Jury Upholds Employee's Termination After Admission of Post-Incident Evidence Reflecting Subjective Consent to Alleged Harassment.

Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s jury verdict on Title VII  retaliatory discharge claims where the employee had alleged that she was raped by a security guard, but the employer contended that the contact was consensual and violated its policy when she was still on-the-clock.  Graf v. Morristown-Hamblen Hosp. Ass’n, No. 24-5798 (6^th Cir. 9-10-25).  Summary judgment was granted to the employer on her hostile work environment claims, which were not part of this appeal.  Evidence of her post-incident interactions and communications with the guard were relevant to show whether she subjectively believed that he violated Title VII during the alleged incident and, thus, whether she engaged in protected conduct when she reported that he had raped her.  The jury believed that the incident was consensual, and thus, she did not have a good faith belief that she was reporting a Title VII violation.  The trial judge did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 412 when he permitted the introduction of such evidence – limited to her interaction with that particular security guard –as evidence of her subjective belief regarding consent.

According to the Court’s decision, the plaintiff became friendly with a security guard, hired through a contractor of the employer.  They exchanged hundreds of texts and frequently met during breaks in stairwells and other places.  The guard contended that they sometimes discussed intimidate details, but the plaintiff disagreed that she ever initiated such conversations.  One day, at the guard’s invitation, the plaintiff snuck during her lunch break – when she was not required to clock out -- into an unauthorized area to avoid being seen by the employer’s security cameras.  She contended that she was handcuffed and raped.  He contended it was consensual and she never used their before-agreed safe words.  She did not report the incident and returned to work after crying in the bathroom.  However, they continued to text and exchange naked photos of each other after the alleged rape.  She claimed that she had been to afraid to not comply. Six weeks later, she learned from his supervisor that he had been accused of sexual harassment by other female staff and she then reported the rape.  He was fired. 

When the employer’s HR learned of it, they also interviewed her, but did not conduct a further investigation since the guard had already been fired.  However, the employer decided to terminate her employment because she was in an unauthorized location, where she had snuck into to avoid being videotaped by security cameras, and had relations while still on the clock.   She brought suit for sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge.   The trial court dismissed the sexual harassment claim on summary judgment.  A jury ruled in the employer’s favor after the court admitted evidence about her alleged consent to the interaction with the guard -- as reflected in the post-incident texts, photos and videos -- and rejected her allegation that she had been fired for reporting the alleged rape to the guard’s supervisor.

The trial court refused to admit evidence about her conversations with others about her sexual preferences and videos that she had exchanged with the guard.  However, it admitted the texts and photos which she exchanged with the guard after the incident and the fact that she had also sent videos.  The court found the jury could decide whether she had consented or not in determining whether she had a good faith and reasonable belief that her conduct was protected by Title VII.   The Sixth Circuit agreed that this did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 412.

Rule 412 provides in relevant part that certain evidence is not admissible. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 412 prohibits the admission of two types of evidence in cases involving sexual misconduct: “(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.”

However, the second part of the Rule as exceptions in civil cases: “the court may admit evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”  This Rule interacts with sexual harassment cases in cases like these where the plaintiff’s consent is an issue.  In this case, the plaintiff's consent was an issue as to whether she subjectively believed that the guard had violated Title VII when she reported him. 

“[a] person opposing an apparently discriminatory practice does not bear the entire risk that it is in fact lawful; he or she must only have a good faith belief that the practice is unlawful . . . . In the years since Booker, we have interpreted this language to mean that, in order to prove that they engaged in protected conduct, a retaliation claimant must demonstrate “that the opposition [was] based on ‘a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed practices were unlawful.’” . . .

In holding that the protected-conduct element of a retaliation claim includes this reasonable and good-faith requirement, however, we have been careful to clarify that “the operative question is not whether [the complained of] conduct was actually unlawful, but whether Plaintiff held an objectively reasonable and good faith belief to that effect.”  . . .  A retaliation claimant therefore “does not need to oppose actual violations of Title VII in order to be protected from retaliation.” . . .

