DOL Addresses Volunteer Work by Non-Profit Exempt Employees

Last month, the federal Department of Labor issued an Opinion Letter 2026-12 addressing when non-profit employees can volunteer for their employer without additional compensation.  The DOL has long taken the position that employees may not volunteer without expectation of compensation to perform duties that are the same or similar to their regular compensable work.  In addition, if an exempt employee volunteers similar work, the employer must be careful that the employee’s primary duty remains exempt work or those employees would be entitled to additional compensation.   This particular work involved socializing puppies at home to become service animals.  The duties of office workers and veterinarians were dissimilar enough from the tasks of socializing puppies at home and, thus, could be voluntary.  However, the compensable duties of exempt dog trainers were too similar to be volunteer work.  Further analysis would be required to determine whether raising puppies changed the primary duty of their exempt position.  “If the employee remains exempt under the applicable duty and salary tests, the employee’s salary could serve as compensation for any hours spent raising puppies at home, and no additional compensation would be required.”  This is because, “an employee who is exempt from the minimum wage and overtime requirements under section 13(a)(1) may perform additional juvenile canine socialization work without additional compensation if the employee’s primary duty remains the performance of exempt work and the employee continues to satisfy the salary requirements for the exemption.”

The DOL has long applied by analogy FLSA regulations applying to government work to non-profit agencies.

[A]n employment relationship does not exist when a public sector [i.e., government] employee volunteers to perform services to the employing public agency, so long as the individual receives no compensation to perform the volunteer services,3 and such services are not the same type of services for which the individual is employed to perform for the public agency. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(4)(A). In addition, the Division’s regulations clarify that individuals are volunteers “only where their services are offered freely and without pressure or coercion, direct or implied, from an employer.” 29 C.F.R. § 553.101(c). . . .

Although the FLSA does not include a similar express provision for private, nonprofit employers, the Division has consistently applied the same requirements to employees of religious, charitable, or nonprofit organizations who volunteer their services to their employing organization for civic, charitable, or humanitarian reasons. . . .

Accordingly, an employee of a nonprofit organization may, freely and without coercion from the employer or its agents, volunteer to perform work that is neither the same nor of similar type as the work that the employee is employed to perform. Put another way, a nonprofit employee cannot be both a paid employee and a non-paid volunteer while performing the same type of work for the same employer  … . .When a nonprofit employee volunteers to do the same type of work that the employee is employed to perform, the Division has long considered that volunteer work an indivisible part of the employment relationship for FLSA purposes, and, as such, it may constitute hours worked.  . . . Additionally, employees cannot agree, or be required to “agree,” to waive their rights to compensation under the FLSA under the guise of volunteering.

If an exempt employee volunteers to perform work that is the same or similar to his or her regular duties, the employer need not necessarily pay extra salary or compensation unless the amount of so-called volunteer work involves non-exempt aspects of the employee’s job and the employee’s primary duties are no longer exempt duties.

An employee’s exemption status can become relevant, however, if the “volunteer” work does not satisfy the conditions for volunteering required by the Act and explained in the Division’s regulations, including, for example, if the volunteer duties are of the same or similar type as those the employee is employed to perform, and thus are part of the employment relationship. In those circumstances, for a non-exempt employee, the employer must pay for all combined hours worked, including any “volunteer” hours, pursuant to the Act.

In analyzing job duties in comparison to the tasks of raising puppies at home, the DOL concluded that exempt veterinarian and office workers could volunteer to raise puppies, but exempt dog trainers could not volunteer without further analysis of how the non-exempt work of raising puppies affected their primary duty test.

Based on a general understanding of the work that veterinarians typically perform, we assume for the purposes of this letter that the veterinarians’ duties involve providing medical care to the canines, such as diagnosing and treating sick or injured dogs, and do not include providing non medical care to, training, or socializing juvenile canines. Likewise, we assume for the purposes of this letter that the directors’ duties involve supervising employees and do not include directly caring for, training, socializing, or otherwise interacting with the juvenile canines. As such, the veterinarians’ and directors’ duties would be sufficiently different from the routine care, socialization, and early training involved in raising juvenile canines, and veterinarians and directors could volunteer to provide these services in their homes . . .  

