Title VII Protects HR Employees, Too

Last summer, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgments given to two employers on claims brought by human resources employees.   In Briggs v. UC, 11 F.4^th 498 (6^th Cir. 2021), the Court ruled that a jury should evaluate a compensation analyst’s claim of wage discrimination within a college human resources department based on race and gender.  In Jackson v. Genesee County Road Commission, 999 F.3d 333 (6^th Cir. 2021), the Court ruled in favor of a fired HR Director who had advocated on behalf of employees alleging unlawful discrimination and asserted that her termination had been in retaliation for her opposing unlawful discrimination and engaging in those protected activities.  More interestingly, the Court found that Title VII – governing employment discrimination --  protected her role as the EEO Officer in ensuring EEO compliance by the employer’s vendors: as EEO Officer, her “actions could reasonably be viewed as steps to ensure there was no discrimination in hiring both within GCRC and among its vendors, and, thus, were protected activity under Title VII.”

According to the Court's analysis of the plaintiff's allegations in Briggs, the HR department hired a new compensation analyst in 2015 who possessed a college degree but no compensation experience.  She was paid significantly more than the incumbent-plaintiff, who had significant compensation experience but no college degree.   Part of the reason for the disparity was a policy requiring a 5% raise for any promotion and part was to entice her to leave her current position.  Although the manager advocated for an equity adjustment for the plaintiff (who was paid both less than the new peer and also below market) in 2015, the new VP allegedly refused because of his “inconsistent” 2016 performance evaluation (which apparently did not explain objectively the basis for the lower evaluation).  It was implied that the plaintiff had performed only his basic expectations before understanding that advancement came with exceeding expectations.  Ultimately, the manager claimed that he suffered retaliation for advocating on behalf of the plaintiff’s equity adjustment.  The new employee exceeded expectations, was promoted again and ultimately left.  When the plaintiff applied for her former position, the VP apparently revised the job description in an alleged attempt to render him unqualified.  There was also an implication that the VP contended that the plaintiff was not even qualified for his own position.  The VP gave the plaintiff the lowest possible performance bonus.

The Court rejected the employer’s argument that the compensation difference was based on a factor other than sex or race:

no authority supports the concept that an employee’s prior salary or demand for a specific salary is sufficient in isolation to justify a wage differential. Such a rule would simply perpetuate existing sex-based pay disparities and undercut the purpose of the Act—to require that those doing the same work receive the same pay. . . .

Though a defendant need not offer contemporaneously produced evidence of its rationale, there must be evidence in the record proving that the employer’s proffered justification was the reason for the wage differential’s existence. . .

                . .  .

The record does not show beyond dispute that Wittwer’s bachelor’s degree and higher performance ratings than Briggs, or any other specified factors, were the reason for the salary disparity between her and Briggs.   [The employer] has therefore failed to meet its burden of proving that these distinctions were “the reason for the pay disparity.”

The Court also rejected the employer’s argument regarding the new employee’s higher education and better attitude towards self-improvement and working outside the job description because of the lack of documentary evidence regarding the plaintiff’s purported performance issues until after he requested an equity adjustment and because of the lack of evidence that these issues actually motivated the pay disparity.  The Court explained that an employer is required to submit evidence “beyond dispute” from which “a factfinder could conclude that the proffered reasons “in fact” explain the wage disparity—not just that the reasons could explain it.” The Court also found sufficient evidence of pretext in that the employer’s explanation was not credible:

The record contains no contemporaneous evidence that the cited distinctions between Wittwer and Briggs actually motivated their salary disparity, and it contains disputes of fact among [the employer’s] own witnesses as to whether performance is, in practice, a consideration for employees’ base pay. The post-hoc nature of the justifications contained in Stidham’s affidavit further support an inference of pretext, particularly given that several of the statements contradict statements made by Stidham in Briggs’s performance reviews and cannot be squared with the undisputed fact that Stidham recognized Briggs’s pay was below market and requested an equity adjustment for him. “An employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.”