The dispute at the center of this case lies at the intersection of these two concepts. In alleging that [the employer] retaliated against her for opposing sexual assault, [The plaintiff] can succeed on her retaliation claim even if [the guard’s] conduct was not, as a legal or factual matter, sexual assault. But [she] must prove that she had a reasonable and good-faith belief that the conduct of which she complained was unlawful under Title VII. In other words, she must show that her belief that she was raped was reasonable and in good faith.

Importantly, the plaintiff was not required to prove that she was the victim of a sexual assault, but she was

required to demonstrate her reasonable and good-faith belief that [the guard’s] conduct violated Title VII. And [the employer]  was entitled to introduce evidence rebutting [her] alleged good-faith belief in the purported violative conduct she had reported, including evidence that [she] had consented to the sexual encounter, because such evidence was directly relevant to the reasonableness of [her] belief in whether Title VII prohibits that conduct. . . . 

 . . . . But our inquiry is not whether a rape violates Title VII (it does)—our inquiry is whether [she] had a good-faith belief that [he] raped her at work. Therefore, although we need not determine whether [he] raped [her], we must consider whether [she] “held an objectively reasonable and good faith belief” that she reported a legitimate rape. . . .

To be sure, we have noted that a lack of reasonable and good-faith belief may stem from “an unreasonable mistake of law.” Wasek, 682 F.3d at 469. And a retaliation plaintiff could make an unreasonable mistake of law by believing that conduct outside the scope of Title VII’s protections was conduct falling within the statute’s protections. But we have also stated that a plaintiff may fail to satisfy the reasonable and good-faith belief standard where “there are not facts from which a plaintiff could have reasonably believed that a violation occurred.” Id. And while we have yet explicitly to so hold, several of our sister circuits have made clear that Title VII retaliation plaintiffs do not engage in protected conduct when they make a false, fabricated, or malicious complaint of unlawful conduct because such plaintiffs do not reasonably and in good faith believe in the truth of their complaint.  . . . (emphasis added).

 . . . . The district court thus did not err in concluding that, in proving her retaliation claim to a jury, Graf was required to demonstrate that she reasonably and in good faith believed that, when she made her complaint against Ogle, she was reporting a rape. “Whether she actually held such a belief, a question of credibility,” was necessarily “left to [the] jury.” 

The Court agreed that propensity evidence must still be excluded as would reputational evidence.  What was relevant was her subjective belief as evidenced by her own actions with the security guard.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

And There's More . . .

 Here are some more interesting cases from over the summer involving the FLSA, mandatory arbitration clauses and age discrimination:

A divided Sixth Circuit Court of  Appeals reversed the employer’s summary judgment, which found that the employee was paid on a salary basis when he received over $800/week whenever he performed any work, but also $100/hour for all other work performed that week.  Pickens v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions, LLC., 133 F.4th 575 (6^th Cir. 2025).  The Court found that paying an employee a weekly guarantee of over $800/week did not constitute a “salary” when he typically worked 52 hours/week, or earned $5200/week.  “To be paid on a weekly basis, we conclude, an employee must be paid for a regular week’s worth of work. . . . . A weekly salary must compensate an employee “for the general value of services performed” over the week, as opposed to merely serving as a minor auxiliary to an employee’s substantial hourly or daily pay.”  In addition, “[t]he employer must not only pay a guaranteed amount to each employee each week, but that amount also must be “roughly equivalent” to the employee’s usual earnings.”   The Court recognized the regulatory exception for when an employer pays a salaried employee for “extra” work – i.e., hours beyond the normal workweek – but here the employee was being paid extra for hours worked in a regular work week. 

