Divided Franklin County Court of Appeals Finds Noose By Itself to Be Sufficiently Severe for Hostile Work Environment

Last week, a divided Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment on racially hostile work environment and retaliation claims.  Croley v. JDM Servs., L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-4762.  The Court found that the existence of a noose in a vehicle temporarily assigned to a new African-American employee on his second day of work by itself – without any racial comments or other  evidence – was sufficient to create a jury question whether it was intended to harass and intimidate him on account of his race.  Similarly, the later spontaneous shattering of  his assigned vehicle’s windshield – with a pre-existing hole in it – was also sufficient to create a jury question whether it had been shot out without any other evidence of a gun or bullet fragment.  Finally, the employer’s termination of the employee for refusing to permit a sample to be taken from the noose to compare to other rope on the worksite during its investigation of his allegations was found create a jury question of retaliation when the employer had not already gathered rope samples before the employee’s refusal based on his mistrust of the employer.  The Court conceded that there was sufficient holes in the plaintiff's case for a jury to rule in favor of the employer, but felt that the jury should make the decision instead of the trial court. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired on January 10 by the employer’s General Manager and began work on January 13. On January 14, the GM directed that the plaintiff be trained on the compacter, which he was by two different employees.  During a ride on the compacter, he grabbed a rope for stability, but did not find it helpful.  Later, while alone in the compactor, he realized that the rope was a noose hung from the rearview mirror and it made him extremely fearful.  He took the noose and hung it from the door of the employee trailer.   That night, he reported it to the employment agency and the next day, January 15, the GM questioned him about it, reiterated that the employer does not tolerate discrimination and commenced an investigation.  The plaintiff put the noose in his truck for safekeeping and refused to turn it over to the employer, although he did let them see it and inspect it.  The following week, the windshield of the vehicle he was operating had a small hole in it and then spontaneously shattered while he was in it.   He believed that the windshield had been shot out by a gun and saw the GM’s vehicle parked up the hill.   A few days later, he was again requested for the noose or a piece of it so that it could be compared to other rope at the work site during the employer’s investigation.  While he allowed the noose to be inspected in his presence, he again refused to turn it over or permit a sample to be taken and was fired for insubordination for impeding the investigation.

After the plaintiff was terminated, the owner reported him for making criminal threats against a co-worker, but the co-worker told the police that he did not feel threatened and nothing came of it.  The employee filed suit in October.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer on the discrimination, harassment and retaliation claims.  The Court of Appeals reversed the harassment and retaliation claims, finding sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to evaluate.

While the Court’s majority conceded that many courts would not find the noose incident – by itself – to constitute a hostile work environment, it disagreed:

The noose is a symbol of this nation’s violent legacy against African Americans and brings them “ ‘the grim specter of racially motivated violence’ that continues today.”  . . . . The noose is “among the most repugnant of all racist symbols, because it is itself an instrument of violence.”

Historically, the noose is forever “linked to lynching, the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”), and the murdering of thousands of African-Americans.” . . .

 . . . .

 . . . For the reasons above, we conclude the act of hanging a noose on the mirror of an African American’s vehicle is undoubtedly an unwelcome form of harassment based on race.

 . . . .

 . . .  The question becomes whether the act of hanging a noose on the vehicle assigned to an African American male, on his second day of work at the facility, is severe enough conduct to support a hostile work environment claim. We unequivocally answer this question in the affirmative.

 . . . .

 . . . Even in cases where the noose does not appear directed at a particular individual, given the noose’s dark legacy, a reasonable African American employee could be forever altered by such a visceral symbol in the workplace. African Americans who observe such a heinous symbol should not be required to explain the violent history of the noose and how it can invoke fear and anxiety. The threat of a noose is self-evident.3

The Court also believed that the window spontaneously shattering while the plaintiff was inside could also be considered by a jury as evidence of harassment even though no shell casings or bb or pellet was found afterwards that might have explained why it shattered.  It also rejected the employer’s explanation that windshields periodically shatter at the worksite because of the regular vibrations.

