Sixth Circuit Finds Excellent Customer Service Requirements Doom ADA Claim

 

Last month, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on claims for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate when, after several options failed, it transferred the plaintiff delivery driver to an open overnight warehouse non-customer facing position after receiving repeated complaints about the plaintiff’s profane and racists outbursts caused by his disability.  Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC, No.  23-5397 (6^th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024).   The Court noted that the plaintiff stipulated that excellent customer service was an essential job function and that the plaintiff’s own physician indicated that he required an accommodation (i.e., a constant co-worker to handle the customer serving functions on his route).  The Court noted that “the ADA does not require an employer to tolerate an employee’s repeated inadequate job performance for a certain amount of time before it acts.” Further, the plaintiff could not identify any open delivery positions which did not require excellent customer service.   Finally, the Court rejected his constructive discharge claim because the employer tried most of his accommodation requests, including medical leave, a seasonal driver-helper and was not deliberately indifferent.  “Although “a complete failure to accommodate, in the face of repeated requests, might suffice as evidence to show the deliberateness necessary for constructive discharge,” . . . that is not the case here.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff delivery driver would regularly exhibit ticks and utter profane sexist and racist outbursts while delivery cola and setting up displays inside customer stores.  This lead to complaints about him from the customers and their customers and employees.   His job description required that he provide excellent customer service.   The plaintiff was granted several medical leaves to adjust his medication and to attempt different therapies.  He was also provided with a seasonal helper who could handle the customer-facing roles, but there were still complaints.  His physician indicated that he required a helper in order to perform his customer-facing duties.  Although the plaintiff requested to be transferred to other routes without customer facing duties, there were no vacancies in those routes and one had changed from non-customer facing to customer facing.  As a result, he was offered a vacant overnight warehouse position (with a cut in pay) where he would not have to interact and offend customers.   After working there for a few months, he resigned -- indicating that there were no hard feelings -- because he found another delivery driver job with customer-facing duties where the customers were not offended.    He then filed suit alleging that his warehouse transfer was discriminatory, that he could perform his job without a reasonable accommodation, and that he was constructively discharged. 

The Court agreed that excellent customer service was an essential job function.  First, it was noted in his job description.  Second, the plaintiff stipulated that excellent customer service was an essential job function.

A reasonable jury could not find that [the plaintiff] could provide excellent customer service to [the employer’s] customers in his role as a delivery merchandiser without an accommodation. Of particular importance, [his] own doctor noted that [he] needed an accommodation to perform his job duties. When a plaintiff’s own doctor—not merely the defendant employer— concludes that the plaintiff cannot perform his job without an accommodation, the plaintiff likely cannot establish that he is otherwise qualified to perform the job without an accommodation .  . .  [His] disability, moreover, caused him to vocalize racist and profane words in the presence of others in the stores of [the employer’s] customers. At various times during his employment, [its] customers complained about the language he used while delivering [its]  products. In fact, [he] acknowledges many of the customer complaints made against him in his amended complaint.

His need for a reasonable accommodation was further demonstrated by the medical leaves that he took and his request for a helper to handle the customer-facing aspects of his duties.

The Court rejected his argument that his comments were generally indecipherable because enough of them had been understood by complaining customers.  The Court also rejected his argument that his involuntary sexist and racist comments were not frequent enough to justify the transfer, thus creating

 

a factual dispute remains about the number of complaints customers made against him. It is undisputed, however, that [he] offended [the employer’s] customers at least twice with his use of racist and profane language, and the ADA does not require an employer to tolerate an employee’s repeated inadequate job performance for a certain amount of time before it acts. The specific number of complaints made against [him] is also immaterial because [he] contends that his verbal tics using inappropriate language remained consistent throughout his employment.

The Court also rejected his failure to accommodate claim. The plaintiff failed to identify any open delivery routes without customer facing duties.  While he contended that the Dollywood route had been non-customer facing when he previously drove it, he produced no evidence to dispute that the customer’s system had since changed, making it also a customer-facing route.

“Where the requested accommodation is a job transfer, ‘employers have a duty to locate suitable positions for’ employees with disabilities.”  . . . Still, “this duty does not require employers ‘to create new jobs [or] displace existing employees from their positions . . . to accommodate a disabled individual.’”  . . .  Nor does a reasonable accommodation require employers to eliminate or reallocate an essential job function.  . . . A “reasonable accommodation” under the ADA can include “reassignment to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

                         . . . .

However, “[a]n employer may reassign an employee to a lower grade and paid position if the employee cannot be accommodated in the current position and a comparable position is not available.”  . . .. And as we explained above, [he] could not perform the delivery merchandiser position without an accommodation, and he failed to propose an objectively reasonable accommodation. Thus, [the employer’s] accommodation, via transfer to a warehouse position, was reasonable.

Finally, the Court rejected his constructive discharge claim.

To establish a claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the employer deliberately created working conditions that a reasonable person would perceive as intolerable, (2) the employer did so to force the employee to quit, and (3) the employee quit.  . . . . Constructive[1]discharge claims require courts to examine “both the employer’s intent and the employee’s objective feelings.”  . . .  [His] claim fails at the second element—he cannot show that [his employer] deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing him to quit.

Each time [he] requested an accommodation from [his employer], the company provided one. For example, after the incident at the Dollar General store in early 2018, [it] adjusted [his] route so that he would not have to service Dollar General stores. And after Cooper submitted a request to be put on a truck with another driver in August 2018, [it] temporarily allowed him to work as a driver helper. Although “a complete failure to accommodate, in the face of repeated requests, might suffice as evidence to show the deliberateness necessary for constructive discharge,”  . . . that is not the case here.

In fact, [he] admits [it] provided him with the warehouse position as an accommodation. Of course, he preferred a different accommodation. But the evidence demonstrates that [it] offered [him] a vacant position that was as close as [it] could get to his delivery merchandiser job. What is more, [he] admitted that when he resigned, he told his supervisor that he held nothing against [the employer].

