Franklin County Court of Appeals Reverses Employer's Summary Judgment on "Regarded As" Disability Discrimination Claim.

Last month, the Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed in major part a disability discrimination claim brought by a terminated day care worker with a genetic heart condition which made her susceptible to infections.  Anderson v. Bright Horizons Children's Ctrs., L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-1031.  The Court agreed that the plaintiff could not show that she was “disabled” under Ohio law because O.R.C. §4112.02 – unlike federal law -- does not include “operation of a major bodily function” as a disability.   The Court also rejected her argument that she had requested a reasonable accommodation with vague statements.   However, the Court found sufficient evidence for trial about whether the plaintiff was “regarded as” disabled and had suffered an adverse employment action on account of her heart condition when she had within the prior week disclosed that she suffered from a heart defect which was causing her attendance issues and there was a factual dispute as to whether she was even required to call off after being taken off the work schedule.    The Court also revived a claim against the plaintiff's former supervisor for aiding and abetting the employer's alleged discrimination.  

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff suffered from a genetic heart valve defect which rendered her more susceptible to bacterial infections.    She was hired in March 2017 to work in the infant room of her employer’s daycare center.  Over the next 3.5 months, she missed 8 non-consecutive days due to various infections.  When she called off for another infection on July 10, she disclosed her genetic heart defect as the underlying cause.  When she returned to work on July 12, she was counselled for excessive absenteeism, informed that she was not providing the necessary consistency of care for the infants and it was suggested that she transfer to the substitute pool or resign.  She was also reprimanded for inappropriate use of her cell phone when she was supposed to be teaching earlier that day.   She suffered an anxiety attack when she next reported to work on July 14, called off and went to the ER.   Her mother called in to explain her genetic condition, her treatment in the ER for anxiety, migraine and blood pressure, etc. and admonished her supervisor for permitting feverish infants to be admitted to the day care when they posed a risk to her daughter.   While the mother requested that the employer not hold the heart defect against her, neither the mother nor daughter ever informed the employer that she had been released to return to work after leaving the ER.

The plaintiff was not put on the following week’s schedule, purportedly because she had not yet reported that she had been released to return to work.  The plaintiff claims that she assumed that she had been fired and did not report to work, but instead, attempted repeatedly to call her supervisor and manager and assumed that they were avoiding her.  The HR Department attempted repeatedly to call the plaintiff and, because her voice mailbox was full, emailed her with times they were available to talk with her.  The plaintiff did not call or email them as requested.  The employer’s policy provided that an employee would be considered to have resigned if they failed to report or call off from work for two consecutive “scheduled days.”   The plaintiff was informed on July 20 that she was deemed to have resigned because she had not reported to or off from work on July 14 (when she had) or on July 17 or 18 (when she was not on the schedule).  

The plaintiff sued the following month for disability discrimination.  The trial court granted the employer summary judgment, but the appellate court reversed.

The Court of Appeals first noted that while Ohio courts rely on federal ADA and ADAA decision for persuasive authority and guidance, federal court decisions are not controlling because the ADAA and its regulations differ substantially from federal law.  In particular, unlike federal law, Ohio law does not provide “that the operation of a major bodily function is a major life activity.”  Courts will not amend a statute where the General Assembly has not done so.   Accordingly, the plaintiff “has not demonstrated that her congenital heart defect substantially limits a major life activity” and cannot show that she is “disabled” under Ohio law under the first prong of the definition. 

Yet, the third prong of the definition encompasses “regarded as disabled” claims.  “Under the plain language of R.C. 4112.01(A)(13), a plaintiff may be disabled if the employer regarded the plaintiff as having a mental or physical impairment, without regard to whether the employer regarded the plaintiff as substantially limited in his or her major life activities.”  There was no dispute that the plaintiff suffered from a physical impairment due to her heart defect.   There was also no dispute that the plaintiff and her mother had disclosed the heart defect in the week before she was terminated.    The court rejected the employer’s argument that the disclosure of the defect was insufficient because they had no medical confirmation that it was actually causing her absences:

However, a question of fact arose regarding whether defendants believed [she] had a physical impairment once [she] informed [her supervisor] about her congenital heart defect.   [She] did not have to substantiate her medical condition with documentation to create a question of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment.

The court also rejected the employer’s arguments that the plaintiff’s prior medical releases to return to work without restrictions (for her prior sinus infections) precluded her from providing a disability because she was not claiming that her sinus infection was her disability.  Rather, the plaintiff had alleged

that defendants regarded her as disabled due to her congenital heart defect. Defendants did not receive any medical note returning [her] to work without restriction after an absence to treat her congenital heart defect. Consequently, defendants in this case had no reason to believe that the ongoing condition [she] suffered from—a congenital heart defect—had resolved itself because she had produced a note returning her to work without restriction after an acute infection.

The Court also rejected that the employer’s argument that the plaintiff had necessarily voluntarily resigned by not reporting to work after she had been taken off the schedule.  The employer argued that Mondays and Tuesdays were her regular work days and she was required to show up or call off.  The Court concluded that a reasonable jury could disagree about whether the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned by not properly calling off work on her normal work days (because she assumed that her supervisor was not answering the phone to deliberately avoid her) or responding to the HR Department when she had not been put on the schedule.   If she had voluntarily resigned under the policy, then she had not suffered an adverse employment action.  

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she had provided direct evidence of discrimination from the employer’s testimony that her prior sporadic absences played a role in the decision to terminate her employment.   Rather, that testimony required an inference from her disability-related absences were really about the disability and not the absences.    Nonetheless, that testimony was relevant to proving indirectly or circumstantially that she had been terminated on account of her disability.

A reasonable factfinder could determine that [the supervisor] deduced from this information that [the plaintiff’s] congenital heart defect was the underlying cause of her numerous acute infections and concomitant absences from work. Thus, a reasonable factfinder could infer that when [the supervisor] conceded that [her] absences played a role in her termination, she was really conceding that [her] perceived disability played a role in her termination.

Not surprisingly, the temporal proximity between the date when the plaintiff disclosed her heart defect and the date of her termination also constituted evidence that her disability motivated her termination:

[D]efendants terminated [her] employment on July 20, 2017, only ten days after [she] first disclosed her congenital heart defect to [her supervisor]. The temporal proximity between the disclosure of [her] alleged disability and the adverse employment action is circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination.

Plaintiff was also replaced with an employee who did not have a disability.

The Court found irrelevant that the plaintiff was reprimanded for her inappropriate usage of her cell phone because that reprimand played no role in the decision to terminate her employment.

