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Showing posts sorted by date for query offer of judgment. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Tuesday, June 21, 2022

Court Rejects Claims for Unpaid Commissions When Details Were Never Agreed

Last month, the Montgomery County Court of Appeals affirmed an employer’s summary judgment on a claim for unpaid sales commissions.  Brown v. Fukuvi USA Inc., 2022-Ohio-1608.  The plaintiff alleged that he had been verbally promised sales commissions before accepting the job in 2006.  His offer letter – which he signed -- said that a commission structure would be discussed later,  and it was.  However, they could never come to an agreement on a salary and commission structure.  Instead, the employer kept his salary in place and eventually raised it several times before he finally sued in 2019.  The courts found that there was never a meeting of the minds or agreement on the details of a commission structure and, therefore, the employer was not obligated to pay any commissions. 

To be enforceable, contracts must be definite and certain.  An agreement to agree is only enforceable if it is sufficiently definite to be enforced. “When the terms of a contract are not sufficiently definite, the contract is unenforceable.  . . . ‘The terms of a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.’ ””  The plaintiff’s offer letter offered a salary until 2007 and then a reduced salary with a commission – the details of which were to be discussed.  The details were never mutually agreed to and his salary remained unchanged.   “[N]o specific amount of commission or bonus was outlined. Furthermore, details were to be discussed at some future date, with no indication of what those details would be.”

The plaintiff

contends that he was told when he signed the Offer Letter that “his commission structure would operate in the same manner as the prior sale representative, which was a percentage on sales over an initial threshold or goal.”  . . . However, taking this statement at face value, it was made by a [HR] person who lacked authority to authorize payment of commissions; it was also inconsistent with the letter, which said that details would be discussed later. When “later” came, [the company president] elected not to pay commissions due to the severe financial position of the company, and this was communicated to [him]. At that point, if [he] were dissatisfied with the situation, he could have left the company. Instead, he chose to stay. Notably, his salary was not decreased to the considerably lower level mentioned in the Offer Letter.

“Here, the parties may have envisioned a commission and bonus structure, but the details were left to future discussion. Consequently, there was no enforceable promise.”

The court refused to find enforceable details from a commission policy document which the plaintiff had found in his predecessor’s files and which he claims had been referenced during his employment discussions.  The court refused to incorporate them into the offer letter without more evidence.  There was no evidence that the company had provided the policy to the plaintiff during their negotiations or were part of or intended to be part of his offer letter.  The document did not even indicate who prepared it.

The Court also rejected his claims for promissory estoppel, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations and unjust enrichment on the grounds that they were time barred by the then six-year (and now four-year) statute of limitations.  It rejected his argument that the failure to pay commissions constituted a continuing violation because (1) the Supreme Court of Ohio had taken the position that courts are reluctant to apply this doctrine outside the civil rights context; (2) “continuing violations are distinguished from ‘continuing effects of prior violations’; in this context, ‘ “ ‘ “[a] continuing violation is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not continual ill effects from an original violation” ’ ” ’ ”; and (3) the lack of authority in Ohio extending this doctrine to breach of contract cases.

The  Court also rejected his equitable estoppel claim because none of his allegations were sufficient to show that the company prevented him from filing suit earlier.   Indeed, a person of reasonable intelligence would have been on notice years earlier of his need to file suit. 

Finally, the plaintiff could not show that he had not been paid his wages under Ohio’s prompt payment act because there was no underlying obligation to pay him commissions.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, March 29, 2022

Franklin County Court Affirms Claim of Denial of Reasonable Accommodation and Constructive Discharge

 Last month, the Franklin County Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court judgment in favor of a plaintiff who alleged disability discrimination and failure to accommodate.  Coomer v. Opportunities for Ohioans with Disabilities, 2022-Ohio-387.    The plaintiff had requested to return to her former work schedule in order to control her late afternoon anxiety.  Although the employer conceded that this was not a burdensome request, it denied it on the grounds that it was unpersuaded that the schedule change was necessary prior to exploring alternatives and because of her recent inadequate productivity.   The trial and appellate courts found that changing her work schedule was necessary to control her anxiety and that the employer had constructively discharged her by denying the accommodation.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff suffered from an anxiety disorder, but worked successfully for approximately seven years before requesting to delay her work schedule by an hour due to childcare obligations.  However, her anxiety worsened in the afternoons, slowing her productivity, so she took FMLA leave and requested to return to her former work schedule so that she could finish by 3:30.  While her supervisor approved the request, his manager denied it due to her recent performance issues.  The employer’s “core” work hours were 8 to 5, but management had discretion to change shifts by an hour earlier or later.   The following month, the plaintiff submitted a supportive note from her nurse and her physician answered the questions of the employer’s ADA coordinator.  The Coordinator and the Assistant HR Director denied the plaintiff’s request to return to her former schedule so that she could finish an hour earlier on the grounds that the information provided did not demonstrate a need to leave work earlier. While there was no dispute that she had a disability, leaving early was not deemed necessary and other actions were suggested to lessen her anxiety.  While these alternatives were discussed with (and rejected by) the plaintiff, no alternatives were submitted to her physician.    She ultimately received STD and then LTD. 

