The dispute centers on certain language in the FMWA in
Article II:
“[E]mployer,” “employee,” “employ,” “person” and “independent
contractor” have the same meanings as under the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act or its successor law, except
that “employer” shall also include the state and every political subdivision
and “employee” shall not include an individual employed in or about the
property of the employer or individual’s residence on a casual basis. Only the exemptions set forth in this section
shall apply to this section.
* * *
This section shall be liberally construed in favor of its purposes.
Laws may be passed to implement its
provisions and create additional remedies, increase the minimum wage rate
and extend the coverage of the section, but in no manner restricting any provision
of the section or the power of municipalities under Article XVIII of this
constitution with respect to the same.
(emphasis added).
The FMWA also contained a number of exemptions from the
statute which did not mirror the FLSA
exemptions and did not, for instance,
include any of the white collar exemptions for administrative, professional or
management employees. When the General
Assembly passed implementing legislation in 2007, it defined “employee” to
include both the FLSA definition of employee and to also include the exemptions to the minimum wage which
existed in the FLSA’s § 213 (i.e., the white- collar exemptions).
The plaintiffs argued that the exclusion of the white collar
exemptions violated the constitutional admonition that “only the exemptions set
forth in this section shall apply . . . “
However, the employer asserted that the FMWA broadly incorporated the
FLSA and would have specified which specific exemptions to reject if it had not
meant to incorporate all of the white-collar exemptions.
The Court
noted that legislation is presumed to be constitutionally valid unless it
appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and
constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.” In this case, the FMWA said that it broadly
incorporated “meanings” (plural) from the FLSA, which means that more
than one definition applies. This could
include both definitions and exemptions (and, thus, creates a reasonable
doubt). Further, it would be logical to
assume that the FMWA did not list exemptions which already existed in the FLSA
because it impliedly included them.
Indeed, at least one publication from 2006 distributed by at least one
group advocating the passage of the FMWA implied as much.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you
of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not
apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can be changed or amended without
notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If
you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or
retain an employment attorney.