Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Ohio Court of Appeals Denies Statutory Immunity to Sergeant at Pleadings Stage Based on Allegations of Bad Faith and Lack of Requirement to Anticipate Affirmative Defenses in Complaint

 Last week, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of statutory immunity to a Sheriff’s Sergeant on a motion for judgment on the pleadings of a claim of workplace harassment and denial of due process.  Little v. Cuyahoga Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 2026-Ohio-4485.  The Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged malice and bad faith when the Sergeant allegedly blamed the plaintiff for his own violation of policy, resulting in a suspension and denial of a promotion, meaning that the Sergeant was plausibly not entitled to statutory immunity. “[I]n reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant should not be fatal to the complaint.”  . . . .  There is no heightened pleading requirement,  . . . that would require the plaintiff to allege specific exceptions to immunity when bringing suit against a political subdivision and such a plaintiff is under no obligation to prove his or her case in the initial pleadings and need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff received positive performance reviews for eight years.  Then, in 2019, the Sergeant created a hostile work environment and “unlawful discipline” by accusing the plaintiff of causing the mis-release of an inmate by falsely accusing the plaintiff of violating policy when it was the Sergeant who violated the policy.  The plaintiff was then suspended and denied a promotion based on the Sergeant’s false information.  The Complaint alleged that the Sergeant’s “conduct was “unlawful, reckless, and [constituted] a deliberate disregard of [his] rights.”  The Sergeant answered the Complaint and then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings alleging that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the Sergeant had statutory immunity under Ohio Revised Code § 2744.07. The Court denied the motion and the Sergeant appealed only the denial of statutory immunity.

The Court found that the Sergeant was not entitled to subdivision immunity under O.R.C. § 2744.09, which only applied to political subdivisions.   The plaintiff argued that the exception to political subdivision immunity for employment-related claims barred immunity to the Sergeant.  However, the Ohio  Supreme Court had previously held that this statute applied only to political subdivisions and not its employees, meaning that the exception also did not apply to employees like the defendant sergeant.

Rather, the applicable statutory immunity for the Sergeant was O.R.C. § 2744.03

Generally, an employee of a political subdivision is immune from tort liability, subject to three exceptions set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6). The exceptions are as follows:

(a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities;

(b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;

(c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code.

In this case, the Court found that based on the pleadings alone (at this stage of the litigation), the Complaint had sufficiently alleged that the Sergeant’s actions were malicious and in bad faith. 

The allegations were not merely unsupported legal conclusions. For example, [Plaintiff] alleges that Sgt. . . . , not he, violated policy that led to the erroneous release of an inmate and then provided false information about the release, leading to Little’s suspension and other ensuing negative consequences.

Malicious conduct is defined as conduct “‘indulging or exercising malice; harboring ill will or enmity.’”  . . .  Malice has also been defined as “the willful and intentional design to do injury, or the intention or desire to harm another . . . through conduct which is unlawful or unjustified.” . . . .  

Bad faith indicates a “dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud.” . . . .  Wanton misconduct is “the failure to exercise any care toward those to whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm will result.”  . . . .  And reckless conduct is characterized by “the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.”  . . .

 Ohio is a notice-pleading state.  . . . .  As such, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.” Civ.R. 8(A)(1). “Ohio law does not ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with particularity.”  . . .  Thus, “in reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant should not be fatal to the complaint.”  . . . .  There is no heightened pleading requirement, as there is for certain types of cases, that would require the plaintiff to allege specific exceptions to immunity when bringing suit against a political subdivision and such a plaintiff is under no obligation to prove his or her case in the initial pleadings and need not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage.  . . . .  

Having reviewed the complaint and construing all material allegations and all reasonable inferences in favor of [Plaintiff], we are unable to find that he could prove no set of facts that would support an exception to Sgt.[‘s] claimed immunity. That is, we find that Sgt.[‘s] immunity cannot be resolved in his favor at the pleading stage.

