Tuesday, March 9, 2010

Sixth Circuit: ADA Applies to Teachers in Church Sponsored Schools.

[Editor's Note: The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on this case on October 5, 2011].

This morning, the Sixth Circuit reversed a judgment which had been entered in favor of a Lutheran church and its elementary school on an ADA discrimination claim brought by a former teacher. EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, No. 09-1134 (6th Cir. 3/10/10). The District Court had granted the School summary judgment on the retaliation claim on the grounds that the teacher fell within the ministerial exception to the ADA and he would not inquire into why she had been fired. The Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the primary duties of teacher showed that she was not a ministerial employee.

According to the Court’s opinion, the teacher spent about 45 minutes of each class day in religious activities with her students. After she developed narcolepsy and took an approximately 7-month leave of absence, the School refused to reinstate her in part because of a concern for the safety of her students and because it had already made arrangements with a substitute teacher. Indeed, it decided on its own that she was physically unable to return and offered to pay a portion of her medical insurance for the next ten months if she resigned even though her doctor had released her to return to work without restrictions. Because she appeared for work the day after her physician released her and made clear that she would sue the School after she was told that she would likely be fired, the School indicated that she would be terminated for being disruptive and insubordinate and that she had damaged her relationship beyond repair by threatening to sue the School. When her attorney explained how the School’s actions violated the ADA and that she would file a Charge with the EEOC if the matter were not resolved, the School fired her. Two years later, the EEOC filed suit on her behalf against the School.

The ministerial exception permits “preference in employment to individuals of a particular religion” and to “require that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenants of such organization.” 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d). However, although based on the First Amendment, this exception is very narrow and is not meant to obviate the ADA. According to legislative history, “However, a religious organization may not discriminate against an individual who satisfies the permitted religious criteria because that individual is disabled. The religious entity, in other words, is required to consider qualified individuals with disabilities who satisfy the permitted religious criteria on an equal basis with qualified individuals without disabilities who similarly satisfy the religious criteria.”

“The question of whether a teacher at a sectarian school classifies as a ministerial employee is one of first impression for this Court. However, the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that parochial school teachers such as Perich, who teach primarily secular subjects, do not classify as ministerial employees for purposes of the exception.” In general, “an employee is considered a minister if “the employee’s primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship.” In this case, the teacher’s “employment duties were identical when she was a contract teacher and a “called” teacher and that she taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music using secular textbooks.” Her duties were also virtually identical to those of the teachers who were not entitled ministers. That she teaches at a religious school does not necessarily convert a teacher to a ministerial employee. That the School “has a generally religious character–as do all religious schools by definition–and characterizes its staff members as “fine Christian role models” does not transform [her] primary responsibilities in the classroom into religious activities.”

Similarly, it did not matter that she had specialized religious training and a religious title. “The governing primary duties analysis requires a court to objectively examine an employee’s actual job function, not her title, in determining whether she is properly classified as a minister. In this case, it is clear from the record that Perich’s primary duties were secular, not only because she spent the overwhelming majority of her day teaching secular subjects using secular textbooks, but also because nothing in the record indicates that the Lutheran church relied on Perich as the primary means to indoctrinate its faithful into its theology.”

While the Court did not want to intrude on church theology, it noted that the School’s employee manual included an EEO policy and that the focus of the court would be on the plaintiff’s disability and whether the School violated the ADA, not church theology (except as whether church theology was a genuine defense). In this case, however, the School did not identify church doctrine as a reason for firing the teacher in her termination letter.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.