The Court also rejected the employer’s honest belief defense on the retaliation claim because the VP could not show a factual basis for her mistaken belief about the incumbent’s qualifications and his experience before being hired by the college and the fact that she pulled the job posting soon after he made his discrimination complaint.   

a reasonable jury could conclude that [the VP’s] alteration of the posting was retaliatory rather than innocent. Contemporaneous e-mails and other evidence suggest that [her] decision-making about Briggs’s complaint and the job posting were linked. Briggs made his complaint on November 8. . . .

Then, on November 13, [she] e-mailed [the manager] directing him to pull the senior compensation analyst job posting. Although in retaliation cases “temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis for finding pretext,” it can be “a strong indicator of pretext when accompanied by some other, independent evidence.”

According to the Court's evaluation of the plaintiff's allegations in Jackson, the employer had fired its HR Director without any explanation or investigation following a number of complaints about her communication skills, including some from individuals who had been investigated and/or counselled by her.   The employer had previously supported all of the actions she had taken.  One of the complaints was from a vendor which incorrectly claimed that she had frozen its payments based on a discrimination complaint it had received from one of its own employees.   The employer’s outside counsel had also complained about her insistence that all communications go through her when he was attempting to meet with witnesses and prepare for hearings, etc.  The employer did not investigate any of the complaints or give her any explanation for why she was being terminated.  Without being able to identify that it had relied only on accurate complaints or on complaints that did not implicate her investigating and remedying unlawful discrimination, the Court found that a jury should determine whether she had been terminated in retaliation for engaging in protected activities.

The opposition clause of Title VII makes it “unlawful . . . for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made . . . unlawful . . . by this [title.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The Supreme Court has held that the term “oppose” should be interpreted based on its ordinary meaning: “[t]o resist or antagonize . . . ; to contend against; to confront; resist; withstand.” . . .

This court and the Supreme Court have imposed limited restrictions on what activity constitutes opposition activity. While the plaintiff’s allegations of protected activity do not need to “be lodged with absolute formality, clarity, or precision,” the plaintiff must allege more than a “vague charge of discrimination.” . . . The plaintiff also must express her opposition in a reasonable manner. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 580. For example, “[a]n employee is not protected when he violates legitimate rules and orders of his employer, disrupts the employment environment, or interferes with the attainment of his employer’s goals.”. . .

. . .the district court held that the opposition clause is limited to conduct that goes beyond the plaintiff’s regular job duties. However, the district court’s assertion is contrary to both the text of the opposition clause and this court’s interpretation of Title VII for two reasons. First, the text of § 2000e-3(a) states that it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees,” which suggests that all employees are subject to the same standard. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). The statute also does not state that the employee’s conduct must fall outside of her regular job duties. . . .

                . . . this court has previously allowed plaintiffs to bring a retaliation claim for conduct related to their job responsibilities. . . . In Johnson, the vice president of human resources brought a Title VII claim . . . for allegedly firing him in part because of his advocacy on behalf of minorities related to his management of the university’s affirmative action program. . . . The Johnson court found that “the fact that Plaintiff may have had a contractual duty to voice [his concerns about the affirmative action program] is of no consequence to his claim.” . . . Excluding the vice president from the protection of Title VII would “run[] counter to the broad approach used when considering a claim for retaliation under this clause, as well the spirit and purpose behind Title VII as a broad remedial measure.” . . . The court worried that narrowing the scope of Title VII could create perverse incentives for employers and leave the employees specifically hired to do the often difficult work of combating discrimination with fewer protections than general employees. . . . In sum, both the text of Title VII and our precedent reject the district court’s additional restriction that the opposition clause does not extend to an employee’s regular job duties.

That being said, the Court did not find that all of the plaintiff’s investigations amounted to protected activity because she had not concluded that some of the alleged misconduct was the result of unlawful race discrimination.   Where she had concluded that unlawful race discrimination had occurred, her conduct in that investigation, informing management and negotiating a severance agreement for the offending manager constituted protected conduct.

Interestingly, the Court also found her role as EEO officer in working with vendors (not employees) was similarly protected conduct. “Jackson’s actions could reasonably be viewed as steps to ensure there was no discrimination in hiring both within GCRC and among its vendors, and, thus, were protected activity under Title VII.”

