Wednesday, June 3, 2026

Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Lawyer's Complaint that His ADHD Should Excuse Submitting Law Firm Time Sheets For Failure to Allege Reasonable Alternative

 Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a law firm employer’s judgment on the pleadings on claims by a former associate lawyer who alleged that his ADHD prevented him from submitting timely and accurate time sheets so that the law firm could bill its clients for his time and services.  Longergan v. Gallagher Sharp LLP, No. 25-3808 (6th Cir. May 29, 2026).  As a former law firm associate, I of course found this fascinating.  The Court agreed that failing to allege any details about proposed accommodations was fatal to his failure to accommodate claim because bare legal assertions that a reasonable accommodation and job modifications had been made were insufficient to state a viable claim. “Plaintiff did not create the plausible inference that he is qualified to perform his job with or without a reasonable accommodation because he did not adequately plead the fact that he proposed any accommodation to Defendant, let alone a reasonable one.”    Although he could have moved to amend his complaint to provide details about his proposed job modifications, he failed to do so.   Finally, the employer was not required to engage in the interactive process until he proposed a reasonable accommodation, which his complaint failed to sufficiently allege that he had done. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff suffered from ADHD and had trouble submitting time sheets.  (Law firms bill clients based on the time sheets submitted by their attorneys and is how the firms pay their employees and rent, etc.) While the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he suggested modifications and accommodations, he did not describe what they were in his complaint.  Instead, he argued that his suggestions were flatly rejected as unworkable.   In later briefing, these suggestions turned out to be (1) having a legal assistant identify the projects on which he worked each day so that he could then insert the amount of time spent on each; (2) assigning him only flat rate projects or (3) giving clients a discount for his work.   After he was put on probation, he managed to comply for a few weeks, but then realized within two months that he had failed to submit some weekend hours.    He then became hopeless, “checked out” and was terminated three months later.    He filed a pro se lawsuit that Fall.   

After answering the complaint, the law firm then moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual with a disability because his complaint failed to factually describe any reasonable accommodations that he had proposed.   The plaintiff responded that he only needed to satisfy notice pleading – that he had generally alleged his proposal of an unidentified reasonable accommodation and the law firm’s failure to engage in the interactive process.  Although the plaintiff indicated that he could amend his complaint, he never submitted a proposed amended complaint to fix the problems with his pleading or a formal motion.  Moreover, the alleged accommodations he indicated that he had requested failed to satisfy the requirement that they be reasonable or effective to solve the problems.

While a complaint

need not include “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[,] . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[, or] . . . ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”  . . . . “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  . . . . Although we “‘construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,’ . . . [m]ere labels and conclusions are not enough; the allegations must contain ‘factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”  . . .  Those “rules . . . exist to keep litigants from sandbagging their opponents until they are on notice of what their allegations lack.”  . . .

Although a plaintiff bringing an employment discrimination suit need not establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage, he still must plead facts showing that he is entitled to relief.   . . . The ADA “prohibits ‘discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability’ as it applies to aspects of employment including hiring, advancement, and firing.”  . . . The statute includes in the definition of disability-based discrimination “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified [employee] with a disability . . . , unless . . . the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). A qualified employee is one “who can perform the ‘essential functions’ of his job ‘with or without reasonable accommodation.’”  . . . . Thus to state a claim, Plaintiff had to “plead facts that make plausible the inference that (1) []he is disabled, (2) []he is qualified to perform [his] job requirements with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) []he would not have been discharged but for the disability . . .  With respect to the second element, Plaintiff would ultimately have to show that he “propose[d] a reasonable accommodation” to Defendant. . . .

 . . . Plaintiff’s complaint failed to adequately state a failure-to-accommodate claim. Plaintiff did not create the plausible inference that he is qualified to perform his job with or without a reasonable accommodation because he did not adequately plead the fact that he proposed any accommodation to Defendant, let alone a reasonable one. The complaint merely stated that Plaintiff had requested “a modification to job requirements” and “repeatedly approached partners at the firm and suggested accommodations . . . .”  . . . . Those allegations are conclusory recitations of the reasonable accommodation element, devoid of any factual substance. Plaintiff failed to provide notice to both Defendant and the district court about what he believes would have constituted a reasonable accommodation that would have qualified him for the job. They were left to fill in the blanks. Even accepting all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded material allegations as true, the district court did not have a basis to infer that Defendant could be liable for disability discrimination by failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s requests. . . . .

Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant failed to engage in the mandatory interactive process suffers from the same infirmity. The regulations under the ADA state, in relevant part, that “it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process” to “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”  . . . . That process is mandatory, id., “[b]ut an employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process is actionable only if the employee can demonstrate that she was qualified for the position[,]”  . . .  Without pleading facts to support that he proposed any accommodation, Plaintiff failed to plead that he was in fact qualified, as defined by the statute.

The Court also found that the district court had not abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint when the plaintiff had 5 months in which to submit a formal motion and failed to do so.  Mentioning in a memorandum in opposition that he could  amend his complaint to address its deficiencies is not a proper motion and need not be considered or granted by a trial court. 

As for the time sheets, all private practice attorneys hate doing them, but they are not generally required by when working for corporations, non-profits or government agencies. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, June 2, 2026

DOL Issues Several Interesting Opinion Letters

Last week, the federal Department of Labor issued several Opinion Letters concerning the FLSA, regular rate and bonuses, meal breaks, time clock rounding and extra pay for exempt employees.  Such letters indicate the DOL’s official position, but it is not binding on courts.  In the first, Op. FLSA2026-5, the DOL explained that an exempt nurse trainers could be paid an hourly rate for picking up staff nurse shifts outside their regular working hours without destroying their exempt status when their primary duties remained their exempt work and the extra non-exempt shifts constituted less than 50% of the hours worked that week. In the next Opinion Letter FLSA2026-6, the DOL explained that employers need not recalculate the regular rate each quarter when providing non-discretionary bonuses that are based on the employee’s total earnings (i.e., straight and overtime) in a way that does not dilute their overtime earnings.  In another Opinion Letter FLSA2026-7, the DOL explained that an employer need not pay its employees for 30 minute meal breaks during which the employee is relieved of work responsibilities even if that is insufficient time to depart a corporate campus to travel off-site for more than 15 minutes.    In the final Letter FLSA2026-8, the DOL questioned the employer’s practice of rounding employees’ work time to the beginning or end of their scheduled shift, whether it might not be compensating all employees for certain “integral and indispensable” pre-shift activities, and whether the founding was neutral de minimis, but agreed that the employer need not compensate employees for waiting to clock in and out as long as it was before or after their principal work activity.