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

 

Sixth Circuit Rejects ADA Claim Based on Self-Diagnosis and Belated Request to Transfer to Avoid Supervisor Even Though Employee Later Discovered Brain Tumor

A unanimous Sixth Circuit yesterday affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on claims brought by an employee terminated for repeated poor attendance which she later blamed on persistent depression and a brain tumor that were not discovered or diagnosed until after her termination.   Hrdlicka v. General Motors LLC, No. 22-1328 (6^th Cir. 2/7/23), reissued (6th Cir. 3-23-23).  The Court found that her time off requests were not specific enough to prevail on disability discrimination, failure to accommodate or denial of FMLA claims and the employer was justified in acting based on the information that it had at the time and was apparently not required to inquire further.   Merely mentioning possible depression is insufficient to put an employer on notice of the ADA because depression is not always a disability and the employer reasonably attributed the issues to a personality conflict.  The Court also found that the employer was not required to engage in the interactive process when her unreasonable request to transfer was plausibly based on her dislike of her job, co-worker and supervisor rather than self-diagnosed depression.   It also found her request to transfer was too little too late when it came after her Final Written Warning, after she had been late two more times and two days before she was ultimately fired.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had worked for GM for over 30 years when she was terminated for excessive absenteeism.  She had previously taken a few medical and other leaves of absence, showing that she knew how to request such leaves.   She was transferred to a new department in May 2018, but did not like a co-worker, her new supervisor or the work environment.   She requested by August to be returned to her former department, but her position had been eliminated, she was not qualified for any other positions and someone would have to backfill her current position.   Within a year, she began frequently missing, and being hours late for, work.  She gave a variety of reasons for her attendance, when she explained it at all, including child care issues, traffic, not feeling well, headache, bad cough, family situations, being tired, etc.  The only time she mentioned going to see a doctor was a fabrication.  Her attendance was criticized in her June 2019 performance evaluation and, finally, she was given a final written warning on August 14, 2019 after she had missed the summer intern presentations over which she had primary responsibility.  She was encouraged to utilize a medical leave of absence or seek a reasonable accommodation if necessary and provided with information to contact the EAP.  She was late the next two days and then on August 19 requested against to transfer back to her former department.  To support this request, she mentioned that she was unhappy with her work environment and supervisor and it was disputed whether she also mentioned that she had been suffering from [self-diagnosed] depression.  She was late again the next day and her employment was terminated.    

She immediately appealed her termination and claimed that she had informed HR before her termination that she suffered from depression caused by her supervisor.   In October, she was diagnosed with persistent depressive disorder.  A brain tumor was discovered in November and removed.  The employer was so informed.   Her appeal – which was limited to facts which existed at the time the August termination decision was made – was denied because there was no evidence submitted prior to her termination to substantiate her depression.  She then filed suit, alleging violations of the ADA, FMLA, state law, ERISA,  and Title VII.  The employer was granted summary judgment on all claims and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 

The Court agreed that she could not prevail on a disability discrimination or failure to accommodate claim based on an impairment which was not even diagnosed until after her termination, particularly when she never sought medical help until after she had been fired.  The Court was not influenced by her self-diagnoses:

Although an employee is not required to use the word “disabled” to put his or her employer on notice, the employer still must “know enough information about the employee’s condition to conclude that he is disabled. Relevant information could include, among other things, a diagnosis, a treatment plan, apparent severe symptoms, and physician-imposed work restrictions.”  . . . “The employer is not required to speculate as to the extent of the employee’s disability or the employee’s need or desire for an accommodation.”

[Plaintiff’s] text messages required [her supervisor] to speculate as to the existence of a disability. Many of the text messages reference only generalized ailments, such as [her] “head . . . really hurting,” having a “fever and other symptoms,” or simply being “sick.” Such symptoms are consistent with many short-term, nondisabling ailments, including a common cold. Other text messages make even more general references to “having a tough time” or dealing with “a mental thing.” Although these messages might have given [the supervisor] a general awareness of a health issue, that is not enough. . . . .. At bottom, these text messages were not sufficient to apprise [the supervisor] of a disability, especially when [the plaintiff] herself was unaware of any disability.

The closer question is whether [the plaintiff] put General Motors on notice of a disability when she met with [HR] shortly before she was terminated. In that meeting, [she] told them that she had felt depressed since transitioning to the Design Academy. In explaining her tardiness, however, [she] stated that “it was all related to [her] current work environment created by [her supervisor,] . . . includ[ing] a lack of leadership, direction, a lack of trust within the group, favoritism,” etc. . . .

In sum, [the plaintiff] made only a single, unsubstantiated statement that she was depressed without any corroborating medical evidence and without ever having sought medical help, and she consistently presented the issue as a workplace conflict, not a disability. Although a diagnosis is not necessary for an ADA claim to succeed,  . . .  [she] failed to present any of the “[r]elevant information” that this court has found pertinent to determining if an employer was placed on notice of a disability. . . .

The mention of depression alone is insufficient to constitute a “severe symptom” for two reasons. First, depression does not always render an employee “disabled.” . . . Second, [she] consistently and specifically attributed both her attendance issues and depression to a dislike of [her supervisor] and the work environment, leaving General Motors to “speculate” as to the existence of a disability as opposed to [her] concern about her interpersonal work conflict.

The Court also concluded that even if she suffered from a disability, the employer had a legitimate reason to terminate her for her repeated poor attendance and prior warnings: “The chronic tardiness and repeated absences, coupled with [her] immediate failure to abide by her Attendance Letter, were clearly legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to terminate her.”

The Court also rejected her failure to accommodate claim based on her request to transfer back to her former department days after her Final Written Warning and two days before she was terminated (after she had again been late to work without a valid medical excuse).   She had never linked this request with any purported disability.  Unlike the Sixth Circuit panel just days earlier, it found her request to transfer to avoid her supervisor was unreasonable:

Based on the facts in the record, however, this request was not “reasonable.” A transfer request is not reasonable if it was made to avoid working with certain people. . . . . A court is not in a position to “act as a super-bureau of Human Resources” and determine who should work with whom.

[She] herself conceded during her deposition that, when meeting with [HR], she “complained about [her co-worker] and [her supervisor’s] lack of leadership at this meeting” and that her tardiness was “related to [her] current work environment created by [her supervisor].” In other words, she attributed her attendance issues to the work environment and to her supervisor. She explicitly noted that her depression began once she was transferred to the Design Academy, and that this “precipitated her request for a transfer back to Sculpting.”

These facts compel the conclusion that her transfer request was specifically linked to her distaste for her current work environment. Basically, it was a desire to “force [the defendant] to transfer [her] so that [she] will not be required to work with certain people.” . . .

Even assuming that [she] adequately attributed her request to a disability and not just to a desire to escape the Design Academy, her request was untimely. “When an employee requests an accommodation for the first time only after it becomes clear that an adverse employment action is imminent, such a request can be ‘too little, too late.’” . . .

Similarly, [her] request came after a long history of attendance issues and a warning that her “job was in jeopardy” if she did not improve. After [she] arrived late for three successive days immediately following the issuance of her Attendance Letter, she was terminated. Her last-minute request for a transfer back to the Sculpting Department was not reasonable under the circumstances.

The Court also rejected her argument that her employer failed to engage in the interactive process:

General Motors did not violate a duty to engage in an interactive process because the duty is an independent violation of the ADA only “if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing that he proposed a reasonable accommodation.” Id. at 1041. As discussed above, [she] did not request a reasonable accommodation and, therefore, General Motors did not fail to engage in an interactive process.

The Court also rejected her FMLA claim on the ground that she failed to provide sufficient notice of the need for such leave.  Her “general references to her head “really hurting,” feeling “sick,” or having a “fever and other symptoms” are simply generalized descriptions of ailments that do not rise to the level of “serious health conditions” within the meaning of the FMLA.”