Therefore, this exception to general statutory immunity applied to permit the litigation to proceed to the discovery and summary judgment motion phase.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, November 16, 2026

NLRB Upholds Most of Arbitration Policy's Confidentiality Obligation

Last August, the National Labor Relations Board concluded that an employer violated the NLRA when its arbitration policy precluded employees from disclosing that their employment-related dispute was resolved through arbitration, but that it did not violate the NLRA by prohibiting employees from disclosing the content and outcome of the arbitration proceeding or from requiring arbitration of all employment-related disputes with a specific exemption for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.   Ralphs Grocery Company, 375 NLRB No. 25 (Aug 10, 2026).

According to the Board’s opinion, the employer required all employees to abide to a pre-dispute arbitration policy, which provided that employees must use mandatory single-party arbitration to resolve

any and all . . . employment-related disputes that exist or arise between Employees and Ralphs . . . that would constitute cognizable claims or causes of action in a federal, state or local court or agency under applicable federal, state or local laws. . . .

There was specific exemption for charges filed with the EEOC and NLRB.  Employees were also required to maintain confidentiality:

Except and only to the extent it may be required by ap plicable law, the parties and the Qualified Arbitrator shall maintain the existence, content, and outcome of any arbitration proceeding held pursuant to this Arbitra tion Policy in the strictest confidence and shall not dis close the same without the prior written consent of all the parties.

The plaintiff security guard filed a class action in federal court in 2009 under the FLSA and California state law against the employer, which then moved to enforce the arbitration policy.  The plaintiff then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, which found the policy to be unlawful for prohibiting class actions and requiring confidentiality.   The employer appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but while the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that arbitration agreements could require single-party proceedings.  The Ninth Circuit then remanded the dispute back to the NLRB, which recognized the FAA was equal to the NLRA and reversed all but one of its prior holdings. 

In California Commerce Club, 369 NLRB No. 106 (2020), the Board held that “provisions in an arbitration agreement requiring that arbitration be conducted on a confidential basis, including provisions precluding the disclosure of evidence, award, and/or decision beyond the arbitration proceeding, do not violate the Act and must be enforced according to their terms pursuant to the FAA.” . . .

 . . . .

We find that the portions of the confidentiality provision restricting the disclosure of the content and outcome of the arbitration are limited to the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted and are therefore lawful under California Commerce Club and subsequent cases in which we applied that precedent. The provision prohibiting disclosure of the content of the arbitration is function ally equivalent to the provision that “all arbitration proceedings . . . shall be confidential” at issue in Dish Network. Similarly, the provision’s requirement to maintain the confidentiality of “the outcome” of the arbitration is lawful because it is consistent with the finding in California Commerce Club that parties may lawfully agree that there shall be no disclosure of the “award/decision beyond the arbitration proceeding.” . . .

We reach a different result, however, with respect to the portion of the confidentiality provision that prohibits disclosure of the existence of the arbitration. As the Board has held, “confidentiality requirements beyond the scope of the arbitration proceeding and ‘the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted’ receive no protection from the FAA.”  . . . Applying this principle, the Board found that a provision requiring that settlements be kept confidential was not shielded by the FAA in Dish Network,  . . .  We reach the same result here with respect to the prohibition on disclosing the existence of the arbitration. Prohibiting the disclosure of the fact that the arbitration ever happened long after it ended is a perpetual gag order against disclosing, outside the arbitral forum, that the arbitration ever occurred. It has nothing to do with the rules under which the arbitration will be conducted.

Having found that the portion of the confidentiality provision prohibiting disclosing that the arbitration existed is not shielded by the FAA, we next determine whether the maintenance of this provision violates the Act. We find that it does. By its terms, the Arbitration Policy covers “any and all . . . employment-related disputes that exist or arise between Employees and Ralphs . . . that would constitute cognizable claims or causes of action in a federal, state or local court or agency under applicable federal, state or local laws. . . .” It therefore encompasses, among other things, disputes arising under the Act. Moreover, the events giving rise to all claims covered by the Arbitration Policy would concern wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment; employees’ conversations with one another concerning those events do implicate the Act; and nothing in the Agreement’s settlement-confidentiality provision limits its scope.