As the window incident occurred only a week after the display of the noose, we find, considering the evidence in a light most in favor of the nonmoving party, the incident amounts to threatening conduct that indicates a willingness to act on the statement made by the noose incident. Because the window incident amounts to a physical threat of violence, the implicit threat from the noose is heightened and, based on the close sequence of events, could reasonably be construed to have a racial animus. Finally, there is a dispute of fact as to liability as [the plaintiff] claims that [the GM’s] vehicle was in the immediate vicinity when the glass shattered.

The dissent, realizing that nooses exist for reasons other than lynching, required more evidence than the bare existence of a noose:

The dissent contends that “[o]ther than the noose, there are no credible allegations of any race-based comments or other activity involving race. The noose is not connected to any threatening intent or racial animus by [the employer].”

 . . . .

 . . . At this phase of the case, however, we are limited to determining whether a dispute of fact exists for trial. Given the line of cases that have found that the single display of a noose in the workplace can create a hostile work environment, we find it is the province of the jury to determine whether the alleged conduct in this case is severe or pervasive enough to demonstrate a hostile work environment claim. What the dissent proposes is that, as a matter of law, leaving a noose in the vehicle of an African American male does not constitute a severe enough act, without more, to create a hostile work environment. In good conscience, we cannot support such an approach. While a jury could very well find that the alleged incident was not severe enough conduct to create a hostile work environment claim, the argument that hanging a noose in the excavator that [the plaintiff] was assigned to operate could not, as a matter of law, sufficiently alter the conditions of employment for an African American is untenable.

The Court then found that the employer could be held liable for the noose incident because it was alleged (without any evidence) that the GM had put it there since he was the individual who had assigned the plaintiff to that vehicle on that date.   The Court refused to credit the employer with conducting an investigation – despite its employee interviews – because it had delayed a few hours in retrieving and safeguarding the noose and had not gathered rope samples before firing the plaintiff for refusing to permit a sample to be taken.

It is the province of the jury to resolve whether the [the employer] took reasonable steps to correct the alleged behavior. Furthermore, there is a dispute of fact whether [the plaintiff] unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities that the employer provided. The [employer] commenced an investigation into the matter and met with [the plaintiff]. [He] agreed to show them the noose but refused to leave the noose or allow it to be cut for comparison with other rope at the worksite. [He]  explained that he did not feel comfortable turning over the noose or allowing them to cut a piece of it because he did not trust [the owner]. It is for the jury to resolve these factual disputes.

The Court rejected certain evidence submitted by the plaintiff to support his hostile work environment claim because he was unaware of the incidents until after he had been fired.  For example, he had been written up (without his knowledge) for improper operation of certain equipment.  They also rejected the police report as part of this claim because it happened after his termination.  ““ ‘Plaintiff cannot use events that happened after his termination to support his hostile work environment claim.’ ”

The Court also concluded that he had produced sufficient evidence that his termination was retaliatory for complaining about the noose incident.   While generally employees may be terminated for refusing to cooperate with a workplace investigation, there are exceptions and the Court found the plaintiff’s distrust of his employer to be sufficiently protected conduct in this situation to let a jury decide whether his distrust was justified and protected.

Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to [the plaintiff], a jury could reasonably determine that turning over evidence to a supervisor you do not trust, or allowing that evidence to be damaged, is a reasonable nonparticipation in the investigative process. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that when [he] initially informed [the GM] of the noose’s location outside the employee trailer, [the GM] failed to [immediately] retrieve and secure the noose. Furthermore, [the plaintiff], despite his trepidations, repeatedly allowed the noose to be inspected. A jury could reasonably believe [his] explanation that his claim could be hindered if the noose was damaged or not be properly preserved. Conversely, the [employer] have represented that they wanted the noose to aid in the investigation. Given the accusation at issue, there is at least a dispute of fact that [his] fears were justified.

In addition, the plaintiff met several times with the employer and answered their questions.  His only refusal concerned preservation of the integrity and safekeeping of the noose.  Moreover, his termination came only days after his protected conduct in reporting the alleged harassment.

We find that the [the employer] have provided a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating [his] employment. A reasonable jury could find that failure to turn over the noose, or allow it to be cut, unreasonably impeded the investigation providing a legitimate reason for termination.

