Last week, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on claims for disability discrimination and FMLA retaliation. Erwin v. Honda North America, Inc., No. 22-3823 (6th Cir. 4/21/23). The Court found that the plaintiff had failed to identify any materially adverse employment actions which she had suffered after taking various medical leaves of absence due to her mental health issues. She complained about a change in her job duties and reporting relationships, but none of the changes were substantial and merely involved reporting full time to one of her two managers and working full-time for that manager doing the same type of work she had previously been assigned. The suspension of her ability to work remotely was only temporary while she was being trained. None of these slight changes affected her compensation, job title, benefits, status, level of responsibilities, shifts, etc.
Having worked for the company for more than two decades, the
plaintiff had been a recruiter since 2017.
She took a lot of FMLA leave for mental health issues. At one point, she recruited only for
full-time positions, at other points only for contingent positions. In 2019, she recruited for both and reported
to two different managers (one for full-time positions and one for contingent
workers). When a new FMLA leave request
was denied for failing to supply medical documentation, she was given leave
under company policy. When she returned,
she was assigned to only recruit for full-time positions and to report to one
manager and to relocate her desk to be near that manager. When she complained about that manager, the
manager was disciplined for making unprofessional comments about her, but it
was also found that she had poor attendance that was unrelated to her FMLA
leave. She took another FMLA leave and
then resigned rather than return.
Although she later applied (and was hired) for a contingent position,
she brought suit alleging disability discrimination and FMLA retaliation.
The Court found that she had not suffered an adverse
employment action. The change in her job
duties back to recruiting only full-time positions did not affect anything about
her job and she didn’t even testify that she preferred recruiting for
contingent workers. A mere alteration of job responsibilities is
not an adverse employment action.
A change in management that did not affect her job status
likewise was not an adverse employment action.
The requirement that [she] work in person, at her relocated desk, does not qualify in these circumstances either. The record shows that [her] suspension from remote work was only temporary, while she completed training. Because the revocation was temporary and “no economic loss occurred,” [her] loss of remote work capability is “properly characterized as a de minimis employment action that does not rise to the level of a materially adverse employment decision.” Bowman, 220 F.3d at 462. As for her desk being moved, Erwin doesn’t explain the significance; she simply notes that it was moved. And although she complains about increased supervision, even “intense supervision” is not an adverse employment action where, as here, Erwin was not “terminated or demoted,” and did not have her “pay rate reduced, benefits lessened, or responsibilities diminished.” Broska v. Henderson, 70 F. App’x 262, 267 (6th Cir. 2003).
The court also rejected her constructive discharge claim:
. . . Constructive discharge occurs when an employer creates “an objectively intolerable work environment to deliberately force [an] employee to resign.” . . . “[I]ntolerability is a demanding standard.” Id. The conditions must be “so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. (citation omitted). “[C]riticism and negative feedback do not suffice.” Id. So [her] fear of returning to work because she might face increased supervision and critical feedback does not show her work environment was intolerable. [She] has failed to show that a “reasonable person” would find the “conditions objectively intolerable.” . . . . And [she] offers no evidence that Honda acted “deliberately” to “force” her to resign. . . .. Even when construing the facts in [her] favor, she has not shown she was constructively discharged.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert
you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does
not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to
different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice.
Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have
any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain
an employment attorney.