 . . .

The second issue presented in this case is whether the Arbitration Policy violates Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by interfering with employees’ ability to access and use the Board’s processes. As explained below, we find that it does not. . . .

 . . .

In Stericycle, Inc., 372 NLRB No. 113 (2023), the Board overruled Boeing and adopted a new standard for determining whether facially neutral workplace rules and policies violate the Act. Under Stericycle, the Board analyzes the Policy under the “reasonably could” standard. That is, the agreement would be presumptively lawful if employees could not reasonably interpret it to interfere with their right to file charges with the Board.  . . .

We find that the arbitration agreement meets the standard set forth in Stericycle. The Arbitration Policy, a three page document, includes a prominent stand-alone paragraph addressing employees’ ability to pursue administrative remedies. That paragraph expressly states, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Arbitration Policy, all Employees retain the right under the National Labor Relations Act (‘NLRA’) to file charges with the National Labor Relations Board (‘NLRB’) . . . .” Under Stericyle, the provision is presumptively unlawful only if “an employee could reasonably interpret” it to restrict or prohibit Section 7 activity. As the Board held in Anderson Enterprises, with respect to the provision at issue in this case, “objectively reasonable employees would understand that the inclusion of such language in a legal document is intended to, and does, describe their legal rights in precisely the manner that the text explicitly states: employees have the right to file charges with the Board.” Consistent with this holding, a reasonable employee could not interpret the Arbitration Policy to restrict their right to file charges with the Board.  

Further, we find that, as in Anderson Enterprises, the Policy does not give employees the impression that filing charges would be futile, does not require employees to file an arbitral claim either before or at the same time as they file a charge with the Board, and does not “’necessarily’ interfere with employees’ statutory right to the Board” by requiring individual employees to arbitrate their employment-related disputes.

The holding in Anderson Enterprises is clear. Where an arbitration agreement contains prominent language in a savings clause expressly stating that employees retain their ability to file charges with the Board, that specific language is deemed to resolve any ambiguity created by the more generalized language in the agreement. As a result, no reasonable employee could understand the agreement to prevent them bringing their employment-related disputes to the Board. Anderson Enterprises also establishes that the savings clause at issue in this case is sufficiently prominent and clear. Applying that clear holding here, we find that no reasonable employee could understand the Arbitration Policy as interfering with their ability to access the Board and its procedures, and we find that the Policy does not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.

All that being said, this turned out to be a tempest in a teapot because the parties all agreed that the employer had rescinded the Policy and offending language back in 2012 after it first lost the case.  So, no rescission remedy was required by the NLRB.   The employer was merely required to post notices about the prior offending language and promising to not include it again if it reinstituted the other, valid portions of the arbitration policy.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.


Monday, November 9, 2026

Ohio Court of Appeals Stays Entire Litigation Pending Arbitration Despite Clause Carve-Out Exception for Injunctive Relief for Alleged Breaches of Non-Compete and Non-Disclosure Clauses

At the beginning of the month, the Portage County Court of Appeals affirmed a stay pending arbitration of litigation involving alleged breach of non-disclosure and non-competition covenants despite the common carve-out exception for injunctive relief in the parties’ arbitration clause for those types of disputes.  RoviSys Co. v. MRS Instrumentation & Controls, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-4339.   The Court held that the entire proceeding – both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims as well as injunctive and non-injunctive relief and even claims against non-signatories – would be referred to arbitration on the grounds that if any of the claim are arbitrable, then all claims must be first referred to arbitration.  Therefore, the entire lawsuit filed by the plaintiff employer against a former employee and his new employer involving breaches of a non-competition and non-disclosure clauses (and other tort claims) was referred to arbitration even though the new employer never signed the arbitration clause and the agreement contained a carve-out for injunctive relief sought to enforce those clauses.   Every employer should review their existing arbitration agreements to determine how to proceed. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff employer filed a lawsuit against a former employee and his new employer alleging, among other things, that he violated the non-disclosure and non-competition provisions in his employment agreement both before and after resigning his employment.  It sought injunctive relief and damages against the employee and his new employer and the parties agreed to a 90-day preliminary injunction, after which the defendants obtained counsel and then moved to stay the entire proceeding pending arbitration of the entire dispute prior to filing an answer or engaging in discovery.    The relevant 2004 employment agreement contained a broad arbitration clause, which created an exception: “provided, however, the Company shall be entitled to seek injunctive relief, without resorting to Arbitration, for any breach of Paragraphs 4, 5 or 6 [i.e., the non-compete and non-disclosure provisions].   The new employer obviously had never signed the employment agreement or agreed to arbitrate any dispute with the plaintiff employer.  The court stayed the entire litigation pending arbitration and the plaintiff employer appealed.

