Court Rejects Employer’s Attempt at Two-Bites at the Same Apple When Challenging ULP

Last week, the Sixth Circuit rejected the attempt of a government contractor to avoid an unfair labor practice charge by claiming that it was a joint employer entitled to the benefit of the NLRA exemption for the federal government.  Bannum Place of Saginaw LLC, v. NLRB, No. 21-2664 (6th Cir. 7-14-22).   The employer first raised the argument -- that the federal Bureau of Prisons so regulated its operations under their service contract that the employer constituted a joint employer with the federal government – when the union sought recognition.  However, the employer failed to appeal the Regional Director’s decision rejecting the argument and the NLRB refused to entertain – or relitigate -- the issue when the same employer was then subject to an ULP Charge arising out of that same, or related, election. 29 C.F.R. § 102.67(g).  The Court agreed that courts will defer to the NLRB’s refusal to relitigate legal issues which the party could have but failed to appeal to the Board during the representation phase.  In any event, “because Congress has unambiguously limited the reach of the exemption in § 2(2) to governmental entities and wholly owned government corporations, this court will not extend the exemption to government contractors.”

The Court observed that the no-re-litigation rule only applies when the second proceeding is related to the representation issue when the argument was first raised and then not appealed.  However, the employer could not successfully argue that this ULP was unrelated to the earlier representation proceeding for the first time on appeal because the employer failed to raise the unrelatedness argument before in the underlying ULP proceeding.   The Court will only consider arguments that had first been made to the NLRB.

The employer also failed to point to any new circumstances that could have justified re-litigation of the issue during the ULP phase.

The employer then argued that its joint employer argument went to the NLRB’s statutory jurisdiction and could not be waived.   However, the Court found that this argument would likewise fail because the NLRA did not address joint employment and only exempted certain types of employers, including the federal government.  The Supreme Court had earlier rejected a similar argument by a hospital which claimed its lease with a state government made it a government subdivision.  Other circuit courts had likewise rejected arguments to expand the reach of the limited exemptions:

As the Tenth Circuit held, “because Congress has unambiguously limited the reach of the exemption in § 2(2) to governmental entities and wholly owned government corporations, this court will not extend the exemption to government contractors.”

. . .

In sum, even if Bannum’s contract vests in the BOP substantial control over Bannum’s daily operations, that does not transform the company from a covered employer into either a governmental entity or a wholly owned government corporation and thus beyond the Board’s reach.

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Just When You Thought It Was Safe To Get Back in the Water, EEOC Revises COVID/ADA Guidance

 Yesterday, the EEOC posted updated COVID guidance concerning employment issues involving the pandemic and the Americans With Disabilities Act.  The updated guidance – which is substantial and affects a wide number of issues -- is posted below.  In its announcement, the EEOC update only mentioned one of the changes, involving whether an employer can always require COVID testing at work:

 EEOC’s assessment at the outset of the pandemic was that the ADA standard for conducting medical examinations was, at that time, always met for employers to conduct worksite COVID-19 viral screening testing. With the revision of A.6, below, on July 12, 2022, EEOC makes clear that going forward employers will need to assess whether current pandemic circumstances and individual workplace circumstances justify viral screening testing of employees to prevent workplace transmission of COVID-19. A.6. offers employers possible factors to consider in making this assessment, including community transmission levels and types of contacts between employees and others in the workplace. This change is not meant to suggest that such testing is or is not warranted; rather, the revised Q&A acknowledges that evolving pandemic circumstances will require an individualized assessment by employers to determine whether such testing is warranted consistent with the requirements of the ADA.

These are the updated Q&As from the EEOC:

A.5. When an employee returns to the workplace after being out with COVID-19, does the ADA allow employers to require a note from a qualified medical professional explaining that it is safe for the employee to return (i.e., no risk of transmission) and that the employee is able to perform the job duties? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. Alternatively, employers may follow CDC guidance to determine whether it is safe to allow an employee to return to the workplace without confirmation from a medical professional.

When an employee returns to the workplace after being out with COVID-19, the ADA allows an employer to require confirmation from a qualified medical professional explaining that the individual is able to safely return. Such a request is permitted under the ADA. First, because COVID-19 is not always a disability, a request for confirmation may not be a disability-related inquiry. Alternatively, if the request is considered a disability-related inquiry, it would be justified under the ADA standard requiring that such employee inquiries be job-related and consistent with business necessity. Here, the request meets the “business necessity” standard because it is related to the possibility of transmission and/or related to an employer’s objective concern about the employee’s ability to resume working. For example, an employer may require confirmation from a medical professional addressing whether an employee may resume specific job duties requiring physical exertion.

As a practical matter, employers may wish to consider other ways to determine the safety of allowing an employee to return to work if doctors and other healthcare professionals are unable to provide such documentation either in a timely manner or at all. This might include reliance on local clinics to provide a form, a stamp, or an e-mail to confirm that an individual is no longer infectious and is able to resume working.