The Court then required the plaintiff to show that the employer’s explanation was pretext for retaliation.

[The plaintiff] can demonstrate pretext by introducing evidence that he provided the noose on multiple occasions to further the investigation. [He] had also previously allowed [the GM] to take the noose when he left it outside the employee trailer. [The owner] had not collected any samples of rope from around the worksite to compare it with the noose, did not offer to keep the noose in a neutral location, and never called law enforcement to report the incident.  .. . .  A jury could reasonably believe [the plaintiff’s] explanation for not wanting to turn the noose over to the appellees or allow them to cut a portion of the noose.

There was no discussion in the Court’s retaliation opinion about post-termination conduct of the employer in reporting the plaintiff for alleged criminal threats.  There was also no discussion of the same-actor inference since the alleged harasser was also the same individual who hired him only days earlier.  There was no also discussion of the racial composition of the workforce, which might have put more context in the plaintiff’s paranoia.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Revives Hostile Workplace Sexual Harassment Claim But Finds Plaintiff Failed to Utilize All Options To Report Supervisor Harassment

On Friday, the Sixth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for a Cleveland area employer on a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim brought by an employee who had resigned four years earlier. Gallagher v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., No. 08-3337 (6th Cir. 5/22/09). During the brief four months of her employment, “she complained to her immediate supervisor about the crude and offensive language and conduct of her co-workers, but her complaints fell on deaf ears. Disgusted, she resigned” in part because of the office celebration leading up to the OSU-Miami national collegiate championship football game on January 2, 2003. The Court found that the plaintiff produced enough evidence that she was subjected to an objectively and subjectively hostile work environment even though much of the offensive conduct and comments were not directed specifically at her, but were facially offensive to most women. Moreover, the company was on notice about the offensive conduct by her co-workers because she complained to her supervisor about it and because her supervisor witnessed and participated in some of it. Nonetheless, the Court agreed that the employer would not be liable for strictly supervisory harassment allegations because there was no tangible job actions and because the plaintiff failed to utilize alternative methods of reporting the alleged harassment by her supervisor based on unsupported suspicions of retaliation.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired into an inside sales position and worked from a cubicle where employees had very little privacy, could overhear others’ conversations and see their computer monitors. The plaintiff “describes the atmosphere at the Cleveland office of CHR during her four-month tenure as being much like “a guys’ locker room” characterized by unprofessional behavior on the part of both males and females, and an environment that was hostile to women. She testified to the prevalent use of foul language by mostly male coworkers who openly and loudly referred to female customers, truck drivers, coworkers and others as bitches, whores, sluts, dykes and cunts. She testified that male and female co-workers viewed sexually explicit pictures on their computers (although the only incident she could specifically recall was a sexually explicit picture on co-worker Angela Sarris’ computer during the Christmas holidays), and that male coworkers left pornographic magazines lying open on their desks. Gallagher testified that, on several occasions, Starosto brought in nude pictures of his girlfriend in different sexual poses and shared those pictures with several of his male co-workers who occasionally brought in, and shared, pictures of their own with him. She testified that her male co-workers traded sexual jokes and engaged in graphic discussions about their sexual liaisons, fantasies and preferences in her presence on a daily basis. Gallagher also testified that some of the employees drank beer in the office in the afternoon on Fridays, that some male co-workers came in to the office on Saturdays (when branch manager Greg Quast was not there) without a shirt on, that one woman planned her entire wedding at the office, and that another planned her baby shower at the office.”

As for the offensive conduct towards the Plaintiff, she testified that she was once called a “bitch” and another time a co-worker said that the company satisfied two quotas when she was hired: the female quota and the “fat” quota. She further alleged that a co-worker “made several derogatory comments about her weight, and [another employee] once referred to [her] as a “heifer” with “milking udders,” and “moo”ed when she walked by his desk. [She] testified that on one Saturday when she was scheduled to work, three male co-workers came into the office following a session at a gym in the building next door. [One] co-worker, who was wearing only a towel and announced that he was “commando” (meaning that he was wearing no underwear) sat on [a nearby] desk, displaying his whole thigh, and talked with the others about anal sex, their enjoyment of it and how [an employee’s] girlfriend objected to it. On the next business day, [the plaintiff] complained to [her supervisor] about this incident and told him she did not want to work on Saturdays anymore.” She also described how a co-worker would repeatedly physically block her from walking down an aisle until she spoke to him.