The better argument is when [she] more explicitly referenced having “depression” in her meeting with [HR] shortly before she was terminated. But this conversation was not accompanied by any request for FMLA leave despite the fact that [she] was familiar with the process because she herself had already taken FMLA and maternity leave when she had had her two children. Moreover, the possibility of taking FMLA leave was directly stated in her Attendance Letter, which was both read and emailed to [her].

                 . . .

             . . . In sum, [she] made only a single statement that she was depressed, which was not made in the context of requesting time off, but as a justification for her desire to transfer back to the sculpting Department (and to continue working, not stop working as FMLA leave would entail).

The remaining claims were denied based on the employer’s legitimate and non-discriminatory reason to terminate her on account of her poor attendance, after several warnings, based on the information that the employer had at the time of the decision. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Blames Employee for Failure of Interactive Process When Employer Could Reasonably Infer Request to Change Supervision

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit issued an interesting decision affirming the employer’s summary judgment on an ADA claim involving PTSD.  Tomlinson v. Krauss -Maffei Corp., No. 21-6245 (6^th Cir. 2/6/23).  The Court unanimously agreed that the plaintiff had not engaged in good faith in the interactive process by resigning after repeatedly failing to respond to emails about his allegedly discriminatory performance evaluation and, thus, could not establish a failure to accommodate, constructive discharge or retaliation.  They disagreed, however, with whether the plaintiff had requested, and whether it was reasonable to request, a change in supervision, with the majority finding that such a request was made and could be found to be reasonable.    The majority opinion goes so far as to find that the employer should have realized from the employee’s unhappiness with his performance evaluation that he was requesting a change in supervision even if he never used those words.  Of course, the extended discussion becomes dicta – and not legal binding -- when it was unnecessary to the Court’s judgment affirming dismissal of all of the employee’s claims on the grounds that “the evidence shows that [the employer] was persistent in trying to reach a resolution with [the employee] but he terminated the interactive process through his resignation.” 

According to the majority opinion,  the plaintiff informed Human Resources almost a year after he was hired that he had PTSD and wanted to never be scheduled again with a particular co-worker who he alleged was harassing him.  HR and his supervisor (with whom he only spoke approximately twice a year) granted his request.   However, the following year, he received a negative performance evaluation from his supervisor based on customer and co-worker complaints.   When the supervisor refused to change the evaluation following a conversation, the plaintiff reported to HR that he found the supervisor’s tone to be threatening and aggressive.  No threats were made to the plaintiff’s employment.   The plaintiff then complained to the General  Counsel, but did not respond to two of her emails. The plaintiff then took FMLA and STD and complained to the employer’s president about the evaluation.  It took weeks to for him to respond to HR’s inquiries.  He explained that he was having difficulty communicating because of his PTSD. 

The Company’s General Counsel investigated his concerns, but refused to modify his performance evaluation.  However, he was encouraged to return to work and asked how they could be more sensitive to his PTSD.  It also kept him apprised during the investigation, which considered transferring him, but no similar positions were available.   The company also refused on August 20 to have him report to the coordinator because she was not a manager/supervisor.   Nonetheless, although it allegedly informed the plaintiff that it was considering changing the performance evaluation process, it did not tell him the changes that it ultimately decided to make (after he had resigned on August 24) so that the coordinators would draft the performance evaluations for review by the supervisor.    The investigation concluded that the supervisor had been spread too thin and made lots of mistakes to seven of the performance evaluations that he completed that year.   The employee brought suit almost a year later, which was dismissed on summary judgment on the grounds that the request for a new supervisor was unreasonable and he had failed to engage in good faith in the interactive process.

In evaluating an employee’s burden of proving the denial of a reasonable accommodation, “[e]ncompassed in the reasonableness prong of the above framework is a requirement that both parties communicate in good faith to reach an agreement on a reasonable accommodation.”  In other words, one cannot show that a request is reasonable without also showing mandatory participation in the interactive process.  The majority opinion observed that “[w]hile it may be true that such a request [for a new supervisor] is generally unreasonable, our precedent informs that presumptions regarding the reasonableness of an accommodation “eviscerate[] the individualized attention that the Supreme Court has deemed ‘essential’ in each disability claim.”

A fresh look at the record evinces that a reasonable juror could conclude that [the employee’s] request was reasonable. After all, the [General Counsel] testified that the reason [the company] denied the request was because it did not “seem” like an option that would fit within the company’s structure. Critically, however, [the HR Director] testified that, during [the General Counsel’s] investigation of [the employee’s] complaints regarding [the manager’s] delivery of his performance review, [the company’s] leadership actually discussed revamping the evaluation process in a way that would have satisfied [his] request. Indeed, [the company] planned to explore the idea of having the service coordinators (Bouza’s position) conduct the performance reviews for FSEs ([his] position), instead of service managers (Wiley’s position). All things considered, a reasonable jury could discern that that [he] requested even before [the General Counsel] denied his request, but [the company] further made and implemented that change the following year.

The concurring judge, however, disagreed.  Among other things, the plaintiff had apparently admitted that he could continue to work with his supervisor because they only spoke about twice each year.   She denied that the record reflected him ever making a request to report instead to the coordinator and the investigation report never mentions such a request. “[A] change in supervision is not generally considered a reasonable request but must be individually considered in each case.”  Nonetheless, because the coordinator is not a supervisor or manager and was not being considered for a promotion, “[a] company does not have to change its reporting structure to accommodate an employee’s disability.”

Not letting the point go, the majority opinion then made clear that the employee need not specifically request a change in supervision if it should have been clear from the circumstances that this would have resolved the issue:

To begin, our precedent does not require employees to recite any particular buzz words for us to find that an accommodation was requested. . . . . The record supports that [the employee] made clear that he wished to be accommodated based on his disability even before he made the specific request for a change in supervision. Starting with his first call to [HR] after receiving his written performance review, until the moment that he resigned, [he] made clear that he had an issue with [his supervisor] and wanted [the company] to take some sort of action. For instance, in his first communication to the company’s general counsel, Beene-Skuban, [he] indicated that [his supervisor] made threatening and harassing comments which [he] felt were an attack on his PTSD. He later followed up with the president of the company stating that the only request he had made thus far was to not “deal with bullying or harassment.” Though he did not state specifically that he wanted to report to [the coordinator] instead of [his supervisor], [the company] should have reasonably inferred that he had an issue working with [the supervisor] such that it was appropriate to initiate an interactive process to reach a resolution, which is exactly what it did. [The Company] repeatedly attempted to initiate a discussion with [the employee] to hear more about his concerns and [the General Counsel] explicitly stated in one of the emails that she wanted to be “sensitive to” [his] PTSD.