A.6. Under the ADA, may an employer, as a mandatory screening measure, administer a COVID-19 viral test (a test to detect the presence of the COVID-19 virus) when evaluating an employee’s initial or continued presence in the workplace? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes, if the employer can show it is job-related and consistent with business necessity.

A COVID-19 viral test is a medical examination within the meaning of the ADA. Therefore, if an employer implements screening protocols that include COVID-19 viral testing, the ADA requires that any mandatory medical test of employees be “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” Employer use of a COVID-19 viral test to screen employees who are or will be in the workplace will meet the “business necessity” standard when it is consistent with guidance from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and/or state/local public health authorities that is current at the time of testing. Be aware that CDC and other public health authorities periodically update and revise their recommendations about COVID-19 testing, and FDA may revise its guidance or emergency use authorizations, based on new information and changing conditions.

A positive viral test result means that the test detected SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, at the time of testing, and that the individual most likely has a current infection and may be able to transmit the virus to others. A negative test result means the test did not detect SARS-CoV-2 at the time of testing. However, a negative test does not mean the employee does not have any virus, or will not later get the virus. It means only that the virus causing SARS-CoV-2 was not detected by the test.

If an employer seeks to implement screening testing for employees such testing must meet the “business necessity” standard based on relevant facts. Possible considerations in making the “business necessity” assessment may include the level of community transmission, the vaccination status of employees, the accuracy and speed of processing for different types of COVID-19 viral tests, the degree to which breakthrough infections are possible for employees who are “up to date” on vaccinations, the ease of transmissibility of the current variant(s), the possible severity of illness from the current variant, what types of contacts employees may have with others in the workplace or elsewhere that they are required to work (e.g., working with medically vulnerable individuals), and the potential impact on operations if an employee enters the workplace with COVID-19. In making these assessments, employers should check the latest CDC guidance (and any other relevant sources) to determine whether screening testing is appropriate for these employees.

Note: Question A.6. and A.8. address screening of employees generally. See Question A.9. regarding decisions to test only individual employees.

A.7. Under the ADA, may an employer require antibody testing before permitting employees to re-enter the workplace? (Updated 7/12/22)

No. An antibody test, as a medical examination under the ADA, must be job-related and consistent with business necessity. As of July 2022, CDC guidance explains that antibody testing may not show whether an employee has a current infection, nor establish that an employee is immune to infection; as a result, it should not be used to determine whether an employee may enter the workplace. Based on this CDC guidance, at this time such testing does not meet the ADA’s “business necessity” standard for medical examinations or inquiries for employees. Therefore, requiring antibody testing before allowing employees to re-enter the workplace is not allowed under the ADA. An antibody test is different from a test to determine if someone has evidence of infection with SARS-CoV-2 or has COVID-19 (i.e., a viral test). The EEOC addresses COVID-19 viral screening tests in A.6.

C.1. If an employer is hiring, may it screen applicants for symptoms of COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. An employer may screen job applicants for symptoms of COVID-19 after making a conditional job offer, as long as it does so for all entering employees in the same type of job. This ADA rule applies whether or not the applicant has a disability.

In addition, if an employer screens everyone (i.e., applicants, employees, contractors, visitors) for COVID-19 before permitting entry to the worksite, then an applicant in the pre-offer stage who needs to be in the workplace as part of the application process (e.g., for a job interview) may likewise be screened for COVID-19. The screening is limited to the same screening that everyone else undergoes; an employer that goes beyond that screening will have engaged in an illegal pre-offer disability-related inquiry and/or medical examination. For information on the ADA rules governing such inquiries and examination, see Section A.

C.4. May an employer withdraw a job offer when it needs an applicant to start working immediately, whether at the worksite or in the physical presence of others outside of the worksite, because the individual has tested positive for the virus that causes COVID-19, has symptoms of COVID-19, or has been exposed recently to someone with COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

An employer should consult and follow current CDC guidance that explains when and how it would be safe for an individual who currently has COVID-19, symptoms of COVID-19, or has been exposed recently to someone with COVID-19, to end isolation or quarantine and thus safely enter a workplace or otherwise work in the physical presence of others. An employer who follows current CDC guidance addressing the individual’s situation may withdraw the job offer if (1) the job requires an immediate start date, (2) CDC guidance recommends the person not be in proximity to others, and (3) the job requires such proximity to others, whether at the workplace or elsewhere. Given that for some individuals there may only be a short period of time required for isolation or quarantine, employers may be able to adjust a start date or permit telework (if job duties can be performed remotely).

