Sixth Circuit Rejects Claims After Plaintiff's Public, Profane and Unprofessional Attacks on Colleagues

Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer ‘s summary judgment on Title VII, Rehabilitation Act and First Amendment discrimination and retaliation claims brought by a professor after the plaintiff’s request to transfer to the main campus was denied.  Patterson v. Kent State Univ., No. 24-3940 (6^th Cir. Sept 12, 2025).   There was no evidence that plaintiff’s gender identity was ever discussed or considered in the decision.  The sole stray remark about the plaintiff’s mental stability  -- in light of the unprofessional comments being made -- was insufficient upon which to base a disability discrimination claim.   The employer had sufficient reason for its actions in light of the plaintiff’s unprofessional and profane attacks on colleagues, and resignation from service.   There was also no evidence that the decisionmakers were aware of any protected activities at the time of the decisions.  Finally, complaints about colleagues were not matters of public concern entitled to First Amendment protections. “Complaining about and insulting your coworkers simply doesn’t implicate a matter of public concern.”

According to the Court’s decision, the plaintiff tenured professor requested to be considered to Chair a dormant Center that had been suspended pending a reorganization.  Although the position was not open, the Dean agreed to reallocate half of the plaintiff’s teaching load so that the plaintiff could develop new course material for the dormant Center if it were to be resurrected.  The plaintiff was contacted by the Chair of the School where the Center would be housed about joining the planning committee.  The plaintiff was unhappy that the Dean and Chair would be in charge of the Center and began attacking them – using profanity and derogatory terms about their gender – on social media and in emails to other colleagues. “So to sum up, Patterson condemned both Mazzei and Munro-Stasiuk as “transphobe[s]” and “cishet white ladies in charge, with [no] content expertise,” engaged in “F*ckery,” “shit,” “trans antagonism,” and “epistemic violence” who were “quite literally killing [me].”   After a few weeks of this and plaintiff’s refusal to meet and discuss the stated concerns, the Dean cancelled the planned teaching allocation.   The plaintiff did not respond, but cancelled “and instead resigned from university service commitments.”  The Chair issued general invitations to join the gender studies and Center committees, but the plaintiff did not respond.  Instead, the plaintiff bullied those who did join the committee through tweets and applied to transfer to the main campus.  The requisite committees held a joint meeting, discussed the plaintiff's resignation from service, negative interaction with faculty colleagues and the department’s need and voted 12-2 against the transfer request.  The Dean requested that they reconvene and vote separately, which they did.  The result was the same and the plaintiff’s gender identity was never mentioned.

Title VII Discrimination

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that denial of the transfer request was direct evidence of gender discrimination when there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s gender identity was ever mentioned or discussed.   Because an inference of discrimination would be required, the decision could not be direct evidence in and of itself.

[The plaintiff] also points to the committees’ discussion of whether the English department needed more faculty with backgrounds in LGBT studies, claiming that this is direct evidence of discrimination. That argument conflates a professor’s scholarly discipline with a professor’s personal traits.  . . . . An Italian person may offer to teach Italian classes, but if a university doesn’t need more Italian classes, that’s not direct evidence of animus against Italian people. So there’s no direct evidence of discrimination.

The Court agreed that the denial of the transfer request could be an adverse employment action under Title VII because it inflicted some harm.   Nonetheless, the employer clearly had a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for its actions in revoking the teaching reallocation and denying the transfer request:

[The employer] had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for what it did. [The plaintiff] sent rude and profanity-laced tweets, emails, and texts insulting [the Dean] and [the Chair], including disparaging references to their race, sex, and occupations. Those messages violated university policy against attacking colleagues or their academic fields. And they easily provided reasonable grounds—having nothing do to with sex or gender—for disciplining or reprimanding an employee. . . .

