Wednesday, September 25, 2019

Start Your Engines: DOL Amends White Collar Salary Levels


Yesterday, the federal Department of Labor finally announced the issuance of a final regulation on the “white collar” overtime exemptions, raising the minimum required salary from approximately $23,400/year to $35,568/year (or $684/week).   For employees exempt under the “highly compensated” exemption, the minimum total annual compensation increases from $100k/year to $107,432/year (and the minimum salary increases as with the other exempt employees).   The new rule also permits employers to satisfy up to 10% of the minimum salary from nondiscretionary bonuses, incentive pay and commissions that are paid at least annually.  The new rule will take effect on January 1, giving employers three months to adjust their payrolls and examine whether to continue the exempt status of certain employees, or convert them to non-exempt status.  The new regulation replaces the Obama-era regulation that was to take effect on December 1, 2016 before it was stayed by a federal court and which had included annual increases in a higher minimum salary.


The salary basis test has been amended to include a variation of the Obama-era regulation provision permitting the 10% credit for non-discretionary bonuses, incentive compensation and commissions towards the minimum salary in §541.602(a)(3):


Up to ten percent of the salary amount required by § 541.600(a) may be satisfied by the payment of nondiscretionary bonuses, incentives and commissions, that are paid annually or more frequently. The employer may utilize any 52-week period as the year, such as a calendar year, a fiscal year, or an anniversary of hire year. If the employer does not identify some other year period in advance, the calendar year will apply. This provision does not apply to highly compensated employees under § 541.601.

The Obama-era rule required the variable compensation to be paid quarterly, instead of annually, but still only permitted a 10% credit.  


The regulation also almost doubles the minimum exempt salary for exempt employees in the motion picture industry, from $695/week to $1,043/week.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Friday, September 20, 2019

DOL Clarifies that FMLA Leave is Available to Care for Children and Parents Outside Medical Setting, Including to Attend School ISP Meetings.


Last month, the federal Department of Labor issued an Administrative Opinion letter that employees are eligible to take FMLA leave to attend meetings at their child’s school to discuss their Individualized Educational Program (IEP) required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).   FMLA Op Ltr No. 2019-2-A.  The DOL explained that the “analysis and conclusion in this opinion letter apply to any meetings held pursuant to the IDEA, and any applicable state or local law, regardless of the term used for such meetings.” The DOL had previously approved FMLA leave at attendance at meetings to discuss a parent’s care as well. The employee’s need to attend “IEP meetings addressing the educational and special medical needs” of the children —who have serious health conditions as certified by a health care provider—is a qualifying reason for taking intermittent FMLA leave.”


As explained by the DOL,

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) requires public schools to develop an IEP for a son or daughter who receives special education and related services with input from the child and the child’s parents, teachers, school administrators, and related services personnel. Under the IDEA, “related services” include such services as audiology services, counseling services, medical services, physical therapy, psychological services, speech-language pathology services, rehabilitation counseling services, among others.

In the particular fact situation, the employee had already been approved for intermittent leave to care for her children, but the employer would not permit her to use FMLA leave to attend mandatory ISP meetings at the school. The “children receive pediatrician-prescribed occupational, speech, and physical therapy provided by their school district, and that four times a year their school holds CSE/IEP meetings to review their educational and medical needs, well-being, and progress.”  The DOL found that the employee’s

attendance at these CSE/IEP meetings is “care for a family member … with a serious health condition.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.100(a); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C); 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(a)(3).  As noted above, “to care for” a family member with a serious health condition includes “to make arrangements for changes in care.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.124(b).  This includes taking leave to help make medical decisions on behalf of a hospitalized parent or to make arrangements to find suitable childcare for a child with a disability.