C.5. May an employer postpone the start date or withdraw a job offer because of the employer’s concern that the individual is older, pregnant, or has an underlying medical condition that puts the individual at increased risk from COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

No. An employer’s concern for an applicant’s well-being -- an intent to protect them from what it perceives as a risk of illness from COVID-19 -- does not excuse an action that is otherwise unlawful discrimination. The fact that CDC has noted that older adults, people with certain medical conditions, or pregnant and recently pregnant people may be at greater risk of severe illness from COVID-19 does not justify unilaterally postponing the start date or withdrawing a job offer. Therefore, an employer may not discriminate based on age (40 or older) or pregnancy and related conditions. If an underlying medical condition is a disability, an employer must determine whether the individual’s disability poses a “direct threat” by starting work immediately and, if so, whether reasonable accommodation can be provided to sufficiently lessen or eliminate any risks without causing an undue hardship. For more information on assessing direct threat and reasonable accommodation in this situation, see G.4. and G.5. For more information on potential issues regarding discrimination based on age or pregnancy, see Sections H and J.

D.17. Might the pandemic result in excusable delays during the interactive process? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. Some of the issues initially created by the pandemic that delayed engaging in an interactive process and/or providing reasonable accommodation may no longer exist. But, as the pandemic continues to evolve and new issues arise, it is possible that an employer may face new challenges that interfere with responding expeditiously to a request for accommodation. Similarly, reopening a workplace may bring a higher number of requests for reasonable accommodation. In all these situations, an employer must show specific pandemic-related circumstances justified the delay in providing a reasonable accommodation to which the employee was legally entitled. To the extent that evolving circumstances created by the pandemic cause a justifiable delay in the interactive process–thereby delaying a decision on a request–employers and employees are encouraged to use interim solutions to enable employees to keep working as much as possible.

D.18. Federal agencies are required to have timelines in their written reasonable accommodation procedures governing how quickly they will process requests and provide reasonable accommodations. What happens if circumstances created by the pandemic prevent an agency from meeting this timeline? (Updated 7/12/22)

Situations created by the current COVID-19 pandemic may constitute an “extenuating circumstance”—something beyond a federal agency’s control—that may justify exceeding the normal timeline that an agency has adopted in its internal reasonable accommodation procedures.

Some of the issues initially created by the pandemic that delayed engaging in an interactive process and/or providing reasonable accommodation may no longer exist. But, as the pandemic continues to evolve and new issues arise, it is possible that an agency may face new challenges that interfere with responding to a request for accommodation within an agency’s timeline. Similarly, reopening a workplace may bring a higher number of requests for reasonable accommodation. In all these situations, an agency must show specific pandemic-related circumstances that constitute an “extenuating circumstance.” To the extent that there is an extenuating circumstance, agencies and employees are encouraged to use interim solutions to enable employees to keep working as much as possible.

G.1. As government restrictions are lifted or modified , how will employers know what steps they can take consistent with the ADA to screen employees for the virus that causes COVID-19 when entering the workplace? (Updated 7/12/22)

The ADA permits employers to make disability-related inquiries and conduct medical exams to screen employees for COVID-19 when entering the workplace if such screening is “job-related and consistent with business necessity.” For more information on disability-related inquiries and medical examinations, see Section A. For information on reasonable accommodation requests related to screening protocols, see G.7.

Employers should make sure not to engage in unlawful disparate treatment based on protected characteristics in decisions related to screening and exclusion.

G.2. An employer requires workers to wear personal protective equipment and engage in other infection control practices. Some employees ask for accommodations due to a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance that affects the ability to wear personal protective equipment and/or engage in other infection control practices. How should an employer respond? (Updated 7/12/22)

In most instances, federal EEO laws permit an employer to require employees to wear personal protective equipment (PPE) (for example, masks and/or gloves) and observe other infection control practices (for example, regular hand washing or physical distancing protocols). Some employers may need to comply with regulations issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that require the use of PPE. OSHA regulations do not prohibit the use of reasonable accommodations under the EEO laws as long as those accommodations do not violate OSHA requirements. Employers also may follow current CDC guidance about who should wear masks.

Regardless of the reason an employer requires PPE (or other infection control measures), when an employee with a disability needs a reasonable accommodation under the ADA to comply with an employer’s requirement to wear PPE (e.g., non-latex gloves, modified face masks for interpreters or others who communicate with an employee who uses lip reading, or gowns designed for individuals who use wheelchairs), or when an employee requires a religious accommodation under Title VII (such as modified or alternative equipment due to religious attire or grooming practices), the employer should discuss the request and provide accommodation (either what is requested by the employee or an alternative that is effective in meeting the employee’s needs) if it does not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business under the ADA or Title VII. For general information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see Section D.

G.3. What does an employee need to do in order to request reasonable accommodation from an employer because the employee has one of the medical conditions that CDC says may put a person at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

An employee—or a third party, such as an employee’s doctor—must let the employer know that the employee needs a change for a reason related to a medical condition . Individuals may request accommodation orally or in writing. While the employee (or third party) does not need to use the term “reasonable accommodation” or reference the ADA, the employee may do so.