[The employer] also had legitimate reasons to deny the campus tenure-transfer application. The evidence shows that [the plaintiff’s] lack of collegiality and decision to quit university service committees played a part. The classes [the plaintiff] wanted to teach also didn’t fit with the main campus English department’s curriculum and needs at that time. And the department wanted to preserve its ability to hire a new tenure-track professor the next year; it worried that a lateral hire from a regional campus would use up that spot. This is standard stuff for tenure decisions.

The Court finally concluded that the plaintiff could not show that these explanations were pretextual – or a disguise - - for unlawful discrimination.  “A plaintiff can establish pretext in several ways, such as by showing that the defendant’s articulated reasons had no factual basis, didn’t in fact motivate the action, or could not warrant the action taken.  . . . But there’s no evidence here to support any of those theories.”

[The employer’s] decisions had ample basis in fact. The record contains many disparaging tweets, emails, and texts, which led to a toxic work environment. And that factual basis was more than enough to warrant some kind of response. [The Dean and the Chair] were both originally excited to work with [the plaintiff]. They only changed course after the hostile tweets and texts. The tenure-transfer rejection likewise bears no indicia of pretext. The same English department had voted to unanimously to grant [the plaintiff] tenure less than a year before. If the committee members were biased against transgender people, wouldn’t they have shown it then? What’s more, after the committees voted “no” on the first transfer vote, [the Dean] realized that they hadn’t followed the right procedures. So she had them vote again. If she was biased, why not just leave the “no” vote at that? Why erase the vote and give [the plaintiff] another shot? No evidence suggests that [the employer’s] true motivation was animus against anyone’s sex or gender identity.

Title VII Retaliation

The Court also rejected the Title VII retaliation claim.  It agreed that the plaintiff could show protected opposition activities:

First, an email to a university official, Amoaba Gooden, in which [the plaintiff] resigned as a university DEI representative and complained that [the employer] wasn’t a “safe or welcoming place for trans faculty.”  . . .  Second, an email to Professor M’Baye, the English department chair, in which [the plaintiff] stepped back from service on a university “DEI Strategic Planning Process.”  . . . . Third, an email to Kathy Davis-Patterson, another faculty member, in which [the plaintiff] reported on “inequity” and “transphobes” at [the employer].  . . . . Fourth, an email to Deb Smith, who worked with the faculty union. In this email, [the plaintiff] resigned as a union representative, citing “inequity and discrimination in the workplace” at [the employer]. . . .

However, the second email never mentioned any protected activity or opposition, but instead, cited only health concerns.   Therefore, it could not be a protected activity.  In addition, the plaintiff could not show that the Center position had been filled by anyone, so there was no adverse action there.  Moreover, some of the protected activities took place after the Dean had revoked the teaching reallocation.  Finally, the remaining emails were unknown to the Dean and the tenure committees.  when the teaching reallocation was revoked.    Therefore, they could not have motivated any retaliation.

First Amendment

As for the First Amendment claims, the Court found that the plaintiff’s derogatory tweets did not touch on matters of public concern, but rather  were “complaints about other Kent State faculty members and their workplace decisions—“employee beef,” plain and simple,” which are not entitled to First Amendment protection. “The tweets are insulting, disparaging, and targeted. They use profanities, and they describe [the Dean and Chair] in terms of their race and sex. Complaining about and insulting your coworkers simply doesn’t implicate a matter of public concern.”

[The plaintiff] frames the tweets as publicizing [the employer]s alleged transphobia and exposing discrimination in the workplace. In fairness, a few tweets do make more general references that sound less like targeted insults. For example, one tweet states: “Academia is fundamentally racist, heterosexist, cissexist, ableist, classist & sexist.”  . . . . In isolation, perhaps that qualifies as protected speech.  . . . . But the tweet is swarmed on either side by other attacks on [the Dean and Chair]. Indeed, that same tweet’s very next sentence accuses [the Chair] of “violen[ce].”  . . . . A public employee can’t blend protected speech with “caustic personal attacks against colleagues,” and then use the protected speech to immunize those attacks. . . .

