Showing posts with label motivating factor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label motivating factor. Show all posts

Thursday, October 10, 2019

Sixth Circuit Rejects Employer's Independent Investigation and Honest Belief Defenses and Finds Cat's Paw Theory


In June, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment in a USERRA retaliation case on the grounds that the plaintiff produced sufficient direct evidence of discrimination, produced sufficient evidence to proceed under a cat’s paw theory and the employer’s explanation was clearly pretextual when the plaintiff had been fired, in part, for engaging in conduct that violated corporate policy as directed in a text message by his allegedly biased manager.  Hickle v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., No. 18-4131 (6th Cir. 2019).  The employer could not rely on an honest belief defense when the investigator did not interview witnesses to the biased threats to terminate the plaintiff for a pretexual reason on account of his military service and supported the termination of the plaintiff in part for violating a policy at the clear direction of his manager who was allegedly biased against him.   

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been hired while in high school, joined the national guard, served overseas and was promoted to kitchen manager.  Over the years, his manager repeatedly complained about his military leave and he complained about this to the General Manager.  He was never denied military leave.   When he reported that he required military leave the weekend of a big Avengers movie release in April 2015, his manager indicated in front of another employee that he might be fired if he did not report to work.   He also heard from other employees that his manager was planning to set him up to get fired and he reported this to his manager, who texted him that he should obtain written statements about this before leaving for the day.   Apparently, investigating workplace misconduct is exclusively reserved for corporate employees and obtaining witness statements is considered to be impeding an investigation.  In the meantime, he was involved in a dispute with two subordinates that lead to their termination for trying to take home too many leftover chicken-fingers.  


A corporate investigation commenced and he reported to the investigator that his manager had openly resented his military leave and indicated that he could be fired for attending drill instead of the Avengers premiere.  The investigator also indicated that the General Manager thought he should be fired.  The investigator did not interview the employee who heard the manager threaten the plaintiff with termination.  In the end, the investigator found that the plaintiff had engaged in several instances of misconduct, and he was fired in April 2015 for the chicken finger episode and impeding an investigation, despite the written instruction from his manager.   


On appeal, the Court found that he had produced sufficient direct evidence of retaliation with (disputed) evidence of his manager’s comments to him and his repeated complaints about it to the General Manager and to the investigator even though the discriminatory comments were not made by the decisionmaker or investigator who made the recommendation.   The Court was influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had been terminated for violating a rule at the explicit direction of the manager who had threatened to have him fired for attending national guard drill that same month during the Avengers premiere.

The decisionmaker (Bradley) and those with direct input (Kalman and Melton-Miller) knew about Adler’s persistent, discriminatory comments. . . . In sum, the decisionmaker knew that Hickle was told to commit a fireable offense—gathering statements and thereby impeding an investigation—by someone Hickle had repeatedly said had made discriminatory comments threatening his job.  Yet the decisionmaker chose to fire Hickle.

The Court also found sufficient evidence to proceed to a jury with a cat’s-paw theory of liability.  As previously explained by the Supreme Court, ““if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”  The trial court did not find it to be a jury question whether the manager intended to cause the plaintiff to be fired when she directed him to obtain witness statements in violation of company policy even though she had very recently told him that he would be fired for a pretextual reason if he missed the Avengers premiere in order to attend military drill.   Drawing inferences in favor of the plaintiff could lead a jury to believe that the manager texted him order to set him up to be fired.


The Court indicated that it was also a question for the jury whether an independent investigation by corporate broke any chain of causation between the manager’s alleged animus and the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment.   On one hand, the plaintiff may have engaged in other misconduct as alleged by other employees involving the chicken-finger incident which was also cited as additional reasons for his termination, but on the other hand, the investigator weighted the “impeding the investigation” more heavily in her deposition testimony and failed to interview key employee witnesses who could have supported the plaintiff’s concerns with anti-military animus. “As best as we can tell, the investigation consisted mostly of gathering statements from a few employees, and was not necessarily thorough.” (But the deposition at issue admittedly was not clear).   Moreover, the investigator referred to the General Manager as her “partner” in the investigation.


The Court also found that the plaintiff produced sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation, particularly from the employer’s failure to articulate a cogent explanation for why “impeding an investigation” was an dischargeable offense when his own allegedly biased manager directed him to do gather the witness statements at issue.   The Court did not find it to be a close question whether sufficient evidence had been produced merely because the employer had always granted the plaintiff’s military leave requests.

We do not find this fact to be determinative, as there could be numerous situations in which an employer would grant requests for military leave (albeit grudgingly) for years and nevertheless finally wrongfully terminate an employee for taking such leave.  Certainly, granting Hickle’s leave requests helps AMC’s case, but it does not insulate AMC from charges of retaliation.

While the district court found that the employer had satisfied its burden of proving that it would have terminated the plaintiff even if he had never served in the military because of the other incidents alleged by his subordinates, the Court found that this was a question for the jury because:

it remains an open question whether the decisionmaker relied solely on the chicken-finger incident in deciding to terminate Hickle, and whether she would have reached the same conclusion in the absence of the charges of impeding the investigation. 

