Thursday, September 4, 2014
Ohio Supreme Court Questions Genaro and Holds Individual Supervisors Are Entitled to Immunity From Most Discrimination Claims
Thursday, July 25, 2013
Ohio Supreme Court Issues Two Interesting Employment Decisions
Wednesday, July 13, 2011
Ohio Supreme Court: Courtesy Faculty Appointment Does Not Confer Sovereign Immunity
The original malpractice claim was brought in common pleas court against the physician arising out of two allegedly negligent surgeries performed by the physician. The physician held a courtesy clinical faculty appointment at the nearby state medical college and was being observed during the surgeries by a third-year medical student on a one-month rotation. In the malpractice lawsuit, the physician raised the defense of sovereign immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 9.86 because he had been acting as a clinical faculty instructor at the time of the challenged surgeries. While the trial court stayed the common pleas action, the plaintiff then filed a malpractice action in the Court of Claims against the medical college and also sought a declaration of the physician’s immunity. The Court of Claim confirmed the physician’s immunity and this was affirmed by the Franklin County Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed.
Pursuant to O.R.C. § 9.86:
Except for civil actions that arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle and civil actions in which the state is the plaintiff, no officer or employee shall be liable in any civil action that arises under the law of this state for damage or injury caused in the performance of his duties, unless the officer’s or employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.
A court’s analysis is generally focused on whether the defendant is an employee or officer and whether he or she was acting outside the scope of employment, etc. Whether an individual is a state employee is determined by reference to O.R.C. § 109.36, subsection (a) of which provides that a defendant is covered if he is “[a] person who, at the time a cause of action against the person arises, is serving in an elected or appointed office or position with the state or is employed by the state.”
Clearly, the physician was not elected or appointed to an office. However, prior decisions had not examined the employment status of physicians in any detail. The Court declined to announce a specific test for physicians, but stated that it would consider the following factors:
• The contractual relationship between the state and the individual;
• State control over the individual;
• Whether he received any tangible benefits from his courtesy appointment; and
• Whether the individual was paid by the state or affiliated entity.
In this case, the courtesy faculty appointment of the physician was unpaid, and there was no evidence that he had been hired or credentialed by the medical college. The medical college had no control over the private medical practice of the physician. While the courtesy faculty appointment subjected the physician to unspecified rules and policies of the college, he was not permitted to use his academic title in connection with any published research without the explicit and discretionary authority of the college department chair. The physician did not receive any office space or assigned staff or equipment, research projects, clinical privileges or lecturing responsibilities. Therefore, there were insufficient indications of an employment relationship with the state which was necessary to justify immunity.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
Tuesday, May 31, 2011
Double Double Toil and Trouble: When Workplace Violence, Workers’ Compensation, & Immunities Collide
Last week, the Ohio Court of Appeals issued a decision involving the collision of a violent workplace rape, workers compensation, sovereign immunity and waiver. Vacha v. North Ridgeville, 2011-Ohio-2446. According to the decision, the plaintiff employee was violently raped by a coworker at the defendant city's wastewater treatment plant. Because she suffered both physical and psychological injuries, she applied for and was awarded permanent total disability benefits through Ohio workers' compensation system. She later filed suit for civil damages and asserted claims for negligent and reckless hiring and supervision of the rapist, vicarious liability and an employer intentional tort. The City argued in moving for summary judgment that it could not be liable for civil damages to an employee who prevailed on a workers' compensation claim. It also argued that it was protected by sovereign immunity provided to political subdivisions. Finally, it argued that the plaintiff could not show that it had committed an intentional tort (to avoid workers compensation immunity). The Court agreed with most of the City's arguments, but sent the case back to the trial court because political subdivisions were not immune from all employer intentional tort claims and the City had failed to raise one of its arguments before the trial court.
The City's first argument was that the plaintiff's sole remedy was the workers' compensation system. Although purely psychological injuries are not compensable through workers' compensation, the plaintiff suffered both physical and emotional damages from the rape and was awarded total disability benefits. Therefore, the court decisions permitting plaintiffs to pursue negligent/reckless hiring/supervision claims were distinguishable because the plaintiffs in those cases – unlike the plaintiff in this case -- were not eligible to receive workers compensation benefits and, thus, were not subject to the exclusive workers' compensation remedy. As the Court noted,
R.C. 4123.74 provides that employers who are in full compliance with their obligation to pay workers' compensation premiums "shall not be liable to respond in damages" for "any injury *** received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment[.]" The statute is a codification of the principle set forth in Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution that workers' compensation benefits will be an employee's exclusive remedy against her employer for workplace injuries and provides, in part:
"Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to *** damages, for such *** injuries *** and any employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law *** shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such *** injuries[.]"
The Court ultimately concluded that "if an employee's "injury" is compensable within the workers' compensation system, the employer is consequently immune from a civil action by the employee for negligently or recklessly causing the injury."
Conversely, if an employee's "injury" does qualify for workers' compensation coverage, that remedy is exclusive and the employer is immune from civil action liability arising out of an allegation that the employer was negligent or reckless in causing the employee's injury. That is the only reasonable interpretation of the language of R.C. 4123.74 and 4123.01(C) and any other interpretation would be unfair to the employer in the overall balance of competing interests in the workers' compensation system.
Nonetheless, the workers' compensation immunity does not apply to employer intentional torts. The trial court found that there were disputed issues of material fact concerning the intentional tort claim which could not be resolved on summary judgment. On appeal, the City argued that the more stringent employer intentional tort standard of R.C. § 2745.01 should apply to bar the plaintiff's claims. However, the City had not raised that argument before the trial court – probably because the statute's constitutionality was being challenged – and, thus, had impliedly waived that argument.
Finally, the City argued that it was entitled to sovereign immunity under R.C. § 2744.02 because none of the plaintiff's claims arose within any of the exceptions to that statute. In response, the plaintiff correctly pointed out that "R.C. 2744.09(B) explicitly provides that R.C. Chapter 2744 political subdivision tort immunity does not apply to "[c]ivil actions by an employee *** against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision[.]" However, the city contended that employer intentional tort actions are not "civil actions" within the meaning of the immunity statute. The majority of the Court was not impressed and found that an employer intentional tort claim could come within the political subdivision sovereign immunity statute. (However, one judge dissented and concluded that political subdivisions are immune from employer intentional tort claims).
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.