Showing posts with label non-compete period. Show all posts
Showing posts with label non-compete period. Show all posts

Monday, July 17, 2023

Clermont County Enforces Non-Compete Even After Employee Placed on Paid Administrative Leave for One Year

Earlier this month, a unanimous Clermont County Court of Appeals reversed a trial court decision denying judgment to an employer who sued a former employee and her new employer for violating her non-competition and non-solicitation agreement even after the new employer put her on a paid leave of absence during the non-compete period.  Total Quality Logistics, L.L.C. v. Leonard, 2023-Ohio-2271.  The Court found that the agreement was not merely to protect the unfair poaching of its customers, but also to prevent the poaching of its employees after a significant investment in training them.  By putting the employee on a paid leave of absence, the new employer created an incentive for the employee to leave the plaintiff employer and deprive the plaintiff employer of its investment. “Allowing a competitor to circumvent a noncompete agreement by simply hiring an employee and placing the employee on paid administrative leave for the duration of the noncompete agreement would defeat the purpose of noncompete agreements, reward former employees and the competitors hiring them, and ignore the employer's legitimate business interests.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff employer hired an inexperienced employee and spent 22 weeks training her about the industry, its business and how to win and retain loyal customers. She was required to sign a one-year non-compete and non-solicitation agreement which provided that the one-year period would be tolled while she was in violation.    After two years, she transferred to Massachusetts and became personal friends (i.e., after working hours) with employees of a few customers.  She was then recruited away by another company for its new division, which directly competed with her former employer.  She was incorrectly told that her non-compete was not enforceable in Massachusetts (which should have been suspicious when she was required to also sign a non-compete with her new employer).  The former employer learned about this on LinkedIn and brought suit the following month.  She was then placed on paid administrative leave for a year, at which time the new employer requested to dissolve the agreed preliminary injunction.  The trial court agreed, and after a bench trial limited the plaintiff employer’s damages to the $24K profit lost during the six weeks that she actively worked for the competitor and denied it attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under the agreement.   The Court of Appeals reversed.

Non-compete agreements are only enforced to the extent necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interest.  The trial court found that the employer’s only interest was to protect its customers from being unfairly poached and that this was sufficiently protected by placing the employee on paid administrative leave.  However, the plaintiff employer argued that it also had a protectible interest in retaining its investment of “substantial time, money, and other resources” in the employee.  It argued that the trial court had turned it into a “farm system” for the identification and training of logistics staff for its competitors.

One legitimate purpose of a noncompete agreement is to prevent the disclosure of a former employer's trade secrets or the use of the former employer's proprietary customer information to solicit the former employer's customers. . . . . We have recognized that another legitimate purpose of a noncompete agreement is the retention of employees in which an employer has invested time and other resources. (bolding added for emphasis).

                . . .

            In addition to its legitimate business interest in keeping its proprietary customer information and marketing and business strategy confidential, TQL had a legitimate business interest in retaining its employees. [She] obtained her experience and skills as a freight broker in the logistics industry while being trained extensively by and working for TQL. [She] had a proven track record of success, was demonstrably skilled at developing customer relationships, and was a promising broker as evidenced by her promotions through TQL's ranks, and once she began working for Ally, by her being contacted by former TQL customers and the profits she generated for Ally in less than six weeks . . .

The upshot of [defendants’] argument is that the NCA restricts them only from competing with TQL for customers. However, the NCA is not so limited as it also restricts "employment" with a TQL competitor.  Moreover, the purpose of the NCA is to prevent not only unfair competition for customers but also for the human resources necessary to conduct business. The NCA promotes this purpose by, among other things, disincentivizing TQL employees from leaving the employ of TQL to work for a competitor. Adopting [defendants’] narrow construction of the NCA would permit competitors to acquire TQL's key and high-performing employees and placing them on paid administrative leave for a year, thus depriving TQL of the benefit of its investment in the employee and the employee's services while avoiding liability for tortious interference and breach of contract. (bolding added for emphasis).

In light of this construction, the Court also found it was an error to conclude that the employee ceased being employed by a competitor after she was placed on paid administrative leave simply because she conveyed no tangible benefit to her new employer during that time because this conclusion did not give weight to the plaintiff employer’s interest to disincentive its employees to resign for greener pastures.