Arbitration is a matter of contract.   The Court easily (and properly) rejected the plaintiff employer’s argument that the arbitration clause applied only to claims brought by the employee and not to any claims brought by the employer.  If that had been true, then there would be no need for the carve-out clause at the end of the arbitration clause making an exception for when the employer sought injunctive relief:

 . . .  the plain text of the full clause indicates that the parties agreed to arbitrate any claims that involve [his] employment, except as otherwise specified in the carve-out. This is because the agreement uses the term “any claim or dispute” and contains no limitation as to which party must assert it. As one court has explained, the purpose of this type of carve-out is to enjoin a party “from continuing to allegedly breach the employment agreement until the two parties [can] obtain arbitration.”  . . .  By contrast, if Appellant’s reading were correct, then there would be no need for the carve-out.

Further, the carve-out did not exempt all claims involving breaches of the non-compete and non-disclosure – it only carved out one particular remedy:  injunctive relief.  Ohio courts have described “injunctive relief” as “a remedy, not a cause of action.”  Therefore, “Appellant is permitted to seek the remedy of injunctive relief in court for [his] alleged breaches of paragraphs 4-6; however, Appellant is not permitted to seek other remedies in that forum.”  If the plaintiff had wanted to exempt any claim it would make involving breaches of those provisions, it should have used the term “action” or “lawsuit” instead of merely exempting “injunctive relief.”

More problematic is that the Court stayed the entire action, not merely the arbitrable claims. “Pursuant to R.C. 2711.02, when an action involves both arbitrable and non arbitrable claims, the entire proceeding must be stayed until the issues that are subject to arbitration are resolved.”

However, it seems questionable whether R.C. §2711.02 commands that result:

(A) As used in this section and section 2711.03 of the Revised Code, "commercial construction contract" means any written contract or agreement for the construction of any improvement to real property, other than an improvement that is used or intended to be used as a single-family, two-family, or three-family detached dwelling house and accessory structures incidental to that use.

(B) If any action is brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which the action is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in the action is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until the arbitration of the issue has been had in accordance with the agreement, provided the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with arbitration.

(C) Except as provided in division (D) of this section, an order under division (B) of this section that grants or denies a stay of a trial of any action pending arbitration, including, but not limited to, an order that is based upon a determination of the court that a party has waived arbitration under the arbitration agreement, is a final order and may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.

(D) If an action is brought under division (B) of this section upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration that is included in a commercial construction contract, an order under that division that denies a stay of a trial of the action pending arbitration, including, but not limited to, an order that is based upon a determination of the court that a party has waived arbitration under the arbitration agreement, is a final order and may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed on appeal pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.

The Court also rejected the argument that the defendants had waived the arbitration clause by initially agreeing to the 90-day preliminary injunction because they had been unrepresented by counsel, had never filed an answer (i.e., defaulted) and had never engaged in pre-trial discovery.