In any event, a unanimous court agreed that the plaintiff’s failure to participate meaningfully in the discussions surrounding his allegations about the discriminatory performance evaluation and then resigning despite the company’s efforts to work with him to reach a satisfactory solution prevented him from prevailing on any discrimination or constructive discharge claim.

The ADA does not oblige “employers to make on-the-spot accommodations of the employee’s choosing.” . . . Rather, the regulations acknowledge that determining the appropriate accommodation may require the employer “to initiate an informal, interactive process.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. This process functions to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” Id. And “[e]ven though the interactive process is not described in the statute’s text, [it] is mandatory, and both parties have a duty to participate in good faith.” . . . . . Causing unnecessary delays, obstructing the process, and/or failing to adequately communicate or provide information during the process may evidence a party’s bad faith. . . . Where a party fails to participate in good faith, “courts should attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown and then assign responsibility.”

In this case, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that his PTSD prevented him from meaningful participation in the interactive process through either email or telephone calls as repeatedly offered by the employer over several months:

But after [he] took medical leave, he became largely unresponsive, demanding that [the company] give him advanced notice before contacting him, yet neglecting to provide the company his availability. In this vein, [his] argument that he could not participate in the process on account of his PTSD is unpersuasive.

Despite his repeated failure to communicate, the employer explored several possibilities internally, showing that it was attempting in good faith to resolve his concerns.   Thus, the failure of the interactive process was his fault, not the employer’s:

a reasonable juror cannot conclude that he engaged in the mandatory interactive process in good faith. [He] argues that [the company] “completely sidestep[ped]” the process by failing to explore alternatives to his request. The record tells a different story. [He] terminated the interactive process by resigning when [the company] rejected his specific accommodation, even after the company made clear from the start of [his discrimination] complaint that it wanted to work with him to identify a reasonable accommodation. And after [the company] rejected [his] request [for a new supervisor], [it] advised him in writing that it intended to have a “face-to-face meeting” upon his return to further discuss next steps.

                . . . .

            it appears that [the employee] argues that he requested a pre-return phone call as an accommodation to support his failure-to-accommodate claim. This claim fails as well. [The Company] attempted several times throughout the course of [his] medical leave to schedule a call and ultimately offered to set up an in-person meeting upon his return from medical leave. Assuming [he] made this request, he is not entitled to cherry-pick the accommodation of his liking among reasonable alternatives.

The Court also rejected his retaliation claim on the basis that he could not identify an adverse employment action:  his discrimination and failure to accommodate claims had already been rejected.   The Court rejected his argument that he was constructively discharged, which could be an adverse employment action. 

“the employer must have created an objectively intolerable work environment to deliberately force a disabled employee to resign.” Id. Employees who leave “in apprehension that conditions may deteriorate later” will not prevail. . . . That is, if other forms of relief are available to employees, they are expected to try to resolve the issue instead of resigning.

For instance, in Goening , we held that the plaintiff could not use her employer’s criticism of her decision to take protected leave to establish that her work conditions were intolerable. . . . .  We reasoned in part that “this circuit has repeatedly held that an employer’s criticism of an employee does not amount to constructive discharge—especially when the employer’s criticism is limited to a few isolated incidents.” Id. We reached the same conclusion in Savage v. Gee , where the record showed that the faculty members of a university were critical of the plaintiff librarian’s book suggestions, were uncomfortable with his research skills and publicly challenged his professionalism. . . . We reached this conclusion again in Arndt, where we acknowledged that the plaintiff may have felt that the employer badgered and disrespected him about his PTSD, but the employer considered both of his requests for accommodation and placed him on medical leave while the second request was being considered.

In this case, the Court refused “to conclude that an employee can establish constructive discharge by proving that his manager made careless mistakes or included inaccurate information on one of his performance reviews.”  That his supervisor made some mistakes on his and seven other employee performance evaluations is not sufficient to justify a resignation.

 . . . A plaintiff’s testimony that an employer used a threatening tone, without more, is not enough under the circumstances of this case. See Brister v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 705 F. App’x 356, 360 (6th Cir. 2017) (evidence of “humiliation and criticism,” and evidence that the plaintiff was called “stupid” and told that she should “seek psychological help,” was not enough absent evidence that the harassment “manifested in a demotion, reduction in salary, or reduction in job responsibilities”); Goening , 884 F.3d at 631 (holding the plaintiff could not use her employer’s criticism of her decision to take protected leave to establish that her work conditions were intolerable). Even assuming [the supervisor] did use a threatening tone during the review, [he] testified that he only interacted with [the employee] about twice a year and [the employee] corroborated this testimony in his briefing. See id. (“[T]his circuit has repeatedly held that an employer’s criticism of an employee does not amount to constructive discharge—especially when the employer’s criticism is limited to a few isolated incidents.”). Further, [the plaintiff employee] was on medical leave at the time he resigned, lessening his chance of encountering [his supervisor] at the time of his resignation even more. And the record supports that [the company] offered to set up a meeting with [him] upon his return to ensure that [he] felt heard, evidencing [its[ efforts to make the working conditions tolerable for everyone.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Rejects Attempt to Expand ADA Interference Clause and §1985 Conspiracy Claim to Non-Employer

On Friday, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in an ADA and §1985 conspiracy action brought against a hospital by a former nurse of a group physician practice which had employed her.   Post v. Trinity Health-Michigan, No. 21-2844 (6^th Cir. 8/12/22).  After her employer terminated her (claiming budgetary reasons) and filed for bankruptcy, the nurse filed suit against the hospital where her had performed her duties alleging that she had been terminated on account of her disability and that the hospital had interfered with her ADA rights and conspired with her employer to terminate her in violation of the ADA.   The Courts found that the ADA – including the interference clause – only applied to employers, which the Hospital was not.  Further, it similarly concluded that §1985 only applied to constitutional causes of action and certain protected classes and could not overlap with statutory causes of action under the ADA. “[A] plaintiff can assert a claim of interference with employment-related rights under § 12203(b) only against an employer (or the few other entities listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e[1]5(b)).”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff nurse had been employed by the defendant hospital for a number of years.  However, the hospital outsourced her department to a physician group practice, terminated her employment and she continued to work in the same rooms, but for the group practice instead of the hospital.  At some point, she suffered a concussion while at work, received workers compensation and attempted to recover enough to return to work.  However, she lost her hospital privileges while she was off work and neither her employer, nor the hospital would permit her to practice her craft in a simulation room prior to returning to work as suggested by her treating physician.   Her employer also would not certify her ability to return to work under the circumstances as necessary to regain her hospital privileges.  Ultimately, she was terminated by the practice for budgetary reasons and the practice filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter.  Unable to sue her employer, she brought suit against the Hospital for interfering with her ADA rights and for conspiring to deprive her of rights under the ADA.   Oddly enough, she never alleged that the hospital was a joint employer with the group practice.

The ADA’s interference clause does not explicitly apply to employers:

It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b).