Trial testimony established that Leonard signed a two-year noncompete agreement on her first day as an Ally employee, and that while on administrative leave, she continued to be on Ally's payroll, was paid her regular salary, paid taxes on her income, and continued to receive benefits. Leonard and Zambo both identified Leonard as a current employee of Ally. It is axiomatic that only an employee can be placed on paid administrative leave. The trial court focused on the fact that although she was paid during her administrative leave, Leonard did not conduct business of any kind on behalf of Ally and that her pay and benefits were "entirely gratuitous on Ally's part." That Leonard was paid for doing nothing during her administrative leave because Zambo purportedly felt responsible for Leonard's situation does not make Leonard a non-employee of Ally for purposes of the NCA.  The fact that Ally paid Leonard her full salary and benefits during her administrative leave shows that it received a reciprocal benefit. It is no different than an employee going on a paid FMLA, jury duty, or military leave and performing no services for the employer during such leave. From the time Leonard was hired to date, nothing in Leonard's status as an Ally employee changed. By being hired by Ally and by continuing to be employed by Ally, Leonard violated the noncompete provision of the NCA prohibiting its employees from being "employed" by a competitor of TQL.

The Court further focused on the fact that the employee continued to socialize with the three employees of her former employer’s customers while she was on paid administrative leave.  It found these contacts – even though purely social – were contrary to her former employer’s economic interests.

The trial court had found that the plaintiff employer had no legitimate interest in rendering the employee unemployed if she was not competing against it in business.   However, the Court found this focused more on the benefit – or lack thereof -- to the new employer and not on the interest of the plaintiff employer to retain its employee.

Ally's retention of [her] was a benefit to Ally from the outset, and a benefit Ally was able to hold onto by maintaining [her] as an employee after November 25, 2020. However, the test established in Raimonde plainly focuses upon the former employer and its legitimate interests and need for protection, not on the competitor's benefit, and thus requires that noncompete agreements be viewed through the interests of the former employer, not the offending competitor.

As discussed in the first assignment of error, TQL has a legitimate business interest in retaining its employees after it has invested time, money, and other resources in them, and preventing its competitors from recruiting those employees away. Before being employed at TQL, Leonard had no prior experience, clients, or contacts in the logistics industry. At TQL, Leonard received extensive training learning how to become a successful freight broker and was promoted due to her recognized leadership qualities. Trial testimony established that Leonard had a proven track record of success, was extremely skilled at developing customer relationships, and was a promising asset in the logistics industry. Ally's hiring of Leonard undermined TQL's legitimate business interest in retaining Leonard as its employee. The trial court erred by ignoring TQL's legitimate business interest in the retention of its experienced and skilled employees after investing time and other resources in them.

The trial court found that "[h]ad [she] been terminated [by Ally] or had she resigned after November 25, 2020, and then been rehired by Ally after a year had elapsed, the effect upon TQL would have been exactly the same as it is in the current circumstances." Not so. While the result of [her] not working for the logistics industry for a year in compliance with the NCA or her sitting out for a year while on paid leave might have been the same in that [she] performed no services in the logistics industry, [she] would have been less inclined to leave employment with TQL if there were no other employment prospects in the industry. Allowing a competitor to circumvent a noncompete agreement by simply hiring an employee and placing the employee on paid administrative leave for the duration of the noncompete agreement would defeat the purpose of noncompete agreements, reward former employees and the competitors hiring them, and ignore the employer's legitimate business interests.  (emphasis  added). 

Ultimately, the Court found that the plaintiff employer was entitled to a permanent injunction to keep the employee from working for another year and was entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party.

This is exactly the kind of non-compete case to which the NLRB objects -- disincentivizing employees from seeking higher wages and better working conditions.  

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, June 15, 2016

Flurry of Restrictive Covenant and Trade Secret Activity This Spring

There has been a number of developments affecting employment agreements, non-compete agreements and trade secrets this Spring.  First, a new federal statute was enacted last month, the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 which, as discussed below, creates federal court jurisdiction over civil trade secret theft lawsuits, authorizes courts to issue ex parte seizure orders in “extraordinary circumstances” and authorizes treble damages and attorneys’ fees  only when the employer amended its confidentiality agreements and/or policies to permit confidential disclosure to government agencies, under seal in litigation, and to attorneys in whistleblower situations, but does not permit court to enjoin individuals from obtaining employment with a competitor.   In one lawsuit, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed judgment for an employer who revoked a former employee’s severance pay when he began working for a company and the severance agreement permitted the employer in its “sole discretion” to deem it a “competitor.”  In the second, the employer lost in its attempt to keep temporary employees from continuing to work for a client through a competitor supplier because the court interpreted the contract to only apply if the defendant employees had voluntarily resigned, which they had not.  Finally, in the last decision from earlier this month, the court reversed a shortening of the restrictive period from one year to six months because the hardship on the employee was not undue in light of his considerable financial resources.