[Defendants’] only substantive participation in the lawsuit over its four-month duration consisted of consenting to the preliminary injunction while they were unrepresented by counsel. As soon as counsel filed his notice of appearance, however, [Defendants] consistently sought to enforce the arbitration clause. In addition, [Defendants’] execution of the consents was not inconsistent with the arbitration clause. As explained, the arbitration clause expressly permitted [plaintiff employer] to seek injunctive relief regarding [his] alleged breaches of paragraphs 4 and 6 of the agreement. Thus, [the employer] was not prejudiced.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Sixth Circuit Rejects FLSA and Contract Claims of Overworked Computer Professional

Last week, the Sixth Circuit rejected the overtime compensation challenge of an exempt computer professional under the Fair Labor Standards Act and contract law.  Bennink v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Company LLC, No. 26-3150 (6th Cir. 10/29/26).   The Court found that there was sufficient evidence that he was an exempt computer professional and did not examine whether he satisfied the administrative or executive exemptions.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the exemption required any formal training or degree because “the statute’s lack of an explicit educational requirement “reflects the reality that someone [could] learn[] such skills through work experience or self study.”  More interestingly, the Court found that the letter offering him employment at $75/hour was not a binding contract because the letter explicitly said it was not a contract.  Therefore, the employer’s failure to pay $75/hour and to instead pay him a $3,000 weekly salary was not a breach of contract even though he regularly worked more than 15 hours/day. “The mere mention of a rate of pay similar to his previous rate as a contractor, without any assurances as to whether that rate was to be on an hourly or salaried basis, is insufficient to show that the parties agreed to a $75 hourly rate.”  Less controversally, the Court also found that the plaintiff had implicitly agreed to the terms of his actual compensation by accepting $3K/week for almost seven years without complaint.  Such a course of conduct during at-will employment constitutes agreement to the terms of employment because under Ohio law, the terms and conditions of at-will employment can be changed prospectively at any time.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been a long time engineer working with the employer developing its interactive voice response technology (IVR) system, first with outside contractors and then, starting in 2016 as a W-2 employee, to be paid $75/hour but treated as an exempt computer professional.  On his resume, he “described his position  . . .  as an “Ops/IT Solutions & Services Engineer” and  . . .  that he “design[ed], implement[ed], and maintain[ed] IT solutions and services, such as IVR call flow designs, dial plans, and various end user support applications.”  . . .  He highlighted that he “leveraged in depth knowledge of contact center technologies, platforms, and tools,” and accomplished “successful contact center infrastructure migrations (both on premise and Cloud based solutions).”  After regularly working 18 hour days and not receiving more assistance despite his complaints, he resigned in 2023.  He later filed suit because he claimed that he was not paid $75/hour, but only $3000/week and claimed that this both violated the FLSA and breached his contact of employment. 

The FLSA exempts from the statute’s overtime protections “any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker” with one of the specified “primary dut[ies].” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17). In particular, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B) exempts employees who have the primary duty of “design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs . . . based on and related to user or system design specifications.”1 Computer employees “who [are] compensated on an hourly basis” must be “compensated at a rate of not less than $27.63 an hour” to be exempt. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17). Although the parties dispute whether [the plaintiff] was paid on an hourly or salary basis, both agree he was paid at a rate well over the statutorily required hourly rate of $27.63. So we focus on the responsibilities targeted by the statute.

 .. . .

First, 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B) requires that the relevant responsibilities—“design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification”—concern “computer systems or programs.” Here, much of Bennink’s work revolved around Cincinnati Bell’s IVR system. Although the statute does not define “computer system or program[],” 29 U.S.C. § 213; 29 C.F.R. § 541.400, we have little trouble concluding that an IVR system is one. An IVR system is complex and technical. It automatically routes a user’s call based on a programmed menu, pulling in information from various databases and other systems. In fact, even while disputing that his role involved working on a computer system, Bennink himself describes “the various computer systems that contributed to IVR’s functionality” and how part of his role was working with others to ensure the requested IVR updates “were even feasible within the computer systems.”  . . . . This description corroborates our assessment of the IVR system. After all, a program made up of smaller computer systems is still a computer system.