In the first opinion, exempt Nursing Professional Development Specialists are involved in the professional development and training of staff.  While they may assist in their discretion patients and staff nurses, they are never the patient’s primary nurse.   Some of these exempt employees sometimes pick up one or two non-exempt Staff Nurse shifts outside their normal working hours (i.e., on weekends).  Staff Nurses are paid on a hourly basis and the Specialists are  paid this same hourly rate when they pick up Staff Nurse shifts.   The DOL observed that the FLSA regulations permit employers to pay exempt employees an extra hourly rate when they work extra hours outside their normal work schedule without losing the exemption.  Further, the DOL also observed that the FLSA regulations also permit exempt employees to perform some non-exempt work as long as their exempt duties remain their primary duties, or most important part of their job.  Typically, if the employees spends at least 50% of their time on their primary exempt duties, the position will remain exempt, but it remains possible that an employee will remain exempt even if their exempt duties take less than 50% of their time.  Thus, in this case, the Specialists still spent more than 50% of their time performing exempt work and were permitted to receive additional hourly compensation for their extra work. 

In the next Opinion, the DOL addressed a quarterly profit bonus paid to non-exempt employees that was based solely on their respective percentage of straight and overtime hours worked.  In other words, the $100K, was divided among the employees at the end of the quarter based on their respective, comparative percentage of hours worked (both straight time and overtime). Their overtime hours were not diluted by other types of compensation (such as discretionary bonuses, expenses, gifts, benefits, etc.). 

Nevertheless, recomputation of an employee’s regular rate and the resulting additional overtime pay are unnecessary for a “percentage of total earnings” bonus, although they may be required for other types of bonuses. Assuming “total earnings” is the sum of an employee’s total straight-time earnings and total overtime earnings, a percentage of total earnings bonus is a bonus payment that provides for “the simultaneous payment of overtime compensation due on the bonus” (i.e., its own required overtime compensation). 29 C.F.R. § 778.210; see also id. § 778.503. This is not an exception to the FLSA’s overtime pay requirement, but the Division’s longstanding recognition that a bonus that increases an employee’s total earnings by a fixed percentage “increases both straight time and overtime wages by the same percentage, and thereby includes proper overtime compensation as an arithmetic fact.” Id. § 778.503; see also id. § 778.210 (explaining that such percentage of total earnings bonuses “satisfy in full the overtime provisions of the Act and no recomputation will be required”); Brock v. Two R Drilling Co., 789 F.2d 1177, 1179 (5th Cir. 1986). Requiring additional overtime pay for such bonuses “would be to impose overtime upon overtime,” and, therefore, be inconsistent with the Act. Siomkin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 174 F.2d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 1949).

Employers generally calculate total earnings bonuses in one of two ways. The first, as described in 29 C.F.R. § 778.210, occurs when an employer applies a percentage to an employee’s total straight-time and overtime earnings directly without regard to how the employee’s earnings or hours compare to those of other employees. The second takes place when an employer uses earnings or hours to compare each employee participating in a bonus pool to all the employees participating in the bonus pool. . . . an employer may divide each employee’s total earnings by the total earnings of all employees participating in the bonus pool and then multiply that percentage by the bonus pool amount to determine each employee’s share.  Or, as provided in FOH 32c05a, an employer may divide the bonus pool amount by the participating employees’ total earnings and then multiply that percentage by each employee’s total earnings to determine his or her bonus payout. Either approach is acceptable.

Generally, an employer may consider additional factors (such as seniority, work location, job title, base pay, performance, or conduct) to determine the magnitude of an employee’s percentage increase. As long as the resulting percentage increase to each employee’s pre-bonus overtime earnings is no less than the percentage increase to their pre-bonus straight-time earnings, then the principle set forth in sections 778.210 and 778.503 applies even though different employees might receive different percentages. However, an employer may not use the percentage of total earnings bonuses “to evade the overtime requirements of the Act[,]” 29 C.F.R. § 778.210, such as where the percentage bonus “decrease[s] . . . in direct proportion to increases in the number of hours worked in a week in excess of 40.” See id. § 778.503.4 An employer also may not dilute an employee’s overtime earnings by either: (1) applying a higher percentage increase to the straight time earnings than the overtime earnings5 or (2) including items within an employee’s earnings that were previously excluded from the employee’s regular rate of pay, such as gifts, discretionary bonuses, expense reimbursements, or employer contributions to employee benefit plans.

In another opinion, the employees are given 30-minute unpaid lunch breaks where they are relieved of their job duties.  They apparently have a break room which they may use for such purpose.  However, it takes at least 5-10 minutes to get through security to leave the building and walk to the parking lot, and then another 10 minutes to get back through security and return from the parking lot, leaving little, if any time, to travel to nearby restaurants for lunch.   The DOL first observed that employers are not required by the FLSA to provide meal or rest breaks to adults.   Meal breaks need not be compensated, but they must be bona fide breaks from work. Typically, thirty minutes or more is sufficient to constitute a bona fide meal break.  The DOL has since at least 2004 indicated that employers can prohibit employees from leaving the premises during their meal breaks without having to compensate employees for the meal breaks. 

The Act does not require absolute freedom for a break to be bona fide and non-compensable. An employer may place certain limitations or conditions upon a bona fide meal period without having to compensate employees for such time, and courts have agreed that employees need not be permitted to leave the premises to receive a bona fide meal period. For example, in Ruffin v. MotorCity Casino, 775 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 2015), the Sixth Circuit ruled that meal breaks for casino security guards were not compensable under the FLSA because even though they were not permitted to leave the premises and were required to monitor their radios, they were otherwise free to eat and socialize.

In the final letter, the employer had a practice of permitting employees to clock in or out up to seven minutes before or after their shift because of potential wait times at the time clock so that they would not be assessed with tardies or unauthorized overtime.  However, the employer also had a practice of rounding those employees’ work hours to the nearest shift.  For instance, if an employee clocked in at 6:53 for a 7:00 shift, he or she would only be credited with having worked at 7:00.     Similarly, if the employee clocked out at 7:07 when the shift ended at 7:00, the time would be rounded down to 7:00. However, and importantly, if an employee clocked in late or clocked out early, the employer did NOT indicate that it would round down to the nearest shift.  The employer admitted that some employees sometimes immediately began engaging in integral and indispensable pre-shift activities, even when they clocked in early.   The DOL did not think that the de minimis doctrine applied because the employer was capable of administratively capturing this pre-shift work and the rounding practice was not neutral (i.e., it always benefitted the employer).  “The de minimis doctrine “applies only where there are uncertain and indefinite periods of time involved of a few seconds or minutes duration, and where the failure to count such time is due to considerations justified by industrial realities.”  Further, “’[w]hether time is de minimis is a fact-specific analysis, considering the practical administrative difficulty of recording the time, the aggregate amount of compensable time involved, and the regularity with which the work occurs.”

The Department’s regulations explain that employers may practice time rounding, but only under specific conditions. Under 29 C.F.R. § 785.48, employers may round employee time to the nearest fraction of an hour (such as the nearest 5 minutes, 6 minutes, or quarter-hour). This practice, however, is only acceptable if it “will not result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually worked.” 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b). This means a rounding practice must both be neutral on its face and average out over time so it does not consistently favor the employer. . . .