It also applies to other ADA sections governing the government and public accommodations.  Could this, for example, apply to people who illegally park in spaces reserved for the handicapped? However, the Court found the structure of the ADA  and the remedial section’s incorporation by reference to Title VII (which only applies to employers) clarified that the interference clause only applied to employers (and others not at issue in this litigation).   

            Both the plain text of the ADA and our precedent on a related question rebut [the plaintiff’s] boundless reading. These sources instead demonstrate that, in this employment setting, the interference provision authorizes suits only against employers (and a few other entities that are irrelevant in this case).

                . . . .

To summarize things in reverse: Title VII permits suit only against employers (and a few other irrelevant entities). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1). The ADA’s employment subchapter adopts Title VII’s remedial framework. Id. § 12117(a). And the ADA’s interference provision, in turn, adopts the employment subchapter’s remedial framework when a suit raises an employment complaint. Id. § 12203(c). The statutory chain of cross-references thus leaves no doubt that the interference provision in § 12203(b) likewise permits suit only against employers.

The Court also analogized the interference section to the retaliation section, which applies to “persons,” which the Court had earlier held only applied to employers.  While the Court indicated that it might have been willing to entertain a joint-employer theory, she never alleged such a theory and thus, waived that argument.

Section 1985 is a reconstruction era statute signed by President Grant to fight the KKK.   One of its long clauses, contains a 255-word sentence creating a damages action against those who, as relevant here, “conspire” “for the purpose of depriving” “any person or class of persons” of “the equal protection of the laws” or “equal privileges and immunities under the laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).”

This claim fails because [the plaintiff] has not shown that any conspiracy deprived her of the “equal protection of the laws” or the “equal privileges and immunities under the laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To avoid turning § 1985(3) into a generic tort law covering any injury inflicted by two parties, the Supreme Court has interpreted these two phrases to require “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” . . . But our court has substantially limited any non-race-based theory. We have held that § 1985(3) reaches only conspiracies targeting a person based on a classification (like racial discrimination) that would receive heightened scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s equal-protection framework. See . . . . Unfortunately for [the plaintiff], this holding means that § 1985(3) does not “cover” conspiracies grounded in “disability-based discrimination” because that type of discrimination is subject to deferential rational-basis review.

The Court refused to consider differing precedent in other Circuits without a superior decision from the en banc court or the Supreme Court.  In any event, §1985 typically requires some action by the state (i.e., government) to have a cause of action, but the nurse had only sued a private hospital.   In addition, the Supreme Court had previously “cautioned against allowing a plaintiff to use § 1985(3) to enforce a right” that was governed and precluded by Title VII “when the remedial limits in that statute would bar the plaintiff from suing directly under it.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Just When You Thought It Was Safe To Get Back in the Water, EEOC Revises COVID/ADA Guidance

 Yesterday, the EEOC posted updated COVID guidance concerning employment issues involving the pandemic and the Americans With Disabilities Act.  The updated guidance – which is substantial and affects a wide number of issues -- is posted below.  In its announcement, the EEOC update only mentioned one of the changes, involving whether an employer can always require COVID testing at work:

 EEOC’s assessment at the outset of the pandemic was that the ADA standard for conducting medical examinations was, at that time, always met for employers to conduct worksite COVID-19 viral screening testing. With the revision of A.6, below, on July 12, 2022, EEOC makes clear that going forward employers will need to assess whether current pandemic circumstances and individual workplace circumstances justify viral screening testing of employees to prevent workplace transmission of COVID-19. A.6. offers employers possible factors to consider in making this assessment, including community transmission levels and types of contacts between employees and others in the workplace. This change is not meant to suggest that such testing is or is not warranted; rather, the revised Q&A acknowledges that evolving pandemic circumstances will require an individualized assessment by employers to determine whether such testing is warranted consistent with the requirements of the ADA.

These are the updated Q&As from the EEOC:

A.5. When an employee returns to the workplace after being out with COVID-19, does the ADA allow employers to require a note from a qualified medical professional explaining that it is safe for the employee to return (i.e., no risk of transmission) and that the employee is able to perform the job duties? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. Alternatively, employers may follow CDC guidance to determine whether it is safe to allow an employee to return to the workplace without confirmation from a medical professional.

When an employee returns to the workplace after being out with COVID-19, the ADA allows an employer to require confirmation from a qualified medical professional explaining that the individual is able to safely return. Such a request is permitted under the ADA. First, because COVID-19 is not always a disability, a request for confirmation may not be a disability-related inquiry. Alternatively, if the request is considered a disability-related inquiry, it would be justified under the ADA standard requiring that such employee inquiries be job-related and consistent with business necessity. Here, the request meets the “business necessity” standard because it is related to the possibility of transmission and/or related to an employer’s objective concern about the employee’s ability to resume working. For example, an employer may require confirmation from a medical professional addressing whether an employee may resume specific job duties requiring physical exertion.

As a practical matter, employers may wish to consider other ways to determine the safety of allowing an employee to return to work if doctors and other healthcare professionals are unable to provide such documentation either in a timely manner or at all. This might include reliance on local clinics to provide a form, a stamp, or an e-mail to confirm that an individual is no longer infectious and is able to resume working.

A.6. Under the ADA, may an employer, as a mandatory screening measure, administer a COVID-19 viral test (a test to detect the presence of the COVID-19 virus) when evaluating an employee’s initial or continued presence in the workplace? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes, if the employer can show it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.

A COVID-19 viral test is a medical examination within the meaning of the ADA. Therefore, if an employer implements screening protocols that include COVID-19 viral testing, the ADA requires that any mandatory medical test of employees be “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Employer use of a COVID-19 viral test to screen employees who are or will be in the workplace will meet the “business necessity” standard when it is consistent with guidance from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and/or state/local public health authorities that is current at the time of testing. Be aware that CDC and other public health authorities periodically update and revise their recommendations about COVID-19 testing, and FDA may revise its guidance or emergency use authorizations, based on new information and changing conditions.

A positive viral test result means that the test detected SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, at the time of testing, and that the individual most likely has a current infection and may be able to transmit the virus to others. A negative test result means the test did not detect SARS-CoV-2 at the time of testing. However, a negative test does not mean the employee does not have any virus, or will not later get the virus. It means only that the virus causing SARS-CoV-2 was not detected by the test.

If an employer seeks to implement screening testing for employees such testing must meet the “business necessity” standard based on relevant facts. Possible considerations in making the “business necessity” assessment may include the level of community transmission, the vaccination status of employees, the accuracy and speed of processing for different types of COVID-19 viral tests, the degree to which breakthrough infections are possible for employees who are “up to date” on vaccinations, the ease of transmissibility of the current variant(s), the possible severity of illness from the current variant, what types of contacts employees may have with others in the workplace or elsewhere that they are required to work (e.g., working with medically vulnerable individuals), and the potential impact on operations if an employee enters the workplace with COVID-19. In making these assessments, employers should check the latest CDC guidance (and any other relevant sources) to determine whether screening testing is appropriate for these employees.