The employee or the employee’s representative should communicate that the employee has a medical condition necessitating a change to meet a medical need. After receiving a request, the employer may ask questions or seek medical documentation to help decide if the individual has a disability—not all medical conditions meet the ADA’s definition of “disability”—and if there is a reasonable accommodation, barring undue hardship, that can be provided. For additional information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see Section D. For information on pregnancy-related disabilities covered under the ADA, see J.2. For general information on reasonable accommodation requests related to a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, see K.12.

G.4. CDC identifies a number of medical conditions that are more likely to cause people to get severely ill if they get COVID-19. An employer knows that an employee has one of these conditions and is concerned that the employee’s health will be jeopardized upon returning to the workplace, but the employee has not requested accommodation. How does the ADA apply to this situation? (Updated 7/12/22)

The ADA does not mandate that the employer take action in this situation if the employee has not requested reasonable accommodation. Also, an employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodation applies only if an employee has an actual disability or a record of a disability, as defined in the ADA; this means not every individual with one of the medical conditions that might place them at higher risk of COVID-19 complications will automatically satisfy these ADA definitions of disability.

Assuming the employee has a “disability” as discussed above, if the employer is concerned that the health of an employee with a disability may be jeopardized upon returning to the workplace, the ADA generally does not allow the employer to exclude the employee—or take any other adverse action—because the employee has a disability that CDC identifies as potentially placing the employee at higher risk for severe illness if the employee gets COVID-19. Under the ADA, such an adverse action is not allowed unless the employee’s disability poses a “direct threat” to the employee’s health or safety that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

The ADA direct threat requirement is a high standard. As an affirmative defense for the employer, direct threat requires an employer to show that the individual has a disability that poses a “significant risk of substantial harm” to the employee’s own health or safety, or that of others in the workplace under 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(r) (regulation addressing direct threat to health or safety of self or others). A direct threat assessment cannot be based solely on the disability being identified in CDC’s guidance; the determination must be an individualized assessment based on a reasonable medical judgment about this employee’s disability—not the disability in general—using the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. Thus, an employer analyzing a potential direct threat must consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm. Analysis of these factors will likely include considerations based on the severity of the pandemic in a particular area and the employee’s own health (for example, is the employee’s disability well-controlled), and the employee’s particular job duties. A determination of direct threat also would include whether the employee is up to date on vaccinations and the likelihood that an individual may be exposed to the virus at the worksite. Measures that an employer may be taking in general to protect all workers, such as mandatory physical distancing, also would be relevant.

Even if an employer determines that an employee’s disability poses a “significant risk of substantial harm” to the employee’s own health or safety, the employer still cannot exclude the employee from the workplace—or take any other adverse action—unless there is no way to provide a reasonable accommodation (absent undue hardship). The ADA regulations require an employer to consider whether there are reasonable accommodations that would eliminate or sufficiently reduce the risk so that it would be safe for the employee to return to the workplace, while still permitting the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.

An employer’s consideration of a possible reasonable accommodation should involve an interactive process with the employee. If there are no accommodations in an employee’s current position that sufficiently reduce or eliminate direct threat in the workplace, then an employer must consider accommodations such as telework, leave, or—as a last resort—reassignment (perhaps to a different job in a place where it may be safer for the employee to work or that permits telework).

An employer may only bar an employee from working based on the direct threat analysis if, after going through all these steps, the facts support the conclusion that the employee poses a significant risk of substantial harm to the employee’s own health or safety that cannot be reduced or eliminated by reasonable accommodation. For general information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA (i.e., where an individual’s request for reasonable accommodation has nothing to do with potential direct threat concerns), see Section D.

G.5. What are examples of reasonable accommodation that, absent undue hardship, may eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) a direct threat to self or others? (Updated 7/12/22)

Reasonable accommodations that may eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) a direct threat to self or others may include additional or enhanced protective gowns, masks, gloves, or other gear beyond what the employer may generally provide to, or require from, employees returning to its workplace. Reasonable accommodations also may include additional or enhanced protective measures, such as High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration systems/units or other enhanced air filtration measures, erecting a barrier that provides separation between an employee with a disability and coworkers/the public, or increasing the space between an employee with a disability and others. Another possible reasonable accommodation may be elimination or substitution of particular “marginal” functions (less critical or incidental job duties as distinguished from the “essential” functions of a particular position). In addition, accommodations may include telework, modification of work schedules (if that decreases contact with coworkers and/or the public when on duty or commuting), or moving the location of where one performs work (for example, moving a person to the end of a production line rather than in the middle of it if that provides more physical distancing).