When evaluating rounding practices to apply these principles, courts examine the aggregate impact over a period of time. While fluctuation from pay period to pay period is to be expected, a neutral rounding practice must “average out in the long term.” Corbin, 821 F.3d at 1077. For example, an employer’s rounding practices were found to be permissible where the pay records showed that “sometimes [the employee] gained minutes and compensation, and sometimes [the employee] lost minutes and compensation,” and the net difference between hours worked and hours compensated amounted to only 3 minutes and $15 over about a year. Id. at 1079. In contrast, an appeals court reversed a lower court’s conclusion that an employer’s practice was neutrally applied when evidence showed that its practices cost roughly 13,000 employees approximately 74,000 hours of uncompensated time over a 6-year period. Houston, 76 F.4th at 1152. Similarly, another court found an employer’s rounding policy was likely not neutrally applied when evidence showed that it favored the employer 94 percent of the time. Aguilar, 948 F.3d at 1288.

 . . .

To the extent that each day, employees are performing compensable work prior to their paid shifts commencing, such work is unlikely to be de minimis. In general, as noted above, “[a]n employer may not arbitrarily fail to count as hours worked any part, however small, of the employee’s fixed  . . . .

Conversely, to the extent that pre-shift compensable work is irregular, the practical administrative difficulty of recording the time may justify treating it as de minimis. Although the employer has a timekeeping system that is capable of documenting the time of arrival and departure, we cannot definitively say, based on the information provided, whether it is administratively feasible for the employer to record the actual time each employee performs their first principal activity—thus beginning their compensable workday—as opposed to engaging in personal activities such as getting coffee, socializing, checking phones, storing personal belongings, or simply waiting for their shift to start. Given, as noted above, the large number of hospital employees and the likely differences between the extent to which they are, or are not, on a consistent basis performing principal activities between clocking in and the formal start to their shift, we are unable to conclude that the time is—or is not—de minimis. . . .

Employers, including the hospital at issue here, should nonetheless be particularly careful about how and to what extent they apply the de minimis doctrine. Particularly given the technological advances that have made it possible for employers to track employees’ work time with increasing precision, employers should expect exacting scrutiny of de minimis claims where employees perform off-the-clock work with any degree of regularity.

In this case, the employer’s rounding always seemed to reduce the employees’ pay and was always in favor of the employer in rounding up or down. Thus, “the critical question under 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b) is whether a rounding practice, evaluated over a period of time, is facially neutral and operates neutrally such that it does not systematically undercompensate employees for hours worked.”   The DOL could not definitely determine whether the employer was complying or not with the FLSA because of missing factual realities:

We note initially that a rounding policy for clock-in and clock-out time only affects the calculation of hours worked to the extent that employees are performing compensable work between the clock in/out time and the rounded time. As noted above, clocking in or out, by itself, is generally not considered compensable work. Likewise, the time between clocking in and beginning principal activities, and between completing principal activities and clocking out, is also not compensable. . . .

As to the beginning of the day, if employees are, in fact, performing compensable work—such as respiratory therapists receiving handoff reports—after clocking in but before their paid shifts, then based strictly on the information provided, the hospital’s rounding policy is not neutral pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b) because it both is not facially neutral and only ever benefits the employer without ever benefiting the employee. According to the facts presented, the employer’s only rounding practice is to round early check-ins to the scheduled shift time. As a result, employees  who perform compensable work during the up-to-7-minute early check-in period are always uncompensated for that time and are not afforded a chance for over-compensation to average that time. Accordingly, under these facts, the hospital’s rounding practice is inconsistent with section 785.48(b) and would result in a failure to properly record, as well as potentially to properly compensate for, all hours worked. If, however, the hospital’s rounding practice is facially neutral and operates such that employees can and actually do benefit from rounding in other circumstances—for example, if employees who clock in up to 7 minutes late are nonetheless credited with starting at their scheduled time and that practice averages out over time to offset any work time lost due to the rounding of early check-ins to the scheduled shift time—then the policy would likely comply with section 785.48(b).

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, May 26, 2026

Supreme Court Reverses Decision Based on Arguments Never Raised or Briefed by the Parties as Inconsistent with the Adversarial System of Justice

This morning, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam decision of interest to mostly attorneys. Margolin v. Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, No. 25-2067 (5-26-26).    I bring it up because this has happened to most of us at one time or another and is extremely frustrating to explain to a client how we get ambushed by a court on issues never raised by our opponent.  The Court reversed the  Fourth Circuit (for the second time in a year) for reversing a judgment on grounds not raised or briefed by any of the parties in the case and not giving the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs on the issue.  “Federal courts adhere to the principle of party presentation.  . . .  That principle—the ‘rule that points not argued will not be considered’—distinguishes our adversarial system of justice from an inquisitorial one.  . . .  Because courts are ‘essentially passive instruments of government,’ we rely on the parties to ‘frame the issues for decision’ and decide ‘only the questions presented.’”  In other words, “[f]ederal courts are not ‘roving commissions,’  . . . licensed to ‘sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right. . . ’” 

The Fourth Circuit violated the party presentation principle when it decided “a case different from the one [respondent] advanced.”  . . .  As respondent conceded below, our precedent establishes that Congress, through the CSRA, intended to channel covered claims to the MSPB.  . . . . The parties thus confined their arguments to the narrow question whether respondent’s claims were, in fact, covered. Unsatisfied with rejecting respondent’s arguments on that question, however, the Fourth Circuit sua sponte addressed a much broader one and remanded for further proceedings on that question. The court transformed respondent’s argument that the CSRA did not channel its claims into one that the CSRA might not—in light of current conditions—channel any claims. And the court did so without giving either side a chance to address its theory.  . . .  That “‘drasti[c]’” departure from the principle of party presentation “‘constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.’”  . .  .

 Federal courts are not “roving commissions,”  . . . licensed to “‘sally forth each day looking for wrongs to right,’”  . . .

(bolding added for emphasis).

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, May 20, 2026

Sixth Circuit Affirms Employer's Summary Judgment on FMLA Interference and Retaliation Claims Where Employee Was on Last Chance Agreement and Never Sought Medical Treatment

Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on FMLA interference and retaliation claims.  Paris v. McAllister Machinery Co., Inc., No. 25-1726 (6th Cir. 5-14-26).  The employee could not prevail on the FMLA interference claim because he could not show that he suffered a serious health condition with hospitalization or consulting with a medical provider about his mental distress.   While he could show that his inquiries about taking FMLA leave for his mental distress were protected activities, and were temporally proximate to his termination less than a month later, he could not show that his termination was pretextual when he was already on a Last Chance Agreement and his violation of any policies justified his termination.   Temporal proximity could not satisfy his need to prove the employer’s explanation was pretextual. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff employee had a long history of performance problems and was ultimately placed on a Last Chance Agreement in October 2018 to avoid being immediately terminated.  He was then told by his union steward in early December  that he was about to be fired.  His supervisor a few weeks later confronted him about not wearing steel-toes shoes during his shift. He denied the allegation, which prompted the supervisor to try and stomp on his foot to prove his point.  Upset, he called HR and said he needed time off for anxiety, anguish and mental distress.  They discussed him applying for FMLA and he asked for the forms so that he could do so.  However, despite the passage of a month between this event and his termination, he never sought medical care or treatment for his distress and he never submitted a formal request for FMLA leave after receiving the forms upon request.   He was then fired in mid-January 2019 for a variety of infractions over the last few months, including not wearing required protective clothing, overcharging customers,  and general inability to follow proper procedures.

