According to the Court's opinion, the plaintiff had no work-related performance issues before she became pregnant. After the employer learned of the plaintiff's pregnancy, she was required to obtain a medical release that she had no medical restrictions. When her physician imposed a 50-pound lifting restriction, she was told she could no longer work because only injuries from work-related accidents were accommodated and her restrictions would probably not be lifted because of a high-risk pregnancy. She was treated as having resigned and encouraged to take FMLA leave, which she refused since she wanted to have FMLA leave available when she gave birth. When she stopped by to pick up her personnel records, she was again encouraged to take FMLA leave and management made comments about how her pregnancy would interfere with her work. She filed an EEOC charge and then filed a pro se case in federal court. She later obtained an attorney.
The Court found merit in her pregnancy discrimination claim using an indirect method of proof. The plaintiff conceded that the policy was facially non-discriminatory because it affected both men and non-pregnant women equally. Yet, she still "provided sufficient evidence both to establish a prima facie case and to demonstrate that North Woods' policy of prohibiting any employees with restrictions
from working is pretext for discrimination."
First, the Court found that the plaintiff could compare herself to employees with similar lifting restrictions who were offered light duty from a work-related injury because they were similarly situated in their ability to work. "Although these employees differed from Latowski because their medical conditions were work-related, they were similarly situated in their ability to work because they were placed under lifting restrictions of up to fifty pounds.
Under the ordinary Title VII analysis, employees who were restricted because of work related injuries would be inappropriate comparators because they are not similarly situated in all respects. However, the court [in Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996)] recognized that the PDA altered the Title VII analysis for pregnancy discrimination claims: "While Title VII generally requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that the employee who received more favorable treatment be similarly situated in all respects, the PDA requires only that the employee be similar in his or her ability or inability to work."Second, the plaintiff could show that the employer's explanation was pretextual from the paternalistic comments made by its management about her termination and their concern with the health of her and her unborn child. The Court found the managers' comments to be relevant to showing the policy was pretextual. " These remarks are also substantively relevant to show discriminatory animus because they were made directly in relation to Latowski's termination. . . . . [These] comments made by various members of the North Woods administration raise the inference that North Woods' policy was merely pretext for discriminatory animus against pregnant women. This is particularly true where the policy at issue may be found to be unreasonable.
A policy is not necessarily pretext for discrimination merely because we find it ill-advised: "The law does not require employers to make perfect decisions, nor forbid them from making decisions that others may disagree with." Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 1996). However, "the reasonableness of an employer's decision may be considered to the extent that such an inquiry sheds light on whether the employer's proffered reason for the employment action was its actual motivation." A reasonable jury could easily conclude that North Woods' business decision—to implement a policy terminating otherwise qualified workers whose doctors imposed any restrictions arising from non-workplace injuries, even if those restrictions do not limit the employees' ability to competently perform their jobs — is so lacking in merit as to be a pretext for discrimination.The Court rejected the plaintiff's ADA claim: " Because pregnancy is not a disability under the ADA, North Woods' belief that Latowski was pregnant cannot support her "regarded as" claim. . . . However, "a potentially higher risk of having a future miscarriage[] could constitute an impairment" on which to base a "regarded as" claim. Id. Nonetheless, Latowski is unable to prove that North Woods regarded her as disabled because she has provided no evidence that any North Woods employee believed she was unusually susceptible to miscarrying.
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff's FMLA interference claim based on the employer's suggestion that she utilize the FMLA during her pregnancy instead of after giving birth.
An employer denies an employee FMLA benefits when it "forces an employee to take FMLA leave when the employee does not have a 'serious health condition' that precludes her from working." Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007). However, a claim made on this basis "ripens only when and if the employee seeks FMLA leave at a later date, and such leave is not available because the employee was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past."Because Latowski never sought to take FMLA leave in 2009, her claim never ripened and she cannot prove a prima facie case of FMLA interference. She had been terminated months before she gave birth the following year.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.