These are only a few ideas. Identifying an effective accommodation depends, among other things, on an employee’s job duties and the design of the workspace. An employer and employee should discuss possible ideas; the Job Accommodation Network (www.askjan.org) also may be able to assist in helping identify possible accommodations. As with all discussions of reasonable accommodation during this pandemic, employers and employees are encouraged to be creative and flexible. For general information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA, see Section D.

G.6. As a best practice, and in advance of having some or all employees return to the workplace, are there ways for an employer to invite employees to request flexibility in work arrangements? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. The ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act do not prohibit employers from making information available in advance to all employees about whom to contact—if they wish—to request reasonable accommodation that they may need for a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice or observance upon return to the workplace. Once requests are received, the employer may begin the interactive process. An employer may choose to include in such a notice all medical conditions identified in CDC guidance that may place people at higher risk of serious illness if they contract COVID-19, provide instructions about whom to contact, and explain that the employer is willing to consider on a case-by-case basis any requests from employees who have these or other medical conditions which may qualify as disabilities.

Alternatively, an employer may send a general notice explaining that the employer is willing to consider employee requests for reasonable accommodation for employees with a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, or to consider flexibility on an individualized basis for employees not eligible for reasonable accommodation (e.g., employees who request flexibility due to age). The employer should specify if the point of contact is different depending on whether the request is based on disability, sincerely held religious beliefs, pregnancy, age, or child-care responsibilities.

Either approach is consistent with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title VII.

Regardless of the approach, employers should ensure that those employees who receive, review, or process these requests are sufficiently trained in how to handle them in accordance with the federal employment nondiscrimination laws that may apply, for instance, with respect to accommodations due to a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, observance, or practice; or a request related to pregnancy. For additional information on reasonable accommodation under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act, see Section D.

H.1. CDC has explained that the risk for severe illness with COVID-19 increases with age, with older adults at the highest risk. Do older adults have protections under the federal employment discrimination laws? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employment discrimination against individuals age 40 and older. The ADEA would prohibit a covered employer from excluding an individual involuntarily from the workplace based on being older, even if the employer acted for benevolent reasons such as protecting the employee due to higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19. For more information on postponing a start date or withdrawing a job offer due to older age, see C.5.

Unlike the ADA, the ADEA does not include a right to reasonable accommodation for workers due to age. However, employers are free to provide flexibility to older workers; the ADEA does not prohibit this, even if it results in younger workers being treated less favorably based on age in comparison.

Older workers also may have medical conditions that bring them under the protection of the ADA as individuals with disabilities. As such, they may request reasonable accommodation for their disability.

K.1. Under the ADA, Title VII, and other federal employment nondiscrimination laws, may an employer require all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19? (Updated 7/12/22)

The federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19, subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations discussed below. (See also Section L, Vaccinations – Title VII Religious Objections to COVID-19 Vaccine Requirements). If there is such an employer requirement, the EEO laws do not prevent employers from requiring documentation or other confirmation that employees are up to date on their vaccinations (see K.9.), but the EEO laws may require employers to make exceptions to a vaccination requirement for some employees.

The ADA and Title VII require an employer to provide reasonable accommodations for employees who, because of a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, do not get vaccinated against COVID-19, unless providing an accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business. The analysis for undue hardship depends on whether the accommodation is for a disability (including pregnancy-related conditions that constitute a disability) (see K.6.) or for religion (see K.12.).

As with any employment policy, employers that have a vaccination requirement may need to respond to allegations that the requirement has a disparate impact on—or disproportionately excludes—employees based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin under Title VII (or age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act [40+]). Employers should keep in mind that because some individuals or demographic groups may face barriers to receiving a COVID-19 vaccination, some employees may be more likely to be negatively impacted by a vaccination requirement.

It would also be unlawful to apply a vaccination requirement to employees in a way that treats employees differently based on disability, race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity), national origin, age, or genetic information, unless there is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

K.4. Is information about an employee’s COVID-19 vaccination confidential medical information under the ADA? (Updated 7/12/22)

Yes. The ADA requires an employer to maintain the confidentiality of employee medical information. Although the EEO laws do not prevent employers from requiring employees to provide documentation or other confirmation of vaccination, this information, like all medical information, must be kept confidential and stored separately from the employee’s personnel files under the ADA.

An employer may share confidential medical information, such as confirmation of employee vaccinations (or COVID-19 test results), with employees who need it to perform their job duties. However, such employees also must keep the information confidential. Some possible scenarios include:

· An administrative employee assigned to perform recordkeeping of employees’ documentation of vaccination may receive needed access to the information for this purpose but must keep this information confidential.

· An employee assigned to permit building entry only by employees who are in compliance with a work restriction, such as COVID-19 vaccinations, testing, and/or masking, should only receive a list of the individuals who may (or may not) enter, but not any confidential medical information about why they are on (or not on) the list.