The Company “has policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment on the basis of gender, and prohibiting the electronic dissemination of sexually explicit materials through e-mail or the Internet. [The plaintiff] received copies of these policies on her first day of work. The sexual harassment policy requires employees to report complaints of sexual harassment to the legal department, the branch resources manager, or the branch manager. It provides names and phone numbers for the legal department and the branch resources manager. Although [she] signed an acknowledgment stating that she read the policy and agreed to comply with its terms, she testified at deposition that she did not recall reading it before signing it, that she did not keep a copy of it and that she could not recall asking anyone for a copy. The sexual harassment and email and Internet policies are also available on the company’s internal website, along with an anonymous third-party toll-free hotline and an anonymous e-mail service for reporting incidents of discrimination or inappropriate behavior.”

The Company also required employees “to sign certificates stating that they have complied with CHR’s policies during the preceding year – and that if they have any questions about those policies, to contact the Compliance Officer before signing the certificate. Although [she] testifies that the sexually offensive conduct occurred from the beginning of her employment, she signed a compliance certificate on November 25, 2002, but never contacted the Compliance Officer regarding offensive conduct. Rather, [the plaintiff] testified that she complained frequently to [her supervisor] about the unprofessional and sexually offensive workplace conduct to little or no avail. Although [her supervisor] had his own office, he seldom used it; and he usually required [her] to voice her complaints to him at his work station. Often, he would simply yell at the offending employee to stop the conduct because it was bothering [her] which, she says, subjected her only to more ridicule. Although [she] was aware of the anonymous 800 tip line, she refused to use it because some coworkers and [her supervisor] referred to the number as “the waw-waw line” and one co-worker told her not to call the line because the last person who did, lost her job.”

After the plaintiff received a job offer from a prior employer, she claims that she decided to resign on January 3, 2003. “This was the day of the National Championship football game between Ohio State University and the Miami Hurricanes. She testified that a female co-worker brought Jello shots into the office that day and that, in the early afternoon, many coworkers stopped working and started drinking. When Gallagher left, she discovered that she had a flat tire, went back into the office and asked for help changing it. Several drunk male co-workers laughed at her and when they left the building, they got into their trucks and “flipped her off” when passing her by.” She later formally submitted her letter of resignation on January 8 and began her new job on January 13, 2003.

The district court held that the plaintiff did not present enough evidence to support her prima facie case of sexual harassment or discrimination under state or federal law. “First, the evidence was deemed insufficient to support a finding that the harassment Gallagher experienced was based on her sex. The court found that most of the offensive language and conduct was “indiscriminate;” i.e., was not directed at plaintiff, and was not shown to have occurred because Gallagher is a woman. Second, the harassing conduct, albeit subjectively offensive to Gallagher, was deemed not to be so objectively severe and pervasive as to have unreasonably interfered with her work performance. Third, the court concluded that [the employer] could not be held liable for offensive conduct engaged in by its employees because Gallagher failed to take advantage of several available avenues for reporting the conduct to upper management, but instead reported it only to her immediate supervisor, who she acknowledged could not handle the situation.” The Court of Appeals reversed.

There were instances in the workplace when Gallagher was repeatedly called a “bitch” by a co-worker in anger, was referred to by another as a “heifer” with “milking udders,” and was taunted by a male co-worker wearing nothing but a towel around his waist when she was the only female in the office. These incidents, in which offensive conduct was directed at Gallagher, reflect sex-discriminatory animus. Yet, the record suggests that much of the other highly offensive conduct was not directed at Gallagher. Among the commonplace offensive occurrences, Gallagher complained of: co-workers’ vulgar descriptions of female customers, associates and even friends as “bitches,” “whores,” “sluts,” “dykes,” and “cunts;” co-workers’ joint ogling and discussions of obscene photographs and pornographic magazines; and co-workers’ explicit conversations about their own sexual practices and strip club exploits. Gallagher could not avoid exposure to these offensive behaviors because they occurred in close proximity to her work station, where she was required to be. Still, the offensive conduct does not appear to have been motivated by Gallagher’s presence or by the fact that she is a woman.”