Many of [the plaintiff’s] responsibilities regarding the IVR system fell within several of the duties described in 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B), namely, “documentation,” “design,” and “development.” For one, [he] extensively documented the IVR system, mapping out where and how the system routed callers based on their needs. He worked in collaboration with others in IT, updating the map to reflect changes made by programmers or giving the programmers direction on what should be updated to make the system more effective. Although [he] insists that this responsibility was little more than creating “complicated flowcharts,”  . . . , his documentation was essential to helping others in the company understand how the current system worked, and therefore how it could be successfully changed in the future. . . .

[The plaintiff’s] documentation responsibilities also bled over into “design” and “development.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(17)(B). In a system like IVR, which exists solely to route customers to the relevant assistance, “the design is the flow.”  . . . . [He] met with the team members who would be using or supporting the IVR, taking their feedback and determining how the system should be structured to meet user needs while complying with technical demands. By gathering these inputs and proposing the flow of the IVR, Bennink was designing and developing the system.

 . . .

To be sure, not all of Bennink’s work fell cleanly within the exemption. Bennink relied on other team members to carry out the actual programming of the system and ensure that the necessary data would be pulled in accordance with the goals laid out by his document. He also often acted as a project manager, coordinating across teams, negotiating deadlines and budgetary requirements, or preparing for the launch of a new IT solution. But it is not surprising that a job like Bennink’s was multi-dimensional. On this record, Bennink’s responsibilities concerning documentation, design, and development of the IVR system were the “main” or “most important” part of his job, making them his “primary duty.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). Although the parties do not present an exact breakdown of how much time Bennink spent on his various responsibilities, the evidence demonstrates that Bennink’s IVR related responsibilities were key to his role at Cincinnati Bell. Bennink himself believed he was brought on as an employee at Cincinnati Bell in large part because of his IVR expertise. These skills later made him an integral part of the efforts to migrate and update Hawaii Telecom’s IVR system, a task he admitted was sensitive, complex, and time-consuming. Because these responsibilities were so central to Bennink’s initial hiring and his workload, we conclude that they were his primary duty.

The Court also rejected the breach of contract claim based on his offer letter’s promise to pay him $75/hour when the employer “only” paid him $3,000/week despite him regularly working more than 15 hours per day.  As a contractor, he had been paid $75/hour for all hours worked, but he was not paid more when he worked more than 40 hours in a week after he became a W-2 employee.   To his detriment, despite his complaints about his working hours, he never complained about his compensation until he filed the lawsuit.

Even drawing all inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, [he] cannot show that his offer letter created a valid contract between him and [the defendant employer]. Two facts are insurmountable. First, [his] offer letter, which he signed, stated twice that it “does not constitute an employment contract.” . . . . Second, in his deposition, [he] himself stated that he “d[idn’t] think there was a meeting of the minds” when the parties exchanged the offer letter. . . . . . To find that the offer letter itself constituted a valid contract here, where one party clearly stated that it did not intend to enter into a contract and the other party admits to understanding that lack of intent, would require us to ignore the fundamentals of contract law.

It is true that despite the lack of an initial contract, [the plaintiff] went on to work as an at-will employee for [the defendant employer] for several years. And Ohio recognizes that at-will employment is generally “contractual in nature.”  . . . But even if at-will employment necessarily creates some sort of contractual relationship, enforcing any contract provision requires sufficiently definite terms.  . . .  Ohio courts allow the trier of fact to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding at-will employment, including the custom and course of dealing between parties, to determine whether “implied or express contractual provisions . . . alter[ed] the terms” of employment.  . . . So the ultimate question is whether [he] can demonstrate that a $75 hourly rate (including hours beyond forty per week) was a term the parties agreed upon.

In contrast to cases where employees have alleged that specific conversations or company documents provided guarantees about their employment,  . . .  [the plaintiff] argues only that he was being paid $75 per hour as a contractor before joining [the defendant employer as an employee]. So, he believed the offer was intended to be under “precisely the same terms.”  . . . . But the offer letter containing the $75 per hour rate did not say whether this would be on an hourly or salary basis, nor did it provide any details regarding overtime pay or hours to be worked per week. And [he] does not provide any evidence of other, later assurances made by [the employer] on such matters. The mere mention of a rate of pay similar to his previous rate as a contractor, without any assurances as to whether that rate was to be on an hourly or salaried basis, is insufficient to show that the parties agreed to a $75 hourly rate.

