According to the Court’s opinion, the principal had been accused of wrongdoing by staff (whom she claimed were merely disgruntled) and placed on paid administrative leave in May 2007. In the meantime, however, based on an internal investigation, the Assistant Superintendent informed the principal in June 2007 that she would remain on administrative leave during the next academic year and he would be recommending that her contract not be renewed for 2008-09. When the principal had been informed in June 2007 of the Assistant Superintendent’s recommendation, she requested her hearing before the Board, but was never informed in advance of when the Board would be voting and was never given the opportunity to meet with the Board before the vote was taken. In her December 2007 and February 2008 performance evaluations, the Assistant Superintendent reiterated that he would be recommending that her contract not be renewed. The Board accepted the Assistant Superintendent’s recommendation in March 2008 without ever giving her notice of the agenda or meeting with the principal as she requested in June 2007. The State Department of Education ultimately found in November 2008 that nothing significant had been proved against the principal.
A mandamus action was filed with the common pleas court where the principal sought reinstatement. It granted summary judgment for the school, which was affirmed on appeal. The appellate court found that her June 2007 request was premature because it was months before her performance evaluations and before the Board was scheduled to meet to discuss and vote on the superintendent’s recommendation. The Supreme Court found that there was nothing in the statute which supported the lower court’s imposition of these burdens on a school administrator.
R.C. 3319.02(D)(4) states:
Before taking action to renew or nonrenew the contract of an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator under this section and prior to the last day of March of the year in which such employee’s contract expires, the board shall notify each such employee of the date that the contract expires and that the employee may request a meeting with the board. Upon request by such an employee, the board shall grant the employee a meeting in executive session. In that meeting, the board shall discuss its reasons for considering renewal or nonrenewal of the contract. The employee shall be permitted to have a representative, chosen by employee, present at the meeting.Thereafter, R.C. 3319.02(D)(5) states:
Nothing in division (D) of this section shall prevent a board from making the final determination regarding the renewal or nonrenewal of the contract of any * * * administrator. However, if a board fails to provide evaluations pursuant to division (D)(2)(c)(i) or (ii) of this section, or if the board fails to provide at the request of the employee a meeting as prescribed in division (D)(4) of this section, the employee automatically shall be reemployed at the same salary plus any increments that may be authorized by the board for a period of one year, except that if the employee has been employed by the district or service center as an assistant superintendent, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator for three years or more, the period of reemployment shall be for two years.
. . . .
[N]othing in the language of the statute, which clearly contemplates the context of contract renewal, requires that the request for a meeting occur after the board makes a final evaluation and informs the administrator that the contract will not be renewed, and after the board gives the administrator notice of her right to request a hearing. Rather, R.C. 3319.02(D)(4) plainly and simply states that notice must be given “[b]efore taking action to renew or nonrenew the contract.” There is no temporal restriction that requires the request for a meeting to occur at any given time, and no proper basis from which to conclude that the request for a meeting may not be made until after final evaluation. Had the General Assembly intended for the request for a meeting to be dependent on any temporal specificity, it would have included that specificity in the statute itself, as it did in other sections of this statute.
The Court rejected the argument that an administrator could play games by always prematurely requesting a hearing the hope the School would forget because “R.C. 3319.02(D)(4) requires the board to meet in executive session with the administrator to discuss the reasons for nonrenewal only after an administrator has been informed that her contract will not be renewed, and only after being so informed may an administrator request a meeting with the school board to discuss the nonrenewal of her contract.”
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