The DOL had previously approved FMLA leave for attendance at “[c]are [c]onferences related to her mother’s health condition,” because her attendance at these conferences was “clearly essential to the employee’s ability to provide appropriate physical or psychological care” to her mother.  WHD Opinion Letter FMLA-94 . . . “


In this situation, the employee attends

these meetings to help participants make medical decisions concerning [the] children’s medically-prescribed speech, physical, and occupational therapy; to discuss [the] children’s wellbeing and progress with the providers of such services; and to ensure that [the] children’s school environment is suitable to their medical, social, and academic needs.  [The] child’s doctor need not be present at CSE/IEP meetings in order for [the employee’s] leave to qualify for intermittent FMLA leave. 


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, September 19, 2019

Sixth Circuit Reverses Employer’s Judgment on FMLA Claim When Policy Penalized Employees Taking FMLA Leave Differently Than Other Employees on Unpaid Leave


Last month, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment on an FMLA claim because the employer’s perfect attendance system (which reduced attendance points under its disciplinary policy) made exceptions for pre-scheduled leave (i.e., holidays, military leave, jury duty, bereavement leave, and union leave), but not FMLA leave.  Dyer v. Ventra Sandusky, LLC, No. 18-3802 (6th Cir. 2019).  The employer’s no-fault attendance system did not assess attendance points for FMLA absences, but would only “roll back” attendance points after 30 consecutive days of perfect attendance under its system (which did not count FMLA absences in calculating perfect attendance).  The plaintiff had been fired under the no-fault attendance policy and argued that he would not have been terminated if the employer had given him credit for perfect attendance when he took FMLA leave.  The Court found that “denying a valuable term or condition of employment to an employee taking FMLA leave interferes with the right to take that leave.”  In short, " FMLA leave could freeze the accrual of attendance but could not reset it; upon returning, [the plaintiff] was entitled to the days of attendance he had accrued when leave began and to continue accruing them in the same way."


According to the Court’s opinion, the employer utilized a no-fault attendance policy which did not assess points for FMLA absences.  The plaintiff exercised his FMLA rights in connection with his migraine headaches, which caused him to miss a few days of work each month.  The employer would drop points from an employee’s attendance record for every 30 consecutive days that the employee had perfect attendance.  As mentioned, an employee could be absent for various approved absences (like holidays, vacations, bereavement leave, jury duty and military leave) and still get credit for perfect attendance because these issues were treated as days worked  However, FMLA leave was not considered to be perfect attendance and was not treated as days worked.  


Whenever the plaintiff took a day off for FMLA leave, the 30-day calendar restarted for purposes of calculating perfect attendance.   Although taking FMLA leave did not add points to his disciplinary record, it re-started the perfect attendance clock. When he reached 12 attendance points (for non-FMLA issues), he was terminated.  His union did not pursue arbitration because his termination did not violate the bargaining agreement.   It was undisputed that the plaintiff received all FMLA leave which he requested.

It is considered interference for purposes of the Act for employers to use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions.  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).  To prevail on his FMLA interference claim, [the plaintiff] must show that taking FMLA-protected leave was used as a negative factor in defendant’s decision to terminate him.  The sole issue on appeal is whether [the employer]’s “Attendance Point Reduction Schedule” violates the FMLA by serving as a “negative” factor in defendant’s decision to terminate Dyer.
               . . ..

The plain language of the FMLA is clear.  “At the expiration of the employee’s leave period, she must be reinstated to her position or to a position equivalent in pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment.”  . . . . Therefore, denying a valuable term or condition of employment to an employee taking FMLA leave interferes with the right to take that leave.  Put differently, “attaching negative consequences to the exercise of protected rights surely ‘tends to chill’ an employee’s willingness to exercise those rights.”   . . . .  Resetting [the plaintiff's] perfect-attendance clock every time he took FMLA leave effectively denied him the flexibility of the no-fault attendance policy that every other employee not taking FMLA leave enjoyed. . . . Although the policy here does not formally hinge point reduction on not taking FMLA leave, the practical result is the same for someone like Dyer who must take frequent intermittent FMLA leave.