And even if the tweets did involve a matter of public concern, they still wouldn’t receive protection. [The employer’s] interest as an employer in administering effective public services outweighs Patterson’s interest in this kind of trash talk. . ..

There’s a way to raise awareness of discrimination without engaging in profanity-laced and race- and sex-based aspersions against colleagues. The tweets created serious strife within the [the employer] community, causing [the Dean and Chair] to feel harassed and insulted. And it led to a dysfunctional work environment for several months. [The Chair] had to text [the Dean], for example: “I’m really thinking continuing [having [the plaintiff] involved] is unhealthy for the potential program and school, at this point. It’s clearly already having an impact. I have concerns.”  . . . . [The Dean] also testified to how noxious things had gotten. “The foundation of [revoking the offer],” she stated, “was the toxic, hostile tweets that [the plaintiff] had been posting over the course of over a month . . . . [I]t was escalating, continually targeting [the Chair], in particular, continually targeting [other professors], to a certain extent myself.”  . . . . The Dean discussed how [the plaintiff] had “show[n] over, and over, and over again” a refusal to be collaborative or respectful and was “completely trying to undermine the process.”  . . . . In short, [the plaintiff] had compromised any “ability to lead any initiative” and any “ability to work in the Center, or the [major.]”

[The employer’s] business is educating students. When an employee seriously undercuts the university’s power to do its basic job, the Constitution doesn’t elevate the employee over the public that [the employer] exists to serve. All told, “[t]he First Amendment does not require a public employer to tolerate an embarrassing, vulgar, vituperative, ad hominem attack, even if such an attack touches on a matter of public concern.”  . . .  When “the manner and content of an employee’s speech is disrespectful, demeaning, rude, and insulting, and is perceived that way in the workplace, the government employer is within its discretion to take disciplinary action.”

Rehabilitation Act

Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim at the prima facie stage because it was based on one stray comment where concern was expressed by another professor about the plaintiff’s mental stability.

This isolated comment is not the kind of evidence that courts have found satisfies the “regarded as disabled” definition. “Personality conflicts among coworkers (even those expressed through the use (or misuse) of mental health terminology) generally do not establish a perceived impairment on the part of the employer.”  . . . . [The professor’s] remark simply expressed her concern about [the plaintiff’s] uncollegial and unprofessional attitude. At most, it is a “mere scintilla” of evidence—insufficient to survive summary judgment.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Jury Upholds Employee's Termination After Admission of Post-Incident Evidence Reflecting Subjective Consent to Alleged Harassment.

Last week, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an employer’s jury verdict on Title VII  retaliatory discharge claims where the employee had alleged that she was raped by a security guard, but the employer contended that the contact was consensual and violated its policy when she was still on-the-clock.  Graf v. Morristown-Hamblen Hosp. Ass’n, No. 24-5798 (6^th Cir. 9-10-25).  Summary judgment was granted to the employer on her hostile work environment claims, which were not part of this appeal.  Evidence of her post-incident interactions and communications with the guard were relevant to show whether she subjectively believed that he violated Title VII during the alleged incident and, thus, whether she engaged in protected conduct when she reported that he had raped her.  The jury believed that the incident was consensual, and thus, she did not have a good faith belief that she was reporting a Title VII violation.  The trial judge did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 412 when he permitted the introduction of such evidence – limited to her interaction with that particular security guard –as evidence of her subjective belief regarding consent.

According to the Court’s decision, the plaintiff became friendly with a security guard, hired through a contractor of the employer.  They exchanged hundreds of texts and frequently met during breaks in stairwells and other places.  The guard contended that they sometimes discussed intimidate details, but the plaintiff disagreed that she ever initiated such conversations.  One day, at the guard’s invitation, the plaintiff snuck during her lunch break – when she was not required to clock out -- into an unauthorized area to avoid being seen by the employer’s security cameras.  She contended that she was handcuffed and raped.  He contended it was consensual and she never used their before-agreed safe words.  She did not report the incident and returned to work after crying in the bathroom.  However, they continued to text and exchange naked photos of each other after the alleged rape.  She claimed that she had been to afraid to not comply. Six weeks later, she learned from his supervisor that he had been accused of sexual harassment by other female staff and she then reported the rape.  He was fired. 