The District Court relied Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 565 (6th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that the “based on sex” element makes it incumbent on [the plaintiff] to show that the offensive conduct “occurred because she is a woman.” However, that reliance was misplaced because “in Williams, the court was addressing a different question, i.e., whether harassing conduct that is not sexually explicit may nonetheless satisfy the “based on sex” requirement. . . . In other words, even non-sexual harassing conduct may be deemed to be based on sex if the plaintiff is otherwise able to show that, but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of the harassment.”

Here, in contrast, most of the complained of harassment just summarized—both conduct directed at Gallagher and indiscriminate conduct—is explicitly sexual and patently degrading of women. The natural effect of exposure to such offensive conduct is embarrassment, humiliation and degradation, irrespective of the harasser’s motivation—especially and all the more so if the captive recipient of the harassment is a woman. In connection with such evidence, it is hardly necessary for Gallagher to otherwise show that the conduct evinces anti-female animus; it is obvious. Hence, even though members of both sexes were exposed to the offensive conduct in the Cleveland office, considering the nature of the patently degrading and anti-female nature of the harassment, it stands to reason that women would suffer, as a result of the exposure,greater disadvantage in the terms and conditions of their employment than men.

“The district court, in evaluating the “based on sex” element, focused too narrowly on the motivation for the harassers’ offensive conduct rather than on the effects of the conduct on the victim-recipient.” As for the “equal opportunity harasser” defense, “a harasser whose offensive conduct afflicts both men and women is not an “equal opportunity curser” if the conduct is more offensive to women than men.”

The Court also found the trial court to have erred in determining “that the harassment was not shown to be so severe and pervasive as to interfere with Gallagher’s job performance.” The Court reiterated that the standard puts “the focus of the objective/subjective inquiry should remain on (1) whether a reasonable person would find the environment objectively hostile, and (2) whether the plaintiff subjectively found the conduct ‘severe or pervasive.’ Further, . . . this evaluation of the work environment must take into account the totality of the circumstances. “[E]ven where individual instances of sexual harassment do not on their own create a hostile environment, the accumulated effect of such incidents may result in a Title VII violation.” While the trial “court emphasized that most of the offensive conduct was not directed” at the plaintiff, which is not an irrelevant consideration, the “court appears to have ignored the fact that, due to the configuration of the Cleveland workplace, it was practically impossible for [the plaintiff] to avoid her co-workers’ offensive conduct. Whether the offensive conduct was intentionally directed specifically at [her] or not, the fact remains that she had no means of escaping her co-workers’ loud insulting language and degrading conversations; she was unavoidably exposed to it. Her complaints to co-workers and her supervisor were not only ignored, but actually tended to exacerbate the harassment.”

Further, the district court erroneously insisted on a showing that the harassment was both subjectively and objectively severe and pervasive; whereas the Williams standard requires a showing that the environment is objectively hostile and the harassment subjectively severe and pervasive. The district court had no trouble concluding there was a triable issue as to whether the harassment was subjectively severe and pervasive. The next question thus should have been whether a reasonable person could have found the environment objectively hostile. Considering the totality of the circumstances as described in Gallagher’s deposition, the conclusion is inescapable that a reasonable person could have found the Cleveland office—permeated with vulgar language, demeaning conversations and images, and palpable anti-female animus—objectively hostile. The district court reached a contrary conclusion by erroneously limiting its consideration only to some instances of abusive conduct, instead of considering the workplace as a whole.

Moreover, the district court also erred in requiring evidence that [the plaintiff's] work performance suffered measurably as a result of the harassment. The court placed inordinate weight on Gallagher’s testimony that she was able to meet her daily and weekly quotas and that her work performance was rated average to above average. In finding that [the plaintiff] failed to present any evidence that the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work, the court ignored her testimony that, from day one in the Cleveland office, she was “horrified” by the loudness, constant swearing and vulgar language, and that she “left there every day crying.” Considering Gallagher’s description of the offensive conduct to which she was exposed, her reaction can hardly be dismissed as implausible, unreasonable, exaggerated or hypersensitive. Nor is it improbable that the hostility and antagonism she experienced rendered her work more difficult. In Williams, the court made it clear that a plaintiff need not prove a tangible decline in her work productivity; only “that the harassment made it more difficult to do the job.” Based on the instant record, a reasonable jury could certainly find that the complained of harassment made it more difficult for Gallagher to do her job.

