employees alleging that they violated her civil rights under color of state law under § 1983.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stratton wrote that the court was “asked to determine which statute of limitations governs actions filed in Ohio under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code. The Supreme Court has instructed that in Section 1983 actions, courts must apply a state’s general or residual statute of limitations that governs personal-injury actions. Owens v. Okure (1989), 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594. We hold that R.C. 2305.10, which contains a two-year limitations period, is Ohio’s general statute of limitations governing personal injury in Ohio. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”
The dissent and the Franklin County Court of Appeals had concluded that the four-year statute of limitations in O.R.C. § 2505.09 applied. R.C. 2305.09 provides in relevant part that: “An action for any of the following causes of action shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued: * * * (D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections, 2305.10 to 2305.12 * * * of the Revised Code.” In contrast, the statute which the Court found to apply provides in relevant part that “an action “for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years” after the cause of action accrues.”
Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3918.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
In Nadra, Franklin County Children Services employees and the Columbus Police investigated plaintiff’s home and found her “nine-year-old son locked in the basement. On January 3, 2002,” defendant FCCS employees “filed a complaint alleging that Nadra punished her son by locking him in the basement, chaining him to a pole at times, withholding food from him, and making him use a bucket as a toilet. Consequently, the complaint asserted that Nadra’s son was abused, neglected, and dependent.” Custody was eventually awarded to the child’s father and a jury acquitted plaintiff of criminal charges filed in the matter. Thereafter – more than two years after the child had been removed from her home, the plaintiff filed suit against the children services employees alleging that they violated her civil rights under color of state law under § 1983.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stratton wrote that the court was “asked to determine which statute of limitations governs actions filed in Ohio under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code. The Supreme Court has instructed that in Section 1983 actions, courts must apply a state’s general or residual statute of limitations that governs personal-injury actions. Owens v. Okure (1989), 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594. We hold that R.C. 2305.10, which contains a two-year limitations period, is Ohio’s general statute of limitations governing personal injury in Ohio. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”
The dissent and the Franklin County Court of Appeals had concluded that the four-year statute of limitations in O.R.C. § 2505.09 applied. R.C. 2305.09 provides in relevant part that: “An action for any of the following causes of action shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued: * * * (D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections, 2305.10 to 2305.12 * * * of the Revised Code.” In contrast, the statute which the Court found to apply provides in relevant part that “an action “for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years” after the cause of action accrues.”
Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3918.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Ohio Supreme Court Limits Federal Civil Rights Claims to Two Years.
Yesterday, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10’s two year statute of limitations applied to federal civil rights claims – such as § 1983 claims -- which lack a federal statute of limitations. Nadra v. Mbah, 2008-Ohio-3918. Section 1983 claims are frequently brought against government entities, agencies, employees and officers by government employees and regular citizens alleging that the plaintiff’s federal civil rights were violated under color of state law.
In Nadra, Franklin County Children Services employees and the Columbus Police investigated plaintiff’s home and found her “nine-year-old son locked in the basement. On January 3, 2002,” defendant FCCS employees “filed a complaint alleging that Nadra punished her son by locking him in the basement, chaining him to a pole at times, withholding food from him, and making him use a bucket as a toilet. Consequently, the complaint asserted that Nadra’s son was abused, neglected, and dependent.” Custody was eventually awarded to the child’s father and a jury acquitted plaintiff of criminal charges filed in the matter. Thereafter – more than two years after the child had been removed from her home, the plaintiff filed suit against the children services employees alleging that they violated her civil rights under color of state law under § 1983.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stratton wrote that the court was “asked to determine which statute of limitations governs actions filed in Ohio under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code. The Supreme Court has instructed that in Section 1983 actions, courts must apply a state’s general or residual statute of limitations that governs personal-injury actions. Owens v. Okure (1989), 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594. We hold that R.C. 2305.10, which contains a two-year limitations period, is Ohio’s general statute of limitations governing personal injury in Ohio. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”
The dissent and the Franklin County Court of Appeals had concluded that the four-year statute of limitations in O.R.C. § 2505.09 applied. R.C. 2305.09 provides in relevant part that: “An action for any of the following causes of action shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued: * * * (D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections, 2305.10 to 2305.12 * * * of the Revised Code.” In contrast, the statute which the Court found to apply provides in relevant part that “an action “for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years” after the cause of action accrues.”
Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3918.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
In Nadra, Franklin County Children Services employees and the Columbus Police investigated plaintiff’s home and found her “nine-year-old son locked in the basement. On January 3, 2002,” defendant FCCS employees “filed a complaint alleging that Nadra punished her son by locking him in the basement, chaining him to a pole at times, withholding food from him, and making him use a bucket as a toilet. Consequently, the complaint asserted that Nadra’s son was abused, neglected, and dependent.” Custody was eventually awarded to the child’s father and a jury acquitted plaintiff of criminal charges filed in the matter. Thereafter – more than two years after the child had been removed from her home, the plaintiff filed suit against the children services employees alleging that they violated her civil rights under color of state law under § 1983.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stratton wrote that the court was “asked to determine which statute of limitations governs actions filed in Ohio under Section 1983, Title 42, U.S. Code. The Supreme Court has instructed that in Section 1983 actions, courts must apply a state’s general or residual statute of limitations that governs personal-injury actions. Owens v. Okure (1989), 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594. We hold that R.C. 2305.10, which contains a two-year limitations period, is Ohio’s general statute of limitations governing personal injury in Ohio. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”
The dissent and the Franklin County Court of Appeals had concluded that the four-year statute of limitations in O.R.C. § 2505.09 applied. R.C. 2305.09 provides in relevant part that: “An action for any of the following causes of action shall be brought within four years after the cause thereof accrued: * * * (D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising on contract nor enumerated in sections, 2305.10 to 2305.12 * * * of the Revised Code.” In contrast, the statute which the Court found to apply provides in relevant part that “an action “for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years” after the cause of action accrues.”
Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-3918.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Monday, April 7, 2008
Unanimous Supreme Court: OCRC Must Issue Subpoena Requested by Employer During Preliminary Investigation.
In late March, a unanimous Ohio Supreme Court ruled that Ohio Revised Code § 4112.04(B) requires the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to issue a subpoena requested by an employer during the OCRC’s preliminary investigation. In doing so, the Court invalidated OCRC Rule, Ohio Administrative Code 4112-3-13(B), for conflicting with the controlling statute. State ex rel. Am. Legion Post 25 v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2008-Ohio-1261 (3/26/08).
The case arose because an American Legion Post was notified by the OCRC that a former employee had filed a Charge claiming to have been sexually harassed and then fired for complaining. The Post asserted that the Claimant had been fired after it received an anonymous letter alleging that the Claimant was a convicted felon. The Post requested the OCRC to issue a subpoena to the Claimant’s parole officer so that it could inspect her criminal and probation records to prove a non-discriminatory/retaliatory reason for firing her. The OCRC declined to issue a subpoena on the Post’s behalf, and instead, issued a subpoena on its own behalf and reviewed the records itself. The OCRC declined to permit the employer to review the subpoenaed records and issued a probable cause finding that the Post had probably committed an unlawful discriminatory practice. When conciliation failed, the OCRC instituted formal proceedings against the Post.
In the meantime, the Post initiated mandamus proceedings in court against the OCRC for refusing to issue the requested subpoena. The trial court granted the OCRC’s motion to dismiss. However, that decision was reversed on appeal. As mentioned, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on the grounds that the OCRC was required by statute to issue the requested subpoena.
Insomniacs may read the decision in full at http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-1261.pdf
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
The case arose because an American Legion Post was notified by the OCRC that a former employee had filed a Charge claiming to have been sexually harassed and then fired for complaining. The Post asserted that the Claimant had been fired after it received an anonymous letter alleging that the Claimant was a convicted felon. The Post requested the OCRC to issue a subpoena to the Claimant’s parole officer so that it could inspect her criminal and probation records to prove a non-discriminatory/retaliatory reason for firing her. The OCRC declined to issue a subpoena on the Post’s behalf, and instead, issued a subpoena on its own behalf and reviewed the records itself. The OCRC declined to permit the employer to review the subpoenaed records and issued a probable cause finding that the Post had probably committed an unlawful discriminatory practice. When conciliation failed, the OCRC instituted formal proceedings against the Post.