And regardless of the parties’ initial understanding regarding Bennink’s compensation, in at-will employment relationships, either party “may propose to change the terms of their employment . . . at any time.”  . . .  Here, [the plaintiff] was paid $6,000 per pay period, or $3,000 per week (the equivalent of $75 x forty hours), no matter how many hours he worked since October 2016. Although [he] argued below that he did not assent to any change in the terms, this argument is unavailing. [He] reviewed his paychecks, which stated he was being paid “$3,000 weekly.”  . . . [He], moreover, knew he was unable to log more than 40 hours per week and that he was categorized as an “exempt” employee. For its part, management knew that [he] was working many hours, partly because of [his] own complaints about his schedule—complaints where he did not mention any issues concerning his compensation. So even if [he] and [the employer] had initially agreed to a $75 hourly rate for all hours worked, we conclude on these facts that [he] agreed to continued employment on a salary basis.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, October 27, 2026

Police Chief Loses Qualified Immunity Argument After Having HR Consultant Arrested on Misdemeanor Charges Allegedly to Retaliate or Intimidate Her

Every now and then a case shows up that even I – in my jaded old age – find jaw dropping.  This morning was one of those times.  A local HR Consultant was arrested and incarcerated for 36 hours in connection with an internal investigation in northeast Ohio.  Needless to say, the Police Chief (who was a subject of that investigation and arranged for her arrest and incarceration) was promptly placed on leave and then fired.  After she subsequently brought suit against him and the Township for, among other things, abuse of process, he claimed qualified immunity because he had probable cause to have her arrested for a misdemeanor charge.  The Court noted that he had confused malicious prosecution (where there was no probable cause) with abuse of process.  “The premise of an abuse of process claim is that a process has been abused, not that it was illegal to invoke the process by proceeding without probable cause.”  Further, there was sufficient evidence that he sought to silence the Consultant to preserve his employment, not merely to see her justly prosecuted for a misdemeanor offense.  Therefore, evidence of his malicious purpose in having her arrested was sufficient to justify denial of qualified immunity.  McDowell v. Pomesky, No. 26-3027 (6th Cir. Oct. 26, 2026).

According to the Court’s opinion, the Consultant was engaged by the Township to audit its human resources practices and concerns with the Police Chief.  In the course of her audit, she discovered a number of complaints against the Chief.  She also discovered that he was monitoring which employees she spoke with (possibly to intimidate them) and had opened an investigation (in retaliation) against the person who told her about his monitoring.  She provided a draft report to the Township about the issues with the Chief and became concerned that he would retaliate against her when he not-so-subtly -informed her that he knew her home address. She responded with a false bluff that she was aware someone had looked her up on LEADS, and he promptly investigated whether that LEADS report had been generated from the Township department.  Several days later, he convinced a local prosecutor that she had engaged in misdemeanor falsification and obstruction of official business and obtained an arrest warrant from a judge.   Typically, misdemeanor arrests are only made in that County and  misdemeanors are only subject to a summons, not an arrest.  (In fact, no misdemeanor warrants had been issued or arrests occurred outside the County in the Chief’s memory or career).  However, the Chief arranged for the Consultant to be arrested in Franklin County, where she was held for 36 hours.   At no time had the Township ever arranged for someone to be arrested for a misdemeanor more than 4 hours away, like the Consultant.

After the defendants moved for summary judgment, the District Court agreed that the Consultant had sufficient evidence to show that the Chief had engaged in abuse of process – i.e., “whether [the Chief] perverted the process for an ulterior purpose.”  It also found qualified “immunity under Ohio law does not extend to government employees who act “with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” The Chief appealed only the denial of qualified immunity.