The Court noted that the parties did not seem to address or dispute whether the plaintiff was qualified for her position.  It also refused to consider the issue of pretext because the trial court had not addressed it below.   Nonetheless, it found the trial court had erred in granting summary judgment based on the circumstantial evidence the plaintiff had presented that she had been discriminated against on account of being regarded as disabled.

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the employer failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation.  “When an employee does not propose a reasonable accommodation, his or her failure-to-accommodate claim must fail.”   The plaintiff claimed that she had requested on July 10 that the employer not count her disability-related absences against her, but the court found she had not sustained her burden of proving that she had requested a reasonable accommodation.  It similarly rejected the affidavit of the plaintiff’s mother she had requested on July 12 that the employer not hold the heart defect against her daughter because the statement was “not sufficiently direct and specific enough to qualify as a request for a reasonable accommodation.”

It is too vague for any employer to recognize it as a proposal for specific, special action needed to accommodate a disability in the workplace. Melody Anderson's request is more like general plea for "understanding" than a proposal for a concrete accommodation.

The  Court refused to recognize a separate claim for the employer’s alleged failure to engage in the interactive process because such a duty only arises under federal law when the plaintiff requests a reasonable accommodation – which did not occur here.  The Court noted that O.R.C. §4112.02 never mentions the interactive process obligation.  

The Court also reinstated the plaintiff’s claim that her supervisor had aided and abetted the employer in discriminating against her.   Because the “regarded as” disabled claim had been revived, this claim would be revived as well.

The Court then affirmed a number of discovery rulings and sanctions involving emails and recorded telephone conversations.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

Sixth Circuit Refuses Employee Claim for Age Discrimination and to Award Attorneys Fees to Prevailing FMLA Plaintiff

This morning, the Sixth Circuit issued a few employment decisions that may be of interest to employers and employees.  In the first case, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s age discrimination claim where she had been fired for insubordination.   Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.,  No. 20-3511 (6^th Cir. 1-12-21, amended 2-19-21).  The Court reiterated that the Supreme Court has held the ADEA does not permit mixed-motive cases, unlike Title VII.  Further, her evidence of stray remarks by the Bank’s president about an employee who was 40 years older than her were too vague and unrelated to her situation to constitute direct evidence that she had been fired because of her age.    In the second case, the plaintiff physician was denied prevailing party attorney fees in his FMLA claim by the arbitrator because he had failed to educate the arbitrator that the statute prevailed over contrary language in the arbitration clause and because he failed to submit any definitive evidence of the fees he was claiming.

In the first case, the plaintiff teller was fired by her long time banking employer for insubordination for refusing to submit a written request for time off until the day before her day off even though such requests were due a month in advance.  She argued that this was pretext for age discrimination.  The district court granted summary judgment to the employer and she appealed.

The plaintiff attempted to argue that she had proved age discrimination with direct evidence based on a few inflammatory statements that the Bank’s president made about another employee who was 40 years older than the plaintiff and that he wanted to hire younger tellers.  The Court disagreed.  “In reviewing direct evidence, we look for “evidence from the lips of the defendant proclaiming his or her . . . animus.”  . . .Inferences are not permitted.”

“Direct evidence is evidence that proves the existence of a fact without requiring any inferences” to be drawn.  . . . In other words, direct evidence is “smoking gun” evidence that “explains itself.”

                . . .

In determining the materiality of allegedly discriminatory statements, we consider four factors, none of which are dispositive: “(1) whether the statements were made by a decisionmaker . . . ; (2) whether the statements were related to the decision-making process; (3) whether the statements were more than merely vague, ambiguous or isolated remarks; and (4) whether they were made proximate in time to the act of termination.”

             . . . None of the statements were related to [the plaintiff]’s termination. In fact, they were not made in relation to any termination decision and were about an entirely different employee. Additionally, nothing in the record suggests that the statements were more than isolated remarks. Here, it appears as though these statements were only made once or twice to certain higher-level management employees.

                . . . Hiring younger tellers does not require the termination of older employees.

 . . ., in terms of timing, the comments in question come from late 2015 or early 2016, more than six months before her termination. We have previously suggested that time spans of six or seven months can be temporally distant.

That being said, such statements could be considered as circumstantial evidence to argue pretext if the plaintiff attempted to prove her case through burden shifting and to raise a “plausible inference of discrimination.”     Nonetheless, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the employer’s explanation for her termination – that she was insubordinate – was pretext for age discrimination.

First, the plaintiff could not prove that the explanation had no basis in fact.  She argued that she was not insubordinate because she had submitted a written request one day in advance and had obtained verbal approval a month in advance.  However, the Court pointed out that she had been required by her manager’s policy to submit the written request a month in advance and she had admittedly told her manager that she refused to do so because she disagreed with the policy.  She did not ultimately submit her written request until the day before her took time off.  Her “late completion of the form could not cure her original refusal to follow Sonderman’s directive.”

She also could not prove pretext with the isolated and sparse comments that the Bank president had made about another situation. Those comments “were not directed towards Pelcha, not directed towards anyone near Pelcha’s age, and not made in connection with any termination decision at all.”

She also could not show that her employer changed its explanation for her termination by also later documenting issues with her negative attitude and contribution to a negative work environment.  Prior decisions have held that “providing “additional, non-discriminatory reasons that do not conflict with the one stated at the time of discharge does not constitute shifting justifications”.

In addition, she could not show pretext by arguing that the employer failed to comply with its own progressive disciplinary policy.   The policy was clear of the typical steps in the process and clarified that some offenses would justify skipping some or all of the steps.  In conclusion, “an ‘employer may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason.’”

Ultimately, she also could not satisfy the prima facie case because she could not prove that she was treated more harshly than another, younger employee because the fact that a younger co-worker may have neglected to turn in the form is not the same as insubordination in refusing to turn in the form. “Neglecting to complete a time off form and defiantly refusing to do so upon being asked by a superior are significantly different actions.”

