Mansfield Company Pays $188K to Settle EEOC Sex Discrimination Lawsuit

Yesterday, the EEOC announced that it had settled a lawsuit against a Central Ohio company for $188K which involved retaliation and sex and wage discrimination. In the lawsuit, the EEOC alleged that the defendant employer hired an experienced female drafter to prepare drawings and sketches for batteries and engines, but paid a higher salary to a similarly qualified male engineer hired a few months after her to perform the same tasks. When the female engineer learned of the salary disparity, she complained to the human resources manager and was subsequently fired – allegedly in retaliation for complaining about the discrimination. The EEOC ultimately filed suit on her behalf in 2010, alleging violations of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act.

In addition to monetary damages for the female engineer, the EEOC obtained a two-year consent decree which requires training for the defendant employer's human resources personnel and employees at the Hyundai Ideal Electric Company's home office in Mansfield, Ohio and posting of anti-discrimination notices.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Arbitrator Exceeded Authority By Ignoring Clear Contract Language and Deletion of Holiday Pay Cash-Out Negotiated at Table.

Last week, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal and vacation of an arbitration award in favor of a union's claim for holiday pay. Eastlake v. Fraternal Order of Police/Ohio Labor Council, 2011-Ohio-2201. In that case, the city and union had negotiated to delete a provision which provided employees with the option of (1) taking the holiday off with pay or (2) working the holiday and cashing out holiday pay at the end of the year. Afterwards, the City had the discretion to permit employees to work on holidays and to let the employee take a constructive holiday with pay. However, when the City exercised its rights under the new holiday provision following ratification of the bargaining agreement, the union argued that the employees were still entitled at their option to work the holiday and cash out holiday pay even though the former provision had been deleted. An arbitrator found that the new provision was ambiguous and would create a hardship for the employees if they lost out on the opportunity to receive 96 hours of pay at the end of the year as they had before negotiations. When the City moved to vacate the arbitration award, the trial court found that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by disregarding clear contract language, ignoring the bargain reached at the negotiating table and ignoring other provisions in the bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals agreed.

According to the Court's opinion, before negotiations, union employees

had the option of either taking their 12 paid holidays as a holiday off with pay or working the holiday and then cashing out some or all of their holidays at the end of the year. Therefore, an employee could potentially cash out 96 hours of holiday pay in December of each year. That section read as follows:

"Employees shall have the option of either taking the time off with pay or to be paid for the holidays at their straight time rate of pay and shall notify the Chief of their election."

After negotiations, this provision was deleted from the bargaining agreement and Section 3 was inserted into the Agreement:

"Section 3. Holiday Work Option. At the discretion of the respective department head with consideration of workloads and department needs, an employee not regularly scheduled may work designated holidays. The employee may then elect to take the additional holiday compensation in the form of
payment.

Section 4. Holiday Time Scheduling. An employee that works on a recognized holiday or whose regular continuous schedule does not include the day of the observed holiday shall designate the days he wishes to take off at a later date, which shall be subject to the advance approval of the employee's supervisor as to when they may be taken. "An employee electing to take time off for holidays, shall be required to take the time during the year it is earned and not be able to carry the time over into the next calendar year.

The arbitrator found Section 3 to be ambiguous and, apparently, the Union testified that it had never been their intention during negotiations to lose the 96 hours of holiday pay. The common pleas court found that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in disregarding clear language in the agreement, finding a non-existent ambiguity, and giving the Union a better bargain than it negotiated.

The unequivocal language of the Agreement must be followed. Nowhere in Article 34 does it state that the Union would be entitled to cash out ten holidays in December of each year. In fact, as previously mentioned, the part of the Agreement that conferred such a benefit was deleted during negotiations. Under Sections 3 and 4, an employee may fall into only one of three categories: (1) an employee who is not regularly scheduled, but who is called into work by the respective department head; (2) an employee who is scheduled to work on a recognized holiday; and (3) an employee who is not scheduled to work on a recognized holiday. Only under the first scenario, i.e., Article 34, Section 3, may an employee cash out holiday compensation in the form of payment.

Further, the arbitrator's decision makes note of the fact that if the employees were not entitled to cash out the ten holidays for payment in December, it would be a harsh or unreasonable result and would have a substantial impact on the bargaining unit. However, the Union agreed both to the deletion of the provision, which granted them the holiday cash-out option, and to the addition of Section 3, which unequivocally limits the circumstance in which an employee may cash out holiday compensation in the form of payment.

