Showing posts with label unreasonable accommodation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label unreasonable accommodation. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 30, 2025

Sixth Circuit Rejects ADA Accommodation and Interactive Process Claims When Request to Sit Every 10 Minutes Was Unreasonable on its Face

Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on an ADA claim on the grounds that the requested accommodation was unreasonable on its face, meaning that the employer did not have to even engage in the interactive process or grant the requested accommodation.   Bowles v. SSRG II, LLC, No. 25-5329 (6th Cir. 12-17-25).   The newly-hired  fast-casual restaurant cashier had requested the right to sit for five minutes every time that she had to stand for 10 minutes because of arthritis in her knees.  The undisputed facts showed that the essential functions of the job required multi-tasking and spending the majority of time standing and walking.  There were no “standalone register-only” positions.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired for a cashier position.  This required her to take orders for dine-in and carry-out, fill drink orders, stocking the drink station and refrigeration station, expediting food orders, delivering items to eat-in customers, clean tables, vacuum, etc. in a fast-paced environment.   “Those features made multitasking essential.”  During the application process, she had disclosed her disability and that she would need to periodically sit if required to stand for long periods of time and was hired anyway. 

During her orientation, the plaintiff disclosed that she would need to sit when needed or to sit and work. HR delayed her start date pending medical documentation, which initially indicated only that she would need a chair because of her arthritis.  HR then requested to know how long she could stand and how often she would need to sit, etc.   The plaintiff responded that she could only stand for 10 minutes at a time and then would need to sit for 5 minutes.   HR responded that there were no sitting positions.

The Court rejected the employee’s failure to accommodate claim for failing to specify a reasonable accommodation:

[Her] claim stumbles from the start, as she did not satisfy her initial burden of showing that her proposed accommodation—being able to sit for five minutes after every ten minutes of standing—is objectively reasonable, accounting for the essential requirements of the cashier/service-team member role  . . . .

 . . .

Juxtapose these critical job duties with what [she] requested: the ability to sit in one location for a duration of five minutes—presumably in front a cash register—after standing for ten. [Her] request would necessarily change the nature of the cashier/service-team member position. For a third of her shift, [her] job would be isolated to manning the cash register, regardless of whether there was a customer waiting at the register. And during those periods, [she] would be unable to tackle numerous duties, from greeting a customer at the door to rushing an order out to a hungry patron to cleaning up a spill at the drink station, just to name a few, any of which could occur at a moment’s notice in the setting of a fast-casual restaurant. This collection of duties is why [the employer] requires both multitasking and mobility from its team members.

The plaintiff attempted to argue that she was only hired to be a cashier and not to multi-task.

The problem for [the plaintiff] is that there is no evidence that she was hired for a standalone register-only position. In fact, no such position existed at the restaurant. The only position identified in the record is the cashier/service-team member role. And its written job description and the deposition testimony presented at summary judgment show that the role was far more than a limited, register-centric job. True, both [the restaurant’s] employees as well as [the plaintiff] referred to the position colloquially as the “cashier” role. But the position’s name, either formal or informal, is far less meaningful than its critical functions. As we engage in the “highly fact specific” inquiry into what is an essential function,  . . .a job title alone tells us very little, . . .

The Court also rejected her argument that her earlier requests to sit periodically should have been given more weight than her last, more specific request.   It distinguished other cashier cases where the plaintiff’s station was stationery, rather than fluid. 

 . . . requiring a duration of five minutes of sitting after standing for ten is what makes [her] request facially unreasonable. Meeting those terms would alter essential functions of the cashier/service-team member position while foisting added duties on co-workers when [she] manned the cash register. Perhaps, as [she] emphasizes, she could perform some tasks during her time standing. But that misses the point. The nature of the job—working in the front of the house at a fast-casual restaurant— necessarily means that a given task could crop up at any time. In one minute, the kitchen might have prepared a food order to run out to a customer. The next, a customer might finish her meal, leaving a messy table behind. And a minute later, the beverage station or refrigerator may need restocking. Had [the employer] granted [her] accommodation, all of those tasks would go unattended by [her] while she sat at the cash register, despite her position’s essential requirements and the restaurant’s needs.

The Court also refused to assign the “reasonableness” of the request to a jury determination:

While there undoubtedly are cases where disputes of fact arise over what a job entails and whether an accommodation would interfere with core functions of that job, in the end, disputes over both issues involve a mixed question of law and fact.  . . .  And it is appropriate for us to resolve these mixed questions at summary judgment when there are few evidentiary disputes over the material facts. . . .  That is the case here. There is no evidentiary dispute as to the essential functions of the cashier/service-team member position. Nor is there a dispute over the nature of [her] proposed accommodation. As a result, we follow the well-trodden path of determining as a matter of law whether [her] proposed accommodation is a facially reasonable one.