In the second case, the Court denied the appeal of a physician who was denied in arbitration attorney’s fees as the prevailing party on his FMLA claim.  Gunasekera v. War Memorial Hospital, No. 20-1340 (6^th Cir. 1-12-21).   The physician asserted (correctly) that attorneys’ fees are awarded under the FMLA statute to prevailing plaintiffs.  However, the arbitrator reasoned that the arbitration agreement provided that each party would pay its own fees and, in any event, his attorney had failed to submit evidence of the attorneys’ fees accrued to that point during the hearing.    The Sixth Circuit found that a mere error of law by the arbitrator does not constitute the necessary manifest disregard of the law (if that standard even still applied) as required to overturn an arbitration award.  This was particularly true when the arbitration briefs failed to argue that the FMLA provision overrode the terms of the parties’ agreement.    More importantly, the physician failed to submit any evidence to the arbitrator of the amount of his fees. “In that brief, Dr. Gunasekera merely asserted that he was entitled to receive ‘all of his legal fees,’ which exceeded $35,000.”  Without concrete evidence upon which to base an award of a specific sum, the arbitration could not have erred in failing to award fees to a prevailing party under the FMLA.  

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

Sixth Circuit Rejects Employer's Independent Investigation and Honest Belief Defenses and Finds Cat's Paw Theory

In June, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment in a USERRA retaliation case on the grounds that the plaintiff produced sufficient direct evidence of discrimination, produced sufficient evidence to proceed under a cat’s paw theory and the employer’s explanation was clearly pretextual when the plaintiff had been fired, in part, for engaging in conduct that violated corporate policy as directed in a text message by his allegedly biased manager.  Hickle v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., No. 18-4131 (6^th Cir. 2019).  The employer could not rely on an honest belief defense when the investigator did not interview witnesses to the biased threats to terminate the plaintiff for a pretexual reason on account of his military service and supported the termination of the plaintiff in part for violating a policy at the clear direction of his manager who was allegedly biased against him.   

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had been hired while in high school, joined the national guard, served overseas and was promoted to kitchen manager.  Over the years, his manager repeatedly complained about his military leave and he complained about this to the General Manager.  He was never denied military leave.   When he reported that he required military leave the weekend of a big Avengers movie release in April 2015, his manager indicated in front of another employee that he might be fired if he did not report to work.   He also heard from other employees that his manager was planning to set him up to get fired and he reported this to his manager, who texted him that he should obtain written statements about this before leaving for the day.   Apparently, investigating workplace misconduct is exclusively reserved for corporate employees and obtaining witness statements is considered to be impeding an investigation.  In the meantime, he was involved in a dispute with two subordinates that lead to their termination for trying to take home too many leftover chicken-fingers.  


A corporate investigation commenced and he reported to the investigator that his manager had openly resented his military leave and indicated that he could be fired for attending drill instead of the Avengers premiere.  The investigator also indicated that the General Manager thought he should be fired.  The investigator did not interview the employee who heard the manager threaten the plaintiff with termination.  In the end, the investigator found that the plaintiff had engaged in several instances of misconduct, and he was fired in April 2015 for the chicken finger episode and impeding an investigation, despite the written instruction from his manager.   


On appeal, the Court found that he had produced sufficient direct evidence of retaliation with (disputed) evidence of his manager’s comments to him and his repeated complaints about it to the General Manager and to the investigator even though the discriminatory comments were not made by the decisionmaker or investigator who made the recommendation.   The Court was influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had been terminated for violating a rule at the explicit direction of the manager who had threatened to have him fired for attending national guard drill that same month during the Avengers premiere.

The decisionmaker (Bradley) and those with direct input (Kalman and Melton-Miller) knew about Adler’s persistent, discriminatory comments. . . . In sum, the decisionmaker knew that Hickle was told to commit a fireable offense—gathering statements and thereby impeding an investigation—by someone Hickle had repeatedly said had made discriminatory comments threatening his job.  Yet the decisionmaker chose to fire Hickle.

The Court also found sufficient evidence to proceed to a jury with a cat’s-paw theory of liability.  As previously explained by the Supreme Court, ““if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”  The trial court did not find it to be a jury question whether the manager intended to cause the plaintiff to be fired when she directed him to obtain witness statements in violation of company policy even though she had very recently told him that he would be fired for a pretextual reason if he missed the Avengers premiere in order to attend military drill.   Drawing inferences in favor of the plaintiff could lead a jury to believe that the manager texted him order to set him up to be fired.


The Court indicated that it was also a question for the jury whether an independent investigation by corporate broke any chain of causation between the manager’s alleged animus and the decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment.   On one hand, the plaintiff may have engaged in other misconduct as alleged by other employees involving the chicken-finger incident which was also cited as additional reasons for his termination, but on the other hand, the investigator weighted the “impeding the investigation” more heavily in her deposition testimony and failed to interview key employee witnesses who could have supported the plaintiff’s concerns with anti-military animus. “As best as we can tell, the investigation consisted mostly of gathering statements from a few employees, and was not necessarily thorough.” (But the deposition at issue admittedly was not clear).   Moreover, the investigator referred to the General Manager as her “partner” in the investigation.


The Court also found that the plaintiff produced sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliation, particularly from the employer’s failure to articulate a cogent explanation for why “impeding an investigation” was an dischargeable offense when his own allegedly biased manager directed him to do gather the witness statements at issue.   The Court did not find it to be a close question whether sufficient evidence had been produced merely because the employer had always granted the plaintiff’s military leave requests.

We do not find this fact to be determinative, as there could be numerous situations in which an employer would grant requests for military leave (albeit grudgingly) for years and nevertheless finally wrongfully terminate an employee for taking such leave.  Certainly, granting Hickle’s leave requests helps AMC’s case, but it does not insulate AMC from charges of retaliation.

While the district court found that the employer had satisfied its burden of proving that it would have terminated the plaintiff even if he had never served in the military because of the other incidents alleged by his subordinates, the Court found that this was a question for the jury because:

it remains an open question whether the decisionmaker relied solely on the chicken-finger incident in deciding to terminate Hickle, and whether she would have reached the same conclusion in the absence of the charges of impeding the investigation. 

  The Court distinguished a case where the investigator did not know about the potential discriminatory animus and conducted a more thorough investigation.  The Court also rejected the employer’s honest belief defense when the investigator was aware of the manager’s potentially biased motive in directing the plaintiff to violate corporate policy and obtain witness statements.