The Court agreed that he could not prevail on an FMLA interference claim because he had never sought medical treatment of any kind for his mental anguish.   Without such treatment or medical consultation, he could not prove that he had a serious health condition and was entitled to take FMLA leave.  No jury could rule in his favor on such a claim, entitling the employer to summary judgment as a matter of law.

The Court also agreed that he could not prevail on his FMLA retaliation claim, but for different reasons than the trial court.  The Court agreed that his inquiries about taking FMLA leave and requesting the FMLA forms constituted protected conduct and that his termination approximately a month later could support a causal connection between the two (i.e., temporal proximity).  However, he could not show that the employer’s explanation for his termination – poor performance and violation of company policy in violation of his Last Chance Agreement – was pretextual.  He had been told by the union before his protected conduct that he was about to be fired for violating the Last Chance Agreement. The employer specified a number of incidents and violations which took place in the few months before his termination that violated his Last Chance Agreement.  “We agree with [the employer] that a single violation of [its] policies following [the plaintiff’s] entry into the LCA would have constituted a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination.”

[He] then failed to carry the burden of showing that any of [the employer’s] reasons were “in reality a pretext to mask discrimination.”  . . . . He failed to do so because he provided no evidence that [its] termination was pretextual.  . . .  And temporal proximity alone cannot support a showing of pretext.  . . .  There is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether [its] termination of [his] employment was pretextual, and [it] was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on [his] FMLA retaliation claim.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Does Not Require Clear and Convincing Evidence for Each Preliminary Injunction Element Unless Required by Statute

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit reversed the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by an employer against a former employee who allegedly absconded with trade secret information for the benefit of his new employer, a competitor. PCC Airfoils LLC v. Daughterty, No. 25-3794 (6h Cir. 5-19-26).    The Court found that the employer need not prove each element of its claim by clear and convincing evidence in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.  “Rather than requiring clear and convincing evidence for each preliminary injunction factor, a court should consider all four factors to determine whether, taken together, they clearly weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief.”

According to the Court’s opinion,  a long time employee who had designed turbine airfoils was promoted to director in 2020 and then demoted a year later during a restructuring.  Frustrated, he later resigned to become a director at a competitor.  He did not have a non-compete agreement.  After his resignation, the employer discovered that he had prepared to print four confidential documents two days before leaving and that he had not left those documents in his office upon his departure.    The employer alleged that he “printed several documents containing trade secrets on his way out the door,”  but it could not prove that he actually printed them.   It sued him and his new employer to prevent him from disclosing trade secrets or working on similar products for the competitor.   The trial court denied the requested injunction on the grounds that the employer had failed to prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.

When faced with requests for a preliminary injunction, district courts consider four factors: (1) the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff in the absence of an injunction; (3) the risk that an injunction will harm others; and (4) the broader public interest. . . .

 . . . Courts, generally speaking, should engage with all four factors in a sliding-scale inquiry. A strong showing as to one factor may “outweigh[]” a weaker showing as to another factor. Winter, 555 U.S. at 23–24. After weighing the four factors against one another, a court may grant a preliminary injunction only if a plaintiff has made “a clear showing that [it] is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22. All of this means that a movant does not need to establish a quantum of proof, whether a preponderance or clear and convincing evidence, with respect to each factor to be eligible for preliminary relief.

Two qualifications exist. If the plaintiff has “no likelihood of success on the merits,” there is nothing left to balance and the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction must fail regardless of its showing on the other factors. Higuchi Int’l Corp. v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 103 F.4th 400, 409 (6th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). Likewise, a court must reject a plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction if it fails to show any risk of irreparable injury.

Measured by these requirements, the district court erred in requiring [the employer] to establish “clear and convincing evidence” with respect to each of the four factors in order to be eligible for preliminary relief.  . . .  While a court should “consider” all four factors, it is a sliding-scale inquiry that turns “as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it presents.”  . . .  The necessary showing for any one factor turns on the strength of the plaintiff’s showings for the other factors. Because generalizations are dangerous when it comes to equity, and because the Supreme Court has cautioned that the clear and convincing evidence standard applies in only a few rare circumstances, . . .  a court may not require every plaintiff to meet a heightened standard of proof for every preliminary injunction factor to qualify for injunctive relief. The district court erred in reaching a contrary conclusion.

 . . . .

 . . . Requiring a “clear showing” to obtain a preliminary injunction—because it is an extraordinary form of relief—is not the same thing as requiring “clear and convincing evidence” to establish each of the four factors to establish eligibility for this relief.

Instead of creating a heightened standard of evidentiary proof for each factor individually, the “clear showing” phrase clarifies that, on balance, the four preliminary injunction factors must clearly weigh in the plaintiff’s favor to qualify for injunctive relief.

The Court agreed that an unpublished Sixth Circuit had applied the clear and convincing evidence standard to all four factors, but was not bound by that precedents or later decisions that relief on it.  The Court also agreed that Ohio state court apply the clear and convincing standard to all four elements, but the federal court procedural rules apply to claims brought in federal court, even if the substantive law is governed by Ohio law.  Further, there was no substantive statute requiring use of a higher standard of proof.

Ohio’s rules of equity generally apply the clear and convincing evidence standard to the four preliminary injunction factors.  . . .  Because one of his claims seeks relief under an Ohio statute, [the defendant employee] contends that Ohio’s preliminary injunction rules should apply. But a federal court applies federal procedural rules, even when deciding cases under state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The preliminary injunction inquiry falls on the procedural side of the line,  . . . requiring us to apply federal, not Ohio, rules. And we treat the preliminary injunction considerations as equitable factors to be weighed, not elements to be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

 . . . .

The clear and convincing evidence standard thus had no role to play in this case. Indeed, as it pertains to the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits, it seems particularly odd to require the plaintiff to prove its case by a higher standard than will be required at trial even before the parties have had the benefit of discovery.  . . .  . . . .

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Friday, May 15, 2026

DOL Formally Restores 2019 White Collar Exemption Levels Under FLSA

Yesterday, the DOL announced that it was formally revising the federal regulations published in the Code of Federal Regulations to restore the 2019 language after subsequent amendments were vacated by a federal court. "The Department’s technical amendment removes from the Code of Federal Regulations the regulatory language from a 2024 rule that was judicially vacated, and republishes the operative regulations, which were established in a rule the department issued in 2019. The restored regulations require that most exempt executive, administrative, and professional employees be paid a salary of at least $684 per week. The regulations also set a total annual compensation threshold of $107,432 for certain highly compensated employees."