In the meantime, the Post initiated mandamus proceedings in court against the OCRC for refusing to issue the requested subpoena. The trial court granted the OCRC’s motion to dismiss. However, that decision was reversed on appeal. As mentioned, the Supreme Court affirmed the reversal on the grounds that the OCRC was required by statute to issue the requested subpoena.
Insomniacs may read the decision in full at http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2008/2008-Ohio-1261.pdf
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Thursday, December 27, 2007
Ohio Supreme Court: Although Employers Still Cannot Retaliate, They Can Terminate Employees Receiving Workers’ Compensation for Other Reasons
On December 20, 2007, the Ohio Supreme Court “clarified” (although some may say partially reversed) its 2003 decision in Coolidge v. Riverdale Local School Dist., 100 Ohio St.3d 141, 2003-Ohio-5357. The Court now holds that that “an employee who is terminated from employment while receiving workers’ compensation has no common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy underlying R.C. 4123.90, which provides the exclusive remedy for employees claiming termination in violation of rights conferred by the Workers’ Compensation Act” and limits the Coolidge decision to teachers who are both receiving workers compensation and are covered by O.R.C. § 3319.16. Bickers v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2007-Ohio-6751.
In Bickers, the at-will plaintiff had not been provided with a light duty assignment and, instead, had been terminated while receiving temporary total disability payments as a result of a workers’ compensation injury. She did not file a claim for workers’ compensation retaliation under O.R.C. § 4123.90 (which has a short limitations period), but instead, filed a public policy wrongful discharge claim. In essence, she argued that even if she wasn’t fired in retaliation for seeking workers’ compensation, it violated the public policy of the state of Ohio to fire an employee while receiving workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court dismissed her claim, but the appellate court reversed. After all, the Ohio Supreme Court had previously held in the Coolidge syllabus that “[a]n employee who is receiving temporary total disability compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56 may not be discharged solely on the basis of absenteeism or inability to work, when the absence or inability to work is directly related to an allowed condition.”
After acknowledging the receipt of much criticism for Coolidge, the Ohio Supreme Court now holds that the Coolidge decision involved only the narrow issue of just cause for terminating teachers (receiving workers compensation) under O.R.C. § 3319.16. Moreover, the workers’ compensation retaliation statute precludes the need for a common law remedy involving the termination of employees while receiving workers compensation. Therefore,”R.C. 4123.90 . . . provides the exclusive remedy for employees claiming termination in violation of rights conferred by the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Because O.R.C. § 4123.90 prohibits only retaliatory discharges, it is no longer unlawful for an employer to terminate a non-teaching employee for non-retaliatory reasons (such as inability to work or indefinite absence) even if the employee is receiving workers’ compensation benefits.
Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/0/2007/2007-ohio-6751.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.
Thursday, October 18, 2007
Supreme Court Rejects Public Policy Claims for Age Discrimination, Shortening Time for Bringing Discrimination Claims Against Ohio Employers
On September 27, 2007, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a 6-1 decision holding that public policy wrongful discharge claims (based on prohibitions against age discrimination) may no longer be brought against employers subject to Ohio Revised Code § 4112 (governing employment discrimination). The rationale for this holding is that ORC § 4112 already provides sufficient remedies for injured plaintiffs without having to recognize a common law remedy. This holding will likely be applied to other employment discrimination claims as well. The Court refused to address whether the holding will apply to employers who are NOT subject to ORC § 4112 (i.e., employers with less than 4 employees, etc.). The practical effect of this decision is to reduce the statute of limitations for ORC § 4112 claims of employment discrimination seeking damages to only 180 days (or 6 months), not four years as was available for common law public policy claims. (Plaintiffs still retain the right for six years to seek backpay, attorneys' fees, and reinstatement under ORC § 4112.14). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim in this case was dismissed for being filed beyond the 180 day limitations period. Leininger v. Pioneer Natl. Latex, 2007-Ohio-4921.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney. Insomniacs may read a copy of the decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/0/2007/2007-Ohio-4921.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney. Insomniacs may read a copy of the decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/0/2007/2007-Ohio-4921.pdf.
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