Here, [the investigator] knew of Hickle’s USERRA complaints and knew that Adler told Hickle to take action that would amount to impeding the investigation; nevertheless, Bradley seems to have considered the charge of impeding the investigation relevant to the decision.  Thus, the honest-belief rule does not help the defendant.  The “particularized facts that were before [the employer] at the time the decision was made,”  . . ., included Adler’s anti-military comments and her text to Hickle telling him to collect statements.  This was not a case in which the decisionmaker was acting on a clean record and in ignorance of lurking discriminatory motives.  The decisionmaker was fully aware of the facts suggesting that the “impeding the investigation” charge was pretextual.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Rejects Full-Time Work Schedule as Presumptive Essential Job Requirement Under the ADA

Last month, the Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment on a claim brought under the ADA, FMLA, and Pregnancy Discrimination Act on the grounds that the employer failed to prove that full time employment was an essential function of the position that precluded the plaintiff from working half-time for six more weeks while she recovered from post-partum depression.   Hostettler v. College of Wooster, No. 17-3406 ((6^th  Cir. 7-17-18).  The employer made a few hair-brained decisions:  denying a temporary extension of a requested medical leave (i.e., part-time schedule) right after giving the plaintiff a glowing performance evaluation.   It also failed to engage in the interactive process once it realized that her modified work schedule was more trouble than it was worth and that it questioned her need for leave.   Accordingly, as with another recent Sixth Circuit decision, the Court concluded that an employer’s rescission of a reasonable accommodation constitutes direct evidence of disability discrimination, making the McDonald-Douglas burden shifting analysis inappropriate.  “An employer cannot deny a modified work schedule as unreasonable unless the employer can show why the employee is needed on a full-time schedule; merely stating that anything less than full-time employment is per se unreasonable will not relieve an employer of its ADA responsibilities.” 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired when she was four months pregnant and worked full time until she delivered.  She requested and was given more than twelve weeks of maternity leave, even though she did not qualify under the FMLA.  When her separation anxiety and post-partum depression precluded her from returning to work full-time, she was granted a reasonable accommodation of returning to a half-time schedule for approximately ten weeks.   She received a glowing performance evaluation in June.  In July, she submitted another certification indicating that she required approximately another six weeks of half-time work before she could return full-time. The next day, she offered to stay a couple hours later each day.  The day after that she was fired.   Although there was evidence that she had timely completed all of her assignments and had even been working a little from home, her boss was very stressed from picking up the slack and was concerned about work that was not getting done at all, like recruiting, lunch trainings, etc.  The plaintiff was not the only employee on medical leave and her boss was often the only person remaining in their small office.  The department was also starting a new online benefits enrollment system that month, which was taking the supervisor’s time as well.  However, a replacement was not hired until October – a month after the plaintiff likely would have returned to full-time work.

The employer argued that the employee only wanted to work part-time for the summer and that the only limitations she experienced with transitory and brief panic attacks.  However, the Court noted that she had been prescribed anti-depressants and had witnesses describe symptoms that went beyond the occasional brief panic attacks.

The “crux” of the case was whether the plaintiff was qualified for her position with or without a reasonable accommodation.

A job function is essential if its removal would fundamentally alter the position. . . . Put another way, essential functions are the core job duties, not the marginal ones . . . .

This analysis does not lend itself to categorical rules—it is “highly fact specific. . . . Although this court has stated that “[r]egular, in-person attendance is an essential function” of most jobs, EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 762–63 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc), it is not unconditionally so; courts must perform a fact-intensive analysis.  In determining what functions are essential, courts may consider as evidence—among other things—the amount of time spent on a particular function; the employer’s judgment; “written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing” for the position; and the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the particular function.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3).  Although the employer’s judgment receives some weight in this analysis, see Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs., 847 F.3d 384, 391–92 (6th Cir. 2017), it is not the end-all—especially when an employee puts forth competing evidence.

The Court found that the plaintiff had created a factual dispute about whether full-time work was an essential function of her position.  A co-worker supplied an affidavit that there was no work within the department which was not being accomplished.  The plaintiff had just weeks earlier received a positive performance evaluation which confirmed that she was performing her job. Indeed, the plaintiff had never been criticized about her work.   (The Court seemed oblivious to the fact that no rational employer is going to criticize an employee for not performing work while on medical leave).  When asked, her boss could not identify a particular task which was not getting performed.

On its own, however, full-time presence at work is not an essential function.  An employer must tie time-and-presence requirements to some other job requirement.  To be sure, [the employer] cites language from this court’s cases that, when viewed independently from the facts of the cases, supports the college’s position.  But those cases nevertheless carried out a fact intensive analysis of actual job requirements.

The Court continued:

In sum, full-time presence at work is not an essential function of a job simply because an employer says that it is.  If it were otherwise, employers could refuse any accommodation that left an employee at work for fewer than 40 hours per week.  That could mean denying leave for doctor’s appointments, dialysis, therapy, or anything else that requires time away from work.  Aside from being antithetical to the purpose of the ADA, it also would allow employers to negate the regulation that reasonable accommodations include leave or telework.  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii).   

[The employer] may have preferred that [the plaintiff] be in the office 40 hours a week.  And it may have been more efficient and easier on the department if she were.  But those are not the concerns of the ADA:  Congress decided that the benefits of gainful employment for individuals with disabilities—dignity, financial independence, and self-sufficiency, among others—outweigh simple calculations of ease or efficiency.  To that end, the ADA requires that employers  reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities, including allowing modified work schedules.  An employer cannot deny a modified work schedule as unreasonable unless the employer can show why the employee is needed on a full-time schedule; merely stating that anything less than full-time employment is per se unreasonable will not relieve an employer of its ADA responsibilities.  

The Court put limits on his holding:

[The plaintiff] never claimed, nor do we hold, that she had a right to perform her job on a part-time basis indefinitely.  If she had, we might be reviewing a closer case; one in which Wooster at least would have had the opportunity to show that such an accommodation was unreasonable.   . . . But that is not the case here.  Here, [the plaintiff] introduced sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact over whether her moderate, time-limited accommodation allowed her to perform the essential functions of her position.

The Court also found a disputed issue of fact as to whether the employer had properly engaged in the interactive process. The trial court found it had by having four separate conversations with the plaintiff about the need for her to return to a full-time schedule, but the plaintiff asserted that it had only been discussed once and the employer never responded to her offer to work 6 hours/day.

The Court also reversed summary judgment on the plaintiff’s PDA claim because the trial court had concluded that the plaintiff’s refusal to work full-time was a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason to discharge her that was not disproven as pretext.  However, the Court had already rejected the full-time work argument and found that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence of pretext by questioning whether that was the actual reason for her termination and showing disparate treatment by the longer medical leaves taken by two other employees for non-pregnancy reasons.