The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a FLSA lawsuit challenging the classification of hairstylists as independent contractors.  Gavin, et al. v. Lady Jane’s Haircuts for Men Holding Co., LLC, 135 F.4th 461  (6^th Cir. 2025).   The plaintiffs’ contracts contained an arbitration clause, which contained language that provided that the AAA’s Commercial Rules would govern.  However, the fee shifting provisions of the AAA’s Commercial Rules would cost more than the individual plaintiffs’ annual salary, making that unconscionable and unenforceable.   The district court used the contract’s severability clause to sever that “provision,” making the AAA Employment rules the default provision and, thus, enforceable.   The Court agreed that the contract’s severability clause could be used to sever offending provisions to make the contract and arbitration clause enforceable.  The Court found that the sections of the contract were distinguishable from “provisions” within each section and the district court was not required to sever the entire section (like the arbitration clause) merely because a single provision was unenforceable.  Striking the reference to the Commercial Rules also did not require the trial court to rewrite the entire arbitration clause or agreement.  

The Sixth Circuit also reversed the employer’s summary judgment on an age discrimination claim.  Smith v. City of Union, Ohio, 144 F.4th 867  (6^th Cir. 2025).  The police officer was investigated and ultimately terminated for violating several policies over a two-day period and did not have a clean performance history, but a younger co-worker who violated several of the same policies at the same time was neither investigated nor disciplined.  The officer was reinstated by an arbitration with only a suspension, but the employer delayed returning him to work for six weeks.  In that period, they promoted the younger co-worker over him and gave all other officers a raise for which he would not be eligible based on his reinstatement date.  The Court agreed that there was sufficient evidence of pretext for a jury to consider.  The officer was the oldest and longest tenured officer. The arbitrator had found that he had not violated the pursuit policy and the incorrect decision infected the termination decision, and termination was too severe for the remaining minor policy violations when a more severe violation had been treated more leniently a few years earlier.  The jury could also rely on the Chief’s comment that “younger officers” did not make the same kinds of mistakes.  “[A] comment by an employer can constitute circumstantial evidence of ageist intent even if it isn’t clear enough to amount to direct evidence.” There was also sufficient evidence of retaliation when the employer delayed his reinstatement until after the promotion of and raises given to younger officers.  The request for a fitness for duty exam and delayed reinstatement after he passed the exam could deter a reasonable officer from filing an EEOC Charge.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

In Case You Missed It This Summer

I've been busy this summer and am catching up (for my dear readers) with important decisions from the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit. 

 In June, the Supreme Court held that retirees are not  “qualified individuals” under the ADA when they neither hold nor desire a job whose essential functions they can perform with a reasonable accommodation.   Stanley v. City of Sanford, 145 S. Ct. 2058  (2025).  The plaintiff was hired in 1999.  The employer’s policy of providing medical benefits until age 65 changed in 2003 to only two years when an employee retired with a disability before age 65 and before achieving 25 years of service.  The plaintiff retired due to a disability prior to age 65 and after only 19 years of service. The ADA statute “made it unlawful to ‘discriminate against’ someone who ‘can perform the essential functions of’ the job she ‘holds or desires." The Court construed "those [present tense] verbs to suggest that the statute does not reach retirees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged act of discrimination.”  In addition, the suggested reasonable accommodations in the statute involve current employees or applicants, not retirees.  Finally, the retaliation provision protects any individual, not just qualified individuals, suggesting different standards would apply.

In August, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the employer’s summary judgment on a sexual harassment, retaliation and racial discrimination claim.  Bivens v. Zep, Inc.  147 F.4th 635 (6^th Cir. 2025).   The plaintiff had been asked on a date by a client.  When she reported it to her supervisor, the client was reassigned away from her to avoid a repeated uncomfortable situation.  Later, the Company laid off sales employees, including plaintiff, with territories below a financial threshold.  She could not identify anyone who was hired to take over her territory.   The Court held that employers are not automatically liable for their clients’ or customers’ behavior without some evidence of an intent to discriminate or harass, which was completely absent in this case.   Ellerth liability assumes an agency relationship between the employer and the harasser and that is generally absent when the alleged harasser is a customer. 