Again, "'[a collective bargaining agreement] is limited to the provision bargained for and *** an arbitrator may not apply extraneous rules to the agreement, where those rules were not bargained for and are contrary to the plain terms of the agreement itself.' *** Because a valid arbitrator's award draws its essence from a [collective bargaining agreement], *** an arbitrator exceeds his powers when the award conflicts with the express terms of the agreement or cannot be derived rationally from the terms of the agreement. ***" (Internal citations omitted.) Summit Cty. Children Serv. Bd. v. Communication Workers of Am., Local 4546, 113 Ohio St.3d 291, 294, 2007-Ohio-1949.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed the common pleas court and ruled in favor of the employer.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

EEOC’s Cleveland Office Announces $300K Settlement of Sexual Harassment Lawsuit

On Friday, the EEOC announced that its Cleveland, Ohio district office had settled for $300,000 a sexual harassment lawsuit brought in federal court against Dave's Supermarket, a 13-store grocery chain with 1500 employees. According to the EEOC's press release, a former meat department manager made repeated and unwanted sexual advances to female employees, "and that upper management, aware of his behavior, failed to stop it." In addition, the EEOC alleged that "the sexual harassment included an incident during" where the manager "exposed himself to a newly hired female employee," who complained to upper management "about the incident, but that management did not investigate or discipline" the manager. However, according to the EEOC, the market finally fired the manager after another female employee also complained that he sexually harassed her as well.

In addition to the monetary relief for four female employees, "the two-year consent decree settling the suit provides for mandatory training of all staff on sexual harassment and the company's obligations under Title VII, with an emphasis on the definition of sexual harassment, maintaining a harassment-free workplace, and the laws prohibiting unlawful retaliation. The decree also requires management and/or supervisor accountability concerning sexual harassment and posting of a notice to inform employees about the lawsuit and provide the EEOC's contact information."

Insomniacs may read the full EEOC press release on its website.

In a similar announcement, the Chicago regional office of the EEOC announced a $195,000 settlement of a national origin harassment federal lawsuit (EEOC v. Fireside West, LLC d/b/a Hilton Lisle/Naperville, No. 09-cv-5979) involving an executive chef’s derogatory references to two Hispanic members of the kitchen staff. Like the Cleveland lawsuit, there was also a three-year consent decree.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Same Time Next Year: Different Court Different Result on Disability Discrimination

Last month, the Eighth District Court of Appeals in Cuyahoga County reversed summary judgment in favor of a school district on a disability discrimination and retaliation claim brought by a terminated teacher. Johnson v. Cleveland City School Dist., 2011-Ohio-1917. In that case, the plaintiff teacher brought suit for a failure to accommodate her cervical myelopathy. In fact, she initially brought suit in federal court, which dismissed her federal claims on summary judgment . . . . . .twice . . . . after the Sixth Circuit once reversed. However, the federal court had declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims (disability discrimination, breach of contract and infliction of emotional distress) and she filed those in state court while her federal appeal proceeded. When the district court granted summary judgment again, the school attempted to dismiss the state court action based on res judicata, but the appellate court was not having any of that.

According to the Court's opinion, the teacher's physician recommended certain accommodations of her disability so that she would not get worn out. These medical restrictions were honored by the school for a number of years. Then, according to the teacher, a new administrator decided that they would not be accommodated any longer and she had to return to teaching a regular class, which the teacher said she could not do. When a stalemate ensued, the teacher took a medical leave of absence and filed a Charge of Discrimination. When the Charge was dismissed, the school denied to continue her leave and she returned to work, but still would not perform regular teaching duties. Instead, she requested a fitness for duty examination, which resulted in the same medical limitations as before.

At this point, the parties do not agree on what happened next. The plaintiff asserted that she produced a guidance counselor certificate and said she could perform those duties. The school denied that she ever applied for a counselor position. The school refused to accommodate all of her restrictions, but offered her three teaching positions. The teacher said that she agreed to accept one, but the school said that she denied all three positions. The school then fired her.

The Court of Appeals found that there were disputed issues of material facts as to whether the teacher had a covered disability and been accommodated and whether her termination was in retaliation for exercising protected rights in seeking a reasonable accommodation and filing a Charge of Discrimination. Therefore the case was remanded for a jury trial.

The trial court determined that the physician's conclusory diagnosis that the teacher had a "disability" did not create a disputed issue of fact about substantial limitations of major life activities, but the Court of Appeals disagreed. Moreover, two other physicians agreed that plaintiff was disabled.

The trial court had found that the plaintiff was not qualified because her restrictions on speaking prevented her from maintaining control over a classroom. However, again, the Court of Appeals disagreed because, among other things, she had received "excellent" performance evaluations since the restrictions were put in place years earlier.

Finally, the retaliation claim was revived because there was evidence that the school provided knowingly false information in the termination letter when it claimed that the teacher had declined an offered position, but the human resources' employees notes stated otherwise (as did the plaintiff teacher).

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit: Students Who Are Actually Learning Are Not Employees Under the FLSA

This morning, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a rather rare child-labor decision. In it, the Court was required to decide whether students at a vocational school were student-learners or employees due minimum wage for the "work" they performed at the school (in a nursing, farming, maintenance or other workplace setting). The Court rejected the Department of Labor employee-trainee test in favor of one that determines whether the individual or the school primarily benefits from the services performed. In other words, "the proper approach for determining whether an employment relationship exists in the context of a training or learning situation is to ascertain which party derives the primary benefit from the relationship." In particular, the Court agreed that the students primarily benefitted from the work because the students were not displacing regular employees in performing essential services. Indeed, all of the work could be performed by the instructors without the assistance of the students if that were the defendant school's aim. Moreover, the education received by the students was effective at teaching necessary skills. Solis v. Laurelbrook Sanitarium and School, Inc., No. 09-6128.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.