Based on the language of the Act and the Department of Labor regulations, point reduction can be viewed as an employment benefit, the accrual of which, like the accrual of other benefits or seniority, must be available to an employee upon return from leave.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(2).  The regulations state that “[a]t the end of an employee’s FMLA leave, benefits must be resumed in the same manner and at the same levels as provided when the leave began.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.215(d)(1).  Whereas an employee is not entitled to “accrue any additional benefits or seniority during unpaid FMLA leave[,] [b]enefits accrued at the time leave began . . . must be available to an employee upon return from leave.”  Id. § 825.215(d)(2).  The FMLA defines “employment benefits” expansively to mean “all benefits provided or made available to employees by an employer, including . . . sick leave, [and] annual leave,” whether provided by practice or written policy.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(5).  Point reduction fits within this definition, because it is both a benefit Ventra Sandusky affords its employees to flexibly manage their absences, and because the reduction of a point effectively awards an additional day of allowed absence, akin to awarding sick leave.  Consistent with this approach, the Seventh Circuit has held that “wiping a point off the absenteeism slate is indeed an employment benefit.”  Bailey v. Pregis Innovative Packaging, Inc., 600 F.3d 748, 750–51 (7th Cir. 2010).  In other words, [the plaintiff's] FMLA leave could freeze the accrual of attendance but could not reset it; upon returning, Dyer was entitled to the days of attendance he had accrued when leave began and to continue accruing them in the same way.

In two separate opinion letters, the most recent of which was issued in August 2018, the Department of Labor applied these regulations to no-fault attendance and point-reduction policies and stated that accrual toward point reduction must, at the very least, be frozen during FMLA leave.  In its 1999 opinion letter, the Department of Labor opined that an employer’s FMLA obligation to restore an employee to the same or equivalent position includes the obligation to restore the number of days accrued toward absentee point reduction.   . . . . It clarified the point by example:  “If the employee had 45 days without a recordable [absence] at the time the unpaid FMLA leave commenced, the employer would be obligated to restore the employee to this number of days credited without an [absence].”  Id.  In 2018, the DOL reaffirmed the point, approving a policy under which “the number of accrued points remains effectively frozen during FMLA leave.”  . . . . Although these letters are not binding, they are entitled to persuasive effect.
               .. . .

In addition, [the employer] is not entitled to summary judgment if FMLA leave is treated less favorably than other equivalent leave statuses.  The district court held that the policy did not violate the Act because “equivalent” non-FMLA leave also interrupts the 30-day window.  But, under [the employer]'s policy, there is a disputed issue of material fact as to what constitutes “equivalent” leave and whether any equivalent leave statuses similarly reset the point-reduction clock.  Although neither the FMLA nor its implementing regulations define “equivalent leave status,” the regulations imply that equivalency turns on whether the leave is paid or unpaid.  For example, in describing the equivalency principle, the regulations state that “if an employee on leave without pay would otherwise be entitled to full benefits (other than health benefits), the same benefits would be required to be provided to an employee on unpaid FMLA leave.”  See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (emphasis added).  At her deposition, [an] employee, Catherine Cupal, stated that under the collective bargaining agreement, active duty military leave and some forms of union leave are both unpaid leave and yet, unlike FMLA leave, they do not restart the 30-day point-reduction clock.  


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Wednesday, September 18, 2019

Sixth Circuit Rejects FMLA Leave to Rest Shoulder (by playing golf) When FMLA Use was Approved Only for Incapacitating Flare-Ups Which Prevented Plaintiff from Working

Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on an FMLA retaliation claim where the employee was fired after being observed on two occasions playing golf when he had called off work under the FMLA due to a shoulder disability.  LaBelle v. Cleveland Cliffs, Inc., No. 18-2444 (6th Cir. 9-13-19).  When the employer approved his intermittent leave request, it limited his FMLA use to the monthly “flare-ups” of his shoulder condition and four medical appointments each year.  However, the plaintiff was stacking his FMLA leave in between or following pre-scheduled vacation time, he says, to give his shoulder a rest.  The employer concluded that if he could play golf, he could work.  The FMLA leave was approved for “flare-ups” that incapacitated him, not for rest by playing golf.  The Court agreed and held that the employer did not unlawfully retaliate in firing the employee for FMLA abuse and did not even need to rely on an honest belief defense.