Notwithstanding the fact that no reasonable human resources employee could have believe that she was covered by the FMLA, the Court resurrected her FMLA claim by permitting her to pursue an equitable estoppel theory on the grounds that that the employer treated her leave as through she was covered by the FMLA even though she had only worked four months before she began her leave and had been given well more than 12 weeks off work before returning on a part-time basis.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

A Tale of Two ADA Claims Or The Role of an Employer’s Legitimate Expectations Under the ADA

Within the past week, the Sixth Circuit has decided two ADA cases.  In both cases, the employer argued that it terminated the plaintiff because the employee was not meeting its legitimate expectations. In both cases, the plaintiffs raised claims that the employer failed to accommodate their disabilities.  In one case, the Court found that the employer’s failure to approve the employee’s requested accommodation or explore any alternatives constituted direct evidence of discrimination and, therefore, her termination for violating a standard rule in violation of its legitimate expectations was also discriminatory without regard to how it treated other employees for violating the same rule.  In contrast, in the other case, the Court refused to consider the plaintiff’s accommodation claim because he was not meeting the employer’s legitimate performance expectations and the employer had spent a month discussing the requested accommodations with the employee.  In one case, the plaintiff prevailed, receiving over $275K in back pay and compensatory damages and over $445K in fees for her successful attorneys, but the other plaintiff’s claim was dismissed without an expensive trial.  More problematic for employers, however, is that the Court held that when an employer denies a reasonable accommodation, the employer’s termination of the employee for not complying with the neutral policy that should have been modified as an accommodation constitutes direct evidence of discrimination and the employer may not defend itself by arguing it had a legitimate reason or treated other employees the same. “Failure to consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation for known disabilities, if it leads to discharge for performance inadequacies resulting from the disabilities, amounts to a discharge solely because of the disabilities.”

This morning, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the ADA claims brought by an employee who had been terminated for never mastering his job duties eight weeks after he had been hired.   Most v. BWXT Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. , No. 18-3059 (6^th Cir. 8-15-18).  The plaintiff suffered from social anxiety disorder (which caused panic attacks, etc.)  and had been treated for several years.  Based on his job experience, he applied for a job and was trained at the same time as another new hire, who like most new hires, mastered their job duties within a couple of weeks.  The plaintiff, however, had not mastered them after 8 weeks.   He was the only programmer hired in the prior 8 years who had not mastered his duties within a month of being hired. 

He took a few days off to consider whether to proceed with this job.  When he returned, he disclosed his disability and requested accommodation of certain job requirements which had not been identified in the online job listing when he applied.   At least one of those accommodations was granted, but the Court’s opinion is unclear about others even though there had been discussions over several weeks.  The Court also noted that the HR Manager was exceedingly rude to the plaintiff during the first month after the plaintiff sought accommodation of his disorder.  After two months of not improving sufficiently to perform billable work, the employer requested documentation to prove his claimed social anxiety disorder and gave the plaintiff six days in which to produce such evidence (i.e., before May 31).  On May 31, the plaintiff reported that the clinic had closed, but he produced two years of prescriptions and made an appointment with his primary care physician to receive an updated diagnosis.  He was fired six days later for not meeting job expectations nine weeks after being hired, requesting and requiring an unreasonable accommodation (which his supervisor had already told him was granted) and failing to provide medical documentation to prove the existence or extent of his disability.

The Court affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff was not qualified for his position because he did not meet the legitimate performance expectations of his employer:

[He] puts forth no evidence of positive performance that conflicts with [the employer’s] negative evaluations of his performance.  He also does not submit evidence that he was qualified to do the job, other than his on-paper qualifications.  Rather, [his] deficient performance supports that he was unqualified to do the job.  [His] claim for disability discrimination thus fails as a matter of law.

The Court refused to consider his failure-to-accommodate claim because he had not shown “that he was qualified for the position with or without reasonable accommodation” in light of his poor job performance.

The Court rejected the retaliation claim because concerns of his deficient performance had been expressed before he disclosed his disability and requested accommodation and he had not, as discussed above, refuted that his performance was not meeting his employer’s expectations or showed that he was treated differently than a similarly-situated employee.  As for the mistreatment by the HR Director, “these statements, although imprudent when viewed standing alone, are insufficient to show that [the plaintiff’s] poor performance did not actually motivate [the employer’s] decision to terminate him” in light of his poor performance and the period of almost a month while the employer engaged in the interactive process.

In contrast, a week earlier, the Court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of a former cashier who was fired for violating the employer’s rule against consuming merchandise in front of customers during her shift because she wanted to self-treat her low blood sugar.  EEOC v. DolGenCorp, LLC, No. 17-6278 (6^th Cir. 8-7-18).  The employer’s summary rejection of the plaintiff’s requested accommodation and failure to explore alternatives effectively precluded it from convincing a jury that equally effective alternatives existed.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was a type-II diabetic who had twice been previously hospitalized and was required to monitor her blood sugar, take insulin daily and monitor her diet to keep from shaking, seizing or passing out.  When she has an episode, her doctors recommended that she immediately take 100 calories of glucose.  Although other options were available, the plaintiff preferred to drink orange juice because it was easy to measure and took effect quickly.  She had worked for the employer since 2009 and had been promoted several times, to the point of being trusted to staff the store alone.  Prior to her most recent promotion, she would take quick breaks in the back when she required orange juice, but in her new role, she could not leave the front of the store unattended.  Accordingly, she requested permission to keep OJ at the cash register and was told that it was against company policy.

Nonetheless, while there were customers in the store when she was the only employee on duty, she suffered two hypoglycemic episodes.  Because she could not leave the front of the store unattended, she purchased OJ from the store cooler and drank it.   Both times, she later informed her General Manager without consequences.   During a later audit by the District Manager and Regional Loss Prevention Manager of merchandise shrinkage issues (i.e., shoplifting), she was told that she had been seen eating Little Debbie snack cakes at the register.  She denied that accusation but admitted to buying and drinking OJ during two medical emergencies.   This was found to violate the franchise “grazing policy,” which forbids employees from consuming merchandise in the store before paying for it, and she was immediately fired.

The employer argued that it had not been required to provide the requested accommodation – OJ at the cash register – when other accommodations were possible according to the plaintiff’s own nurse: “glucose tablets, or gels, honey, candy, and peanut butter crackers.”  However, by summarily rejecting the requested accommodation and failing to explore alternatives, there was no discussion of the well-established rule that employers are not required to grant the specific accommodation requested as long as the employee is provided with an effective accommodation.  There was also no discussion about these accommodations being ineffective (although the plaintiff argued that they were not as convenient as OJ).  Rather, the Court found that a jury could find these alternatives to violate the same rule that had been cited to deny the plaintiff permission to keep OJ at the cash register, even though that policy provided an explicit exception for disabilities depending on the circumstances.