The Court also found sufficient evidence of causation from the temporal proximity of her protected activities (i.e., 2.5 months) and her termination.

The temporal proximity between Jackson’s protected activities and her termination is strong circumstantial evidence. In addition, many of the same people who complained to Daly about Jackson’s communication style were involved either in the negotiations with Bennett, such as Derderian, or communication about EEOPs, such as Plamondon, Peivandi, and two outside vendors. A reasonable juror could infer that these individuals described Jackson’s communication style as offensive and abrasive because they took issue with her handling of the investigation into Bennett’s or Jackson’s efforts to ensure EEOP compliance. Thus, Jackson has met the relatively light burden of demonstrating causation at the prima facie stage.

While there was some evidence supporting the employer’s explanation for her termination, she was also able to produce sufficient evidence of pretext to go to a jury.  Some employees, vendors and Board members contended that they had an excellent relationship with her.  “This evidence contradicts GCRC’s claim that Jackson’s communication style was inflexible and abrasive and could lead a juror to conclude Jackson’s communication style was not the true reason she was fired.”

Furthermore, several of the GCRC employees who complained about Jackson’s communication style also complained about Jackson’s protected activities, so a reasonable juror could conclude that their complaints about Jackson’s style were motivated to some degree by their opposition to her protected activities. . . . Although it is true that some of the employees who complained about Jackson’s communication style were not directly involved in her protected activities, there is enough overlap between the employees who complained to Daly and the individuals objecting to Jackson’s protected activities to call into question the strength of GCRC’s nondiscriminatory proffered reason.

  NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Divided Sixth Circuit Permits Rescission of Severance Agreement Release When Severance Pay Was Tendered Back A Few Weeks After Sex Discrimination Lawsuit Was Filed

Yesterday, a divided Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment on pregnancy and sex discrimination claims despite the fact that the plaintiff had signed a severance agreement and release in exchange for severance pay which she did not return until more than a year later -- after the EEOC investigation and a few weeks after she filed a lawsuit against her former employer.  McClellan v. Midwest Machining, Inc., No. 17-1992 (6^th Cir. 8-16-18).   The trial court found that the plaintiff’s release of claims had not been knowing and voluntary because she had been pressured to sign the release in the same meeting where she was terminated.  Although the trial court concluded that she had been required to tender back the severance pay before filing suit, the Sixth Circuit disagreed.  It found that, by returning the severance pay and revoking the agreement within weeks of when her attorney was informed of the agreement’s existence, she had satisfied the tender-back rule, if it even applied to bar federal discrimination claims.  Rather, the amount of severance could be deducted from any monetary award that she received during the litigation.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had worked in inside sales for the defendant employer for eight years with no disciplinary actions.  In August, she announced that she was pregnant and her supervisor appeared annoyed when she missed work for pre-natal appointments.  In November, she was called into the president’s office, informed that she was being terminated and that she would only get severance pay if she signed the severance agreement and release that day.  Although the president reviewed the terms with her, he did so quickly and shot down her questions about the amount of her accrued vacation pay.  The Release apparently did not explicitly mention that it covered claims of discrimination because she testified that she thought that that it only applied to wage claims. 

She later filed an EEOC Charge and retained an attorney, who filed a complaint asserting claims for pregnancy discrimination, pay discrimination and a sex-segregated workplace.  When the employer notified her attorney about the severance agreement, the plaintiff sent a letter to the employer rescinding the agreement and enclosing a check in the full amount of the severance pay that she had received.   The employer returned her check on the grounds that there was no legal basis for rescinding the agreement. 

The trial court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there were disputed questions of fact as to whether the plaintiff’s signature on the severance agreement release had been knowing and voluntary in light of the economic and other pressure she felt to sign the agreement during the termination meeting and the lack of clarity about the release encompassing discrimination claims.    However, the trial court granted the employer’s summary judgment motion on the grounds that even if the severance agreement had been voidable on grounds of involuntariness or duress, the common law tender back doctrine required her to return the consideration that she received prior to filing her lawsuit, not after, or she would be found to have ratified the severance agreement by retaining the consideration.