· An employee tasked to ensure compliance with a testing requirement for employees would need to review testing documentation submitted by those employees but must keep that testing information confidential.

Mandatory Employer Vaccination Programs

K.5. May an employer require an employee to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination requirement applicable to all employees entering the workplace if that employee has sought an exemption based on disability? (Updated 7/12/22)

Under the ADA, an employer may require an individual with a disability to meet a qualification standard applied to all employees, such as a safety-related standard requiring COVID-19 vaccination, if the standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity as applied to that employee. An employer does not have to show that a qualification standard in general (i.e., as applied to all employees) meets the “business necessity” standard. Under the ADA it must satisfy this standard only as applied to an employee who informs the employer that a disability prevents compliance. If a particular employee cannot meet such a safety-related qualification standard because of a disability, the employer may not require compliance for that employee unless it can demonstrate that the individual would pose a “direct threat” to the health or safety of the employee or others while performing their job. A “direct threat” is a “significant risk of substantial harm” that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r). This determination can be broken down into two steps: determining if there is a “significant risk of substantial harm” and, if there is, assessing whether a reasonable accommodation would reduce or eliminate the threat.

To determine if an employee who is not vaccinated due to a disability poses a “direct threat” in the workplace, an employer first must make an individualized assessment of the employee’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job. The factors that make up this assessment are: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm. The determination that a particular employee poses a direct threat should be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge about COVID-19. Such medical knowledge may include, for example, the level of community spread at the time of the assessment. Statements from the CDC provide an important source of current medical knowledge about COVID-19, and the employee’s health care provider, with the employee’s consent, also may provide useful information about the employee. Additionally, the assessment of direct threat should take account of the type of work environment, such as: whether the employee works alone or with others or works inside or outside; the available ventilation; the frequency and duration of direct interaction the employee typically will have with other employees and/or non-employees; the number of partially or fully vaccinated individuals already in the workplace; whether other employees are wearing masks or undergoing routine screening testing; and the space available for social distancing.

If the assessment demonstrates that an employee with a disability who is not vaccinated would pose a direct threat to self or others, the employer must consider whether providing a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, would reduce or eliminate that threat. Potential reasonable accommodations could include requiring the employee to wear a mask, work a staggered shift, making changes in the work environment (such as improving ventilation systems or limiting contact with other employees and non-employees), permitting telework if feasible, or reassigning the employee to a vacant position in a different workspace.

As a best practice, an employer introducing a COVID-19 vaccination policy and requiring documentation or other confirmation of vaccination should notify all employees that the employer will consider requests for reasonable accommodation based on disability on an individualized basis. (See also K.12 recommending the same best practice for religious accommodations.)

K.16. Does the ADA limit the value of the incentive employers may offer to employees for voluntarily receiving a COVID-19 vaccination from a health care provider that is not affiliated with their employer (such as the employee’s personal physician or other health care provider, a pharmacy, or a public health department)? (Updated 7/12/22)

No. The ADA does not limit the incentives (which includes both rewards and penalties) an employer may offer to encourage employees to voluntarily receive a COVID-19 vaccination, or to provide confirmation of vaccination, if the health care provider administering a COVID-19 vaccine is not the employer or its agent. By contrast, if an employer offers an incentive to employees to voluntarily receive a vaccination administered by the employer or its agent, the ADA’s rules on disability-related inquiries apply and the value of the incentive may not be so substantial as to be coercive. See K.17.

As noted in K 4., the employer is required to keep vaccination information confidential under the ADA.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Court Rejects Claims for Unpaid Commissions When Details Were Never Agreed

Last month, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on a claim for unpaid sales commissions.  Brown v. Fukuvi USA Inc., 2022-Ohio-1608.  The plaintiff alleged that he had been verbally promised sales commissions before accepting the job in 2006.  His offer letter – which he signed -- said that a commission structure would be discussed later,  and it was.  However, they could never come to an agreement on a salary and commission structure.  Instead, the employer kept his salary in place and eventually raised it several times before he finally sued in 2019.  The courts found that there was never a meeting of the minds or agreement on the details of a commission structure and, therefore, the employer was not obligated to pay any commissions. 

To be enforceable, contracts must be definite and certain.  An agreement to agree is only enforceable if it is sufficiently definite to be enforced. “When the terms of a contract are not sufficiently definite, the contract is unenforceable.  . . . ‘The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.’ ””  The plaintiff’s offer letter offered a salary until 2007 and then a reduced salary with a commission – the details of which were to be discussed.  The details were never mutually agreed to and his salary remained unchanged.   “[N]o specific amount of commission or bonus was outlined. Furthermore, details were to be discussed at some future date, with no indication of what those details would be.”