In July, the Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment on a retaliation claim where the plaintiff claimed that she was investigated and then fired in retaliation for assisting a co-worker assert her rights under the ADA and be transferred away from her discriminatory supervisor.  Gray v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,  145 F.4th 630 (6^th Cir. 2025).   When her co-worker’s discriminatory supervisor filled in for the plaintiff’s supervisor shortly after the protected conduct, he launched an unprompted and unprecedented investigation into the plaintiff’s time cards by comparing them to her badge swipes and computer use.  No other employee was investigated – despite similar discrepancies -- and the plaintiff was ultimately fired for time card abuse.   The Court agreed that the evidence aligned with its precedent holding that “employees can establish prima facie causation by showing that their employer began scrutinizing them more heavily shortly after they engaged in protected activity, and then used its findings to justify termination.” The plaintiff was able to show that the discriminatory supervisor knew of her assistance to her co-worker and his retaliatory intent under a “cat’s paw” theory of vicarious liability.  While the employer may have avoided direct liability under an honest belief theory, the supervisor’s actions could not. A “supervisor does not have to lie in order to be biased. As we have repeatedly recognized, a supervisor can cause an employee’s termination by reporting true yet selective information.”  Moreover, although “an employer can escape liability by conducting ‘an in-depth and truly independent investigation’ into an otherwise biased report,  . . . when a supervisor reports true but selective information, an investigation will always confirm the supervisor’s allegation.”  In this case, the employer failed to take the plaintiff’s complaint of retaliation seriously or to compare her misconduct to other employees before terminating her employment.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Rejects Challenge to Severance Agreement By Highly Educated, Experienced and Well Compensated Plaintiff With Months to Consider Terms

Last month, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of race and age discrimination claims on the grounds that the plaintiff had signed a valid release of all discrimination claims.  Jamil v. Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA, LLC,  No 24-1871 (6^th Cir. 2/4/25).   The plaintiff was highly educated, experienced with contracts and had over 4.5 months to consider the severance agreement (which provided her with 18 months of pay to bridge her to retirement age).  The Court rejected her allegation that her signature was not knowing and voluntary in light of her education, experience and amount of severance pay, and her admission that the agreement was straightforward, and that she chose not to consult with an attorney.  It also rejected her claim that she had been mislead about the reason for her termination or that this would invalidate the agreement.  Finally, it denied her motions to extend discovery when she waited four months to notice depositions. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had several advanced college degrees and worked for more than 10 years as a finance executive, with several oversees assignments.  After conflicting with a supervisor about whether to extend credit to particular dealerships, she was informed that she was being sent back to the USA instead of to her next overseas assignment and that she would have to accept a demotion, if any positions were even still available, or sign a severance agreement within 4.5 months.  The severance agreement provided for 18 months of severance and contained a waiver of all employment discrimination claims.  After being told that no positions at her level or immediately inferior level were available and after learning that others had received transfers upon their repatriation which she had desired, she signed the severance agreement, but later filed claims for age and race discrimination.   The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment and denied her motions to extend discovery. 

Federal law governs the validity of a release of employment discrimination claims.

To determine whether a release was knowingly and voluntarily executed, we assess: “(1) plaintiff’s experience, background, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the circumstances.” . . . Under the last factor, we consider whether fraud, duress, or other breach-of-contract defenses render the severance agreement unenforceable.

The Court of Appeals rejected her argument that the release was not binding because she had four college degrees and experience with lawyers from her 10 years as a finance executive.  It rejected her argument that her contract experience was not with severance agreements because she also admitted that the agreement was straightforward and so she did not need to consult with an attorney.

The Court agreed that 4.5 months to consider the terms of the agreement was far more than necessary. “As much as she now asserts that some terms were unclear, it was her “obligation to seek [counsel] before she signed if she felt she did not understand the [agreement].”