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, May 14, 2026

Sixth Circuit Denies Paid Leave as Reasonable Accommodation and Rejects FMLA Claim Based on Normal Application of Policy

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on ADA and FMLA claims brought by a Cincinnati teacher who sought three weeks of paid leave to be trained with a guide dog.   Tumbleson v. Lakota Local School District, No. 25-3548 (6th Cir. 5-13-26).   The Court held that the ADA did not require the employer to provide her with paid leave and she could not show that she had been treated less favorably than others.  Unpaid leave remains a reasonable accommodation under the ADA which the employer can select without having to prove undue hardship.  It also found that she failed to show that her employer violated the FMLA by providing her with only unpaid leave under its existing policies.  Nonetheless, it reserved the right of future litigants to show otherwise with better arguments.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff’s medical condition was causing her to progressively lose her sight and hearing.  She had been provided with a number of classroom accommodations and a five-day leave to be assessed for a guide dog.   She continued to excel in her teaching duties.   She later sought three weeks paid leave to be trained with a guide dog, but the employer would only provide her with unpaid leave under the ADA since her request did not involve a “personal illness” under its sick leave or FMLA policies and she was not incapacitated or unable to perform her job duties. After taking the leave and obtaining her guide dog, her physician wrote a letter saying the dog was necessary for medical reasons, but the employer refused to change its decision.  This lawsuit ensued.

The Court rejected her disparate treatment claim under the ADA.    While the Court found that denial of paid leave could constitute an actionable adverse employment action under the ADA, she failed to show that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated co-workers outside her protected class.   This analysis matters both at the prima facie and pretext stages.    In this case, the employer denied the paid sick leave request because she did not fit within the “ due to personal illness” definition in the policy, Ohio law or the collective bargaining agreement.  “Yet she does not offer a single example of a nondisabled employee who received sick leave even when the employee’s proposed absence did not qualify for that leave.”  It was not enough to show that the HR Director routinely granted brief leaves of less than 10 days because she herself had also benefitted from this policy in her initial absence.   Thus, the policy had been neutrally applied and not discriminatorily.  She had also failed to request comparator information during discovery.

The Court also rejected her failure to accommodate claim because she was provided with three weeks of unpaid leave. 

The parties dispute only the “reasonable accommodation” part of this framework. The employee must identify an accommodation and prove its reasonableness.  . . .  How do we decide whether an accommodation is “reasonable”? The ADA’s text makes clear that an accommodation must be work related, meaning that it will allow an employee to “perform the essential functions of the” relevant job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). To qualify as “reasonable,” then, an accommodation must alleviate “a key obstacle” that has prevented the employee from being able to perform an essential job function.  . . .  So courts will find a proposed accommodation unreasonable if an employee can perform the essential job functions and if the employee requests an accommodation for non-work-related reasons.  . . . We thus held that an employer did not have to change an employee’s schedule to allow her to avoid heavy traffic because this burden “exist[ed] outside the work environment.”

Further, even if an employee needs some accommodation, the employer “need not provide the” specific accommodation that the employee wants.  . . .  Rather, the employer has “discretion” to choose from among alternative reasonable accommodations if they all will permit the employee to perform the job.  . . .  The employer thus may pick an accommodation that is “less expensive” or “easier” to implement when given the choice between two reasonable accommodations.  . . .  We have held, for example, that a police department could provide an officer a “desk job” even though the officer preferred an “on the street” job with various restrictions.  . . . . And we have held that a clothing store could provide a warehouse employee with “leave time” even though the employee preferred a transfer to another warehouse role. . . .

This law forecloses [the plaintiff’s] failure-to-accommodate claim. At the outset, it is not obvious that [her] proposed accommodation—that [the school] provide her with paid leave to attend the Leader Dogs training—qualified as a reasonable one. At the time that [she] requested leave, she continued to be an excellent teacher who did a “wonderful job” in the classroom.  . . . . And we see little record evidence to suggest that the lack of a guide dog stood as an “obstacle” that stopped her from completing any “necessary function” of her teaching role.  . . .  Yet we need not decide this issue because [the employer] ultimately gave her an accommodation that allowed her to complete the guide-dog training: unpaid leave.

If [the school’s] unpaid-leave accommodation were reasonable, then, that fact would preclude [her] failure-to-accommodate claim because the ADA did not give her the right to her preferred accommodation.   . . .  Even if we assume that [she] needed a guide dog to work as a teacher, [its] accommodation met our reasonableness test.  . . .  There is no dispute that unpaid leave allowed [her] to attend the Leader Dogs training and bring home Henry. [She] also “offers no evidence linking” paid leave “to the performance of her job.”  . . .  Her doctor’s letter, for example, says nothing about whether that leave should be paid or unpaid. So [the employer] (not[the plaintiff]) had the “ultimate discretion” to choose between the paid-versus-unpaid alternatives because both allowed [her] to perform her job.  . . .  [bolding added for emphasis]

[Plaintiff] responds that unpaid leave was only “partially responsive” to her request because this accommodation required her to go three weeks without pay and caused some financial difficulties for her family.  . . . . But these financial difficulties arose “outside the work environment” and so do not go into the reasonableness calculus.  . . . [Her] financial difficulties are thus “beyond” [the employer’s] “duties to accommodate under the ADA.”  . . .  Indeed, her argument has no stopping point. The ADA says that giving an employee a “part-time” schedule can qualify as a reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Under [the plaintiff’s] view, if this employee did not have the financial means to work only part time, the ADA would require the employer to provide full-time pay for the part-time work. The rule requiring an accommodation to be for work-related reasons avoids this result.  . . . . [bolding added for emphasis]

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the employer was required to show that paid leave would be an undue hardship.  “That fact is true but irrelevant.”

True, an employer need not provide a reasonable accommodation if it “would impose an undue hardship on the” employer’s operations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A). In other words, even if paid leave were the only reasonable accommodation, Lakota would not have to provide that leave if it would cause this hardship . . .  But we need not reach this hardship question because we resolve the appeal on a distinct element. The record proves that two different accommodations—paid leave and unpaid leave—were both reasonable. In that scenario, Lakota had the “ultimate discretion” to choose the “less expensive” option even if the more expensive one would not have posed an excessive hardship.  . . .  In sum, because unpaid leave allowed [the plaintiff] to obtain her guide dog, [the employer] met its obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation. The ADA required nothing more. [bolding added for emphasis]

The Court also rejected her FMLA claim.  “Although the FMLA requires employers to grant leave, it does not require them to pay the employee while off work. Rather, the FMLA presumptively allows employers to treat the required leave as unpaid.”

That said, the law gives employees the right “to substitute any of [their] accrued paid vacation leave, personal leave, or medical or sick leave” for FMLA leave.  . . .  But it then makes clear that “nothing in [the FMLA’s general rules] shall require an employer to provide paid sick leave or paid medical leave in any situation in which such employer would not normally provide any such paid leave.” Id. To obtain paid leave, then, the employee must satisfy “the additional requirements in an employer’s paid leave policy[.]”

The Court observed that there were questions about whether the plaintiff even qualified for FMLA leave because, despite the serious health condition, she could still teach and it was her desire to attend training in Michigan that she sought leave.   The plaintiff did not address these issues, so the Court chose not to address them.    Instead, it rejected her argument that she was entitled to paid leave under the school’s policy when it did not normally provide such leave in similar circumstances.