When the employer’s HR learned of it, they also interviewed her, but did not conduct a further investigation since the guard had already been fired.  However, the employer decided to terminate her employment because she was in an unauthorized location, where she had snuck into to avoid being videotaped by security cameras, and had relations while still on the clock.   She brought suit for sexual harassment and retaliatory discharge.   The trial court dismissed the sexual harassment claim on summary judgment.  A jury ruled in the employer’s favor after the court admitted evidence about her alleged consent to the interaction with the guard -- as reflected in the post-incident texts, photos and videos -- and rejected her allegation that she had been fired for reporting the alleged rape to the guard’s supervisor.

The trial court refused to admit evidence about her conversations with others about her sexual preferences and videos that she had exchanged with the guard.  However, it admitted the texts and photos which she exchanged with the guard after the incident and the fact that she had also sent videos.  The court found the jury could decide whether she had consented or not in determining whether she had a good faith and reasonable belief that her conduct was protected by Title VII.   The Sixth Circuit agreed that this did not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 412.

Rule 412 provides in relevant part that certain evidence is not admissible. 

Federal Rule of Evidence 412 prohibits the admission of two types of evidence in cases involving sexual misconduct: “(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior; or (2) evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.”

However, the second part of the Rule as exceptions in civil cases: “the court may admit evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual behavior or sexual predisposition if its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party.”  This Rule interacts with sexual harassment cases in cases like these where the plaintiff’s consent is an issue.  In this case, the plaintiff's consent was an issue as to whether she subjectively believed that the guard had violated Title VII when she reported him. 

“[a] person opposing an apparently discriminatory practice does not bear the entire risk that it is in fact lawful; he or she must only have a good faith belief that the practice is unlawful . . . . In the years since Booker, we have interpreted this language to mean that, in order to prove that they engaged in protected conduct, a retaliation claimant must demonstrate “that the opposition [was] based on ‘a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed practices were unlawful.’” . . .

In holding that the protected-conduct element of a retaliation claim includes this reasonable and good-faith requirement, however, we have been careful to clarify that “the operative question is not whether [the complained of] conduct was actually unlawful, but whether Plaintiff held an objectively reasonable and good faith belief to that effect.”  . . .  A retaliation claimant therefore “does not need to oppose actual violations of Title VII in order to be protected from retaliation.” . . .

The dispute at the center of this case lies at the intersection of these two concepts. In alleging that [the employer] retaliated against her for opposing sexual assault, [The plaintiff] can succeed on her retaliation claim even if [the guard’s] conduct was not, as a legal or factual matter, sexual assault. But [she] must prove that she had a reasonable and good-faith belief that the conduct of which she complained was unlawful under Title VII. In other words, she must show that her belief that she was raped was reasonable and in good faith.

Importantly, the plaintiff was not required to prove that she was the victim of a sexual assault, but she was

required to demonstrate her reasonable and good-faith belief that [the guard’s] conduct violated Title VII. And [the employer]  was entitled to introduce evidence rebutting [her] alleged good-faith belief in the purported violative conduct she had reported, including evidence that [she] had consented to the sexual encounter, because such evidence was directly relevant to the reasonableness of [her] belief in whether Title VII prohibits that conduct. . . . 

 . . . . But our inquiry is not whether a rape violates Title VII (it does)—our inquiry is whether [she] had a good-faith belief that [he] raped her at work. Therefore, although we need not determine whether [he] raped [her], we must consider whether [she] “held an objectively reasonable and good faith belief” that she reported a legitimate rape. . . .

