Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Lawyer's Complaint that His ADHD Should Excuse Submitting Law Firm Time Sheets For Failure to Allege Reasonable Alternative

 Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a law firm employer’s judgment on the pleadings on claims by a former associate lawyer who alleged that his ADHD prevented him from submitting timely and accurate time sheets so that the law firm could bill its clients for his time and services.  Longergan v. Gallagher Sharp LLP, No. 25-3808 (6^th Cir. May 29, 2026).  As a former law firm associate, I of course found this fascinating.  The Court agreed that failing to allege any details about proposed accommodations was fatal to his failure to accommodate claim because bare legal assertions that a reasonable accommodation and job modifications had been made were insufficient to state a viable claim. “Plaintiff did not create the plausible inference that he is qualified to perform his job with or without a reasonable accommodation because he did not adequately plead the fact that he proposed any accommodation to Defendant, let alone a reasonable one.”    Although he could have moved to amend his complaint to provide details about his proposed job modifications, he failed to do so.   Finally, the employer was not required to engage in the interactive process until he proposed a reasonable accommodation, which his complaint failed to sufficiently allege that he had done. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff suffered from ADHD and had trouble submitting time sheets.  (Law firms bill clients based on the time sheets submitted by their attorneys and is how the firms pay their employees and rent, etc.) While the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he suggested modifications and accommodations, he did not describe what they were in his complaint.  Instead, he argued that his suggestions were flatly rejected as unworkable.   In later briefing, these suggestions turned out to be (1) having a legal assistant identify the projects on which he worked each day so that he could then insert the amount of time spent on each; (2) assigning him only flat rate projects or (3) giving clients a discount for his work.   After he was put on probation, he managed to comply for a few weeks, but then realized within two months that he had failed to submit some weekend hours.    He then became hopeless, “checked out” and was terminated three months later.    He filed a pro se lawsuit that Fall.   

After answering the complaint, the law firm then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability because his complaint failed to factually describe any reasonable accommodations that he had proposed.   The plaintiff responded that he only needed to satisfy notice pleading – that he had generally alleged his proposal of an unidentified reasonable accommodation and the law firm’s failure to engage in the interactive process.  Although the plaintiff indicated that he could amend his complaint, he never submitted a proposed amended complaint to fix the problems with his pleading or a formal motion.  Moreover, the alleged accommodations he indicated that he had requested failed to satisfy the requirement that they be reasonable or effective to solve the problems.

While a complaint

need not include “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[,] . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[, or] . . . ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”  . . . . “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  . . . . Although we “‘construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’ . . . [m]ere labels and conclusions are not enough; the allegations must contain ‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”  . . .  Those “rules . . . exist to keep litigants from sandbagging their opponents until they are on notice of what their allegations lack.”  . . .

Although a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination suit need not establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage, he still must plead facts showing that he is entitled to relief.   . . . The ADA “prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability’ as it applies to aspects of employment including hiring, advancement, and firing.”  . . . The statute includes in the definition of disability-based discrimination “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified [employee] with a disability . . . , unless . . . the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A qualified employee is one “who can perform the ‘essential functions’ of his job ‘with or without reasonable accommodation.’”  . . . . Thus to state a claim, Plaintiff had to “plead facts that make plausible the inference that (1) []he is disabled, (2) []he is qualified to perform [his] job requirements with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) []he would not have been discharged but for the disability . . .  With respect to the second element, Plaintiff would ultimately have to show that he “propose[d] a reasonable accommodation” to Defendant. . . .

 . . . Plaintiff’s complaint failed to adequately state a failure-to-accommodate claim. Plaintiff did not create the plausible inference that he is qualified to perform his job with or without a reasonable accommodation because he did not adequately plead the fact that he proposed any accommodation to Defendant, let alone a reasonable one. The complaint merely stated that Plaintiff had requested “a modification to job requirements” and “repeatedly approached partners at the firm and suggested accommodations . . . .”  . . . . Those allegations are conclusory recitations of the reasonable accommodation element, devoid of any factual substance. Plaintiff failed to provide notice to both Defendant and the district court about what he believes would have constituted a reasonable accommodation that would have qualified him for the job. They were left to fill in the blanks. Even accepting all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded material allegations as true, the district court did not have a basis to infer that Defendant could be liable for disability discrimination by failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s requests. . . . .

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant failed to engage in the mandatory interactive process suffers from the same infirmity. The regulations under the ADA state, in relevant part, that “it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process” to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”  . . . . That process is mandatory, id., “[b]ut an employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process is actionable only if the employee can demonstrate that she was qualified for the position[,]”  . . .  Without pleading facts to support that he proposed any accommodation, Plaintiff failed to plead that he was in fact qualified, as defined by the statute.

The Court also found that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint when the plaintiff had 5 months in which to submit a formal motion and failed to do so.  Mentioning in a memorandum in opposition that he could  amend his complaint to address its deficiencies is not a proper motion and need not be considered or granted by a trial court. 

As for the time sheets, all private practice attorneys hate doing them, but they are not generally required by when working for corporations, non-profits or government agencies. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Conclusory Allegations Will Not Save FLSA Complaint

 Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint for failing to allege sufficiently detailed facts to state a claim under the FLSA.   Forrester v. American Protection and Security Service, LLC, No. 21-5870 (6^th Cir. 5-13-22).   In it, the plaintiff complained about not being paid when the employer required employees to show up 10-15 minutes prior to their shift and stay as late as 10-15 minutes after their shift in order to ensure unbroken coverage.  However, the plaintiff failed to plead what, if any work, she did during this period of time so that the court could determine whether the 15 minutes before and after her shift were compensable under the FLSA.   The allegations in the complaint stated legal conclusions, to which the defendant employer was not required to admit or deny.  Despite having ample opportunity to do so, the plaintiff never formally attempted to amend her complaint or to submit a proposed amended complaint for the trial court to consider whether the deficiencies had been corrected.  Therefore, the trial court was within its discretion to dismiss the complaint without giving the plaintiff the opportunity to try again.