The Sixth Circuit reversed.  In its only prior reported decision applying the tender-back doctrine to a federal employment discrimination release, the court held that the tender back doctrine did not apply to a release of age discrimination claims under ADEA.  Raczak v. Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1997) (relying on Supreme Court decision in Hogue under the FELA).  The Supreme Court later refused to enforce a defective ADEA waiver (which did not comply with the OWBPA) even though the plaintiff had similarly failed to tender back the consideration that he had received prior to filing his ADEA lawsuit.  Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998).   The only other Circuit to address the issue to a Title VII claim had likewise found that the tender-back doctrine would not bar a lawsuit.  The Sixth Circuit found the same policy considerations applied to prevent applying the tender-back rule to federal sex discrimination claims.

In sum, we conclude that the language and reasoning of Oubre and Hogue apply equally to claims brought under Title VII and the EPA.  In Oubre, the Supreme Court was worried about “tempt[ing] employers to risk noncompliance . . . knowing it will be difficult to repay the moneys and rely[] on ratification.”  522 U.S. at 427.  Similarly, we worry that requiring recently discharged employees to return their severance before they can bring claims under Title VII and the EPA would serve only to protect malfeasant employers at the expense of employees’ statutory protections at the very time that those employees are most economically vulnerable.  We therefore hold that the tender-back doctrine does not apply to claims brought under Title VII and the EPA.  Rather, as the Supreme Court said in Hogue, “it is more consistent with the objectives of the Act to hold . . . that . . . the sum paid shall be deducted from any award determined to be due to the injured employee.”  390 U.S. at 518.

In any event, the Court found that the plaintiff’s return of the $4,000 severance pay more than a year after she had been fired and only a few weeks after she filed her lawsuit was sufficient to rescind the severance agreement.  “[F]ederal law does not require that the tender back be before, or contemporaneous with, the filing of the original complaint.” 

The Oubre majority, however, held that the party “elect[ing] avoidance” may tender back any benefits received under the severance agreement not only before filing suit, but at any point “within a reasonable time after learning of her rights.”  522 U.S. at 425 (emphasis added).  This comports with the Restatement of Contracts, which provides that “[t]he power of a party to avoid a contract for . . . duress . . . is lost if, after the circumstances that made it voidable have ceased to exist, he does not within a reasonable time manifest to the other party his intention to avoid it.”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 381(1) (1981) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, even if Plaintiff were required to tender back the consideration, she was required to do so not before filing suit but within a “reasonable time” after she discovered that the severance agreement revoked her right to bring a discrimination claim.  And given the district court’s factual finding that Plaintiff “did not understand she had given up her right to sue for discrimination” until engaging counsel to represent her in this matter, (R. 33, Second S. J. Order, PageID # 231), and that her counsel drafted a complaint immediately after speaking with her, it stands to reason that Plaintiff’s offer to tender back the consideration fell “within a reasonable time after learning of her rights,” Oubre, 522 U.S. at 425.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.  

EEOC Obtains $1.1M Settlement for Male Employees Denied Equal Paid Baby Bonding Time as New Moms

Yesterday, the EEOC announced the $1.1M settlement of a class action lawsuit asserting reverse discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII in favor of 210 new fathers who were denied parental leave benefits provided to new mothers by the Estee Lauder Company. The EEOC alleged in the lawsuit that it filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania at Civil Action No. 2:17-cv-03897-JP that the employer provided “new fathers, less paid leave to bond with a newborn, or with a newly adopted or fostered child, than it provided new mothers. The parental leave at issue was separate from medical leave received by mothers for childbirth and related issues. The EEOC also alleged that the company unlawfully denied new fathers return-to-work benefits provided to new mothers, such as temporary modified work schedules, to ease the transition to work after the arrival of a new child and exhaustion of paid parental leave.”  In particular, male employees received two weeks of paid parental leave, compared to the six weeks of parental leave that female employees received after their medical leaves had ended.