In addition to her admission that the terms were straightforward, the Court noted that “ “a law degree” was unnecessary “to grasp the import of these terms.”  It did not find that the 18 months of salary was unfair or insufficient was consideration.

Finally, it rejected her allegation that she had been deceived into signing the agreement by numerous representations that there were no open positions available when, in fact, there were comparable positions that the employer filled with other employees being repatriated.   The Court noted that the final straw which motivated her to sign the agreement was learning that a position she had desired was filled with another co-worker.  She had suspected for a while that her former supervisor was blocking her from being rehired.

Simply put, while  . . .  human resources department may have overstated the company’s financial difficulties, the record shows that [she] signed the contract with her eyes wide open. [She] knew there were no positions available for her, but that such positions were available to others. The key inquiry here is whether [her] release of claims was knowing and voluntary, and she voluntarily signed the agreement with full knowledge. The totality-of-the-circumstances factor favors [the employer].

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of ADA Reasonable Accommodation, Discrimination and Retaliation Claims by Toxic Employee

On Monday, a divided Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on claims of failure to accommodate and disability discrimination and retaliation. Woodie v. Motorola Solutions, Inc., No. 24-3257 (6^th Cir. 3/10/25).    A unanimous Court found that the plaintiff could not show pretext, retaliation or disability discrimination when he had been terminated after repeatedly being abrasive to customers and colleagues and often threatened to resign when given feedback or removed from assignments.   Noting that he had objected to his work and travel schedule for multiple reasons, a divided Court found that he had failed to request a reasonable accommodation or start the interactive process when he refused to contact the employer’s accommodation department despite referrals each time he requested a schedule change because of his health.  The dissent acknowledged this to be a possible failure to commence the interactive process, but concluded that the employer had a duty to do more than refer him to HR, which should have reached out to him to discuss the issue after his request to his supervisors for a scheduling accommodation. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff claimed to suffer from nocturnal epilepsy.  His job involved traveling 75% of the time, including weekends, but not, apparently, evenings or nights.  When the travel was increased to 80%, he objected vigorously on behalf of all employees and continued to complain for the remainder of his employment.  He apparently offended customers and colleagues by intruding on the duties and responsibilities of others and insisting on doing everything his own way.  He was removed from one job at a customer’s request for being arrogant and abusive.  He was removed from other jobs as well under similar circumstances.  He usually responded to feedback and adverse employment assignments by threatening to resign and was insubordinate to his supervisors.  A few times, he requested vague schedule changes on account of his health.  However, every time he was referred by his supervisors to Human Resources to pursue a possible schedule change/accommodation, he declined to do so.  Ultimately, he was terminated without cause on account of his inability to modify his offensive and insubordinate comments despite multiple coaching.  He found another job the next day and was only unemployed for a month.   He filed suit alleging failure to accommodate, disability discrimination and retaliation.   The employer obtained summary judgment.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the claims.  The unanimous panel agreed that he had no direct evidence of disability discrimination and could not show that the reason for his termination was pretextual.  He admitted to making insubordinate comments and threatening to resign repeatedly when he did not get his own way.  He also did not deny that multiple customers had requested his removal from their projects because of his toxic attitude and that he did not get along well with his colleagues. 

The Court also refused to infer pretext from the fact that his termination was coded “without cause,” meaning that he could possibly be rehired when the employer contended that it had fired him for cause as described above.

The Court’s majority found that his steadfast refusal to pursue a reasonable accommodation through HR despite multiple referrals by his supervisors constituted a failure to request an accommodation.  (It also indicated a breakdown in the interactive process on his part).  The majority focused on his failure to provide medical documentation of his disability (even though the employer never specifically requested it at this point).