According to the Court’s opinion, the employee suffered bone deterioration from avascular necrosis and had already had hip replacement surgery in 2012.  The condition then began affecting his shoulders, causing him to suffer constant pain.  After receiving disciplinary counselling for attendance in 2016, he explained that he was missing work because of shoulder pain and was directed to seek FMLA leave.  His first FMLA request was denied because he failed to show the necessary incapacity or regular medical treatment for a chronic condition.   His next request from a different physician was granted for intermittent monthly three-day flare-ups and for four medical appointments per year.  


Over the next year, the employer then noticed that the plaintiff suspiciously took his FMLA leave in between or immediately following pre-scheduled vacation and assigned a private investigator to observe him on FMLA days, which suspiciously coincided with the plaintiff’s Tuesday golf league.

The videos showed that the plaintiff’s golf swing was unimpaired without any sign of pain or discomfort.  The employer provided the plaintiff with an opportunity to defend himself from what appeared to be FMLA abuse.   He explained that he was in constant pain and he thought that he could take the FMLA whenever he wanted and so he usually attached them to a weekend or other time off in order to give his shoulders the maximum rest from his repetitive duties. He claimed that golf was not nearly as hard on his shoulders as his job.  

The employer concluded that if the plaintiff was well enough to golf, he was well enough to work and terminated his employment.  He pursued union arbitration, but lost.  He then filed his federal lawsuit, alleging both FMLA interference and FMLA retaliation.  


The Court agreed that he had no interference claim because the employer permitted him to take FMLA leave and only fired him after he returned to work.  As for his retaliation claim, the plaintiff pointed to emails where the HR employees expressed hostility to FMLA use and desire to terminate some slackers.   However, in attempting to prove pretext, he did not argue that his golfing was not the actual reason for his termination.  Instead, he argued that his golfing did not constitute FMLA abuse – i.e., that the employer’s articulated reason for his termination had no basis in fact.   Sadly for him, the Court agreed with the employer that his FMLA use had only been approved for medical appointments and flare-ups, not for rest.
But occasional rest to alleviate low-level background pain is not what his FMLA leave was for.  Thus, as the arbitrator put it, “[t]here is no doubt that [LaBelle] did not use his FMLA leave in accordance with the restrictions imposed by [his doctor], or in accordance with the purposes of the law.”  . . .  If LaBelle had constant pain that required occasional long weekends to mitigate, he should have requested FMLA leave for that purpose.   
The Court found that the plaintiff failed his burden of showing that the employer’s reason had no basis in fact.  Accordingly, the employer need not rely on an “honest belief” defense that it honestly believed the plaintiff had abused his FMLA leave even if the golf game constituted rest from his repetitive motion duties. 


NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Monday, September 16, 2019

Sixth Circuit: No COBRA Notice Required Without Loss of Coverage Caused by Qualifying Event


