According to the Court’s decision, the plaintiff and other
MHTs had received training in the morning about the importance of the nurse and
the MHT both checking a patient’s identification band before discharging the
patient. That same afternoon, the plaintiff was
instructed by a nurse to discharge a particular patient and she did so without
checking the patient’s wrist band because she relied on the nurse and had been
busy that morning. The wrong patient was
discharged, having just admitted himself the night before because of suicidal
thoughts. Luckily, the patient
readmitted himself a few hours later. The
plaintiff was fired for committing a major infraction that jeopardized the
safety of patients or staff even though she had only received positive
performance evaluations and no record of disciplinary violations. She filed suit that she was treated more
harshly than male MHTs who committed the same or similar offenses.
One of the comparator MHTs had committed several major disciplinary
offenses, been given a final warning and placed on a last chance agreement
(whereby he could be terminated for even minor offenses). Nonetheless, he was not discharged after
walking out the wrong patient without first checking the patient’s
identification band on the direction of a nurse even though the patient
required crutches and he did not give those crutches to the patient upon
discharging him. The manager determined
that he had been entitled to rely on the direction of the nurse because he had
been busy at the time tending to other patients. The other comparator had been disciplined for
discharging a patient on the instructions of a social worker (instead of a
nurse) and admitting a patient without first searching him (and confiscating
three knives he had been carrying). Even
though these were similarly serious violations, he has only suspended and
placed on a final warning.
The Court found these comparators to be similarly situated
to the plaintiff despite slight differences in their infractions. The Court also rejected the employer’s
explanation that the plaintiff’s violation was more egregious because the
potential consequences of incorrectly discharging a suicidal patient were not necessarily
much more severe than discharging the incorrect patient without his necessary
crutches or admitting a patient who was carrying lethal weapons. Speculation about the potential, likelihood
and comparative severity of the various infractions should be left to the jury.
The Court also rejected the employer’s
argument that the plaintiff’s infraction was more severe because she had just
been trained on that standard the same morning because the same standard had
been in place when the comparators also violated the rule. While the jury could reasonably conclude that
the plaintiff had been terminated in order to make an example of her, it could
also conclude that she should have been treated more leniently in light of her lengthy
tenure and spotless performance record in comparison to the male comparators.
The Court also rejected the employer’s argument that
different discipline was warranted for the slightly different offense of
failing to search a newly admitted patient because the rule was identically
severe in its treatment in the employer’s policies.
Several facts in the record can be used to draw the inference
that DRH considered Jackson’s and Little’s infractions substantially identical
in terms of severity of potential consequences. That their mistakes were cited
as violating the same two major infractions indicates that those mistakes were
substantially identical in terms of potential disciplinary consequences: DRH’s
discipline policy defines major infractions by the potential for immediate termination.
Similarly, that Jackson’s and Little’s mistakes were cited as violations of
major infraction “k,” which is defined as “[a]ny action or conduct that
endangers or may be detrimental to the well being of a patient, co-worker,
physician, contractor or visitor” . . . suggests that DRH considered the
potential harm resulting from those mistakes to be similar. Indeed, Leorea
Heard provided “[t]he patient getting an improper search” as an example of an
“incident that might have put the unit in danger.”
The Court was
also influenced by the fact that “[i]n a majority female workplace,
the fact that Jackson was the only female out of fourteen MHTs supports her contention
that DRH preferred males for that particular position.” Nonetheless, the Court rejected the employer’s
argument that this factor was outweighed by the fact that the decisionmaker was
also female and the plaintiff had always received positive performance
evaluations because the evaluations might have warranted more leniency and the Supreme Court's decision in
Oncale does
not prohibit any consideration
of the fact that the decision-maker was the same sex as the plaintiff. See id. But that case
makes clear that a mere conclusory assertion to that effect does not, on its
own, render unreasonable an inference of discriminatory intent. We find this
maxim especially true here, where the primary inference Jackson attempts to draw
from the record is that Crisis Center management preferred males for the position
of MHT, perhaps “because they thought females could not physically handle
unruly patients.” (Pl.’s Br. At 1.) Jackson’s case is thus largely unaffected by
the fact that her managers were female.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you
of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not
apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can be changed or amended without
notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If
you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or
retain an employment attorney.
