According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff got into a
brief and unprofessional confrontation with a white co-worker. After the
plaintiff returned to his work area, the co-worker then proceeded to the
plaintiff’s desk and resumed the disagreement, which was then taken into the
hallway at the suggestion of another co-worker. Their physical contact was
limited to a swat by the white employee.
A supervisor separated them and Human Resources was brought in to take
action. The plaintiff was still angry, was
unprofessional during the interview and refused to answer certain
questions. He felt that no one asked his
side of the story and asked him only questions to confirm that he was guilty of
initiating the altercation. At one
point, he threw his employee badge on the table, but took it back and denied he
was resigning because he felt that he had not done anything wrong. After he indicated without further
elaboration that “Monday would be a big day,” he was directed to go home and
not return until called. The white
employee was then called to the conference room, asked his side of the story, told
to go home only for the rest of the day and was requested to return to work the
following Monday. He explained that they
were just having a bad day. The HR
employee explained that the plaintiff posed a threat of workplace violence, but
the white employee did not. That
Monday, the plaintiff was terminated for violating the workplace violence and
harassment policies. The white employee
was given only a written disciplinary action, being deemed the non-aggressor,
which stated that he “did nothing wrong and the next time just go straight to
management.” His supervisor told him that he was “absolutely
fine.”
The Bank conducted a second investigation of the incident
after receiving the plaintiff’s Charge of Discrimination. The white employee claims that he provided
the same version of events as during the first interview and again reiterated
that he was the one that had reinitiated the argument after the plaintiff had
left and that he was the one who had swatted the plaintiff in the hallway. The Human Resources employee found his
second version to be materially different and then fired him for violating the
workplace violence policy and being dishonest in the first interview. Following its investigation, the EEOC found
probable cause of discrimination, but could not settle the plaintiff’s Charge. This
lawsuit followed.
The district court had concluded that the plaintiff could
not show that a similarly situated employee who was treated differently from
his white co-worker. The Bank argued
that the plaintiff had a different job, was the aggressor during the
altercation and was rude and inappropriate in the post-altercation
interview. Based on the testimony of
the plaintiff and his supervisor, however, the Court concluded that the
plaintiff and the white co-worker were performing different aspects of the same
job and, thus, were similar enough for comparison. For evidentiary purposes, a ““plaintiff need
not demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving more favorable
treatment” to be considered “similarly situated.” Instead, a plaintiff need
show only that he and his comparator were “similar in all of the relevant
aspects.””
More fundamentally, the identity of job responsibilities is
not truly relevant here
to the question of whether Wheat and Hatfield were similarly situated for Title
VII purposes. Rather, because Wheat’s termination was spurred by a verbal, and
potentially physical, altercation, the relevant comparison between Wheat and
Hatfield should involve only the two men’s roles and actions in the contretemps.
Similarly,
the Court rejected the Bank’s argument about plaintiff being the aggressor
because there were disputed issues of fact as to who was responsible for
prolonging the altercation and initiating any physical contact. “Such divergent explanations of the unfolding of the
relevant events creates an obvious dispute of fact that should preclude the
grant of summary judgment to the defendant at the prima-facie-case
stage of the litigation.”
The Court also rejected the argument that they were
different in how they behaved during the interview because there was a factual
dispute about how the HR employee conducted the interviews, which may have
created some justification for the plaintiff to refuse to answer certain
questions. Moreover, his comments -- which
the HR employee found to be threatening -- were ambiguous and were not found to
be threatening by his supervisor (who was present during the interview).
The
Court also found that the plaintiff had produced evidence to cast doubt on the
Bank’s explanation for his termination sufficient to rebut its explanation as a
mere pretext for discrimination.
“Pretext can be shown by offering evidence that (1) the
employer’s stated reason had no basis in fact, (2) the stated reason did not
actually motivate the employer, or (3) the stated reason was insufficient to
warrant the adverse employment action.”
The Court addressed each of the Bank’s termination explanations. It found there was sufficient evidence to
question whether the plaintiff’s behavior in the investigatory interview was
sufficient to warrant his termination.
The plaintiff claimed that the HR employee’s questions were irrelevant
and she never asked for his version of events, although she did so of the white
employee. Similarly, his vague
statements about Monday being a “big day” and him “taking care” of himself were
too ambiguous to warrant termination, particularly when the plaintiff denied
making any threats.
The Court also rejected the Bank’s concern that the
plaintiff would initiate more violence upon return to work because evidence had
been produced that the white employee had been the aggressor, not the
plaintiff. In light of the fact that the
white employee maintains that he had always told the Bank the truth about what
happened, the HR employee’s credibility was in question as to whether she could
genuinely have believed that the plaintiff was the aggressor before he was
fired.
A jury could reasonably conclude that each of the rationales
proposed by the defendant for its decision to fire Wheat either had no basis in
fact, did not actually motivate the defendant’s decision,
or was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.
Interestingly, there was no discussion in the opinion about
the honest belief rule where the defendant acts based on mistaken assumptions
after a good faith investigation.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you
of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not
apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can be changed or amended without
notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If
you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or
retain an employment attorney.