The result is different for trainers. As discussed above, juvenile canine socialization includes not only routine care but also training. If the nonprofit employs trainers to provide specialized training for canines, as your letter implies, or to care for or socialize the canines, those duties would likely be the same or sufficiently similar to the services performed by juvenile canine caretakers, such that the trainers may not volunteer for your organization to care for or train canines at home.  . . .  This is true regardless whether the employee also performs other work, including exempt work, or whether the employee’s primary duty for purposes of the section 13(a)(1) exemption is caring for or training canines.

For veterinarians and directors whose job duties differ sufficiently from those involved in juvenile canine socialization, the time the employee spends as a volunteer juvenile canine caretaker would not be part of the employee’s employment relationship with your organization for FLSA purposes. In contrast, if the services you employ the employee to perform involve the same or similar type of activities as those involved in juvenile canine socialization, the volunteer hours are part of the employment relationship and must be counted as hours worked for FLSA purposes as long as they qualify as compensable worktime under the FLSA.. . .

Because the volunteer work (which is sufficiently dissimilar from regular job duties) is not considered to be work under the FLSA, no further analysis is required to determine whether the employee’s exempt status is affected.  However, for the exempt dog trainers, further analysis would be required to determine whether raising puppies at home would change the primary duty of their position and affect their exempt status. “If the employee remains exempt under the applicable duty and salary tests, the employee’s salary could serve as compensation for any hours spent raising puppies at home, and no additional compensation would be required.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

DOL Says 60 Minute Break and Walking Time is Not Compensable When Employee is Completely Relieved from Job Duties

 Last month, the federal Department of Labor issued an Opinion Letter 2026-11 finding that a 60-minute break was non-compensable and the employee was not entitled to be paid for time spent walking from her work station to the employee break room if she was completely relieved from duties during that time even if she was prohibited from eating at her work station.  The FLSA does not require employers to provide rest breaks to adult employees. Breaks of up to 20 minutes are generally for the convenience of the employer and must be compensated.  However, meal breaks over thirty minutes – such as this one – are clearly non-compensable. 

[The FLSA]  generally does not require employers to provide employees rest breaks or meal periods.  . . .  And the central issue in most meal break cases is whether the employees were, in fact, relieved from their duties or, instead, were required to “work” for purposes of the Act during their meal period.  . . .  If employees are not relieved from duty during the meal period, then the time is ordinarily considered hours worked and compensable.  . . . The [W&H] Division looks to the duration of the meal period to determine whether it is bona fide and compensable. Typically, “30 minutes or more is long enough for a bona fide meal period.”  . . .  In contrast, short rest breaks of up to 20 minutes in length are considered compensable as “[t]hey promote the efficiency of the employee[.]”  . . .  But these are not rigid, formal requirements. Indeed, meal periods of less than 30 minutes may be considered bona fide and not compensable under certain circumstances— for instance if employees have sufficient time to eat a regular meal or there is an agreement between employer and employee for a period of less than 30 minutes for a meal period.  . . .  If a meal period of facially sufficient duration is significantly reduced through travel time, frequent or lengthy interruptions, or restrictions, then that meal period or portions of it may be compensable.  . . .

 . . . .

Based on the factual representations in your letter, the Division concludes that your employer provides a bona fide meal period under the Act and 29 C.F.R. § 785.19 because you are relieved from your work duties during the break and the period is long enough for you to use it for the  purpose of eating a meal, even accounting for the travel time required by your employer. There is no indication that your employer requires employees to work while they are eating and it appears that employees are relieved from any work responsibilities during that time. Further, the 46 to 54 minutes available for employees after arriving at the break area is more than enough for the purpose of eating a meal. Indeed, this amount of time is much longer than the 30 minutes that is ordinarily sufficient for a bona fide meal period. This analysis focuses on relief from work and the sufficiency of time for the meal after mandatory travel time; the length of travel time is not itself determinative. As such, employees may use the meal period “for the purpose[] of eating regular meals” or for other personal matters . . .

