Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Threadbare ADEA Complaint

This morning, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a “threadbare” complaint under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  Smithv. Wrigley Mfg Co., No. No. 18-5397 (6^th Cir. 10-18-19).  The plaintiff alleged simply that she had been a good and long-time employee and that she had been unfairly fired when younger employees had not been.  While this allegation asserts the basic elements of an ADEA claim, it did not contain any facts showing the differences in ages, behavior or treatment that are necessary to survive a motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6).  A court must only accept as true factual allegations and need not defer to mere legal conclusions.  Accordingly, the case was dismissed before the plaintiff was permitted to conduct any discovery.

According to the Court’s opinion, the complaint in its entirety provided:

Plaintiff was a longtime employee of [Wrigley] and its predecessor company.  Despite Plaintiff’s good record with [Wrigley], [Wrigley] discharged the employment of Plaintiff on or about March 3, 2016.  This discharge was largely based upon the pretext of alleged misconduct when the real motivation was age discrimination in violation of 29 U.S.C. § Sections [sic] 621 to 634.  Plaintiff is and was over 40 years of age at the time of discharge.  The conduct of [Wrigley] in discharging Plaintiff was inconsistent with the way Plaintiff was treated in her many years of service with [Wrigley] and its predecessors, and inconsistent with the way other employees similarly situated, who were younger, were treated.  Plaintiff was qualified for her position and had been so during her many years of service.  [Wrigley] did not object to Plaintiff drawing unemployment.  Plaintiff before being terminated always gave [Wrigley] her best effort as she had always done for years.  Younger employees that were performing on a par with Plaintiff were still working with [Wrigley] after Plaintiff’s discharge.

The Court found that dismissal prior to discovery was appropriate because the complaint had failed to allege facts from which any court could “draw a reasonable inference of discrimination.   . . . . In the absence of facts regarding the ages or positions of the younger,  similarly-situated employees, or any example of how those employees were treated differently, the court could not do so.”

Though [the plaintiff] mentioned that younger employees who were “performing on a  par” with her were still employed when she was fired, she offered no names, ages, or qualifications for the younger employees who were treated differently, or any examples of how their treatment differed.  Without additional facts, the court cannot infer that [the employer] fired [the plaintiff] because of her age.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

Sixth Circuit: Detailed Allegations of Retaliation Are Not Required to Survive Twombly Motion to Dismiss

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a lawsuit under Twombly against an Ohio employer that allegedly fired an HR Director after he protested overt discrimination against employees on account of their race, sex, age and disability and its refusal to reinstate employees following FMLA leave. Rhoads v. R&L Carriers, No. 11-3054 (6th Cir. 8-6-12). The Complaint as amended alleged violations of the FMLA, the ADEA, and the Ohio Civil Rights Act. The District Court dismissed the lawsuit on account of the plaintiff’s failure to allege dates of allege discrimination, how he opposed unlawful employment practices and the names of individuals whom he believed were discriminated against. The Sixth Circuit held that detailed pleading of allegations is not required under Civil Rule 8. Nonetheless, it affirmed dismissal of his promissory estoppels claim based on his resignation from a prior employer in order to work for the defendant employer.

As described by the Court, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged:

Soon after Rhodes joined R&L, he discovered numerous violations of state and federal laws and regulations relating to employment and employee benefits. Specifically, Rhodes contends that R&L unlawfully considered the sex, age, and disabilities of applicants when making hiring decisions. With regard to sex discrimination, Rhodes alleges that R&L refused to hire women to work on the loading dock, paid female sales employees lower base salaries than their male counterparts, and awarded raises to male employees, but not female employees. Additionally, R&L failed to enforce its internal policies, permitting existing sexual harassment to continue. As for age discrimination, Rhodes alleges that R&L reviewed the ages of applicants for employment and specifically rejected applicants based on their age and also set a maximum age limit for certain positions, including drivers. Furthermore, an Executive Vice President discussed at a meeting the need to lower the average age of the workforce to thirty-two years of age. With respect to disability discrimination, applicants were specifically rejected based on apparent potential benefits claims to R&L’s health benefits plan or if the applicants were deemed overweight. Rhodes alleges that an Executive Vice President discussed the need to stop hiring overweight employees.

The amended complaint further alleges that once Rhodes was apprised of these violations, he objected to and opposed these practices, policies, and decisions. Rhodes alleges that he brought his concerns to the Vice Presidents of Human Resources and the Executive Vice Presidents and informed R&L that it needed to stop these practices and comply with employment and employee benefits laws. In July and August 2009, Rhodes placed his opposition in writing, voicing his concerns to the Vice Presidents of Human Resources and corporate counsel. Rhodes’s efforts were unsuccessful: R&L management told Rhodes that the company did not intend to come into compliance with the laws “because R&L had never had to write a big enough check to justify compliance with the rules.” On October 9, 2009, R&L terminated Rhodes. On his last day, Rhodes’s immediate supervisor informed him that his performance had been “great.”

The District Court dismissed the lawsuit for failing to provide many details about the variety of allegations. The Sixth Circuit reversed:

The district court erred in demanding such detailed factual content to survive a motion to dismiss. While these facts may be critical ultimately to proving Rhodes’s claims on a motion for summary judgment or at trial, to demand such detailed pleading at the motion to dismiss stage disregards “the continuing viability of the short and plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” . . .

Rather than demanding highly specific factual allegations to satisfy this plausibility requirement, the district court should have looked to whether “the plaintiff plead[ed] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “If a reasonable court can draw the necessary inference from the factual material stated in the complaint, the plausibility standard has been satisfied.” . . . The amended complaint allege R&L’s various unlawful actions, Rhodes’s opposition to these practices, and his termination mere months after expressing this opposition, despite the “great” work he performed while at the company. From these facts and the reasonable and necessary inferences that arise from them, we conclude that Rhodes has pleaded a plausible claim that R&L retaliated against him for opposing the company’s unlawful employment and employee benefits practices. 

As for his age discrimination claim, the plaintiff alleged that the employer’s upper management “specifically stated in meetings that the average age of the workforce needed to be lowered to 32 years of age, . . . set maximum age limits for particular positions and reviewed applicants’ birth dates, . . . and “specifically rejected [applicants] for employment based on age.” He also alleged that “his membership in the protected class, his qualifications for the position, and his termination despite his immediate supervisor’s belief that he had done “great” work at the company.” The Court found these allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim under the ADEA and should have survived a motion to dismiss under Twombly.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.