Note: Question A.6. and A.8. address screening of employees generally. See Question A.9. regarding decisions to test only individual employees.

A.7. Under the ADA, may an employer require antibody testing before permitting employees to re-enter the workplace? (Updated 7/12/22)

No. An antibody test, as a medical examination under the ADA, must be job-related and consistent with business necessity. As of July 2022, CDC guidance explains that antibody testing may not show whether an employee has a current infection, nor establish that an employee is immune to infection; as a result, it should not be used to determine whether an employee may enter the workplace. Based on this CDC guidance, at this time such testing does not meet the ADA’s “business necessity” standard for medical examinations or inquiries for employees. Therefore, requiring antibody testing before allowing employees to re-enter the workplace is not allowed under the ADA. An antibody test is different from a test to determine if someone has evidence of infection with SARS-CoV-2 or has COVID-19 (i.e., a viral test). The EEOC addresses COVID-19 viral screening tests in A.6.

C.1. If an employer is hiring, may it screen applicants for symptoms of COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. An employer may screen job applicants for symptoms of COVID-19 after making a conditional job offer, as long as it does so for all entering employees in the same type of job. This ADA rule applies whether or not the applicant has a disability.

In addition, if an employer screens everyone (i.e., applicants, employees, contractors, visitors) for COVID-19 before permitting entry to the worksite, then an applicant in the pre-offer stage who needs to be in the workplace as part of the application process (e.g., for a job interview) may likewise be screened for COVID-19. The screening is limited to the same screening that everyone else undergoes; an employer that goes beyond that screening will have engaged in an illegal pre-offer disability-related inquiry and/or medical examination. For information on the ADA rules governing such inquiries and examination, see Section A.

C.4. May an employer withdraw a job offer when it needs an applicant to start working immediately, whether at the worksite or in the physical presence of others outside of the worksite, because the individual has tested positive for the virus that causes COVID-19, has symptoms of COVID-19, or has been exposed recently to someone with COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

An employer should consult and follow current CDC guidance that explains when and how it would be safe for an individual who currently has COVID-19, symptoms of COVID-19, or has been exposed recently to someone with COVID-19, to end isolation or quarantine and thus safely enter a workplace or otherwise work in the physical presence of others. An employer who follows current CDC guidance addressing the individual’s situation may withdraw the job offer if (1) the job requires an immediate start date, (2) CDC guidance recommends the person not be in proximity to others, and (3) the job requires such proximity to others, whether at the workplace or elsewhere. Given that for some individuals there may only be a short period of time required for isolation or quarantine, employers may be able to adjust a start date or permit telework (if job duties can be performed remotely).

C.5. May an employer postpone the start date or withdraw a job offer because of the employer’s concern that the individual is older, pregnant, or has an underlying medical condition that puts the individual at increased risk from COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

No. An employer’s concern for an applicant’s well-being -- an intent to protect them from what it perceives as a risk of illness from COVID-19 -- does not excuse an action that is otherwise unlawful discrimination. The fact that CDC has noted that older adults, people with certain medical conditions, or pregnant and recently pregnant people may be at greater risk of severe illness from COVID-19 does not justify unilaterally postponing the start date or withdrawing a job offer. Therefore, an employer may not discriminate based on age (40 or older) or pregnancy and related conditions. If an underlying medical condition is a disability, an employer must determine whether the individual’s disability poses a “direct threat” by starting work immediately and, if so, whether reasonable accommodation can be provided to sufficiently lessen or eliminate any risks without causing an undue hardship. For more information on assessing direct threat and reasonable accommodation in this situation, see G.4. and G.5. For more information on potential issues regarding discrimination based on age or pregnancy, see Sections H and J.

D.17. Might the pandemic result in excusable delays during the interactive process? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. Some of the issues initially created by the pandemic that delayed engaging in an interactive process and/or providing reasonable accommodation may no longer exist. But, as the pandemic continues to evolve and new issues arise, it is possible that an employer may face new challenges that interfere with responding expeditiously to a request for accommodation. Similarly, reopening a workplace may bring a higher number of requests for reasonable accommodation. In all these situations, an employer must show specific pandemic-related circumstances justified the delay in providing a reasonable accommodation to which the employee was legally entitled. To the extent that evolving circumstances created by the pandemic cause a justifiable delay in the interactive process–thereby delaying a decision on a request–employers and employees are encouraged to use interim solutions to enable employees to keep working as much as possible.

D.18. Federal agencies are required to have timelines in their written reasonable accommodation procedures governing how quickly they will process requests and provide reasonable accommodations. What happens if circumstances created by the pandemic prevent an agency from meeting this timeline? (Updated 7/12/22)

Situations created by the current COVID-19 pandemic may constitute an “extenuating circumstance”—something beyond a federal agency’s control—that may justify exceeding the normal timeline that an agency has adopted in its internal reasonable accommodation procedures.

Some of the issues initially created by the pandemic that delayed engaging in an interactive process and/or providing reasonable accommodation may no longer exist. But, as the pandemic continues to evolve and new issues arise, it is possible that an agency may face new challenges that interfere with responding to a request for accommodation within an agency’s timeline. Similarly, reopening a workplace may bring a higher number of requests for reasonable accommodation. In all these situations, an agency must show specific pandemic-related circumstances that constitute an “extenuating circumstance.” To the extent that there is an extenuating circumstance, agencies and employees are encouraged to use interim solutions to enable employees to keep working as much as possible.

G.1. As government restrictions are lifted or modified , how will employers know what steps they can take consistent with the ADA to screen employees for the virus that causes COVID-19 when entering the workplace? (Updated 7/12/22)

The ADA permits employers to make disability-related inquiries and conduct medical exams to screen employees for COVID-19 when entering the workplace if such screening is “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” For more information on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations, see Section A. For information on reasonable accommodation requests related to screening protocols, see G.7.

Employers should make sure not to engage in unlawful disparate treatment based on protected characteristics in decisions related to screening and exclusion.

G.2. An employer requires workers to wear personal protective equipment and engage in other infection control practices. Some employees ask for accommodations due to a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance that affects the ability to wear personal protective equipment and/or engage in other infection control practices. How should an employer respond? (Updated 7/12/22)

In most instances, federal EEO laws permit an employer to require employees to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) (for example, masks and/or gloves) and observe other infection control practices (for example, regular hand washing or physical distancing protocols). Some employers may need to comply with regulations issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that require the use of PPE. OSHA regulations do not prohibit the use of reasonable accommodations under the EEO laws as long as those accommodations do not violate OSHA requirements. Employers also may follow current CDC guidance about who should wear masks.