According to the Court’s opinion, the 10-15 minutes before and after each employee’s shift was to ensure an overlap and adequate coverage during the shift hand-offs.  The employer apparently did not keep records of this time or pay employees for this time.   However, the employer had disciplined employees who failed to report early for their shift.   The plaintiff brought a class action to challenge this practice and recover unpaid overtime and attorney’s fees.

The court observed that employers are not required to pay for every minute that an employee is at work.  The Supreme Court had previously held that the Portal-to-Portal Act does not require employers to pay for or record time an employee spends commuting to and from work or for time going through an employer’s security checkpoint after work.   The security checkpoint was not an integral part of the employees’ principal activity which the employees were employed to perform.  However, in this case, the plaintiff never pleaded any facts from which the court could determine whether any work was actually performed during the 10-15 minutes before and after her shift.   At best, she alleged that there were “shift-change duties,” but did not elaborate what those entailed.   The court was left to guess whether those “shift-change duties” could be eliminated without impairing the plaintiff’s ability to work.  If so, the “shift-change duties” would not be compensable.

Despite being on notice that her complaint may be factually deficient, the plaintiff never formally requested to amend her complaint or to submit an amended complaint which would have provided detailed allegations.  Accordingly, the trial court was within its discretion to dismiss the complaint without giving the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint and try again. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit: Detailed Allegations of Retaliation Are Not Required to Survive Twombly Motion to Dismiss

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a lawsuit under Twombly against an Ohio employer that allegedly fired an HR Director after he protested overt discrimination against employees on account of their race, sex, age and disability and its refusal to reinstate employees following FMLA leave. Rhoads v. R&L Carriers, No. 11-3054 (6th Cir. 8-6-12). The Complaint as amended alleged violations of the FMLA, the ADEA, and the Ohio Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the lawsuit on account of the plaintiff’s failure to allege dates of allege discrimination, how he opposed unlawful employment practices and the names of individuals whom he believed were discriminated against. The Sixth Circuit held that detailed pleading of allegations is not required under Civil Rule 8. Nonetheless, it affirmed dismissal of his promissory estoppels claim based on his resignation from a prior employer in order to work for the defendant employer.

As described by the Court, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged:

Soon after Rhodes joined R&L, he discovered numerous violations of state and federal laws and regulations relating to employment and employee benefits. Specifically, Rhodes contends that R&L unlawfully considered the sex, age, and disabilities of applicants when making hiring decisions. With regard to sex discrimination, Rhodes alleges that R&L refused to hire women to work on the loading dock, paid female sales employees lower base salaries than their male counterparts, and awarded raises to male employees, but not female employees. Additionally, R&L failed to enforce its internal policies, permitting existing sexual harassment to continue. As for age discrimination, Rhodes alleges that R&L reviewed the ages of applicants for employment and specifically rejected applicants based on their age and also set a maximum age limit for certain positions, including drivers. Furthermore, an Executive Vice President discussed at a meeting the need to lower the average age of the workforce to thirty-two years of age. With respect to disability discrimination, applicants were specifically rejected based on apparent potential benefits claims to R&L’s health benefits plan or if the applicants were deemed overweight. Rhodes alleges that an Executive Vice President discussed the need to stop hiring overweight employees.

The amended complaint further alleges that once Rhodes was apprised of these violations, he objected to and opposed these practices, policies, and decisions. Rhodes alleges that he brought his concerns to the Vice Presidents of Human Resources and the Executive Vice Presidents and informed R&L that it needed to stop these practices and comply with employment and employee benefits laws. In July and August 2009, Rhodes placed his opposition in writing, voicing his concerns to the Vice Presidents of Human Resources and corporate counsel. Rhodes’s efforts were unsuccessful: R&L management told Rhodes that the company did not intend to come into compliance with the laws “because R&L had never had to write a big enough check to justify compliance with the rules.” On October 9, 2009, R&L terminated Rhodes. On his last day, Rhodes’s immediate supervisor informed him that his performance had been “great.”

The District Court dismissed the lawsuit for failing to provide many details about the variety of allegations. The Sixth Circuit reversed:

The district court erred in demanding such detailed factual content to survive a motion to dismiss. While these facts may be critical ultimately to proving Rhodes’s claims on a motion for summary judgment or at trial, to demand such detailed pleading at the motion to dismiss stage disregards “the continuing viability of the short and plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” . . .

Rather than demanding highly specific factual allegations to satisfy this plausibility requirement, the district court should have looked to whether “the plaintiff plead[ed] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “If a reasonable court can draw the necessary inference from the factual material stated in the complaint, the plausibility standard has been satisfied.” . . . The amended complaint allege R&L’s various unlawful actions, Rhodes’s opposition to these practices, and his termination mere months after expressing this opposition, despite the “great” work he performed while at the company. From these facts and the reasonable and necessary inferences that arise from them, we conclude that Rhodes has pleaded a plausible claim that R&L retaliated against him for opposing the company’s unlawful employment and employee benefits practices. 

As for his age discrimination claim, the plaintiff alleged that the employer’s upper management “specifically stated in meetings that the average age of the workforce needed to be lowered to 32 years of age, . . . set maximum age limits for particular positions and reviewed applicants’ birth dates, . . . and “specifically rejected [applicants] for employment based on age.” He also alleged that “his membership in the protected class, his qualifications for the position, and his termination despite his immediate supervisor’s belief that he had done “great” work at the company.” The Court found these allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim under the ADEA and should have survived a motion to dismiss under Twombly.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.