The Court also rejected the employer’s argument that it had a valid reason for terminating her employment: that she violated the anti-grazing policy that applied to all employees (even though it provided exceptions for disabilities that were not granted to the plaintiff).

But a company may not illegitimately deny an employee a reasonable accommodation to a general policy and use that same policy as a neutral basis for firing him.  Imagine a school that lacked an elevator to accommodate a teacher with mobility problems.  It could not refuse to assign him to classrooms on the first floor, then turn around and fire him for being late to class after he took too long to climb the stairs between periods.  In the same way, Atkins never would have had a reason to buy the store’s orange juice during a medical emergency if Dollar General had allowed her to keep her own orange juice at the register or worked with her to find another solution.

                 . .. A defendant may use a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale as a shield against indirect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.   . . . But a neutral policy is of no moment when an employee presents direct evidence of discrimination.   . . .  And failing to provide a protected employee a reasonable accommodation constitutes direct evidence of discrimination.   . . . .  Hence “failure to consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation for known disabilities, if it leads to discharge for performance inadequacies resulting from the disabilities, amounts to a discharge solely because of the disabilities.”

The failure-to-accommodate was all of the direct evidence required to prove the plaintiff’s case.  She was not required to show any disability-animus by the employer.  By way of example, if an employer refused to retain a blind employee because of the added expense of special software, the employer’s cost-justification for her termination would not preclude a finding that its failure to provide a reasonable accommodation (the software) was direct evidence of discrimination on account of her disability.

Accordingly, the Court refused to consider whether the non-grazing policy had been equally applied to other, non-disabled employees because those employees would not be similarly-situated and more importantly, such a comparison is only required when the plaintiff relies on an indirect or circumstantial burden of proof.  In this case, the employer’s failure to accommodate (or consider other accommodations) was direct evidence of discrimination.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.  

Sixth Circuit Affirms City's Judgment But Reversed Union's Judgment in Case Alleging Discriminatory Layoffs

This week there have already been three interesting decisions.  In one, the Sixth Circuit absolved a City of discrimination for accommodating a union demand to layoff one group of employees over another, but pulled the union back into the litigation for potential discrimination liability for making that demand in the first place.   Peeples v. City of Detroit, No. 17-222 (6^th Cir. 2018). The Court refused to let plaintiffs alleging race discrimination “piggyback” on the only timely EEOC Charge which resulted in a right-to-sue letter when that charge alleged only national origin discrimination.  It also refused to find statements made by a city employee about the union’s purported motivation as direct evidence.  It also found no circumstantial evidence of discrimination based only on statistics which did not attempt to show significant deviations from non-discriminatory factors, like seniority, and which were based on small sample size.  The Court, however, found that the plaintiffs did not need to show that the union breached its duty of fair representation in order to sue the union under Title VII.

According to the Court’s opinion, the City of Detroit instituted layoffs in advance of filing for bankruptcy protection.  It announced the layoff list based on city-wide seniority, but the fire department union objected on the grounds that it should be based on department seniority and filed a grievance. The City ultimately resolved the grievance by granting the union’s request.   The distinction resulted in the layoff of more minority officers under the union’s proposal than the City’s plan.  After four EEOC Charges followed, the fire union relented and agreed to the City’s initial plan.  The City ended up re-hiring the affected employees 80 days later and giving them full back pay, missed overtime pay and medical benefits.  Nonetheless, even though only one of the plaintiffs had obtained a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, eleven of the affected minority employees brought suit against the City and the Union, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.

The Court addressed whether all of the plaintiffs could piggy back onto the one plaintiff’s right-to-sue letter.  Sadly for the plaintiffs, they did not raise any arguments to rebut the failure-to-exhaust remedies argument raised in the City’s summary judgment motion and, thus, were limited in what could be argued on appeal.   The only plaintiff to obtain a right-to-sue letter asserted only a national origin discrimination claim and the remaining plaintiffs were asserting racial discrimination.  The Court found that they were not substantially related claims, and thus the race claims could not piggyback onto an EEOC Charge asserting only national origin discrimination.

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim of direct evidence of discrimination.  One of the plaintiffs testified in deposition that he heard a City employee state that he concluded the union was trying to protect the “white boys” from layoff.    This was not direct evidence of discrimination because it was a city employee explaining the union’s motivation and required an inference that the City endorsed that motive.  It also likely hearsay, but the Court did not ultimately resolve that issue.  

The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence, which was pretty much all that they had to show that they were selected for the layoff on account of their race (in that they were not replaced).  First, they failed to organize their statistics in any meaningful way before the trial court.  Second, the fact that the percentage of white layoffs fell and of minority layoffs rose significantly under the union plan did not, by itself, show impermissible bias.  To prove an inference of bias, “the statistics must show a significant disparity and eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity.”  For instance, one could use three standard deviations from hypothetical random chance.   The plaintiffs made no effort to account for seniority differences, for instance.  The City also argued about the sample size (only 27 people) and the other cost-cutting efforts made, including demotions, reductions in overtime and rescinded promotions.   The plaintiffs also made no effort to show the racial composition of the fire department before and after the layoff. “Unless the statistics, standing alone or in comparison, are sufficient to lead the mind naturally to the conclusion sought, they have no probative value; they do not move the proof one way or another.”

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s damage claim in that they had already received full back pay with the resolution of their grievances. The plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence disputing that they had already received full back pay.  The union pointed out that they never raised breach of settlement agreement claims based on the resolution of their grievances when they were reinstated.  Accordingly, while they might have some compensatory and punitive damages available under Title VII, their claims for backpay were rejected by the trial and appellate courts.

Finally, the Court rejected the union’s argument that Title VII claims were subject to the same burden of proof as fair representation claims under labor-relations laws, meaning that the plaintiffs need not show that the union breached its duty of fair representation before it could sue them for discrimination under Title VII. Because the union had prevailed on that issue before the trial court, the Sixth Circuit reversed the union’s summary judgment.  