The Consent Decree, which was entered yesterday, requires Estee Lauder to administer parental leave and return-to-work policies in a non-discriminatory manner.  Estee Lauder recently implemented “a revised parental leave policy that provides all eligible employees, regardless of gender or care­giver status, the same 20 weeks of paid leave for child bonding and the same six-week flexibility period upon returning to work. For biological mothers, these parental paid leave benefits begin after any period of medical leave occasioned by childbirth. The benefits apply retroactively to all employees who experi­enced a qualifying event (e.g. birth, adoption, foster placement) since Jan. 1, 2018. The decree also requires that Estée Lauder provide training on unlawful sex discrimination and allow monitoring by the EEOC.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney

Sixth Circuit: No EPA Violation to Equalize Salesman’s Compensation to Match Female Without Pre-Existing EPA Violation

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment where a terminated male salesman alleged that the employer had violated the Equal Pay Act when it lowered his compensation to equal that of a female colleague. Schleicher v. Preferred Solutions, Inc., No. 15-1716 (6^th Cir. 8-2-16).  Under the EPA, an employer is not permitted to reduce an employee’s compensation in order to come into compliance with the Act.   However, the Court concluded that the employer had not violated the EPA by paying him substantially more than his female colleague because she voluntarily chose to be paid a salary and rejected the option to be paid on a purely contingency basis as he negotiated for himself.   Therefore, when his compensation was later reduced to match her compensation plan, the employer did not violate the EPA in doing so.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was hired after being introduced to the defendant’s president by the female colleague (who formerly worked with him).  While the female colleague was a vice-president, she and the plaintiff were the only salespeople in the healthcare IT market for the defendant company.  The plaintiff wanted to be paid exclusively a percentage of a profit pool based on the profits generated by the healthcare IT market, but the female colleague found that to be too risky and wanted to receive a half of his percentage plus a guaranteed salary.  No one knew who would end up being paid more at the time.  However, their division became extremely profitable and the plaintiff ended up being paid almost $700K more than her over a four year period.  Nonetheless, she never requested to modify her compensation structure.

In the meantime, his workplace conduct and refusal to follow direction created friction between him and the president.  There were also disputes as to who was more responsible for making that division as profitable as it was. The plaintiff alleged that the president made derogatory comments about his gender, suggesting at one point that he would be happier working with other men.  In May 2013, the president changed his compensation structure to match his female colleagues and then, after finding him insubordinate in December, terminated his employment.

The Court assumed that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case of an EPA violation by paying him almost $700k more over four years than his female colleague who was performing the same job.  However, it agreed that the defendant had carried its heavy burden of proving its affirmative defense that the compensation difference was based on a factor other than sex.

The Court found that the female colleague’s decision to take a less-risky compensation plan with a guaranteed salary was a legitimate factor other than sex for the difference in their compensation.  It rejected the plaintiff’s argument that this was a valid defense for the first year or two, but that it became a statutory violation when the compensation difference persisted for two more years without the female colleague being given the option of changing her compensation.    The Court seemed reluctant to characterize a legal decision to an illegal one simply with the passage of time, particularly when the female colleague testified that there was never a time that she wanted or requested to be paid on a purely contingency basis.   There was nothing about the plaintiff’s or colleague’s gender which played a factor in the employer’s decision to pay them with different compensation plans while performing the same work.

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the employer’s explanation was pretextual.  His evidence that there were discriminatory comments directed at him as a man hardly demonstrates why he was paid more because he was a man. 

Because it does not violate the EPA to reduce an employee’s salary if it is not done to remedy an EPA violation, reducing the plaintiff’s compensation to what his female colleague was being paid did not violate the EPA.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit: Employers Cannot Shorten FLSA/EPA Limitations Periods in Employment Agreements or Waivers

Yesterday, a unanimous Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment in a claim for unpaid overtime and unequal wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Equal Pay Act (EPA). Boaz v. FedEx Customer Information Services, Inc, No. 12-5319 (6^th Cir. 8-6-13).  First, the Court found that the employment agreement could not shorten the statutory limitations period from 2-3 years to 6 months because it constituted an invalid waiver of her FLSA and EPA claims.    Unlike other statutory claims, private settlement agreements or waivers of FLSA and EPA claims are not enforceable. Second, the Court found material factual disputes on the merits of her claims for unpaid overtime and unequal pay.  More interestingly, the Court made some observations about the perceived anti-competitive affects of various types of discrimination.