To be sure, we have noted that a lack of reasonable and good-faith belief may stem from “an unreasonable mistake of law.” Wasek, 682 F.3d at 469. And a retaliation plaintiff could make an unreasonable mistake of law by believing that conduct outside the scope of Title VII’s protections was conduct falling within the statute’s protections. But we have also stated that a plaintiff may fail to satisfy the reasonable and good-faith belief standard where “there are not facts from which a plaintiff could have reasonably believed that a violation occurred.” Id. And while we have yet explicitly to so hold, several of our sister circuits have made clear that Title VII retaliation plaintiffs do not engage in protected conduct when they make a false, fabricated, or malicious complaint of unlawful conduct because such plaintiffs do not reasonably and in good faith believe in the truth of their complaint.  . . . (emphasis added).

 . . . . The district court thus did not err in concluding that, in proving her retaliation claim to a jury, Graf was required to demonstrate that she reasonably and in good faith believed that, when she made her complaint against Ogle, she was reporting a rape. “Whether she actually held such a belief, a question of credibility,” was necessarily “left to [the] jury.” 

The Court agreed that propensity evidence must still be excluded as would reputational evidence.  What was relevant was her subjective belief as evidenced by her own actions with the security guard.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

And There's More . . .

 Here are some more interesting cases from over the summer involving the FLSA, mandatory arbitration clauses and age discrimination:

A divided Sixth Circuit Court of  Appeals reversed the employer’s summary judgment, which found that the employee was paid on a salary basis when he received over $800/week whenever he performed any work, but also $100/hour for all other work performed that week.  Pickens v. Hamilton-Ryker IT Solutions, LLC., 133 F.4th 575 (6^th Cir. 2025).  The Court found that paying an employee a weekly guarantee of over $800/week did not constitute a “salary” when he typically worked 52 hours/week, or earned $5200/week.  “To be paid on a weekly basis, we conclude, an employee must be paid for a regular week’s worth of work. . . . . A weekly salary must compensate an employee “for the general value of services performed” over the week, as opposed to merely serving as a minor auxiliary to an employee’s substantial hourly or daily pay.”  In addition, “[t]he employer must not only pay a guaranteed amount to each employee each week, but that amount also must be “roughly equivalent” to the employee’s usual earnings.”   The Court recognized the regulatory exception for when an employer pays a salaried employee for “extra” work – i.e., hours beyond the normal workweek – but here the employee was being paid extra for hours worked in a regular work week. 

The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a FLSA lawsuit challenging the classification of hairstylists as independent contractors.  Gavin, et al. v. Lady Jane’s Haircuts for Men Holding Co., LLC, 135 F.4th 461  (6^th Cir. 2025).   The plaintiffs’ contracts contained an arbitration clause, which contained language that provided that the AAA’s Commercial Rules would govern.  However, the fee shifting provisions of the AAA’s Commercial Rules would cost more than the individual plaintiffs’ annual salary, making that unconscionable and unenforceable.   The district court used the contract’s severability clause to sever that “provision,” making the AAA Employment rules the default provision and, thus, enforceable.   The Court agreed that the contract’s severability clause could be used to sever offending provisions to make the contract and arbitration clause enforceable.  The Court found that the sections of the contract were distinguishable from “provisions” within each section and the district court was not required to sever the entire section (like the arbitration clause) merely because a single provision was unenforceable.  Striking the reference to the Commercial Rules also did not require the trial court to rewrite the entire arbitration clause or agreement.  