The Court also rejected her allegation that the employer failed to engage in the interactive process.  Rather than address the employer’s request for medical information, it concluded that no interaction was required when the requested accommodation was unreasonable on its face:

a viable interactive-process claim presupposes the existence of a reasonable accommodation. And with [her] having presented a facially unreasonable request to [the employer], her remaining claim necessarily fails.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, May 5, 2010

Montgomery County Appellate Court Rejects Perceived Disability Discrimination Claim Based on Prior Accommodations

Last week, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals in Dayton affirmed summary judgment for a public school, although on different grounds than the judgment granted by the trial court. In short, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Political Subdivision and Tort Liability Act (PSTLA) did not apply to bar claims for employment discrimination, but that the plaintiff failed to properly plead or prove a prima facie case for disability discrimination based on her alleged multi-chemical sensitivity allergies. Ogilbee v. Board of Education of Dayton Public Schools, 2010-Ohio-1913, 23432.

According to the Court, the plaintiff clerical assistant alleged that she suffered from multi-chemical sensitivity, which was an allergy to certain perfumes and fragrances which gave her migraine headaches and restricted her ability to breath, sleep, concentrate and walk. Her union refused to assist her when she claimed that her allergies were exacerbated by a new work assignment because it was a "personal problem." She asked HR to be relocated to an empty office or other space or even another building, but these suggestions were rejected as unreasonable. Instead, the school gave her an air purifier and a fan and arranged for a contractor to rearrange her work space. According to the School, she refused to use them without explanation. After she filed a Charge of Discrimination, the School entered into a negotiated settlement agreement and transferred her to another position in another building. The School again attempted to accommodate her by permitting her to annually explain to her co-workers her need for them to not wear perfume, but she believed that after a year that some staff purposely "doused" themselves in perfume and the principal began acting on her complaints less and less. By 2006, the principal would no longer permit her to make her annual announcement. When she arrived at work with a note from her physician indicating that she needed to work in a space free from perfumes and strong odors because they exacerbate her migraine headaches and she had exhausted her paid leave, the School responded shortly thereafter by placing her on a one-year unpaid medical leave of absence because her requested accommodation was unreasonable in that she worked "in a reception area at a public school with over 800 students, 100+ employees, and the public who visit the school on a daily basis. There is no way that a scent-free environment can be guaranteed." When the School refused to reinstate her the following year when there had been no change in her medical condition, she filed a lawsuit in state court alleging disability discrimination and harassment. The trial court found that the School had PSTLA immunity.

Generally, under the PSTLA, "political subdivisions are not liable in damages for injury, death, or loss caused by them in connection with the execution of their functions. See R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). The PSTLA however does not apply to claims by an employee that relate to any matter that "arises out of the employment relationship." R.C. 2744.09(B)." Mysteriously, the trial court concluded that an employment discrimination claim does not arise out of the employment relationship and is more akin to an intentional court. In light of contrary authority to the contrary, the appellate court had no difficulty finding otherwise.

As for her disability discrimination claim, the court construed her argument as applying on to a perceived disability claim and concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove that the School's HR Director perceived her allergy and migraine headaches to substantially limit any major life activities, including working. In particular, the Court rejected her argument that the School must have perceived her as disabled because it made several attempts to accommodate her allergy:

While lay people may think of an allergy as a disability, a "disability" in this context is, as we discussed above, a technical term with a very specific meaning. Also, [Plaintiff] makes much of the fact that [the HR Director], and others, tried, unsuccessfully, to accommodate her allergy, which she argues shows he thought she was disabled. But simply because an employer tries to make an employee's working-environment more comfortable by attempting to accommodate a particular physical characteristic does not mean that he thinks the employee has a "disability." As the statute makes clear, not every physical or mental impairment qualifies as a "disability." From the evidence, it appears that [the HR Director] considered [Plaintiff] to have an allergy, and he did all he thought reasonable to accommodate the allergy. No evidence suggests that [the HR Director] treated the allergy as severely limited her ability to work. [Plaintiff's] naked assertions about [the HR Director's] thoughts and motivations are not sufficient; she "'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'"

The Court does not explain how the School's placement of the plaintiff on a one-year unpaid medical leave was merely a reaction to a non-disabling allergy or how such action by the School was insufficient evidence that it perceived her as substantially limited by her allergy. It also does not explain why there was not enough of a factual dispute for a jury to consider. Perhaps the plaintiff never made the argument in her brief. In any event, the court granted summary judgment for the employer.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.