  The Court distinguished a case where the investigator did not know about the potential discriminatory animus and conducted a more thorough investigation.  The Court also rejected the employer’s honest belief defense when the investigator was aware of the manager’s potentially biased motive in directing the plaintiff to violate corporate policy and obtain witness statements.
Here, [the investigator] knew of Hickle’s USERRA complaints and knew that Adler told Hickle to take action that would amount to impeding the investigation; nevertheless, Bradley seems to have considered the charge of impeding the investigation relevant to the decision.  Thus, the honest-belief rule does not help the defendant.  The “particularized facts that were before [the employer] at the time the decision was made,”  . . ., included Adler’s anti-military comments and her text to Hickle telling him to collect statements.  This was not a case in which the decisionmaker was acting on a clean record and in ignorance of lurking discriminatory motives.  The decisionmaker was fully aware of the facts suggesting that the “impeding the investigation” charge was pretextual.


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, June 1, 2015

Supreme Court: Motive to Discriminate Can Be Based on Mere Suspicion and Does Not Require Actual Knowledge

This morning a divided Supreme Court reversed an employer’s summary judgment and ruled that religious bias can be a motivating factor in an illegal discriminatory hiring decision even if the employer only suspected -- and did not actually know -- whether the applicant was engaging in a religious practice.  EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 14-86 (U.S. 6-1-15). “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in order to avoid accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without undue hardship” even if the employer only suspected that the applicant engaged in a religious practice and never specially requested an accommodation.  Unlike the ADA and other statutes, there is no statutory “actual knowledge” requirement in Title VII.  “[A]n applicant need only show that his need for an accommoda­tion was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”  Therefore, the employer’s summary judgment was reversed and the EEOC’s prior summary judgment was reinstated.

According to the Court, the applicant was qualified to be hired for the position, but the assistant store manager shared concerns with the District Manager about whether the applicant’s headscarf would violate the company’s policy against wearing “caps.”  She assumed that the applicant wore the scarf because of her religious faith.  The District Manager said the scarf would violate the Company’s policy and directed the assistant manager not to hire the applicant.  The applicant was never informed about the policy and never requested to be accommodated.   The EEOC then filed suit, prevailed on summary judgment and obtained $20,000 on her behalf.  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled in favor of the employer on summary judgment on the grounds that the applicant never requested an accommodation and the employer lacked actual knowledge that she wore the scarf as a religious practice.

Under Title VII, religion “is defined to ’includ[e] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demon­strates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to’ a ‘religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.’”  Unlike the ADA, which requires accommodation and prohibits discrimination against only known disabilities, Title VII prohibits only unlawful motives “regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.”  The Court declined to read words in the statute that were put there by Congress. “We construe Title VII’s silence as exactly that: silence.”

Motive and knowledge are separate concepts. An employer who has actual knowledge of the need for an accommodation does not violate Title VII by refusing to hire an applicant if avoiding that accommodation is not his motive. Conversely, an employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed.

                . . . An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions. For example, suppose that an employer thinks (though he does not know for certain) that a job applicant may be an orthodox Jew who will observe the Sabbath, and thus be unable to work on Saturdays. If the applicant actually requires an accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer’s desire to avoid the prospec­tive accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the employer violates Title VII.

The Court also rejected any argument that a neutral employment practice could be used to support a disparate treatment claim:

Nor does the statute limit disparate-treatment claims to only those employer policies that treat religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices. Abercrom­bie’s argument that a neutral policy cannot constitute “intentional discrimination” may make sense in other contexts. But Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regard to religious practices—that they be treated no worse than other practices. Rather, it gives them favored treatment, affirmatively obligating employers not “to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s” “religious observance and practice.” An employer is surely entitled to have, for example, a no­ headwear policy as an ordinary matter. But when an applicant requires an accommodation as an “aspec[t] of religious . . . practice,” it is no response that the sub­sequent “fail[ure] . . . to hire” was due to an otherwise-neutral policy. Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way to the need for an accommodation.

Finally, the Court addressed the obvious question -- that it is difficult to have motive unless there is some level prior knowledge -- and refused to address whether liability would attach without some knowledge or suspicion:

While a knowledge requirement cannot be added to the motive re­quirement, it is arguable that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice—i.e., that he cannot discriminate “because of” a “religious practice” unless he knows or suspects it to be a religious practice. That issue is not presented in this case, since Abercrombie knew—or at least suspected—that the scarf was worn for religious reasons. The question has therefore not been discussed by either side, in brief or oral argument. It seems to us inappropriate to resolve this unargued point by way of dictum, as the concurrence would do.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

En Banc Sixth Circuit Rejects Prior Causation Standard for ADA and Now Requires Plaintiffs to Prove Employer Acted Because of Disability.