To obtain paid leave under the FMLA, [the plaintiff] needed to show that [the employer] “normally provide[d]” this leave for those in her “situation[.]” Id. § 2612(d)(2)(B). But [the HR Director] testified that the guide-dog training did not fall within “the definition of sick leave” in the Ohio Revised Code, the collective bargaining agreement, or the school board’s sick-leave policy.  . . . . The district court thus held that [she] did not qualify for paid leave under the FMLA because she did not qualify for it under [the employer’s] sick-leave policy.

The Court rejected the argument that because the policy and statute did not define “due to personal illness” that this meant that it must be interpreted to incorporate guide dog training.  The Court instead agreed with the District Court that “due to personal illness” should be given its ordinary meaning.   While the symptoms of her serious medical condition could constitute a personal illness,  obtaining training when she was not incapacitated arguably could not.  Because, again, the plaintiff failed to argue this issue [that she required the training because of her serious health condition], thus giving the employer the opportunity to respond, the Court refused to raise the issue on its own initiative.   Nonetheless, it pointed out that this was an issue which could be argued in the future by other litigants. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Two Unanimous Supreme Court Decisions. Federal Courts Retain Jurisdiction Over Claims Stayed Pending Arbitration.

This morning, the Supreme Court issued two unanimous decisions of interest to employees and employers.  In the first, the Court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Act does not preempt state law negligent hiring claims against truck drivers, trucking companies and brokers where the plaintiff had been injured by a big rig in a traffic accident.   Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, No. 24-1238 (5-14-26).   In the second, the Court held that federal courts retain jurisdiction over lawsuits filed alleging federal or diversity questions (like employment discrimination) which were stayed pending arbitration so that the federal court can confirm or vacate the later arbitration decision. Jules v. Balazs Properties, No. 25-83 (5-14-26).   In this case, the arbitrator ruled in favor of the employer and awarded $34.5K in sanctions against the employee.  “[A]federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA . . .  has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award as to those claims under §9 and §10.  . . .  Because a federal court in this scenario has jurisdiction over the original claims and does not lose that jurisdiction while the case is stayed pending arbitration, it retains jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitral award re solving those claims is valid and should be confirmed.”  In other words, a “court with the power to stay the action under §3 has the further power to confirm [or vacate] any ensuing arbitration award.”

According to the Court’s decision in Jules, the plaintiff worked for the employer hotel and brought a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination under federal and state law after he was fired during the pandemic.  The case was stayed pending arbitration pursuant to an agreement he had previously signed.  The arbitrator ruled in favor of the employer on all claims and issued the employer an award of $34,500 in sanctions (when the plaintiff refused to ultimately participate in the arbitration hearing), which it sought to confirm and enforce in the stayed federal court proceeding.  The plaintiff argued that the federal court no longer had jurisdiction because there was allegedly no longer any federal question or diversity jurisdiction.

After an arbitral award has issued, federal courts may confirm, vacate, or modify such an award under §9, §10, or §11. Un der §9, a court must confirm an award upon request “unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11.” The grounds for vacatur and modification are limited.

 . . .

 . . . For a federal court to have jurisdiction over an arbitral dispute, it is not enough that the dispute implicates the FAA. That is because the FAA is “‘something of an anomaly’ in the realm of federal legislation.”  . . .  Although the FAA is a federal statute that provides federal standards, it “does not itself create [federal] jurisdiction.”  . . .  Instead, given the FAA’s “nonjurisdictional cast,” a federal court must have an “‘independent jurisdictional basis’” for granting FAA relief.  . . . That could come, for example, in the form of diversity jurisdiction if a dispute under the FAA arises between citizens of different States with over $75,000 at issue.  . . . Or a court may have federal-question jurisdiction if an FAA motion implicates a federal issue (other than one under the FAA).

In light of this, the Court will look through the allegations of a petition to compel arbitration to the underlying substantive dispute to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists.  However, when the parties proceeded directly to arbitration (without being ordered to do so by a federal court), the Court will not look through the petitions to vacate or confirm an arbitration award to determine whether federal jurisdiction exists. 

The plaintiff argued that the petition to confirm the award did not meet diversity jurisdiction (because it was less than $75K) and did not raise a federal question.  The Second  Circuit and Supreme Court rejected this argument out of hand.

To start with,  . . , assessing jurisdiction over a §9 or §10 motion in a case originally filed in federal court does not require “looking through” the filed action. Instead, the court may assess its jurisdiction by looking at the suit that is already before it. As Badgerow explained, “[j]urisdiction to decide [a] case includes jurisdiction to decide [a] motion” within that case, and usually “there is no need to ‘look through’ the motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court.”  . . .

Here, the District Court had original jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. §1331, over [the plaintiff’s] federal claims. It was this very jurisdiction that authorized the court to adjudicate the arbitrability of [his] claims under the parties’ contract to begin with, before staying litigation pending arbitration. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the parties arbitrated.  . . .  So when the parties returned to court after arbitration with §9 and §10 motions, the court had the same “jurisdiction to decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction to decide th[ose] motion[s],” that it possessed from the start.  . . .  “The court had federal question subject matter jurisdiction and . . . never lost it.” . . .

 . . .

It is true that, by the time the parties filed the §9 and §10 motions here, the arbitrator had issued an award that marked “a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute.”  . . .  As [plaintiff] argues, that out-of-court resolution functioned like a release, which could serve as an affirmative defense and be used to “resolve the original claim” filed in court.  . . .  The fact that the arbitral award may “resolve” [his] original claims, however, only underscores why the District Court’s original jurisdiction extends to the parties’ §9 and §10 motions. Those motions required the District Court to assess whether there were grounds to vacate the award.  . . .  They were thus integral to determining whether the award would continue to serve as a valid defense to the original claims that had been stayed, but were still pending, in District Court until the court confirmed the award. . . .

 . . . this Court has held that federal courts have the power to incorporate private settlements into orders of the court when resolving claims that are the subject of those settlements. In Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375 (1994), for example, the Court made clear that a federal “court is authorized to embody [a] settlement contract in its dismissal order” and later “enforc[e]” that “settlement agreement.”  . . .  Similarly, the Court has recognized federal courts’ jurisdiction to embody contracts “arrived at by negotiation between the parties” as consent judgments in certain circumstances.  . . . . Federal courts also routinely resolve disputes over private settlements in class actions, which can be settled “only with the court’s approval.”  . . .  In each scenario, as here, the parties reach a contractual resolution of claims filed in federal court, and the federal court has juris diction to resolve disputes over that private settlement and embody the settlement in a court order resolving the case.

 . . .