On Friday, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an employee’s summary judgment finding that  COBRA had been violated because the employer failed to send a COBRA continuation notice when the employee began a medical/workers’ compensation leave of absence or when it stopped paying her premiums even though her medical insurance premiums began to be paid from her workers’ compensation payments upon the commencement of the leave.  Morehouse v. Steak N Shake, No. 18-4186 (6th Cir. 2019). In reversing, the Court concluded that the change in payment method and continuation of her medical insurance rendered her reduction in hours (i.e., medical leave) irrelevant and that the later loss of coverage was caused by the employee’s failure to pay her insurance premiums when she was notified that the employer stopped paying them a few months later.  “[A]ltering the contribution method alone, as [the employer] did here when it began deducting premiums from [the employee’s] workers’ compensation checks, does not inherently change the ‘terms and conditions’ of coverage and therefore does not produce a ‘loss in coverage.’”  Accordingly, “no qualifying event occurred that would have triggered a mandatory COBRA notification” even though the employee ceased reporting to work because she did not “’cease to be covered under the same terms and conditions’ when [her] contribution method was altered” by deducting the premium from her workers compensation benefits instead of her paycheck.


According to the Court’s opinion, the employee injured her knee at work on May 25, submitted a workers compensation claim and requested a leave of absence.  The employer began paying workers compensation, began deducting her share of the insurance premiums from the workers compensation (instead of her paycheck) and also sent her an FMLA eligibility notice and request for medical certification, which was timely returned.  The employer failed, however, to ever designate her leave as covered by the FMLA.  Instead, the employer notified her on September 20 that she had exhausted her FMLA a month earlier, when it also stopped paying workers compensation and ceased paying her medical insurance.  She was notified on September 9 that if she failed to pay the entire premium, her medical insurance would be terminated.  She was also notified on September 20 that she should seek a reasonable accommodation and that if her employment was terminated, she could then seek COBRA continuation coverage.  When she failed to pay her insurance premium, her coverage was terminated on October 3, retroactive to August 14 for non-payment. She obtained replacement coverage in January.   Her employment was terminated on February 11 the following year.  


The employee challenged the termination of workers compensation in state court and filed a federal lawsuit for failure to send her notice of her rights of COBRA continuation.  There is no indication that she ever challenged the denial of FMLA leave due to the employer’s failure to ever properly designate FMLA leave. The trial court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment and granted the employee’s motion, awarding her $2500 in dental bills, plus $50/day statutory damages (from when it stopped paying her premiums and when she obtained replacement coverage) and attorney’s fees.


On appeal, the Court noted that employers are required to send a COBRA notice upon a qualifying event, which includes termination of employment and reduction in working hours, if, but for the continuation coverage required under this part, the qualifying event would result in the loss of coverage.


COBRA provides that taking FMLA leave does not by itself constitute a qualifying event.  The parties argued whether the employee was properly placed on FMLA leave because that could impact whether there had been a qualifying event.  However, the Court decided that this argument was irrelevant because “the terms and conditions of [her] insurance have not changed and therefore there was no “loss of coverage” under the statute . . .”  Without loss of coverage, whether there has been an event is irrelevant.  In particular, the Court stated that “[a] ‘reduction in hours’ alone is not necessarily a qualifying event; it must also lead to a loss in insurance coverage.”  


Under 26 C.F.R. § 54.4980B-4, A-4(c), a loss of coverage “means to cease to be covered under the same terms and conditions as in effect immediately before the qualifying event.”  The regulation further clarifies that the “loss of coverage need not occur immediately after the [qualifying] event, so long as the loss of coverage occurs before the end of the maximum coverage period.”


Relying on an unreported 2007 opinion in Jordan v.  Tyson Foods¸ the Court found that it was the plaintiff’s failure to pay her health insurance premium in September which resulted in her loss of coverage, not her reduction in working hours following her injury or the change in payment method of the premiums.  In Jordan, that plaintiff had taken FMLA leave and then failed to pay his premium contribution as required by the employer’s policy and his coverage was terminated.  By the time he failed to return to work following his FMLA leave, his coverage had been terminated and he was not then provided with a COBRA notice.  The Court rejected that a qualifying event had occurred with his FMLA leave (because only the payment method had changed) or his termination (by which time his coverage had been terminated due to his non-payment of premium contributions).  Similarly, in this case, only the payment method changed upon the commencement of her leave of absence and her coverage was terminated on October 3 due to non-payment of premiums.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.