  . . . . .

You also assert that travel time to and from the break area should be compensable because “[e]mployees are not fully relieved of their duties for the purpose of eating a meal until they can access their food in the designated break area[.]” The Division—and most courts—reject the “complete relief from duty” standard and instead evaluate the compensability of meal periods under the predominant benefit test, although a few outliers continue to apply the former formulation. When employees need just a few minutes of travel time to access a break room or other location where they can eat their meal, that time is generally not compensable.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

OSHA Issues Guidance on Employer Response to Workplace Opioid Overdoes That is Consistent with Ohio Statute

 Last month, OSHA releases a two-page guidance about how employers can be prepared for opioid overdoses in the workforce.   Among other things, it suggested stocking  Opioid Overdose Reversal Medications (OORM), training employees to recognize an overdose and administering OORMs and then calling 911 because the drug’s affect is temporary and has no affect unless opioids are present in the subject’s system. “The two FDA-approved OORMs are naloxone and nalmefene, sold under several brand names.”  “Managers, supervisors, and employees should know what to do if someone experiences an overdose at work. Training and education can prepare workers and the community on how to prepare and respond to opioids in the workplace. Having opioid overdose reversal medications (OORMs) on hand can save lives.”  Ohio law provides immunity to administering OORMs if certain conditions are satisfied and 911 is summoned. 

OSHA summarized key training topics which employers should implement:

Key Training Topics for Employees

As more employers keep these medications on hand, it is important that everyone understands how OORMs work. Consider creating a voluntary training program that covers:

• The importance of calling 911 even if the person regains consciousness. Naloxone is not a replacement for emergency medical care.

• Recognizing the signs of an opioid overdose. These may include slow or stopped breathing, blue lips, unresponsiveness, and pinpoint pupils. A gurgling or snoring sound is a red flag that the individual is at risk, as is stupor, cold and clammy skin, coma, or respiratory failure.

• How OORMs work.

• Step-by-step instructions on how to use OORMs.

• The potential need for additional doses. More than one dose may be needed. Follow the dosage and administration instructions in the product labeling.

• Withdrawal symptoms. In people who are dependent on opioids, withdrawal symptoms, such as shaking, sweating, nausea, or feeling angry, may occur after OORM use. This is to be expected.

• The recovery position. How to position someone safely while waiting for emergency services to arrive.

• Good Samaritan laws. These are laws that protect people who help someone during an overdose. Employees should know what protections exist in their state.

Ohio has a number of statutes which govern emergency use of OORMs, including Ohio Revised Code §§ 3715.50  through 3715.505 and §2925.11.  Most applicable is §3715.504, which provides in relevant part:

(A) In the case of an individual who is not otherwise authorized under the Revised Code to administer drugs, the individual may administer an overdose reversal drug under this section. This authority may be exercised by any individual who is in a position to assist another individual who is apparently experiencing an opioid-related overdose.

(B) An individual who administers an overdose reversal drug under the authority conferred by division (A) of this section is not liable for damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property for an act or omission that arises from administering the drug, and not subject to administrative action or criminal prosecution for an act or omission that arises from administering the drug, if the individual, acting in good faith, does all of the following:

(1) Obtains the overdose reversal drug under section 3715.50, 3715.501, 3715.502, or 3715.503 or the Revised Code;

(2) Administers the overdose reversal drug to an individual who is apparently experiencing an opioid-related overdose;

(3) Attempts to summon emergency services as soon as practicable either before or after administering the overdose reversal drug, except that making such an attempt is not required if the individual administering the drug knows that emergency services already have been summoned or are present.

