Showing posts with label choice of law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label choice of law. Show all posts

Monday, April 6, 2026

Ohio Appeals Court Entertains New Questions About Shortening OCRA Limitations Period By Contract

Last month, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed an employer’s summary judgment dismissing the former employee’s OCRA sex discrimination and retaliation complaint as untimely under the shortened limitations period in her employment agreement.  Toth v. Rocket Mtge., L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-926.    The Court found that the trial court had failed to assess whether Michigan or Ohio law applied and whether the most recent amendments to Chapter 4112 would affect the enforceability of the shortened limitations period if Ohio law applied.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff alleged that she had always worked from home in Cuyahoga County and had been terminated in September 2021 on account of her sexual orientation and prior complaints.  She filed a Charge of Discrimination with the OCRC in May 2023 and her lawsuit in February 2024.   The employer moved to dismiss and converted it to a summary judgment motion on the grounds that her offer letter required her to report and visit its Detroit headquarters and employment agreement contained a Michigan choice of law and venue provision and contained a provision limiting her to bringing claims within one year.   The trial court agreed that the complaint was untimely and dismissed it. She appealed.  While agreeing that such shortened limitations periods have traditionally been enforced, when reasonable, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded it to the trial court to make choice of law and venue findings.

The relevant employment agreement provided that claims must be filed within one year in the county where the employee was employed:

Limitation Period and Venue. You must assert any claim against the Company or its current or former employees, officers, owners, or agents, within 1 year after your claim arises or within the applicable statutory limitations period provided by law, whichever occurs first. Your failure to do so shall act as a bar to any claim that you may have. Claims must be asserted in the state court located in, or the federal court that has jurisdiction over, the county in which you are or were employed by the Company.

The Agreement also provided that the Agreement would be interpreted under Michigan law.

Assuming that the trial court believed the limitations period was enforceable whether Ohio or Michigan law applied, it dismissed the claims as untimely without conducting a choice of law analysis.   The appeals court found this to be premature and engaged in an extensive discussion about choice of law principles.   While the agreement required it to be interpreted in accordance with Michigan law,  this provision “does not evidence an intent to subject tort claims or other types of claims between the parties to Michigan law.”   Employment discrimination claims are more like tort claims.  This means that Michigan law may not be applicable since its choice of law provision only applied to contract interpretation and not statutory or tort claims.

In this case, the trial court failed to conduct a choice-of-law analysis to determine whether [the plaintiff’s] statutory employment-discrimination claims were properly brought under R.C. 4112.052 or instead governed by Michigan’s analogous employment-discrimination statute. The trial court’s failure to perform this analysis is significant. Without this threshold determination, the trial court could not definitively say whether the one-year contractual-limitations period contained in [her] Employment Agreement was enforceable.

Materially different considerations apply to the enforceability question depending on which state’s substantive law governs [her] claims. If Ohio law governs [her] employment-discrimination claims, the trial court will have to consider how recent amendments to R.C. Ch. 4112 — known as the Employment Law Uniformity Act (“ELUA”) — affect the enforceability of the statute-of-limitations clause, if at all. Prior to the ELUA, this court upheld contractual provisions shortening the limitations period for employment-discrimination claims brought under R.C. Ch. 4112.  . . . . However, the ELUA materially altered the statutory scheme. Among its most consequential changes, the ELUA (1) imposed an administrative-exhaustion requirement, mandating that claimants first file a charge of discrimination with the OCRC and exhaust administrative remedies before initiating a civil action for damages, see R.C. 4112.052(B)(1)(a), and (2) established a two-year statute of limitations for employment-discrimination claims, which tolls during the pendency of the OCRC process, see R.C. 4112.052(C)(1). Ohio courts have not yet assessed the impact, if any, of these changes on the enforceability of contractual limitations periods. But see Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 828-829 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that the contractual provision setting a six-month limitations period was unenforceable as applied to the plaintiff’s federal-discrimination claims brought pursuant to Title VII which, like the ELUA, imposes a mandatory administrative process and includes a limitations period directly in the statute). (bolding added for emphasis).

On the other hand, if Michigan law governs [her] employment discrimination claims, as the Michigan Supreme Court recently explained, contractual provisions in employment agreements that impose reduced limitations periods are enforceable only if they are reasonable.  . . .  Under Michigan law, the reasonableness of a contractually shortened limitations period is assessed by considering three factors: (1) whether the reduced limitations period in the contract affords the claimant a sufficient opportunity to investigate and file an action; (2) whether the time limitation is so short as to effect a practical abrogation of the right of action; and (3) whether the action would be barred before the loss or damage can be ascertained. . . .

The appeals court rejected the plaintiff’s argument regarding venue and the trial court had never ruled on it. “We do, however, note that on remand if it is determined that venue is not proper in Cuyahoga County but is proper in Michigan, then the Michigan court has authority to make the choice-of-law determination, using that law that applies to that forum.”

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.