 Congressed passed the DTSA in April and it was signed by the President in May.  Federal court may be invoked when a trade secret involving a product or service used in interstate or federal commerce has misappropriated within the prior three years.   In extraordinary circumstances, a court may – without prior notice to the defendant – issue an order for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the dissemination or propagation of the misappropriated trade secret.    The Court may also grant other civil remedies, but may not enjoin an employment relationship or enjoin information that the person simply knows (as opposed to misappropriated trade secrets).  In other words, Congress did not adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine and only provides a remedy when the misappropriation was through “improper means” or was acquired by someone who knew that the information was “derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain the secrecy of the trade secret or limit the use of the trade secret.”  “Improper means” was defined to “include[] theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means” but “does not include reverse engineering, independent derivation, or any other lawful means of acquisition.”  The DTSA does not preempt state law or change the burden of providing that particular information is, in fact, a trade secret.

In order to obtain an ex parte seizure order, the plaintiff needs to show that a TRO (i.e., temporary restraining order) would be inadequate because the defendant ‘would evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply with such an order and the plaintiff would suffer immediate and irreparable injury if the property were not seized.  The plaintiff need also show that the harm to the defendant and third parties is outweighed by the plaintiff’s harm, that the defendant has possession of the trade secret and property to be seized, and that it is likely that information is in fact a trade secret which was misappropriated through improper means (or through such a conspiracy).  Finally, the plaintiff needs to show that the application for a seizure order has not been publicized and, if it were, that the defendant (and/or his/her co-conspirators) would move or destroy or make inaccessible the property to be seized.  The property seized is then placed in the custody of the court.  The defendant could have an action for wrongful seizure against the plaintiff.

In order to obtain treble damages or attorney’s fees following the successful prosecution of a trade secret theft action, the employer must have first provided notice of the DTSA’s statutory immunity to defendant through “any contract or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential information”  which is signed or modified after May 11, 2016 or through “a cross-reference to a policy document provided to the employee that sets forth the employer's reporting policy for a suspected violation of law.”   “Employees” includes contractors and consultants.  This statutory immunity protects individuals from being held criminally or civilly liable under any federal or state trade secret law if the individual’s otherwise unlawful disclosure was made in confidence to a federal, state or local government official or any attorney solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected legal violation, or was disclosed in a complaint or other document filed under seal in a lawsuit or, if the individual  files a whistleblower retaliation lawsuit for retaliation against his or her employer, was disclosed to the individual’s own attorney  or used in the court proceeding if the information is filed under seal and only disclosed pursuant to a court order.

As for non-competition agreement cases, the first case involves a non-competition provision inserted in a severance agreement.  Saunier v. Stark Truss Co., Inc., 2016-Ohio-3162.  The non-competition clause was not very strict.  The employee agreed to not work for any competitor for a year, but even if he did, he would only lose his severance pay.  In addition, the Agreement permitted him to work for a competitor in certain non-sensitive positions (i.e., maintenance), but again, if he did so, his severance pay would cease.  The determination of what entity was a “competitor” was left to the “sole discretion” of the employer without any reasonableness standard.   The employee obtained a job shortly thereafter and, wouldn’t you know it, the employer deemed that entity to be a competitor and cut off his severance pay.  The employee sued and lost because the Court found that the Agreement gave the employer the “sole discretion” to deem the entity a competitor.

In the second case, the employer lost in attempting to keep its temporary employees from continuing to work for its client through a competitor.  Drone Consultants, L.L.C. v. Armstrong, 2016-Ohio-3222.  The plaintiff employer provided temporary employees to a client.  Those employees were required by contract to provide two weeks advance notice of resignation so that their replacements could be recruited and trained and then precluded from returning to their temporary assignment with that client through a competitor.   After the client terminated its contract with the plaintiff employer, the employer notified the six defendant employees that their employment was being terminated and they could collect unemployment.  Instead, they were hired by a competitor who placed them right back in their previous assignments with that client and the plaintiff employer sued.  The Court interpreted the contract to only require the employees to provide notice if they voluntarily resigned, which they had not.  Similarly, the restriction against returning to their previous assignments through a competitor also only applied in the event of their voluntarily resignation and, therefore, did not apply in the event of their involuntary termination.    Although the court ultimately did not discuss or apply it, the plaintiff employer’s contract to provide contingent workers to that client provided that it was required to waive any restrictive covenants that would preclude those workers from continuing to work for the client in the event the plaintiff employer’s contract was terminated by the other party without cause (which it had been).