The Sixth Circuit also reversed the employer’s summary judgment on an age discrimination claim.  Smith v. City of Union, Ohio, 144 F.4th 867  (6^th Cir. 2025).  The police officer was investigated and ultimately terminated for violating several policies over a two-day period and did not have a clean performance history, but a younger co-worker who violated several of the same policies at the same time was neither investigated nor disciplined.  The officer was reinstated by an arbitration with only a suspension, but the employer delayed returning him to work for six weeks.  In that period, they promoted the younger co-worker over him and gave all other officers a raise for which he would not be eligible based on his reinstatement date.  The Court agreed that there was sufficient evidence of pretext for a jury to consider.  The officer was the oldest and longest tenured officer. The arbitrator had found that he had not violated the pursuit policy and the incorrect decision infected the termination decision, and termination was too severe for the remaining minor policy violations when a more severe violation had been treated more leniently a few years earlier.  The jury could also rely on the Chief’s comment that “younger officers” did not make the same kinds of mistakes.  “[A] comment by an employer can constitute circumstantial evidence of ageist intent even if it isn’t clear enough to amount to direct evidence.” There was also sufficient evidence of retaliation when the employer delayed his reinstatement until after the promotion of and raises given to younger officers.  The request for a fitness for duty exam and delayed reinstatement after he passed the exam could deter a reasonable officer from filing an EEOC Charge.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

In Case You Missed It This Summer

I've been busy this summer and am catching up (for my dear readers) with important decisions from the Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit. 

 In June, the Supreme Court held that retirees are not  “qualified individuals” under the ADA when they neither hold nor desire a job whose essential functions they can perform with a reasonable accommodation.   Stanley v. City of Sanford, 145 S. Ct. 2058  (2025).  The plaintiff was hired in 1999.  The employer’s policy of providing medical benefits until age 65 changed in 2003 to only two years when an employee retired with a disability before age 65 and before achieving 25 years of service.  The plaintiff retired due to a disability prior to age 65 and after only 19 years of service. The ADA statute “made it unlawful to ‘discriminate against’ someone who ‘can perform the essential functions of’ the job she ‘holds or desires." The Court construed "those [present tense] verbs to suggest that the statute does not reach retirees who neither hold nor desire a job at the time of an alleged act of discrimination.”  In addition, the suggested reasonable accommodations in the statute involve current employees or applicants, not retirees.  Finally, the retaliation provision protects any individual, not just qualified individuals, suggesting different standards would apply.

In August, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the employer’s summary judgment on a sexual harassment, retaliation and racial discrimination claim.  Bivens v. Zep, Inc.  147 F.4th 635 (6^th Cir. 2025).   The plaintiff had been asked on a date by a client.  When she reported it to her supervisor, the client was reassigned away from her to avoid a repeated uncomfortable situation.  Later, the Company laid off sales employees, including plaintiff, with territories below a financial threshold.  She could not identify anyone who was hired to take over her territory.   The Court held that employers are not automatically liable for their clients’ or customers’ behavior without some evidence of an intent to discriminate or harass, which was completely absent in this case.   Ellerth liability assumes an agency relationship between the employer and the harasser and that is generally absent when the alleged harasser is a customer. 

In July, the Sixth Circuit reversed an employer’s summary judgment on a retaliation claim where the plaintiff claimed that she was investigated and then fired in retaliation for assisting a co-worker assert her rights under the ADA and be transferred away from her discriminatory supervisor.  Gray v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,  145 F.4th 630 (6^th Cir. 2025).   When her co-worker’s discriminatory supervisor filled in for the plaintiff’s supervisor shortly after the protected conduct, he launched an unprompted and unprecedented investigation into the plaintiff’s time cards by comparing them to her badge swipes and computer use.  No other employee was investigated – despite similar discrepancies -- and the plaintiff was ultimately fired for time card abuse.   The Court agreed that the evidence aligned with its precedent holding that “employees can establish prima facie causation by showing that their employer began scrutinizing them more heavily shortly after they engaged in protected activity, and then used its findings to justify termination.” The plaintiff was able to show that the discriminatory supervisor knew of her assistance to her co-worker and his retaliatory intent under a “cat’s paw” theory of vicarious liability.  While the employer may have avoided direct liability under an honest belief theory, the supervisor’s actions could not. A “supervisor does not have to lie in order to be biased. As we have repeatedly recognized, a supervisor can cause an employee’s termination by reporting true yet selective information.”  Moreover, although “an employer can escape liability by conducting ‘an in-depth and truly independent investigation’ into an otherwise biased report,  . . . when a supervisor reports true but selective information, an investigation will always confirm the supervisor’s allegation.”  In this case, the employer failed to take the plaintiff’s complaint of retaliation seriously or to compare her misconduct to other employees before terminating her employment.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Sixth Circuit Rejects Challenge to Severance Agreement By Highly Educated, Experienced and Well Compensated Plaintiff With Months to Consider Terms