The plaintiff filed suit in April 2009 alleging that she had been paid less than a male co-worker performing the same job and that she had been denied overtime pay for jobs she held more than six months earlier (when she had been promoted to a new job).  “The statute of limitations for the FLSA is two years for non-wilful violations and three years for wilful ones. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).”   As long ago as 1946, the Supreme  Court had held that “employees may not, either prospectively or retrospectively, waive their FLSA rights to minimum wages, overtime, or liquidated damages. “  The plaintiff’s employment agreement in this case provided in relevant part that:

 

To the extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against Federal Express Corporation, I agree to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6 months from the date of the event forming the basis of my lawsuit, whichever expires first.

The employer argued that employers are allowed to shorten the limitations period for claims brought under other statutes, like Title VII, and should be able to shorten the limitations period for claims brought under the FLSA.   However, the Court rejected that argument because, unlike the FLSA, employees are permitted to privately settle and waive their claims under Title VII.  In addition, in a startling observation, the Court stated:

Second—and relatedly—an employer that pays an employee less than minimum wage arguably gains a competitive advantage by doing so. See Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36 (1987). An employer who refuses to hire African-Americans or some other racial group does not. The Court’s rationale for prohibiting waiver of FLSA claims is therefore not present for Title VII claims.

The employer next argued that employees are allowed to waive their right to a judicial forum under the FLSA by signing arbitration agreements because the prohibition against private waivers has been held to only apply to substantive rights and not procedural ones.  However, the Court distinguished this precedent by noting that waiving the judicial forum still allows for the effective vindication of the employee’s claim, while the shortened limitations period in the plaintiff’s employment agreement “at issue here does the opposite.”  Therefore, because the limitations provision in the employment agreement operated as a waiver of her claims, “it is invalid.”

The Court held that this reasoning applied with equal force to the plaintiff’s EPA claims because Congress amended the FLSA in 1963 to include the EPA.   Moreover, in contrast to what the Court said (above) about the anti-competitive effects of Title VII, it made the following observation about the EPA:

Second, the Supreme Court’s rationale for barring waiver of FLSA claims appears fully applicable to claims under the Equal Pay Act. An employer who pays women less than a lawful wage might gain the same competitive advantage as an employer who pays less than minimum wage. Indeed the Court has said that “[t]he whole purpose of the [Equal Pay Act] was to require that the[] depressed wages [of women] be raised, in part as a matter of simple justice to the employees themselves, but also as a matter of market economics[.]” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 207 (1974).

The Court also rejected other potential bases to affirm the summary judgment.  For instance, the Court refused to credit the plaintiff’s deposition admission that she had been an exempt employee:

An employee’s subjective belief that her position was exempt from the FLSA, however, does not mean the position was exempt as a matter of law. Cf. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 300–01 (1985) (witnesses’ testimony that they were volunteers was not dispositive of whether they were actually employees under the FLSA). Were it otherwise, an employer could obtain waivers of FLSA  claims  merely by having its employees sign a form stating that they are exempt. FedEx is therefore not entitled to summary judgment on this ground.

The Court found material factual disputes in the employer’s remaining arguments about comparative employees and affirmative defenses.  Therefore, the case was remanded back to the trial court.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Mansfield Company Pays $188K to Settle EEOC Sex Discrimination Lawsuit

Yesterday, the EEOC announced that it had settled a lawsuit against a Central Ohio company for $188K which involved retaliation and sex and wage discrimination. In the lawsuit, the EEOC alleged that the defendant employer hired an experienced female drafter to prepare drawings and sketches for batteries and engines, but paid a higher salary to a similarly qualified male engineer hired a few months after her to perform the same tasks. When the female engineer learned of the salary disparity, she complained to the human resources manager and was subsequently fired – allegedly in retaliation for complaining about the discrimination. The EEOC ultimately filed suit on her behalf in 2010, alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

In addition to monetary damages for the female engineer, the EEOC obtained a two-year consent decree which requires training for the defendant employer's human resources personnel and employees at the Hyundai Ideal Electric Company's home office in Mansfield, Ohio and posting of anti-discrimination notices.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.