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit: Unfairness is No Substitute for Evidence of Discrimination

On Monday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of an age discrimination claim brought by a salesman who was terminated after he refused to resign following the hire of (younger and higher paid) salesmen as he had requested.  Treadway v. California Products Corp., No. 15-5718 (Aug. 1, 2016).   The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that he proved direct evidence of discrimination by repeated references to his retirement or semi-retirement because those comments were not connected to his age but were related to his request to “slow down” and reassign most of his territory.  “The terms “retire” and “retirement” alone, without any evidence that they are being used as a proxy for age to express discriminatory bias, are not direct evidence of age discrimination.“ Further, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the employer’s explanation for terminating his employment – to save money by allocating his minor remaining responsibilities – was pretextual.  While the employer’s decision might have been unfair and/or unwise, it was honestly held and not completely unworthy of belief.  Indeed, the Court concluded that the plaintiff himself was responsible for initiating the chain of events by asking to slow down, by seeking reassignment of most of his territory, and frequently inquiring when his replacement would be hired and that he only changed his mind when his new employer ultimately decided not to retain him as an independent contractor for his local and Bahamas territories.

According to the Court’s opinion, when the plaintiff was 66 years old, he requested to slow down and reduce his multi-state sales territory to eliminate most travel.  After discussions with his supervisor, it was decided to hire new salesmen to assume most of his duties and he would be limited to the area within 40 miles of his home and the Bahamas.   His supervisor assumed that he would retire by the end of 2009 based on their discussion, but the plaintiff denied ever expressing an interest in retirement.  While he was the oldest salesman in the company, all of the other salesmen were over 49 and most of them were over 60.  Initially, two other salesmen would lose their territories, which the plaintiff and another salesman would assume (as extra work), then new salesmen would be hired to take these territories and most of the plaintiff’s former territories.  At that point, the plaintiff would become an independent sales agent, lose his $48k/year salary and be paid strictly on commission, to be re-evaluated annually. 

Some months later, the employer was acquired by the defendant company.  Plaintiff was told to be patient while the new company evaluated its needs and options, so no one was hired to assume his newly expanded territory as had been contemplated a few months earlier.  His supervisor requested that the new company make plans to replace the plaintiff based on his impending retirement.  The plaintiff saw and never objected to the plan which mentioned his impending retirement, but no replacements were hired for more than two years and his salary remained unchanged.  The plaintiff continued to call his supervisor inquiring about the hiring of a replacement because he was stretched thin over four states. 

Finally, near the end of 2011, the defendant hired a new salesman to assume most of his territory.  He was 57, had prior industry and marketing experience and was paid $70K/year ($22k/year more than the plaintiff).  The rest of the plaintiff’s duties were assigned to existing and younger salesmen.  (Another younger and better paid salesman was hired the following year and was given some of the plaintiff’s former accounts).  The defendant refused to retain the plaintiff as an independent sales agent paid only through commission because it did not want to pay his travel expenses to the Bahamas when it could have a full-time employee assigned to that territory.  His supervisor tried again to convince the defendant to retain the plaintiff in some capacity, but was unsuccessful.  When the plaintiff learned that his services were no longer desired in any capacity, he refused to resign or retire as they had originally discussed.  The defendant then sent him a notice notifying him of his retirement and, when he objected, eliminated his position.

The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff had produced direct evidence of age discrimination by the frequent references to his impending and constantly delayed retirement because there was no connection between the discussion of his retirement and his age.  In fact, he admitted that no one ever referenced his age at any time.  Simply being the oldest salesman and his speculation could not constitute evidence of age discrimination.

Direct evidence requires no inference to prove the existence of a fact while circumstantial evidence “is proof that does not on its face establish discriminatory animus, but does allow a factfinder to draw a reasonable inference that discrimination occurred.”  . . .In the context of age discrimination, “‘[o]nly the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of age,’ satisfy this criter[ion].”

                . . .

The terms “retire” and “retirement” alone, without any evidence that they are being used as a proxy for age to express discriminatory bias, are not direct evidence of age discrimination.

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s explanation for terminating him and not retaining him as an independent sales agent was pretextual.  It was plausible for the defendant to believe that assigning the Bahamas territory to the employee already handling Bermuda made more financial sense. The plaintiff could not show that the defendant did not honestly believe its explanation:

We apply a modified version of the “honest belief” rule with regard to pretext.  . . . Under this rule, [the plaintiff] “must put forth evidence which demonstrates that the employer did not ‘honestly believe’ in the proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.”  . . . To show that the proffered reason for its action is “honestly held,” [the defendant employer] “must be able to establish its reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.”   . . .. [The plaintiff], in turn, “must be afforded the opportunity to produce evidence to the contrary, such as an error on the part of the employer that is ‘too obvious to be unintentional.’”   . . . Ultimately, however, pretext “is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer fire the employee for the stated reason or not?”

The plaintiff’s evidence, at best, consisted of references to his impending retirement “in internal e-mails and documents, [the defendant’s] replacement of [him] with younger salesmen at higher salaries, [its] lack of transparency and candor about its plan to retire [him], and the allegedly fraudulent alteration of the March 9, 2009 agreement (evidenced by the two existing versions).”  It was the plaintiff “who wanted to reduce his sales territory and eventually go from being a[n] employee to an independent sales agent responsible for a small number of accounts – [his supervisor] and others at [defendant] used the terms “retire,” “semi-retire,” and “retirement” to refer to this plan."

The Court refused to find pretext by comparing the plaintiff’s $48k annual salary to the $70K and $65K annual salaries of the new salesmen because neither of them assumed all of the plaintiff's prior duties.   Further, the plaintiff overlooked the new employees' prior experience, skill and comparative workloads.

CPC maintains that terminating [plaintiff] and allowing existing employees to absorb his few remaining accounts at no cost was much more cost-effective than paying Treadway $48,000 a year to continue servicing them. These hiring and salary decisions may or may not make good business sense, but [plaintiff] cannot establish pretext simply by questioning CPC’s business judgment. This court is not a “super personnel department” tasked with “second guessing employers’ business decisions.” . . . The ADEA cannot protect older employees from erroneous or even arbitrary personnel decisions but only from decisions that are unlawfully motivated.

While the evidence may indicate that the plaintiff was treated unfairly, it does not establish that the employer’s explanation was a pretext (or a disguise) for unlawful discrimination.  Indeed, the plaintiff had seen the plan mentioning his contemplated retirement and never objected to it.

What is ultimately fatal to [the plaintiff's] claim, however, is that [he] himself initiated and impelled the chain of decisions he now claims was motivated by discriminatory animus on the part of CPC decisionmakers. [The plaintiff] proactively reached out to [his supervisor] in 2009 and asked to reduce his sales territory because he was getting older and needed to “slow down.” Together, [the supervisor] and [the plaintiff] negotiated the terms of the March 9, 2009 agreement which, under either version of the document, establish that [his] sales territory would temporarily increase until a new salesman could be hired to cover the Carolinas, and that [he] would then separate from CPC (“go from Company employee”) to become an independent sales agent handling only three accounts in the Bahamas and those existing accounts within a 40-mile radius of his home in Johnson City, Tennessee. CPC executives, including [his supervisor], used the terms “retire” and “retirement” to refer to this plan. 