On numerous occasions when [the plaintiff] requested a travel change based on his disability, his supervisors and HR directed him to OHR in the event he need an accommodation. Even before requesting travel changes, [he] told  . . . , his immediate supervisor, that he had nocturnal epilepsy. [His supervisor] directed [him] to contact OHR if he needed an accommodation, and he offered to contact OHR for him. Woodie declined. When [he] asked [a manager] for a schedule change, [that person] told him that he didn’t have the authority to provide an accommodation for a disability; such a request had to go through OHR. So he told [him]  to contact OHR. [Yet another supervisor] also told [the plaintiff] he had to go to OHR to request a disability accommodation. [That person] then notified an “HR person that [he] ha[d] somebody that might be requesting a medical accommodation.”  . . .  [The plaintiff] mentioned his medical condition to  . . .  a Human Resources Business Partner, who told [him] that he could “always apply for a reasonable accommodation if needed” and gave him the OHR policy.  . . . [He] again declined.

[The plaintiff] was thus aware of [the employer’s] process for requesting a disability accommodation. He was given the policy, and at each turn, his supervisors directed him to contact OHR because only OHR could determine whether [he] was disabled and needed an accommodation. [One supervisor] contacted HR to inform them of a possible pending request, and [he] discussed his disability with HR. Despite all of that, at no time in his employment with [the employer] did [he] contact OHR. [He] thus failed to request an accommodation sufficient to start the interactive process under the ADA.  . . .

The dissent, however, agreed that the plaintiff’s refusal to contact HR could constitute a breakdown in the interactive process, but would have faulted the employer for not doing more than refer him to HR.  Instead, the dissent found that this request to his supervisors was sufficient to constitute a request for a reasonable accommodation and it was the employer which had the duty to reach out to him instead of setting up a process where he had to contact HR. 

But [his] failure to follow [the employer’s] policy goes to [his] participation in the interactive process; it does not impact whether he requested an accommodation. . . .

 . . . . Here, too, [his] failure to follow [the employer’s] accommodation policy is relevant—not to whether he requested an accommodation— but to whether he caused a breakdown in the interactive process.

Once [he] requested a reasonable accommodation, [the employer] “ha[d] a duty to engage in an interactive process.”  . . .  This duty “requires the employer to initiate an informal, interactive process, in order to identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”  . . . .  This process is mandatory and both parties must participate in good faith.  . . .

 . . .. Courts should also “attempt to isolate the cause of the breakdown [in the interactive process] and then assign responsibility.”  . . .  Thus, if [he] caused the breakdown in the process, he cannot recover for [the employer’s] failure to accommodate or failure to engage in the interactive process. . . . .

There is a genuine factual dispute about whether [the employer] caused the breakdown in the interactive process. [He] repeatedly requested a reasonable accommodation from his supervisors starting in November 2020. Yet no one at [the employer] ever engaged with him to determine an appropriate accommodation, even though [it] had “a duty [to] inquire further.”

True, [his] supervisors told him to contact [the employer’s] human resources department about filing a formal request, which he did not do. Even so, our precedent and EEOC Guidance both suggest that the ADA required [it] to do more than just refer [him] to human resources. We have held that an employer participates in the interactive process in good faith when “it readily meets with the employee, discusses any reasonable accommodations, and suggests other possible [accommodations].” . . .

 . . .

Moreover, [his] failure to follow [its] accommodation policy did not excuse [it] from engaging in the interactive process. . . .

An employee’s failure to file a formal accommodation request does not end the interactive process. True, “an employer may ask the individual to fill out a form or submit the request in written form,” and can also ask that the employee provide “reasonable documentation” related to his disability. See EEOC Guidance, at ¶ 3;  . . .  And where the employee’s disability or need for accommodation “is not obvious,” the employee is not entitled to an accommodation if he refuses to provide such documentation. . . . “the employer cannot ignore the initial request,” id. at ¶ 3, and “failure by the employer to initiate or participate in an informal dialogue with the individual after receiving a request for reasonable accommodation could [still] result in liability for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation,” id. at ¶ 6. That is exactly what [the employer] did here—ignore [his] initial requests for an accommodation just because he never filled out a form.

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.