The Court also disagreed that the employer could not be held liable for the harassment. “Evaluating [the employer’s] liability for the offensive environment in the Cleveland office thus depends fundamentally on whether [her] hostile work
environment claims are based on co-worker harassment or supervisor harassment. [She] insists the answer is “both,” and the record supports her position.” The Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor “was present during and witnessed much of the conduct, participated in some of it, received reports from [the plaintiff] of incidents he did not witness, and through his inaction during the four-month period, ostensibly condoned it all. In other words, both co-workers and supervisor were clearly complicit in creating and maintaining the hostile work environment. This is significant.”

Notably, the district court’s analysis of employer liability appears to have been based on the implicit assumption that the case involved only supervisor harassment. If this case were strictly about supervisor harassment, the district court’s analysis would arguably be correct. Applying the law summarized above in Petrosino, it is apparent that [the supervisor’s] participation in the harassment did not ripen into any tangible employment action against [the plaintiff], such as firing or demotion.” Moreover, the plaintiff did “not challenge the facial adequacy of [the employer’s] sexual harassment policy, but maintains she reasonably tried to take advantage of it by reporting her complaints to her office manager . . . . She contends the lack of resulting corrective action demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the policy.” Of “the many means and opportunities available to [her], she employed only one. Limiting her reports of harassment to [her supervisor] alone was clearly unreasonable, the district court found, because it had become clear to [her] in her first weeks on the job that [her supervisor] was part of the problem, not the solution.

Indeed, the policy expressly provides alternative avenues for reporting harassment where an employee’s supervisor is involved in the harassment. Yet, despite her knowledge of the alternatives, [the plaintiff] did not report her concerns to any other person in management. As the district court put it, “she chose, instead, to deal with the problem by leaving the company for another, higher-paying job with her previous employer.” The plaintiff’s “decision to leave her employment with [the defendant employer] appears clearly to have been reasonable. However, her failure to take reasonable steps to ensure her employer was actually aware of the harassment and had a chance to correct it before she left undercuts her present effort to impose liability on [the employer] based on supervisory complicity in the harassment.” The Court agreed with this analysis and rejected the plaintiff’s subjective and unwarranted suspicions that she would be retaliated against if she utilized other alternatives of reporting the harassment. “An employee’s subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee’s duty under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environment.”

Nonetheless, even if her claim for supervisory harassment failed, an “employer is vicariously liable for co-worker harassment of which it knew or should have known if it failed to take appropriate remedial action, i.e., if its response manifests indifference or unreasonableness.” In this case, it was undisputed that the plaintiff reported much of the offensive conduct by her co-workers and the supervisor even witnessed and participated in some of it. “The facts substantiate a finding the [supervisor] knew or should have known of the offensive conduct and of [plaintiff’s] objection to it. Yet, in the absence of evidence that this knowledge extended higher up in the chain of management, the question is whether [the supervisor’s] knowledge is properly imputed to [the employer].. As explained above, [his] knowledge alone is insufficient to warrant imposing liability on [the employer] for supervisor harassment, but liability for co-worker harassment is different.”

An employer is deemed to have notice of harassment reported to any supervisor or department head who has been authorized—or is reasonably believed by a
complaining employee to have been authorized—to receive and respond to or forward such complaints to management.

The parties disagreed about the effectiveness and reasonableness of the supervisor’s reaction to the plaintiff’s complaints about her co-workers. “Because a reasonable jury could find that [the employer] knew or should have known of the sexual harassment [she] experienced and yet responded with manifest indifference or unreasonably, the district court’s conclusion that the premises for employer liability are lacking is erroneous.”

Insomniacs can read the full opinion at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0184p-06.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.