Showing posts with label qualifications. Show all posts
Showing posts with label qualifications. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 11, 2015

Franklin County Court of Appeals Reinstates Age Discrimination Claim and Rejects Honest Belief Rule When Plaintiff Was Arguably More Qualified Than Successful Candidate

In early June, a unanimous Franklin County Court of Appeals reversed a university’s summary judgment on an age discrimination claim, but affirmed dismissal of the disability discrimination claim. Ceglia v. Youngstown State Univ., 2015-Ohio-2125.   The plaintiff was a part-time social work instructor for many years with the university and applied for a full-time teaching position.  He was much older and had more work and teaching experience than the successful candidate (who had no teaching experience at the time she applied).  When asked if his age had been an issue, he was told by the selection committee chair that they had focused on “mid-level” candidates.   The plaintiff was also able to produce evidence that each of the reasons given by the members of the selection committee as to why he had been rejected had no basis in fact and that they had contradicted each other.  Finally, the Court rejected the trial court’s reliance on the “honest belief rule” based on the plaintiff’s ability to dispute the university’s pretexual explanations and the subjective nature of the committee’s decision.

The most interesting aspect of the decision is the Court’s rejection of the application of the honest belief rule, which is generally an insurmountable obstacle for plaintiffs asserting employment discrimination claims.  “Under the "honest belief" rule, if the employer honestly, but mistakenly, believes in the proffered reason given for the hiring decision at issue, then the employee cannot establish the requisite pretext.”   

As discussed above, appellant did more than simply disagree with the University's proffered reasons for denying him the position. Appellant supported his denials with corroborating evidence upon which it may be reasonably inferred that many of the proffered reasons for denying appellant the position either had no basis in fact or were insufficient to support the decision. Appellant also produced circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory animus based on age. Dr. Morawski's remarks to appellant and the inferences properly drawn therefrom create a genuine factual issue whether the members of the search committee honestly believed the proffered reasons for denying appellant the position and whether appellant's age was the true reason for its decision.
The Court discussed in great detail why the plaintiff was able to sufficiently demonstrate that the university’s explanation for not hiring him were pretextual.    The Court found that the plaintiff showed that the stated reasons had no basis in fact or were insufficient to justify the decision to not interview or hire him.  The university gave five reasons why he was not selected for an interview or hired instead of the young and inexperienced candidate:  

1.      The plaintiff allegedly “crossed boundaries with students by taking them out to a restaurant and socializing with them outside of the classroom setting.” However, the only such events were held after classes were over for the semester and were attended by other department faculty and held at a restaurant on campus.  No one had ever criticized these outings during his fourteen years with the university. Indeed, this issue had apparently not been discussed in the selection committee meetings.

2.      There had been “complaints from some of [his] former students that [he] had permitted students to forgo a mandatory research paper.”  He denied this allegation.  The only research paper he ever required was when he taught a class on behalf of the department chair which required a mandatory research paper and no one else was willing or qualified to teach.  He distributed an example of a research paper to the class and still had two copies of research papers he received from students of that class.  One of the selection committee had been critical that the students were not prepared to conduct research.

3.      Some students had complained that he had given "favorable grades" and “that he dismissed classes early.”   However, when he asked the department chair about whether his grades were too high, he was told his grading was not a problem.   He denied dismissing class early very often and contended that he had kept students over just as often.

4.       He had cancelled classes.  He denied that this happened regularly or often.  None of the selection committee members would admit that they had raised this as an issue, had personal knowledge of it or discussed it.

5.     He was “not the best at paperwork."  However, he had never been reprimanded, disciplined or counselled about paperwork during his fourteen year employment.  Moreover, while there was some dispute about this, there was evidence that administrative duties were less than 10% of the full-time teaching position.