Last month, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of race and age discrimination claims on the grounds that the plaintiff had signed a valid release of all discrimination claims.  Jamil v. Mercedes-Benz Financial Services USA, LLC,  No 24-1871 (6^th Cir. 2/4/25).   The plaintiff was highly educated, experienced with contracts and had over 4.5 months to consider the severance agreement (which provided her with 18 months of pay to bridge her to retirement age).  The Court rejected her allegation that her signature was not knowing and voluntary in light of her education, experience and amount of severance pay, and her admission that the agreement was straightforward, and that she chose not to consult with an attorney.  It also rejected her claim that she had been mislead about the reason for her termination or that this would invalidate the agreement.  Finally, it denied her motions to extend discovery when she waited four months to notice depositions. 

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff had several advanced college degrees and worked for more than 10 years as a finance executive, with several oversees assignments.  After conflicting with a supervisor about whether to extend credit to particular dealerships, she was informed that she was being sent back to the USA instead of to her next overseas assignment and that she would have to accept a demotion, if any positions were even still available, or sign a severance agreement within 4.5 months.  The severance agreement provided for 18 months of severance and contained a waiver of all employment discrimination claims.  After being told that no positions at her level or immediately inferior level were available and after learning that others had received transfers upon their repatriation which she had desired, she signed the severance agreement, but later filed claims for age and race discrimination.   The trial court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment and denied her motions to extend discovery. 

Federal law governs the validity of a release of employment discrimination claims.

To determine whether a release was knowingly and voluntarily executed, we assess: “(1) plaintiff’s experience, background, and education; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff had to consider whether to sign the waiver, including whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (3) the clarity of the waiver; (4) consideration for the waiver; as well as (5) the totality of the circumstances.” . . . Under the last factor, we consider whether fraud, duress, or other breach-of-contract defenses render the severance agreement unenforceable.

The Court of Appeals rejected her argument that the release was not binding because she had four college degrees and experience with lawyers from her 10 years as a finance executive.  It rejected her argument that her contract experience was not with severance agreements because she also admitted that the agreement was straightforward and so she did not need to consult with an attorney.

The Court agreed that 4.5 months to consider the terms of the agreement was far more than necessary. “As much as she now asserts that some terms were unclear, it was her “obligation to seek [counsel] before she signed if she felt she did not understand the [agreement].”

In addition to her admission that the terms were straightforward, the Court noted that “ “a law degree” was unnecessary “to grasp the import of these terms.”  It did not find that the 18 months of salary was unfair or insufficient was consideration.

Finally, it rejected her allegation that she had been deceived into signing the agreement by numerous representations that there were no open positions available when, in fact, there were comparable positions that the employer filled with other employees being repatriated.   The Court noted that the final straw which motivated her to sign the agreement was learning that a position she had desired was filled with another co-worker.  She had suspected for a while that her former supervisor was blocking her from being rehired.

Simply put, while  . . .  human resources department may have overstated the company’s financial difficulties, the record shows that [she] signed the contract with her eyes wide open. [She] knew there were no positions available for her, but that such positions were available to others. The key inquiry here is whether [her] release of claims was knowing and voluntary, and she voluntarily signed the agreement with full knowledge. The totality-of-the-circumstances factor favors [the employer].

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.