Under the rule the Court adopts today, this scheme con tinues to work well: The FAA requires a stay, rather than dismissal, so that a court that has granted a §3 stay can superintend the arbitration to the end, including through confirmation or vacatur. On Jules’s theory, however, things would fall apart. Without an independent jurisdictional ba sis (like complete diversity and more than $75,000 at stake) on the face of a §5, §7, §9, or §10 motion, Jules concedes that a court that grants a mandatory §3 stay has little to do but wait until the arbitration concludes and, finally, dismiss the claims. It would be curious for §3 to mandate keeping cases on federal dockets for essentially no reason at all in the cases where federal interests are likely at their highest: those, like this one, involving live federal questions. More plausibly, a court that grants a §3 stay retains jurisdiction to see the case through and provide the FAA’s “procedural protections” along the way.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, May 7, 2026

Sixth Circuit Affirms Jury Award for Sexual Harassment Where Plaintiff Awarded $179K and Her Attorneys $480K.

Yesterday, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury and attorney’s fee award in a sexual harassment case where the jury agreed that the plaintiff had not been fired in retaliation for her complaints, but still awarded her $314 in back pay, awarded her $179K in compensatory damages (for emotional distress) and the trial court awarded her attorneys over $480K in fees (while rejecting the request for $800K in fees).  Griffin v. Copper Cellar Corp., No. 25-5786 (6th Cir. 5/5/26).   The Court found that the $314 amount was based on the defense’s own arguments and was presumptively entitled to be awarded in a hostile work environment case to make the plaintiff whole.  It found her testimony of emotional distress sufficient to support the compensatory damage award.  Finally, it concluded that her attorneys’ rejection of the offer of unconditional reinstatement and $25K for settlement was ultimately reasonable when it obtained seven times that much at trial.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was being grossly and frequently sexually harassed by a restaurant co-worker.  Her employer failed to stop the behavior and was  unsympathetic, even laughing at her.  The employer offered her unconditional reinstatement five weeks later and $25K to resolve her complaint, but it was rejected by her attorneys.  At trial (which had been bifurcated between liability and damages), the employer apparently successfully argued that she had not been fired as alleged and at best would be entitled to no more than $314 in backpay, which is what the jury awarded to her.

The employer challenged the back pay award of $314 because the jury had determined that the plaintiff had never been fired as alleged.  Thus, if she voluntarily resigned, she was not entitled to any back pay.   The Court did not believe that this challenge was timely, but agreed that timeliness had never been raised by the plaintiff or at the trial court level.  In any event, not only did the defense fail to object to ANY award of back pay prior to the final verdict, it actually suggested in closing arguments that $314 was the most that the jury could award.   The defense also had failed to assert prior to the final verdict that only nominal damages would have been appropriate.   The Court ultimately determined that back pay is always a presumptively appropriate remedy in a hostile work environment case. 

Our cases establish that “successful Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to back pay” sufficient “to make them whole.”   . . . In deciding on an award of back pay, a jury considers “what the claimant would have received but for [the] discrimination.” . . . . We have, moreover, recently upheld awards of back pay on hostile-work-environment claims in cases that, like this one, lacked an express jury finding of discriminatory or retaliatory dismissal . . .  To be sure, an award of back pay typically flows from a jury’s finding of discriminatory, retaliatory, or constructive discharge.  . . .  But we have never held that such a verdict is required as a foundation for an award of back pay. Here, the district court determined that the evidence introduced was sufficient for the jury to find Copper Cellar’s Title VII violations “responsible for [Griffin] leaving her employment,”  . . .  and, therefore, that the award of back pay reflected “what [Griffin] would have received but for” the hostile work environment. . . .  Such an award would not, under our existing precedent, constitute a clear error of law, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion.

The Court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff was only entitled to nominal damages because simply “being upset” by the co-worker’s behavior was insufficient to justify such a large award.   The Court cited to the plaintiff’s testimony about how upset she was and her physical and mental manifestations.  “All told, a jury considering and crediting [the plaintiff’s] testimony could reasonably find that [the employer’s] hostile work environment caused her substantially more than nominal harm.”  The Court also could not find the award to be excessive in light of the harassment and isolation she suffered. “Though we are not convinced that only a “particularly sensitive” plaintiff would suffer harm from the treatment [she] described, her exact degree of sensitivity is beside the point where, as here, the record is not “devoid of any evidence of intangible emotional loss to justify a large non-economic award.”

The plaintiff’s attorneys had requested $800K in fees, but were awarded $480K.  The employer argued that they should not have been entitled to fees when they had rejected a settlement offer of $25K and unconditional reinstatement within weeks.  The Court found no abuse of discretion. 

It is true that “a spurned [settlement] offer might warrant a reduc[ed]” fee award, because “[f]ew, if any, reasonable litigants would call a monetary judgment that comes in well under the money offered to settle the case a success.”  . . .  The problem for [the employer] here is that the $179,000 in damages [she] received was not “well under the money offered.” Id. Quite to the contrary, [her] attorneys convinced a jury to award more than seven times what [the employer] was willing to settle for. Therefore, even ignoring that “a rejected settlement offer” is only one among the “broad constellation of factors a trial court may consider” in awarding fees, this is not a case in which “‘a less favorable recovery after trial’” could justify a reduced fee award.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, April 28, 2026

Employee's Election to Challenge IME Abandoned Reasonable Accommodation Interactive Process

 Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on a Rehabilitation Act failure to accommodate claim because the employee abandoned the interactive process, and had always disputed that she required any accommodation to perform her job duties.  Morgan v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 25-3722 (6th Cir. 4-14-26). Employees who are only “regarded as” disabled are not entitled to a reasonable accommodation.  Further, although she had been given the option of seeking a reasonable accommodation, she rejected that option and elected instead to challenge the IME obtained by the employer.  When she submitted such a medical evaluation, she was immediately reinstated. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff suffered from recurring TIAs.  The only accommodation that she sought was intermittent FMLA leave, requiring her to be hospitalized whenever she had a TIA episode.  After almost a decade of renewed FMLA requests, the employer placed her on paid administrative leave pending an Independent Medical Evaluation with a psychologist concerning repeated aggressive, hostile and unprofessional behavior.  The IME concluded that she was not qualified to perform her current job, would require modified duties and further medical evaluation.  The employer then gave the plaintiff four\ options: (1) disability leave; (2) FMLA leave, (3) an ADA accommodation or (4) challenge the IME.  The plaintiff disputed that she was disabled and opted to challenge the IME.  However, she only submitted two days later a return to work without restrictions statement from her treating Nurse Practitioner.    The employer clarified that she required a physician analysis of the IME and ceased her paid administrative leave.   More than a month later, she submitted a medical statement disagreeing with the IME and releasing her to return to work without restrictions.  The employer then immediately reinstated her, but she filed suit at the end of the month, claiming that she had been discriminated against on account of her disability by an alleged failure to provide an accommodation or engage in the interactive process. 

The trial and appellate courts had no trouble disposing of the failure to accommodate claim.  First, she had always denied that she required an accommodation to perform her job duties and was not entitled to an accommodation in a “regarded as” disability claim.     On the contrary, she produced a release to return to work without restrictions.    

If [her] claim is that [the employer] “regarded” her as having a disability that she did not have, her failure-to-accommodate claim is likewise barred. This circuit has held that the fact that an employee does not have a disability obviates an employer’s obligation to provide an accommodation.  . . .  Applying this precedent, if [her] claim is that [the employer] wrongly perceived or had a mistaken belief that she had a disability and treated her adversely, [it] could not at the same time have an obligation to accommodate a disability that she did not have.