In addition to casting doubt on the university’s explanation for his treatment, the plaintiff also produced evidence that age was the actual reason he was denied an interview and job.  In particular, when asked if age was the reason he was not selected, he was told by the selection committee chair that they were seeking “mid-level” candidates.     While such a comment does not compel a finding of age discrimination (and is, therefore, not direct evidence), it does constitute an inference of discrimination because the speaker inferred age as correlated with experience.

The plaintiff was also able to demonstrate pretext by comparing his relative qualifications to the successful candidate.   

"Relative qualifications establish triable issues of fact as to pretext where the evidence shows that either (1) the plaintiff was a plainly superior candidate, such that no reasonable employer would have chosen the latter applicant over the former, or (2) plaintiff was as qualified * * * if not better qualified than the successful applicant, and the record contains 'other probative evidence of discrimination.' "
The University gave several reasons why the successful candidate was more qualified than the plaintiff:

1.      She “had more experience with agency settings."  However, the plaintiff produced evidence that he had worked for multiple agencies and hospitals, supervised more than 50 student interns and 200 employees.  As an execute director with a county board, he "provided oversight for more than 30 agencies that provided social services.”

2.      She had a "more well-rounded resume."  However, she had no prior teaching experience at the time she applied for the position, in contrast to the plaintiff’s fourteen years of teaching experience.   Indeed, the plaintiff had more years of teaching at the BSW and MSW level than any of the candidates interviewed for the teaching position.  Moreover, the plaintiff’s LISW-S license meant that he could supervise students and able to perform clinical work without supervision.   One of the committee members admitted that this would contribute to the job, but that the successful candidate lacked this qualification.

3.      She had "more field education experience."

4.      She was "organized and had been a supervisor and had been effective."

5.      She was a "better fit" for the position.

 The Court ultimately concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that the university’s decision had been based on subjective feelings instead of objective evidence about the relative qualifications of the candidates. “Construing the evidence in appellant's favor, the University's hiring decision appears to be based, in large part, on the individual committee member's subjective belief that Holcomb-Hathy was a superior candidate to appellant rather than on specific objective evidence.”   Again, when this evidence was paired with the ambiguous statements about age being the true reason for the decision, the plaintiff produced enough evidence at the summary judgment stage to avoid judgment and require a trial on the merits.

In contrast, the plaintiff was unable to produce evidence showing an inference of disability discrimination to survive summary judgment on that claim.

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, December 27, 2007

Sixth Circuit: Prima Facie Case Does Not Require Female Plaintiff To Prove that She Was More Qualified Than Male Replacement

On December 19, 2007, the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of an employer where the female plaintiff had been laid off one day after a male employee was hired onto her work crew and she was never rehired even though the employer’s workforce increased overall by twelve laborers in the plaintiff’s division. Vincent v. Brewer Co., No.06-4138 (6th Cir. 12/19/2007). The district court had dismissed the case on grounds that her male replacement was more qualified, and thus implied that she was not sufficiently qualified for her position as required to meet her prima facie case. However, the Sixth Circuit noted that a plaintiff need only prove that she was replaced by someone outside the protected class and need not show that the replacement was less qualified, or even as qualified, as she. She would only need to show that she was similarly qualified to a similarly-situated male if she was claiming different treatment instead of being replaced by a male.

The employer had also argued it had not discriminated against the plaintiff because it had laid off other employees at the same time as her and that she had a history of misconduct. However, the Court noted that there was sufficient potential evidence of pretext in that, among other things, (1) the other employee were laid off were temps, unlike the plaintiff; (2) there was evidence of numerous sexist comments by the decisionmaker and other managers; (3) she had received several favorable performance evaluations and been promoted in the past; (4) her co-workers claimed that she was very productive; and (5) there was little temporal proximity between her layoff and the prior instances of misconduct. Therefore, there was enough of a factual dispute in the evidence for a jury to decide whether the plaintiff had been laid off on account of her sex as she claimed.

Insomniacs may read the full decision at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/064138p.pdf.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with an attorney.