The final case from earlier this month reversed the trial court’s shortening of the non-compete period from one year to six months.   AK Steel Corp. v. Arcelormittal USA, L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-3285.  In that case, a senior executive with knowledge of the plaintiff employer’s strategic plans for the future was subject to a one-year world-wide non-competition agreement and was recruited to the be the COO of a larger competitor.   The trial court reduced the restrictive period to six months on the grounds that it constituted an undue hardship to the defendant employee without a corresponding benefit to the plaintiff employer.  The appeals court found the restrictive period to be reasonable in light of his confidential knowledge of strategy, business plans, manufacturing processes for current and next generation products, future plant locations, pricing and awarding of contracts, etc.

To be sure, there is no allegation that Howell has in any way attempted to steal confidential or trademarked information for the benefit of ArcelorMittal. Furthermore, it is acknowledged among the parties that certain information available to Howell, such as highly complex and detailed manufacturing processes and patented technology, are simply not capable of reproduction from memory. Rather, the pertinent concerns related to confidential information involving company strategy and information that is relied upon at such a fundamental level that makes non-disclosure nearly impossible. Although there is no evidence to suggest any malicious intent on the part of ArcelorMittal, as competing multibillion dollar companies operating worldwide, there is a certain amount of information, in particular strategic decisions, that the companies have a legitimate interest in remaining confidential. The record establishes that AK Steel has a legitimate interest in restricting Howell, the fourth-highest executive within the company, from accepting employment from a competitor for a one-year period.

Finally, the Court rejected the trial court’s concern with hardship on the defendant employee because every employee suffers some hardship from these covenants, but they can only be modified or eliminated when the hardship is undue:

 . . the trial court failed to consider that "sole means of support," as noted by the Raimonde decision is not limited to employment income. The record here supported a finding that Howell was a highly sought after senior executive of a major steel company, and was recruited by an even larger competitor. Although there was testimony that Howell had a family that depended on his income, there was also testimony that Howell had a large, vested retirement plan from AK Steel, and his new employment with ArcelorMittal would include a $900,000 signing bonus. In resolving the issue of "undue hardship," we find the trial court erred by failing to consider the additional resources in determining whether the noncompete provision deprived Howell of his sole means of support.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, November 3, 2008

Ohio Appeals Court Reduces Non-Compete Period for Long-Time Tax Preparer Employee.

Last month, the Lucas County Court of Appeals reversed in part a summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of a former employee and cut in half the non-compete period in the non-compete agreement. Murray v. Accounting Ctr. & Tax Servs., Inc., 2008-Ohio-5289 (10/10/08).

The plaintiff was forced by her employer to sign a non-compete agreement in 1999 in order to receive her paycheck that day. The agreement provided that she would not accept fees from any client of the employer for two years from the date her employment was terminated. In addition, the agreement provided that the agreement could be transferred to any successor employer upon merger or sale of the firm. In 2004, the firm was sold to the defendant employer, the non-compete agreement was assigned to the new company and the plaintiff continued working for the new company. In November 2006, the defendant employer presented her with a new Confidentiality and Non-Compete Agreement and asked her to sign it along with an agreement changing her compensation structure from hourly wages to commissions. When she refused to work on a commission basis, she was fired in January 2007. She continued to provide services to clients of the defendant employer and filed a declaratory judgment action testing the validity of the non-compete agreement which she signed in 1999. The trial court ruled that the agreement was unenforceable and ruled in favor of the plaintiff.

On appeal, the appeals court found that the 1999 non-compete agreement was properly assigned to the defendant employer over objections that no notice of the assignment was provided to the plaintiff employee.

The court did not address whether the 1999 agreement was supported by sufficient consideration – in that the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff was required to sign it in order to receive her current paycheck – which was to compensate her for services already rendered. The employer could not have legally withheld her wages if she had refused to sign the 1999 non-compete agreement without violating the FLSA or Ohio’s wage payment and collection law. On the other hand, the court may have considered her future employment to constitute valid consideration – but it does not address that obvious point at all.

Instead, the court focused on the reasonableness of the terms of the 1999 non-compete. "A covenant restraining an employee from competing with his former employer upon termination of employment is reasonable if the restraint is no greater than is required for the protection of the employer, does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and is not injurious to the public." The court then decided that the agreement was onerous in restricting the livelihood of a 16-year employee who supported herself by preparing tax returns for her employer and for herself. However, in balancing the interests of the employer in protecting its client base, the court narrowed the non-compete from two years to one year. The court also delayed the running of the one-year period to 60 days from the date of the court’s order. The court did not address the issue of liquidated damages presented in the 1999 agreement even though the plaintiff had admitted that she had provided services to clients of the defendant-employer.

Insomniacs can read the full decision at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/6/2008/2008-ohio-5289.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.