Moreover, even if she had an actual disability, any failure of the interactive process was due to her decision to abandon the interactive process and challenge the IME instead of seeking further evaluation or modification of job duties, etc.    She had been given the option of seeking a reasonable accommodation and she had rejected it. 

The Court did not address her loss of paid time off while challenging the employer’s IME because of the alleged “regarded as” disability claim.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

New Federal Government Initiatives Affect Legal Enforcement

While making changes in employment laws has not been a priority for the Trump Administration in 2026, that does not mean that there is nothing new to watch.  First, ICE announced last month that certain clerical errors in completing I-9 forms which formerly could be corrected in the future now constitute substantive violations which could result in substantial fines. Second, OSHA announced last week an increased enforcement of workplace heat hazards, starting immediately.  Finally, affirmative action requirements for veterans and the disabled remains fully in place due to the underlying statutes, but the Trump Administration has again proposed moving enforcement from OFCCP (which would be defunded) to the Office of Civil Rights. 

Last month, ICE issued enforcement guidance for employers explaining how ICE conducts I-9 form inspections and the ramifications for employers with sloppy records and/or failure to correct technical and other failures.    It is happily well written.  It confirms that employers have 3 days to produce I-9 forms requested by ICE.  “An employer may receive a monetary fine for all substantive violations and uncorrected technical or procedural failures.”  Following an inspection, the employer will receive one of three types of notices which reflect the outcome of the audit.   It also includes a list of “substantive paperwork violations,” (i.e., missing or incomplete fields) which now include the failure to fully complete certain areas of the I-9 form, such as the employee’s date of birth, the date the employee signed the form, incomplete information about the translator (if any), date of hire, date of employer certification, etc.  It also lists examples of technical failures and a description of how fines are calculated.

Last week, OSHA updated its National Emphasis Program for indoor and outdoor heat hazard prevention which provides additional guidance to avoid citations and expands the list of targeted industries.  This will be particularly important during heat waves.    Among other things, OSHA will conduct random inspections of targeted industries during heat waves to ensure compliance.  This initiative began in 2022.  The OSHA new release explained “OSHA identified industries with high rates of heat-related illness and industries with employers that have received heat-related citations or hazard alert letters.” The target lists includes farming, various manufacturers, sawmills, metal production and processing foundries, grocery and related product merchant wholesalers, department stores, air transportation, general freight trucking, couriers, messengers, and delivery services, warehouses, landscapers, community food and housing, automotive repair and maintenance, construction, greenhouses and nurseries, and restaurants.

Trump’s proposed budget again intends to defund OFCCP entirely, which will require amendments to the underlying statutes for Section 503 and VEVRAA, as well as the applicable regulations, which assign enforcement to OFCCP.  This was also proposed in last year’s budget, but was not adopted by Congress.   Employers should remember that although Executive Order 11246 (women and minorities) was rescinded in January 2025, the affirmative action obligations for the disabled and veterans remain fully in place.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, April 7, 2026

Franklin County Appeals Court Affirms Employer’s Summary Judgment on Sex, Race, Harassment and FMLA Retaliation Claims

Last month, the Franklin County Appeals Court affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on FMLA retaliation and sex and race discrimination allegations following the plaintiff’s demotion. Fields-Arnold v. Cent. State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 2026-Ohio-826. The Court found that the plaintiff waived certain arguments about direct evidence, race discrimination and hostile work environment by failing to provide any substantive argument before the trial or appeals courts.  The plaintiff also failed to show replacement outside the protected class or to show that the employer’s explanation for her demotion was pretextual, dooming her sex discrimination and FMLA retaliation claims.  While she was not given a specific reason at the time of her demotion, she admitted that her job performance had previously been criticized and she failed to dispute the reasons given in the employer’s summary judgment motion.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff was encouraged by the university president to apply for a certain promotion, which she eventually received.  However, in their first post-promotion meeting, their relationship soured when she requested a higher salary than offered.  Although she prevailed in receiving a $5K increase, the president allegedly said that she talked too much and reminded him of his wife.   He later criticized her performance in a few meetings and she was demoted back to her prior position a few months later.  In the meantime, she had applied for and, after submitting additional documentation, FMLA leave. She was replaced by a white female and resigned the following year after filing this lawsuit.   The court of claims granted summary judgment on all claims to the employer.

The Court found that she had abandoned her race discrimination claim by failing to make any substantive arguments in her appellate brief when challenging the trial court’s rejection of this claim for failing to show pretext.  Indeed, she apparently only used the word “race” three times in her entire brief.

Similarly, it rejected any claims of direct evidence of sex discrimination because she never raised this argument in opposing the summary judgment brief at the trial court level.  Moreover, the three alleged comments were not directly related to the issue of her demotion, and thus, were not direct evidence since it still required an inference as to the speaker’s intent. 

[His] comments, while disrespectful and perhaps based on stereotypes, do not satisfy the requirements to constitute direct evidence of discrimination. “ ‘Direct evidence is proof which speaks directly to the issue, requiring no support by other evidence.’ ”  . . .  It “ ‘does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the protected group.’ ”

In addition, she failed to identify anyone outside her protected age or sex class who was similarly situated, failed to meet the employer’s performance expectations and was treated better than her. 

The Court also rejected her appeal dismissing her hostile work environment when the trial court found that three alleged comments over a four month period were insufficiently pervasive or hostile.   As with her direct evidence argument, she failed to even mention “hostile work environment” when opposing the employer’s summary judgment motion at the trial court. 

As for her FMLA retaliation claim, the trial court had found that it failed because she received all of the FMLA leave she requested and her demotion did not deter her from seeking additional FMLA leave.  The Court’s majority reversed that determination, but found she still could not prevail because she failed to present evidence showing that the university’s dissatisfaction with her performance was pretext for retaliation. She admitted that the university president had criticized her performance to her face several times and did not try to show that those and other criticisms lacked a factual basis or were insufficient to motivate her demotion, etc.   Therefore, the fact that she was not told at the time of her demotion the specific performance reasons for it, she had previously been informed about dissatisfaction with her performance and failed to show those and other criticisms were pretextual.

Even if an employer approves an employee’s FMLA requests, the employer could still go on to impose an adverse employment action against the employee for exercising her rights under the FMLA. . . .  And that is exactly what [plaintiff] alleged in her complaint—that she was demoted because she took FMLA leave. We find the court of claims erred in concluding [she] “failed to identify an adverse employment action that was taken against her because she used FMLA leave.”

. . . .

Although [Plaintiff] did not receive specific examples of her unsatisfactory performance at or around the time of the demotion  . . . , she was aware of Dr. Thomas’s dissatisfaction before the demotion occurred. In her deposition, [she]recounted two meetings where [he] criticized her performance. . . .

While [her] deposition testimony reflects her general belief that she satisfied the job duties as listed in the job description  . . . , she did not contest the specific assertions [he] made about her purportedly unsatisfactory work. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.