The plaintiff

contends that he was told when he signed the Offer Letter that “his commission structure would operate in the same manner as the prior sale representative, which was a percentage on sales over an initial threshold or goal.”  . . . However, taking this statement at face value, it was made by a [HR] person who lacked authority to authorize payment of commissions; it was also inconsistent with the letter, which said that details would be discussed later. When “later” came, [the company president] elected not to pay commissions due to the severe financial position of the company, and this was communicated to [him]. At that point, if [he] were dissatisfied with the situation, he could have left the company. Instead, he chose to stay. Notably, his salary was not decreased to the considerably lower level mentioned in the Offer Letter.

“Here, the parties may have envisioned a commission and bonus structure, but the details were left to future discussion. Consequently, there was no enforceable promise.”

The court refused to find enforceable details from a commission policy document which the plaintiff had found in his predecessor’s files and which he claims had been referenced during his employment discussions.  The court refused to incorporate them into the offer letter without more evidence.  There was no evidence that the company had provided the policy to the plaintiff during their negotiations or were part of or intended to be part of his offer letter.  The document did not even indicate who prepared it.

The Court also rejected his claims for promissory estoppel, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations and unjust enrichment on the grounds that they were time barred by the then six-year (and now four-year) statute of limitations.  It rejected his argument that the failure to pay commissions constituted a continuing violation because (1) the Supreme Court of Ohio had taken the position that courts are reluctant to apply this doctrine outside the civil rights context; (2) “continuing violations are distinguished from ‘continuing effects of prior violations’; in this context, ‘ “ ‘ “[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation” ’ ” ’ ”; and (3) the lack of authority in Ohio extending this doctrine to breach of contract cases.

The  Court also rejected his equitable estoppel claim because none of his allegations were sufficient to show that the company prevented him from filing suit earlier.   Indeed, a person of reasonable intelligence would have been on notice years earlier of his need to file suit. 

Finally, the plaintiff could not show that he had not been paid his wages under Ohio’s prompt payment act because there was no underlying obligation to pay him commissions.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Reverses Dismissal of Discriminatory Hiring Claim Where No Candidate Was Ever Hired

 

Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of a reverse sex discrimination complaint brought under §1983 and Title IX when the college cancelled the faculty search instead of hiring the top-rated candidate because of the Dean’s alleged preference to hire female candidates.  Charlton-Perkins v. Univ. of  Cincinnati, No. 21-3840 (6^th Cir. 6-3-22).  A plaintiff need not have a valid claim in order to have standing to assert it, so it was irrelevant to a ripeness inquiry whether the position had ever been filed or not.  The plaintiff suffered a concrete injury when he was not hired.  The plaintiff also need not have alleged that less qualified female candidates had been hired instead of him when other evidence of discrimination was present.  “Instead, to state an employment discrimination claim, [the plaintiff] only needed to plead sufficient facts from which we could plausibly conclude that defendants failed to hire him because of his gender.”  In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the job requisition was cancelled to avoid hiring him because he was male and that was sufficient to allege unlawful discrimination.   

According to the Court’s decision, after considering 62 applications, the plaintiff had been the top-rated candidate in a faculty search conducted by the department.  However, the Dean insisted that both next ranked female candidates be hired instead.  When the committee chair objected, the Dean cancelled the faculty requisition altogether claiming that the process had been tainted by a potential conflict of interest that the Diversity Officer had earlier approved.  The plaintiff sued and the trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that his claims were not ripe because he could not have been legally “injured” when the position had never been filled after the Dean cancelled the process and so the plaintiff could not prove that female candidates had been treated better.  

On appeal, the Court found that the trial court had conflated a ripeness inquiry with an analysis of the merits of the claims presented.  It was enough that the plaintiff did not get the posted job to show that he had suffered an injury sufficient to assert a ripe claim. “Ripeness is really, or at least paradigmatically, a doctrine about pre-enforcement challenges. That is why the relevant factors—whether the claim “concerns a dispute that is likely to come to pass” and whether there would be “hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration”—sound so out of place in the context of [this] claim.”  Indeed, the plaintiff “himself could later get the job and it would not erase the fact that he was denied the opportunity to get it in the first instance in 2018. So his injury is not speculative or even imminent; it is instead “actual” because the denial has undisputedly already occurred.” 

The Court also rejected the university’s argument that his claim could not be ripe if he suffered no adverse employment action.  “That reasoning is erroneous, again, because whether the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact does not necessarily hinge upon the substantive requirements of any particular cause of action.”

The Court also rejected the argument that the plaintiff had failed to plead a prima facie case sex discrimination. “Instead, to state an employment discrimination claim, [he] only needed to plead sufficient facts from which we could plausibly conclude that defendants failed to hire him because of his gender.”  While alleging that someone else was given the position is a default rule for proving employment discrimination, it is not the only manner in which unlawful discrimination can be proved or alleged. “Instead, to state an employment discrimination claim, [the plaintiff] only needed to plead sufficient facts from which we could plausibly conclude that defendants failed to hire him because of his gender.”