In Ohio, municipal employees enjoy a “presumption of immunity.”  . . .  But that immunity does not extend to employees whose “acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). [The Consultant] alleges both malice and bath faith. For malice, an employee must act with “the willful and intentional design to do injury or the intention or desire to harm another, usually seriously, through conduct which is unlawful or unjustified.”  . . .  An employee acts in “bad faith” when they have “dishonest purpose,” engage in “conscious wrongdoing,” or breach a “known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will.”  . . .  The question of “[w]hether a government employee acted with the intent necessary to overcome the presumption of immunity is typically a jury question.”  . . .

 Here, [the Chief] argues that he is entitled to statutory immunity because he had a reasonable justification for investigating, charging, and arresting [the Consultant] and because his actions were “authorized” under Ohio law.  . . .  But viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [the Consultant], a reasonable jury could conclude that [his] actions nonetheless evinced malice or bad faith.  Consider even just a few parts of the record that raise a material question as to whether [he] acted with an intent to harm [her] or with a dishonest purpose. [The Consultant], for example, presented evidence that [his] decision to seek and enforce an arrest warrant was contrary to the police department’s policy for misdemeanor offenses. Various officers in the department—including [him]—could not identify a single instance in  their entire careers where misdemeanor charges had been handled in a similar manner. A reasonable jury could find that [he] deviated from the department’s arrest policy for the dishonest purpose of hampering or halting [her] investigation into him by incarcerating her. (italics added for emphasis).

[The Chief] contends that he is entitled to immunity because his decision to arrest [the Consultant]  was supported by probable cause; he emphasizes that a prosecutor brought the charges and a judge signed off on the arrest warrant.  . . . . But [he] does not cite authority for the proposition that the presence of probable cause is, by itself, enough to guarantee immunity. Nor could he: The first element of a claim for abuse of process is “that a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause.”  . . . The premise of an abuse of process claim is that a process has been abused, not that it was illegal to invoke the process by proceeding without probable cause. The latter sounds in malicious prosecution, a distinct claim that [he] improperly conflates with abuse of process.  . . .  So if probable cause could confer statutory immunity, as [he] asserts, government employees would have immunity against all properly pleaded claims of abuse of process and could pursue malicious and bad faith actions with impunity.

The Court also rejected the Chief’s attempt to rely on an Ohio Supreme Court decision’s footnote (which is always dicta) because that decision concerned the merits of an abuse of process claim, and not the issue of qualified immunity, which is governed by statute.

Next, [the Chief] contends that because his actions were “authorized,” he is entitled to statutory immunity. This argument too is unavailing because it conflates two different legal questions. His argument rests on a footnote in Yaklevich, an Ohio Supreme Court case. Yaklevich explains the second element of an abuse of process claim, which requires that “the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed.” Id. The footnote states: “Therefore, ‘there is no liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.’” Id. at 118 n.2 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 898 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.1984)). [The Chief] reasons that because his conduct falls within that footnote’s safe harbor, he did not act with the malice or bad faith required to overcome immunity under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b).

The problem for [the Chief] is that Yaklevich addresses the merits (i.e., what makes the misuse of process tortious), whereas § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) addresses the official’s culpable state of mind for immunity purposes. Whether [the Chief] “perverted” the criminal process is therefore not necessarily coextensive with whether he acted with malicious purpose or in bad faith in pursuing them. Indeed, as Yaklevich’s footnote itself suggests, a defendant can carry a legal process to its authorized conclusion but still have a dishonest purpose. See e.g., Buehner v. City of Cleveland, 788 F. Supp. 3d 827, 914, 921-22 (N.D. Ohio 2025) (holding that allegations of fabricated evidence rose to the level of bad faith or malice necessary to defeat statutory immunity but failed to establish abuse of process absent an ulterior purpose beyond securing a conviction). And here, a reasonable jury could find that [the Chief] exercised otherwise lawful discretion for the dishonest purpose of protecting his job by discrediting and silencing [the Consultant].

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.