The OORMs must be acquired and stored and subject to training in order to satisfy this statute.  Under §3715.50:

(B) Notwithstanding any conflicting provision of the Revised Code, any person or government entity may purchase, possess, distribute, dispense, personally furnish, sell, or otherwise obtain or provide an overdose reversal drug, which includes any instrument or device used to administer the drug, if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) The overdose reversal drug is in its original manufacturer’s packaging.

(2) The overdose reversal drug’s packaging contains the manufacturer’s instructions for use.

(3) The overdose reversal drug is stored in accordance with the manufacturer’s or distributor’s instructions.

(C) In addition to actions authorized by division (B) of this section, any person or government entity may obtain and maintain a supply of an overdose reversal drug for either or both of the following purposes: for use in an emergency situation and for distribution through an automated mechanism.

(1) In the case of a supply of an overdose reversal drug obtained and maintained for use in an emergency situation, a person or government entity shall do all of the following:

(a) Provide to any individual who accesses the supply instructions regarding emergency administration of the drug, including a specific instruction to summon emergency services as necessary;

(b) Establish a process for replacing within a reasonable time period any overdose reversal drug that has been accessed;

(c) Store the overdose reversal drug in accordance with the manufacturer’s or distributor’s instructions.

(2) In the case of a supply of an overdose reversal drug obtained and maintained for distribution through an automated mechanism, a person or government entity shall do all of the following:

(a) Ensure that the mechanism is securely fastened to a permanent structure or is of an appropriate size and weight to reasonably prevent it from being removed from its intended location;

(b) Provide to any individual who accesses the supply instructions regarding emergency administration of the drug, including a specific instruction to summon emergency services as necessary;

(c) Develop a process for monitoring and replenishing the supply maintained in the automated mechanism;

(d) Store the overdose reversal drug in accordance with the manufacturer’s or distributor’s instructions.

(D) If the authority granted by division (B) or (C) of this section is exercised in good faith, the following immunities apply:

(1) The person or government entity exercising the authority is not subject to administrative action or criminal prosecution and is not liable for damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property for an act or omission that arises from exercising that authority.

(2) After an overdose reversal drug has been dispensed or personally furnished, the person or government entity is not liable for or subject to any of the following for any act or omission of the individual to whom the drug is dispensed or personally furnished: damages in any civil action, prosecution in any criminal proceeding, or professional disciplinary action.

(E)(1) This section does not affect any other authority to issue a prescription for, or personally furnish a supply of, an overdose reversal drug.

(2) This section does not eliminate, limit, or reduce any other immunity or defense that a person or government entity may be entitled to under section 9.86, Chapter 2744., section 4765.49, or any other provision of the Revised Code or the common law of this state.

For more information, you can consult: One Call Could Save A Life | Ohio Department of Health, Laws & Rules | Get Naloxone, and Drug Overdose and Ohio’s Good Samaritan Law |OhioSTART.

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Franklin County Court of Appeals Upholds Termination of Direct Care Employee on Same Day of Background Check Showing Legally Prohibitted Convictions and Rejects Hostile Work Environment Based on Two Incidents

Last week, the Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on a retaliation/hostile work environment claim because the plaintiff employee failed to prove sufficient facts that the alleged harassment was sufficiently pervasive and could not show his termination was pretext when Medicaid regulations prohibited his direct care employment when his background check reflected violent criminal convictions.  Garnett v. ViaQuest Residential Servs., L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-3742.   The Court found that the alleged two incidents were isolated in nature and had not been viewed by the plaintiff as sexual or harassment at the time, but merely disrespectful.  Further, “Ohio courts have repeatedly recognized that an employer’s enforcement of a legal disqualification is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.” 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been hired in early February 2023 and was fired a month later on the same day that his mandated background check revealed two convictions for felonious assault which Medicaid regulations prohibited when working in direct care positions with the elderly regardless of the date of the conviction.  ”Notwithstanding that appellant had two prior convictions for felonious assault, one in 2004 and one in 2006—which he does not dispute—he signed a verification form stating he did not have any disqualifying offenses, along with an authorization to conduct the background check.”    More than a year later, he filed suit alleging a hostile work environment and retaliatory discharge for complaining.   He alleged that a female supervisor had made inappropriate comments to him in her home on February 13 and had made unprofessional comments to him a few weeks later.   However, he not only failed to report the first incident to management, he had continued to exchange friendly text messages with that manager after the fact, including a Valentine’s Day message.  As for the second incident, while he reported that he felt disrespected by her comments, he never alleged prior to his termination that he believed he was being sexually harassed.