We understand [the plaintiff] to make such a claim here—that defendants not only failed to hire him because of his gender, but they then canceled the search itself as a pretext to conceal the discriminatory reason for the failure to hire.

In particular, the plaintiff alleged “that defendants canceled the search to facilitate their allegedly unlawful gender discrimination against [him]. There was thus no need for him to additionally allege that somebody else filled the (canceled) position.”

The Court also rejected the argument that cancelling the hiring process purged any discrimination because other court decisions in which such purging had occurred resulted in new job searches without the taint of discrimination.  In contrast, the university here never re-opened the job search which would have given the plaintiff another opportunity to apply and be hired. 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Ohio Appeals Court Applies ADAA Definitions to O.R.C. 4112.02 Claim of Disability Discrimination

 

Last month, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim when it had fired the plaintiff less than a month after hiring her prior to completing her 90-day probation.   Anderson v. AccuScripts Pharmacy, L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-1663.   First, the Court applied the definition of disability from the ADAA, rather than the more restrictive definition from the ADA, to find that the plaintiff suffered from a disability.  Second, it found a material factual dispute as to whether the plaintiff had actually engaged in misconduct – by leaving work without authorization before the completing her shift. 

According to the Court’s decision, the plaintiff claimed that she had informed her employer during her job interview that she suffered from epilepsy (which it denies) and gave them a list of the medication she regularly took (which it admits) to ensure that she did not fail any drug tests.  The employer admits that it asked her if she could drive and claimed to ask that of all applicants.  The employee handbook only referred to a 90-day introductory/probationary period twice.    She claims that she had had no performance issues after beginning work on May 8, but it contends that in just a few weeks she had been missed work on May 15 (because of a spider bite), was hours late to work on May 16, violated a few rules and then left work on May 19 without authorization after she had explained that she did not feel well.  None of the performance issues were documented.    She claims that she told the shift supervisor on that Saturday that she had epilepsy and wanted to bring her service dog into the pharmacy with her to alert her to oncoming seizures.  The supervisor claims that she only said that she was not feeling well after taking too much menstrual medication and was authorized to take a short break.  The supervisor denied authorizing the service dog because it would have to be cleared with the State Pharmacy Board and was not her decision to make.   The supervisor says that she went looking for her after 15 minutes, could not find her and reported the absence (but not the service dog) to the manager on Monday, when he decided to terminate her.  When informed of the termination, the plaintiff objected on the grounds that she had volunteered to work on Saturday, which was not her scheduled shift.  “Please tell me where in the handbook it says you cannot go home on days you aren’t scheduled.”    She also claimed that the supervisor had told her that she could leave after lunch if she was not feeling any better.  The employer claimed that it generally fired employees for poor attendance after only one verbal warning.  Once litigation commenced, the plaintiff claimed that her supervisor encouraged her to leave work early because they were not busy, denied asking to leave early, but also claimed that the supervisor had been unsympathetic and condescending.

She later filed suit claiming that she had been fired for requesting to bring her service dog and because of her epilepsy.  The trial court granted the employer judgment on the grounds that she did not suffer from a disability because she failed to submit evidence that her epilepsy substantially limited any major life activities.  She had testified as to the various types of seizures that she suffered and how they affected her.   She takes medications to control her seizures and has not had a significant seizure between six and eight months.    However, she often had tonic-clonic type seizures around her menstrual cycle and wanted to bring her service dog with her during that time because it would alert her to an oncoming seizure and, thus, prevent her from becoming injured during a seizure.

The trial court found that the plaintiff had failed to show that her epilepsy “substantially limited” a major life activity.   O.R.C. §4112.02 does not define “substantially limits” and in 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court had directed courts to rely on the federal ADA for the appropriate definition.  However, in 2008, the ADA was amended (i.e., the ADAA) to broaden the definition of “substantially limits.”  The Ohio Revised Code was not then amended to incorporate the changes from the ADAA.  The employer argued (and the trial court agreed) to apply the original ADA definition of “substantially limits,” but the Court disagreed and applied the federal definition in place at the time of her termination.   The Court then found that she suffered a disability as a matter of law:

Specifically, under 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1)(vii), “[a]n impairment that is episodic * * * is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” It is undisputed that when Anderson is experiencing a seizure, she cannot work, see, speak, hear, and sometimes breathe.

The Court then found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to why the plaintiff had been terminated:

Anderson averred that during her May 19, 2018 shift, she experienced an “aura” and told Bauman she was not feeling well. Anderson further testified that Bauman told her to go home. Bauman, on the other hand, testified that Anderson stated she was not feeling well, and Bauman told her to “go into the break room and sit down for a while and see.” Bauman testified that she did not tell Anderson to go home. In other words, there is at least a question of fact whether Anderson left her shift with or without permission.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.