Regardless of the reason an employer requires PPE (or other infection control measures), when an employee with a disability needs a reasonable accommodation under the ADA to comply with an employer’s requirement to wear PPE (e.g., non-latex gloves, modified face masks for interpreters or others who communicate with an employee who uses lip reading, or gowns designed for individuals who use wheelchairs), or when an employee requires a religious accommodation under Title VII (such as modified or alternative equipment due to religious attire or grooming practices), the employer should discuss the request and provide accommodation (either what is requested by the employee or an alternative that is effective in meeting the employee’s needs) if it does not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business under the ADA or Title VII. For general information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see Section D.

G.3. What does an employee need to do in order to request reasonable accommodation from an employer because the employee has one of the medical conditions that CDC says may put a person at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

An employee—or a third party, such as an employee’s doctor—must let the employer know that the employee needs a change for a reason related to a medical condition . Individuals may request accommodation orally or in writing. While the employee (or third party) does not need to use the term “reasonable accommodation” or reference the ADA, the employee may do so.

The employee or the employee’s representative should communicate that the employee has a medical condition necessitating a change to meet a medical need. After receiving a request, the employer may ask questions or seek medical documentation to help decide if the individual has a disability—not all medical conditions meet the ADA’s definition of “disability”—and if there is a reasonable accommodation, barring undue hardship, that can be provided. For additional information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see Section D. For information on pregnancy-related disabilities covered under the ADA, see J.2. For general information on reasonable accommodation requests related to a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, see K.12.

G.4. CDC identifies a number of medical conditions that are more likely to cause people to get severely ill if they get COVID-19. An employer knows that an employee has one of these conditions and is concerned that the employee’s health will be jeopardized upon returning to the workplace, but the employee has not requested accommodation. How does the ADA apply to this situation? (Updated 7/12/22)

The ADA does not mandate that the employer take action in this situation if the employee has not requested reasonable accommodation. Also, an employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodation applies only if an employee has an actual disability or a record of a disability, as defined in the ADA; this means not every individual with one of the medical conditions that might place them at higher risk of COVID-19 complications will automatically satisfy these ADA definitions of disability.

Assuming the employee has a “disability” as discussed above, if the employer is concerned that the health of an employee with a disability may be jeopardized upon returning to the workplace, the ADA generally does not allow the employer to exclude the employee—or take any other adverse action—because the employee has a disability that CDC identifies as potentially placing the employee at higher risk for severe illness if the employee gets COVID-19. Under the ADA, such an adverse action is not allowed unless the employee’s disability poses a “direct threat” to the employee’s health or safety that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

The ADA direct threat requirement is a high standard. As an affirmative defense for the employer, direct threat requires an employer to show that the individual has a disability that poses a “significant risk of substantial harm” to the employee’s own health or safety, or that of others in the workplace under 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(r) (regulation addressing direct threat to health or safety of self or others). A direct threat assessment cannot be based solely on the disability being identified in CDC’s guidance; the determination must be an individualized assessment based on a reasonable medical judgment about this employee’s disability—not the disability in general—using the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. Thus, an employer analyzing a potential direct threat must consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm. Analysis of these factors will likely include considerations based on the severity of the pandemic in a particular area and the employee’s own health (for example, is the employee’s disability well-controlled), and the employee’s particular job duties. A determination of direct threat also would include whether the employee is up to date on vaccinations and the likelihood that an individual may be exposed to the virus at the worksite. Measures that an employer may be taking in general to protect all workers, such as mandatory physical distancing, also would be relevant.

Even if an employer determines that an employee’s disability poses a “significant risk of substantial harm” to the employee’s own health or safety, the employer still cannot exclude the employee from the workplace—or take any other adverse action—unless there is no way to provide a reasonable accommodation (absent undue hardship). The ADA regulations require an employer to consider whether there are reasonable accommodations that would eliminate or sufficiently reduce the risk so that it would be safe for the employee to return to the workplace, while still permitting the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.

An employer’s consideration of a possible reasonable accommodation should involve an interactive process with the employee. If there are no accommodations in an employee’s current position that sufficiently reduce or eliminate direct threat in the workplace, then an employer must consider accommodations such as telework, leave, or—as a last resort—reassignment (perhaps to a different job in a place where it may be safer for the employee to work or that permits telework).

An employer may only bar an employee from working based on the direct threat analysis if, after going through all these steps, the facts support the conclusion that the employee poses a significant risk of substantial harm to the employee’s own health or safety that cannot be reduced or eliminated by reasonable accommodation. For general information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA (i.e., where an individual’s request for reasonable accommodation has nothing to do with potential direct threat concerns), see Section D.

G.5. What are examples of reasonable accommodation that, absent undue hardship, may eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) a direct threat to self or others? (Updated 7/12/22)

Reasonable accommodations that may eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) a direct threat to self or others may include additional or enhanced protective gowns, masks, gloves, or other gear beyond what the employer may generally provide to, or require from, employees returning to its workplace. Reasonable accommodations also may include additional or enhanced protective measures, such as High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration systems/units or other enhanced air filtration measures, erecting a barrier that provides separation between an employee with a disability and coworkers/the public, or increasing the space between an employee with a disability and others. Another possible reasonable accommodation may be elimination or substitution of particular “marginal” functions (less critical or incidental job duties as distinguished from the “essential” functions of a particular position). In addition, accommodations may include telework, modification of work schedules (if that decreases contact with coworkers and/or the public when on duty or commuting), or moving the location of where one performs work (for example, moving a person to the end of a production line rather than in the middle of it if that provides more physical distancing).

These are only a few ideas. Identifying an effective accommodation depends, among other things, on an employee’s job duties and the design of the workspace. An employer and employee should discuss possible ideas; the Job Accommodation Network (www.askjan.org) also may be able to assist in helping identify possible accommodations. As with all discussions of reasonable accommodation during this pandemic, employers and employees are encouraged to be creative and flexible. For general information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see Section D.

G.6. As a best practice, and in advance of having some or all employees return to the workplace, are there ways for an employer to invite employees to request flexibility in work arrangements? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. The ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act do not prohibit employers from making information available in advance to all employees about whom to contact—if they wish—to request reasonable accommodation that they may need for a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice or observance upon return to the workplace. Once requests are received, the employer may begin the interactive process. An employer may choose to include in such a notice all medical conditions identified in CDC guidance that may place people at higher risk of serious illness if they contract COVID-19, provide instructions about whom to contact, and explain that the employer is willing to consider on a case-by-case basis any requests from employees who have these or other medical conditions which may qualify as disabilities.

Alternatively, an employer may send a general notice explaining that the employer is willing to consider employee requests for reasonable accommodation for employees with a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, or to consider flexibility on an individualized basis for employees not eligible for reasonable accommodation (e.g., employees who request flexibility due to age). The employer should specify if the point of contact is different depending on whether the request is based on disability, sincerely held religious beliefs, pregnancy, age, or child-care responsibilities.