The Court of Appeals agreed that the alleged harassment was not sufficiently or objectively severe or pervasive so as to affect the terms and conditions of employment or his work performance.  

Here, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellant—i.e., even assuming everything he has asserted regarding the February 13, 2023 incident is true— under the Harris factors set forth above, this isolated incident does not rise to the level of actionable harassment. The conduct was neither severe nor pervasive, was not physically threatening or humiliating, and did not interfere with appellant’s job performance. Indeed, appellant conceded at his deposition that he did not view the behavior of [his manager] at her home as harassment, but rather as her “trying to make a play. That’s what I call it . . . and I just chose not to.” . . .

Although appellant’s characterization of [his manager’s] behavior as “trying to make a play” potentially could be construed as being sexual in nature when read in isolation, other testimony of appellant makes clear that he did not view it as so. For example, appellant also testified that [she] had asked him to be her “special friend,” but he described such a relationship as being her sidekick or henchman, rather than some sort of sexual reference. Id. at 157-159. He further explained that [she] wanted him to take over as one of her “besties,” like Sam  . . . , because Sam was leaving for another position. Id. at 159. Finally, appellant testified that he walked away from the February 13, 2023 encounter thinking she is power-hungry and belittles and disrespects the people she manages, not thinking she wanted to engage in sexual conduct with him. Id. Accordingly, the February 13, 2023 incident cannot support a hostile work environment claim. {¶ 18}

As for the March 5, 2023 staff meeting incident, even assuming it is true that [his manager] snapped her fingers at appellant, patted her thigh and gestured to him to “come here,” this behavior cannot support a hostile work environment claim. As is the case with the February 13, 2023 incident, this is an isolated incident. Furthermore, while [her] behavior toward appellant may have been disrespectful, the behavior was not sexual in nature. Notably, appellant acknowledged this in his deposition: that he felt disrespected. (See Garnett Dep.) But being disrespected by your supervisor at work is not the same thing as harassment; it is instead ordinary workplace friction.

As for the retaliation claim, the Court agreed that the employer was legally required to terminate the plaintiff from his direct care position because Medicaid regulation prohibited individuals with his undisputed criminal convictions from providing direct care to elderly and/or developmentally disabled clients. 

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Affirms Employer's Summary Judgment When Plaintiff's Behavior Justified Request for Fitness for Duty Exam and Refusal Was Not Protected Conduct

Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment dismissing claims of retaliation and violations of the ADA when the hospital employer required a physician to submit to a forensic psychiatric exam and drug test as a condition of reinstatement from a suspension.   Robitaille v. Trinity Health Grand Rapids,  No. 25-2154 (6^th Cir. July 20, 2026).  The Court agreed that the numerous reports of the physician’s unprofessional, erratic and paranoid behavior and his safety-sensitive job duties justified the suspension and fitness-for-duty request and the subsequent refusal to renew his employment agreement when he refused to submit to the exam.  It also rejected his argument that his previously stated objections to the employer’s data safety protocols actually motivated the request and non-renewal of this agreement and that his refusal to submit was protected conduct.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff anesthesiologist was hired in 2022 on a three-year contract.  In December 2023, the computer system experienced an outage and he expressed concerns and agitation about the need for additional safety protocols.    Thus began repeated concerns being expressed to the chain of command about his unprofessional and erratic behavior.  The Practitioners Committee eventual sent him “letters requesting explanations for certain patient-care choices, including multiple instances in which he refused to provide care.”  He summarily referred to patient files after the first few inquiries, but then stopped responding.  “Based on this pattern of conduct, and after an unsuccessful meeting with [him], [the Department Chair] summarily suspended [his] clinical privileges in February 2024.”  The following month, the Executive Committee reviewed the suspension and the Chair’s report, “based on his “disruptive behavior adversely affecting the effective operation of the Hospital.”  . . .  The Executive Committee conditioned any reconsideration of the suspension on [the plaintiff] completing a fitness-for-duty examination that included both drug testing and a forensic psychiatric evaluation.”  The plaintiff submitted to and passed the drug test, but refused to submit to the psychiatric examination.   When his contract expired, the employer decided to not renew it.  Litigation ensued.