 When the transition . . . slowed the process of hiring a new salesman, [the plaintiff] called [his supervisor] throughout 2010 and 2011 to ask when someone would be hired, and even referred two potential candidates  . . .in an effort to expedite the hiring process. After CPC hired Boepple and he assumed responsibility for the Carolinas, CPC decided not to retain [the plaintiff] as an independent agent or continue to pay him a full salary to service his few remaining accounts. [The plaintiff] now argues that these decisions were made because of his age, but no reasonable jury could infer such a discriminatory animus from CPC from decisions that were prompted by [the plaintiff] himself. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Franklin County Appeals Court Reinstates $549K Race Discrimination Verdict Against Columbus Employer

Earlier this month, a divided Franklin County Court of Appeals reinstated a $549K jury verdict rendered against a south-side employer in a lawsuit alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation and producing evidence about disparaging comments and implied threats by management involving guns.    Smith v. Superior Production LLC, 2014-Ohio-1961 (5-8-14).  The plaintiff had been a production supervisor who requested a transfer in 2008 after his manager (also the son of a company owner and part owner himself) yelled at him and referred to him as the “n-word.”  The plaintiff admittedly never mentioned the n-word incident when he requested the transfer or anytime afterwards until he filed his lawsuit.   However, he claimed (over employer denials) that he had complained about his manager being a racist and the hostile work environment that existed in his former facility.  His transfer was granted, but he was demoted.  Despite his years of experience and seniority, he was one of the first employees laid off (with 60 other employees) during the great recession later that year and was not recalled to work when the economy improved months later.   During the jury trial in March 2013, the jury heard evidence about the use of the “n-word” by five different people (two managers and three co-workers) – out of 250 people who worked in the plant -- sporadically in a 10- year period and how a manager would intimidate black employees by putting a cocked gun on his desk during a meeting in his office.  The employer argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that there was pervasive harassment or different treatment of employees and the trial court determined that the employer was entitled to another trial, but then ultimately granted the employer judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.

The Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting the JNOV motion because the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.  For instance, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the race discrimination in termination claim because the plaintiff had been one of the first employees laid off despite his seniority and experience.  Although the evidence was disputed, there was also evidence that the plaintiff’s racist manager had been involved in selecting employees for layoff by identifying the employees he wanted to keep (which, clearly, did not include the plaintiff).   The Court found the manager’s use of the n-word directly to the plaintiff months before the layoff decision was sufficiently proximate to support the jury verdict.  As explained by the Court:

Constructing the evidence in favor of Smith, we determine that perhaps the most offensive word in the English language was used directly by Smith's supervisor in telling him to clock out and leave. As a result, Smith, no longer willing to work under Holstein, was moved to another facility, demoted in title and pay, and worked on another shift. This same supervisor was involved in the decision to layoff Smith two months later. There was a culture of discrimination at Superior evidenced by the common use of the n-word by both staff and management, including the owners as well as the lack of reprimands for use of the word. Holstein also used a gun to intimidate African-Americans during meetings in his office. . . .

There was evidence presented that only about 60 employees were initially terminated,  . . . There was also evidence that Superior sought to retain employees who could perform multiple jobs and provide the most flexible and skilled labor force. Superior typically tried to push down from the top of the workforce, to layoff only the bottom employees, but this was not the case with Smith. (Tr. Vol. III, at 362.) Smith was the first production employee laid-off and only the eighth employee overall. . . . Viewing the evidence most favorably for Smith, the jury could find that Smith, who was a production supervisor, who had performed every job on the production floor, and had over two decades experience, would not have been terminated but for his race.

The Court also concluded that the trial court erred in granting the JNOV motion on the retaliation claim, even with its higher level of proof.  There was evidence that this same manager may have been involved in the recall decisions and that he had made statements to another black employee in early 2009 disparaging the plaintiff with the n-word.  The employer had contended that the plaintiff had not been recalled because his primary skill was in an area supervised by his prior manager, who he had already refused to work for.  The Court concluded that the plaintiff had a wider skill set than the employer freely admitted and that there had never been any complaints about his work performance.   The Court also concluded that the jury may have found the employer witnesses to not be credible in light of inconsistencies in their testimony and discovery responses.

Further, if the jury believed that Holstein was acting like a racist, then Smith's desire not to be directly supervised by Holstein can be viewed by the jury as not being a legitimate business reason for failing to rehire him, and would further damage Holstein's credibility. This view is especially reasonable since Superior had multiple facilities and shifts in which Smith could work and not be supervised by Holstein. (Tr. Vol. III, at 343.) Superior could also have changed Duane Holstein's position so that he was not a manufacturing manager, an occurrence which happened anyway when Holstein became a safety manager. (Tr. Vol. III, at 317.) Reasonable minds can conclude that the jury properly found that Superior's proffered reasons for failing to rehire Smith were pretextual.

The Court also concluded that the trial court erred in granting the JNOV motion on the hostile work environment claim on the grounds that the use of the n-word was isolated and sporadic and “and merely an offensive utterance, rather than being threatening or humiliating.”

Reasonable minds can easily conclude that Holstein's use of the n-word, directly to Smith, while on the production floor, at the same time telling him to go home, was humiliating.

In any event, the Court also concluded that the employer was not entitled to a new trial – even under an abuse of discretion appellate standard -- and, therefore, reinstated the jury’s verdict (which will undoubtedly be appealed to the Supreme Court).

The dissent agreed with the majority on the impropriety of the JNOV verdict on the hostile work environment claim (based on the use of the n-word by two of the company’s owners), but believed the trial court was correct on the race and retaliation claims and saw no abuse of discretion in granting a new trial on all of the claims.   Among other things, he did not find the manager’s disparagement of the plaintiff two months before his layoff to be proximately related to the decision to lay him off.   He also noted that the plaintiff had been replaced by other black employee.  He also disputed the relevance of the gun evidence since there was no evidence that the manager behaved differently with white employees. He also rejected the retaliation claim because the employer’s explanation – that none of the supervisors requested the plaintiff’s return – did not show that the other supervisors were retaliating.  “While Superior's reason is not particularly fair to Smith, it is a motive other than unlawful retaliation.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.