On Friday, the Sixth Circuit issued a rare en banc decision reversing over a decade of precedent requiring ADA plaintiffs to prove that disability discrimination was the sole or only reason for the employer’s adverse action. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. No. 09-6381 (6th Cir. 5/25/12). Instead, the Sixth Circuit now requires ADA plaintiffs to prove that the employer acted because of the plaintiff’s disability. In other words, the employer would not have discriminated or taken adverse action but for the plaintiff’s disability and the plaintiff’s disability no longer need be the employer’s sole or only consideration in order for an ADA plaintiff to prevail. The Court’s majority reached this decision because the statutory language in the ADA, like the ADEA, prohibits employers from discriminating “because of” an employee’s disability. The prior causation standard had been borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act, which the Court found to be inapposite in light of the differences in the statutory texts. “Shared statutory purposes do not invariably lead to shared statutory texts, and in the end it is the text that matters.” The Court also determined that because the ADA statutory language mirrored that of the ADEA, it should follow the causation standard for that statute as recently explained by the Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL Financial Services instead of the more lenient “motivating factor” standard of Title VII as argued by the plaintiff. Although both Title VII and the ADA prohibit employment discrimination, the motivating factor language is never used in the ADA and the Court rejected the plaintiff’s attempts to incorporate it by cross-cross references to Title VII.

At issue was the termination of a registered nurse with a disability who the employer claimed had been fired because “an outburst at work, in which she allegedly yelled, used profanity and criticized her supervisors.” At trial, the plaintiff had requested a jury instruction with the motivating factor theory of causation, but the trial court utilized the “sole” reason jury instruction. The Sixth Circuit rejected both approaches in favor of the “but for” theory of causation based on a comparison of statutory texts and the Supreme Court’s prior Gross opinion. Notably, as of last week, the Sixth Circuit was the only Court of Appeals to still utilize the “sole factor” causation theory in ADA cases and the only other Circuit to have addressed this issue since Gross also concluded that the ADA should be constructed the same as the ADEA. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010).

Interestingly, all of the judges agreed that the sole factor test should be discarded, but there were three separate concurring opinions because they did not all agree on the “because of” standard.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

Sixth Circuit: Employer’s Resentment of Work Employee Missed Due to Military Service Supported Imposing Wrongful Discharge Liability Under USERRA.

Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a bench trial verdict in a wrongful discharge case brought under USERRA by an employee who had been fired in part because of insubordination, but which the trial court found was motivated mostly by the employee’s missing work because of his national guard service. The Court, however, remanded the case for reconsideration of the $352,846 of damages imposed by the trial judge. Hance v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., No. 07-5475 (6th Cir. 7/1/09). Although the employee’s alleged insubordination had been independently investigated and substantiated in a union arbitration, the Court believed there was sufficient evidence that the employer would not have terminated the employee for the alleged insubordination if his supervisor and manager had not both expressed resentment of the amount of work he missed because of his national guard service.

As stated by the Court:


On appeal, [the employer] argues that the district court erred in attributing antimilitary animus to [the employer]and in concluding that [the employer] failed to prove that a nondiscriminatory reason actually motivated the discharge. Regarding the attribution of anti-military animus to the company, [the employer] argues that [the plaintiff’s] immediate supervisor, lacked the authority to investigate or terminate [the plaintiff] and, therefore, that [the supervisor’s] anti-military animus cannot be imputed to the company. But in addition to evidence of [the supervisor’s] hostile attitude, testimony by union representative . . . indicated that Assistant Superintendent Bryson had also expressed concern about [the plaintiff’s] taking “too much time off for the military.” Significantly, Bryson was responsible for the decision to dismiss [the plaintiff]. This evidence of anti-military animus from a decisionmaker, combined with the close temporal relationship between [the plaintiff’s] two-week leave for military service and his discharge was legally sufficient to support the district court’s finding that [the plaintiff] was discharged in violation of USERRA.


The Court also refused to accord res judicata status to the labor arbitration which upheld the plaintiff’s discharge for insubordination. Although courts “accord broad deference” to arbitration decisions, the Court has


previously recognized as an exception to this rule that district courts are not bound by arbitration decisions in employment discrimination cases under Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981. . . . “a federal court may, in the course of trying a Title VII or section 1981 action, reconsider evidence rejected by an arbitrator in previous proceedings.” Id. at 142. In the context of an employment discrimination case, deference is due to an arbitrator’s interpretation of provisions in a collective bargaining agreement or other employment contract, but Becton cautions that an arbitrator’s decision regarding “just cause” for termination is not equivalent to the inquiry and burden-shifting framework mandated by Congress in an employment discrimination case. See id. Hence, a federal court should not consider an arbitrator’s decision binding in a discrimination suit, because to do so would “unnecessarily limit[] the plaintiff’s opportunity to vindicate his statutory and constitutional rights.” Id.

In this case, the district court considered the arbitrator’s decision, the factual dispute over whether Hance’s reporting instructions were clear, and the evidence of anti-military animus by Hance’s superiors. Because the district court was not required to consider the arbitrator’s determination as conclusive, that determination could not prevent the court from holding – correctly, we conclude – that Norfolk Southern had failed to demonstrate a valid, nondiscriminatory basis for Hance’s dismissal, as measured by the standard required under section 4311(c)(1).


Insomniacs may read the decision in full at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/09a0224p-06.pdf

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.