Either approach is consistent with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII.

Regardless of the approach, employers should ensure that those employees who receive, review, or process these requests are sufficiently trained in how to handle them in accordance with the federal employment nondiscrimination laws that may apply, for instance, with respect to accommodations due to a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, observance, or practice; or a request related to pregnancy. For additional information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act, see Section D.

H.1. CDC has explained that the risk for severe illness with COVID-19 increases with age, with older adults at the highest risk. Do older adults have protections under the federal employment discrimination laws? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employment discrimination against individuals age 40 and older. The ADEA would prohibit a covered employer from excluding an individual involuntarily from the workplace based on being older, even if the employer acted for benevolent reasons such as protecting the employee due to higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19. For more information on postponing a start date or withdrawing a job offer due to older age, see C.5.

Unlike the ADA, the ADEA does not include a right to reasonable accommodation for workers due to age. However, employers are free to provide flexibility to older workers; the ADEA does not prohibit this, even if it results in younger workers being treated less favorably based on age in comparison.

Older workers also may have medical conditions that bring them under the protection of the ADA as individuals with disabilities. As such, they may request reasonable accommodation for their disability.

K.1. Under the ADA, Title VII, and other federal employment nondiscrimination laws, may an employer require all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

The federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19, subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations discussed below. (See also Section L, Vaccinations – Title VII Religious Objections to COVID-19 Vaccine Requirements). If there is such an employer requirement, the EEO laws do not prevent employers from requiring documentation or other confirmation that employees are up to date on their vaccinations (see K.9.), but the EEO laws may require employers to make exceptions to a vaccination requirement for some employees.

The ADA and Title VII require an employer to provide reasonable accommodations for employees who, because of a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, do not get vaccinated against COVID-19, unless providing an accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business. The analysis for undue hardship depends on whether the accommodation is for a disability (including pregnancy-related conditions that constitute a disability) (see K.6.) or for religion (see K.12.).

As with any employment policy, employers that have a vaccination requirement may need to respond to allegations that the requirement has a disparate impact on—or disproportionately excludes—employees based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin under Title VII (or age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [40+]). Employers should keep in mind that because some individuals or demographic groups may face barriers to receiving a COVID-19 vaccination, some employees may be more likely to be negatively impacted by a vaccination requirement.

It would also be unlawful to apply a vaccination requirement to employees in a way that treats employees differently based on disability, race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity), national origin, age, or genetic information, unless there is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

K.4. Is information about an employee’s COVID-19 vaccination confidential medical information under the ADA? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. The ADA requires an employer to maintain the confidentiality of employee medical information. Although the EEO laws do not prevent employers from requiring employees to provide documentation or other confirmation of vaccination, this information, like all medical information, must be kept confidential and stored separately from the employee’s personnel files under the ADA.

An employer may share confidential medical information, such as confirmation of employee vaccinations (or COVID-19 test results), with employees who need it to perform their job duties. However, such employees also must keep the information confidential. Some possible scenarios include:

· An administrative employee assigned to perform recordkeeping of employees’ documentation of vaccination may receive needed access to the information for this purpose but must keep this information confidential.

· An employee assigned to permit building entry only by employees who are in compliance with a work restriction, such as COVID-19 vaccinations, testing, and/or masking, should only receive a list of the individuals who may (or may not) enter, but not any confidential medical information about why they are on (or not on) the list.

· An employee tasked to ensure compliance with a testing requirement for employees would need to review testing documentation submitted by those employees but must keep that testing information confidential.

Mandatory Employer Vaccination Programs

K.5. May an employer require an employee to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination requirement applicable to all employees entering the workplace if that employee has sought an exemption based on disability? (Updated 7/12/22)

Under the ADA, an employer may require an individual with a disability to meet a qualification standard applied to all employees, such as a safety-related standard requiring COVID-19 vaccination, if the standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity as applied to that employee. An employer does not have to show that a qualification standard in general (i.e., as applied to all employees) meets the “business necessity” standard. Under the ADA it must satisfy this standard only as applied to an employee who informs the employer that a disability prevents compliance. If a particular employee cannot meet such a safety-related qualification standard because of a disability, the employer may not require compliance for that employee unless it can demonstrate that the individual would pose a “direct threat” to the health or safety of the employee or others while performing their job. A “direct threat” is a “significant risk of substantial harm” that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r). This determination can be broken down into two steps: determining if there is a “significant risk of substantial harm” and, if there is, assessing whether a reasonable accommodation would reduce or eliminate the threat.

To determine if an employee who is not vaccinated due to a disability poses a “direct threat” in the workplace, an employer first must make an individualized assessment of the employee’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. The factors that make up this assessment are: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. The determination that a particular employee poses a direct threat should be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge about COVID-19. Such medical knowledge may include, for example, the level of community spread at the time of the assessment. Statements from the CDC provide an important source of current medical knowledge about COVID-19, and the employee’s health care provider, with the employee’s consent, also may provide useful information about the employee. Additionally, the assessment of direct threat should take account of the type of work environment, such as: whether the employee works alone or with others or works inside or outside; the available ventilation; the frequency and duration of direct interaction the employee typically will have with other employees and/or non-employees; the number of partially or fully vaccinated individuals already in the workplace; whether other employees are wearing masks or undergoing routine screening testing; and the space available for social distancing.

If the assessment demonstrates that an employee with a disability who is not vaccinated would pose a direct threat to self or others, the employer must consider whether providing a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, would reduce or eliminate that threat. Potential reasonable accommodations could include requiring the employee to wear a mask, work a staggered shift, making changes in the work environment (such as improving ventilation systems or limiting contact with other employees and non-employees), permitting telework if feasible, or reassigning the employee to a vacant position in a different workspace.

As a best practice, an employer introducing a COVID-19 vaccination policy and requiring documentation or other confirmation of vaccination should notify all employees that the employer will consider requests for reasonable accommodation based on disability on an individualized basis. (See also K.12 recommending the same best practice for religious accommodations.)

K.16. Does the ADA limit the value of the incentive employers may offer to employees for voluntarily receiving a COVID-19 vaccination from a health care provider that is not affiliated with their employer (such as the employee’s personal physician or other health care provider, a pharmacy, or a public health department)? (Updated 7/12/22)

No. The ADA does not limit the incentives (which includes both rewards and penalties) an employer may offer to encourage employees to voluntarily receive a COVID-19 vaccination, or to provide confirmation of vaccination, if the health care provider administering a COVID-19 vaccine is not the employer or its agent. By contrast, if an employer offers an incentive to employees to voluntarily receive a vaccination administered by the employer or its agent, the ADA’s rules on disability-related inquiries apply and the value of the incentive may not be so substantial as to be coercive. See K.17.

As noted in K 4., the employer is required to keep vaccination information confidential under the ADA.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.