Under the ADA, a covered employer may not “require a medical examination” of an employee unless it is both “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” . . .

The statutory standard authorizing medical examinations can be met by performance- or safety-based issues. On the performance side, an examination is proper if an employer has “a reasonable basis” to believe that the employee is “unable to perform the essential functions of [his] job . . . . Thus, when an employee’s “aberrant behavior” affects his “job performance,” an employer may be justified in “ordering a mental examination.”  . . . . On the safety side, requests are proper if the employer has a “reasonable basis” to believe that the employee “pose[s] a direct threat to [his] own safety or the safety of others.”  . . . . Safety-based concerns carry particular weight in high-stress environments—like hospitals—where “employees are in positions where they can do tremendous harm if they act irrationally.”  . . .  In such settings, employers “may be justified in requesting a psychological exam on slighter evidence than in other types of workplaces.”

 . . .

The clinical shortcomings [the Department Chair] presented—[the plaintiff’s] hesitation to perform routine tasks, avoidance of higher-risk patients, and inability to handle the standard caseload—could all cause a reasonable person to question whether [he] was “still capable of performing his job.”  . . .  Likewise, [his] reported “aberrant behavior”—including paranoid ideation and excessive risk-aversion—noticeably impaired his job performance by causing inefficiencies and delays.  . . . . Because [he] practiced anesthesiology, these performance concerns were inextricably linked with patient safety. Administering life-threatening anesthetic agents is inherently high-stakes work where a single careless or “irrational[]” decision by [him] could “do tremendous harm” to patients in his care. . . .

The combination of documented performance shortfalls and behavioral red flags thus gave the Executive Committee reasonable grounds to question both whether [the plaintiff] was “still capable of performing his job,”  . . . , and whether he “posed a direct threat” to patient safety,  . . . . Given the nature of these concerns, the Executive Committee reasonably sought to rule out underlying impairments related to substance abuse or mental health that could be hindering [his] fitness to practice. The decision to require the medical examination was therefore both “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” . . .

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the district court had inappropriately believed the truth of the allegations against him.” Rather, it correctly identified that “the relevant question is whether the [Executive Committee] had a ‘reasonable belief’ that a medical exam was warranted.”  . . .  And it explained that “the underlying truth of [the Chair’s] claim does not impact whether the [Executive Committee] was reasonable in relying on it.””

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the report and examination request was pretext for discrimination or retaliation.  “For starters, our decision in Sullivan adopted the objective-evidence standard for ADA medical-examination claims and held that “there is no need to assess an employer’s intent in ordering a fitness-for-duty examination.””

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that all of this was pretext as retaliation for his concerns with the computer safety protocols because he failed to address the subsequent months of multiple reports about his behavior and performance issues and his refusal to respond to them or to cooperate with the investigation by the Practitioners Committee. “Those issues, as mentioned, provided an intervening, non-retaliatory basis for the Executive Committee to order the medical examination.”

The plaintiff also argued that his refusal to submit to the fitness-for-duty examination was protected conduct under the ADA.  The Court rejected that argument as well.  The employer’s “request did not violate the ADA, and [he] offers no other arguments that his opposition was reasonable and grounded in good faith.  . . .  [His] argument that he engaged in protected activity therefore fails.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.