Last week, the Ohio Court of Appeals issued a decision involving the collision of a violent workplace rape, workers compensation, sovereign immunity and waiver. Vacha v. North Ridgeville, 2011-Ohio-2446. According to the decision, the plaintiff employee was violently raped by a coworker at the defendant city's wastewater treatment plant. Because she suffered both physical and psychological injuries, she applied for and was awarded permanent total disability benefits through Ohio workers' compensation system. She later filed suit for civil damages and asserted claims for negligent and reckless hiring and supervision of the rapist, vicarious liability and an employer intentional tort. The City argued in moving for summary judgment that it could not be liable for civil damages to an employee who prevailed on a workers' compensation claim. It also argued that it was protected by sovereign immunity provided to political subdivisions. Finally, it argued that the plaintiff could not show that it had committed an intentional tort (to avoid workers compensation immunity). The Court agreed with most of the City's arguments, but sent the case back to the trial court because political subdivisions were not immune from all employer intentional tort claims and the City had failed to raise one of its arguments before the trial court.
The City's first argument was that the plaintiff's sole remedy was the workers' compensation system. Although purely psychological injuries are not compensable through workers' compensation, the plaintiff suffered both physical and emotional damages from the rape and was awarded total disability benefits. Therefore, the court decisions permitting plaintiffs to pursue negligent/reckless hiring/supervision claims were distinguishable because the plaintiffs in those cases – unlike the plaintiff in this case -- were not eligible to receive workers compensation benefits and, thus, were not subject to the exclusive workers' compensation remedy. As the Court noted,
R.C. 4123.74 provides that employers who are in full compliance with their obligation to pay workers' compensation premiums "shall not be liable to respond in damages" for "any injury *** received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment[.]" The statute is a codification of the principle set forth in Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution that workers' compensation benefits will be an employee's exclusive remedy against her employer for workplace injuries and provides, in part:
"Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to *** damages, for such *** injuries *** and any employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law *** shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such *** injuries[.]"
The Court ultimately concluded that "if an employee's "injury" is compensable within the workers' compensation system, the employer is consequently immune from a civil action by the employee for negligently or recklessly causing the injury."
Conversely, if an employee's "injury" does qualify for workers' compensation coverage, that remedy is exclusive and the employer is immune from civil action liability arising out of an allegation that the employer was negligent or reckless in causing the employee's injury. That is the only reasonable interpretation of the language of R.C. 4123.74 and 4123.01(C) and any other interpretation would be unfair to the employer in the overall balance of competing interests in the workers' compensation system.
Nonetheless, the workers' compensation immunity does not apply to employer intentional torts. The trial court found that there were disputed issues of material fact concerning the intentional tort claim which could not be resolved on summary judgment. On appeal, the City argued that the more stringent employer intentional tort standard of R.C. § 2745.01 should apply to bar the plaintiff's claims. However, the City had not raised that argument before the trial court – probably because the statute's constitutionality was being challenged – and, thus, had impliedly waived that argument.
Finally, the City argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under R.C. § 2744.02 because none of the plaintiff's claims arose within any of the exceptions to that statute. In response, the plaintiff correctly pointed out that "R.C. 2744.09(B) explicitly provides that R.C. Chapter 2744 political subdivision tort immunity does not apply to "[c]ivil actions by an employee *** against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision[.]" However, the city contended that employer intentional tort actions are not "civil actions" within the meaning of the immunity statute. The majority of the Court was not impressed and found that an employer intentional tort claim could come within the political subdivision sovereign immunity statute. (However, one judge dissented and concluded that political subdivisions are immune from employer intentional tort claims).
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