The employer argued that the plaintiff was responsible for a breakdown in the interactive process by refusing to discuss or explore the proposed alternatives – changing her lunchtime or listening to music --  with her physician or providing additional evidence.  The trial court “implicitly” rejected this argument by finding that the plaintiff was incapable of working past 3:30 p.m., making her proposed accommodation necessary.   Without acknowledging the weight of authority that an employee is only entitled to a necessary accommodation, not necessarily a preferred accommodation, the court of appeals concluded that “further discussions between Coomer and OOD concerning the request reasonably could be viewed as either unnecessary or futile after the denial.”

The court also rejected the employer’s argument that it had not constructively discharge her. Contending that only a “complete failure” to accommodate or offer reasonable alternatives can constitute a constructive discharge, the employer asserted that it was still engaging in the interactive process when the plaintiff left work, but the court found that the plaintiff could still prove a constructive discharge from the denial of a necessary accommodation.

The court also rejected the employer’s argument that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  The employer offered no expert testimony to refute the plaintiff’s physician about her need to leave work at 3:30 (without utilizing FMLA leave) or her ability to return to a full-time schedule if accommodated.   The Court found it irrelevant that the plaintiff conceded that she was capable of working past 3:30 on some days because she typically became too anxious to work productively after 3:30.   The Court also refused to discredit the treating professionals opinions merely because they relied on the plaintiff’s self-reporting of symptoms.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney. 

Friday, May 28, 2021

EEOC Updates Technical Assistance Guidance on COVID Returning to Work with Proof of Vaccination and Reasonable Accommodations.

 

This morning, the EEOC finally updated its Technical Assistance Guidance for the first time since December to address the new CDC guidelines about masking and vaccinations.  Happily, it is consistent with the prior guidance from December.  It also provides examples of how to reasonably accommodate those unvaccinated employees under the ADA and Title VII.  Employers may require proof of vaccination, should be prepared to reasonably accommodate employees who cannot get vaccinated (by permitting them, for instance, to wear masks, social distance, telework, relocate work space, etc.) and can provide incentives to employees who get vaccinated as long as the employer remembers that an employee’s vaccination status remains confidential under the ADA.   In short, the EEOC’s press release explained the following key points:

·        Federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19, so long as employers comply with the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other EEO considerations.  Other laws, not in EEOC’s jurisdiction, may place additional restrictions on employers.  From an EEO perspective, employers should keep in mind that because some individuals or demographic groups may face greater barriers to receiving a COVID-19 vaccination than others, some employees may be more likely to be negatively impacted by a vaccination requirement.

·        Federal EEO laws do not prevent or limit employers from offering incentives to employees to voluntarily provide documentation or other confirmation of vaccination obtained from a third party (not the employer) in the community, such as a pharmacy, personal health care provider, or public clinic. If employers choose to obtain vaccination information from their employees, employers must keep vaccination information confidential pursuant to the ADA.

·        Employers that are administering vaccines to their employees may offer incentives for employees to be vaccinated, as long as the incentives are not coercive. Because vaccinations require employees to answer pre-vaccination disability-related screening questions, a very large incentive could make employees feel pressured to disclose protected medical information.

·        Employers may provide employees and their family members with information to educate them about COVID-19 vaccines and raise awareness about the benefits of vaccination. The technical assistance highlights federal government resources available to those seeking more information about how to get vaccinated.

 

The updated Q&As on the vaccine and return to work protocols are as follows:

COVID-19 Vaccinations:  EEO Overview

K.1.   Under the ADA, Title VII, and other federal employment nondiscrimination laws, may an employer require all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19?    (5/28/21)

The federal EEO laws do not prevent an employer from requiring all employees physically entering the workplace to be vaccinated for COVID-19, subject to the reasonable accommodation provisions of Title VII and the ADA and other EEO considerations discussed below.  These principles apply if an employee gets the vaccine in the community or from the employer.   

In some circumstances, Title VII and the ADA require an employer to provide reasonable accommodations for employees who, because of a disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance, do not get vaccinated for COVID-19, unless providing an accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.  The analysis for undue hardship depends on whether the accommodation is for a disability (including pregnancy-related conditions that constitute a disability) (see K.6) or for religion (see K.12). 

As with any employment policy, employers that have a vaccine requirement may need to respond to allegations that the requirement has a disparate impact on—or disproportionately excludes—employees based on their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin under Title VII (or age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (40+)).  Employers should keep in mind that because some individuals or demographic groups may face greater barriers to receiving a COVID-19 vaccination than others, some employees may be more likely to be negatively impacted by a vaccination requirement.

It would also be unlawful to apply a vaccination requirement to employees in a way that treats employees differently based on disability, race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation and gender identity), national origin, age, or genetic information, unless there is a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

K.2.   What are some examples of reasonable accommodations or modifications that employers may have to provide to employees who do not get vaccinated due to disability; religious beliefs, practices, or observance; or pregnancy?  (5/28/21)

An employee who does not get vaccinated due to a disability (covered by the ADA) or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance (covered by Title VII) may be entitled to a reasonable accommodation that does not pose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business.  For example, as a reasonable accommodation, an unvaccinated employee entering the workplace might wear a face mask, work at a social distance from coworkers or non-employees, work a modified shift, get periodic tests for COVID-19, be given the opportunity to telework, or finally, accept a reassignment. 

Employees who are not vaccinated because of pregnancy may be entitled (under Title VII) to adjustments to keep working, if the employer makes modifications or exceptions for other employees.  These modifications may be the same as the accommodations made for an employee based on disability or religion.

K.3.  How can employers encourage employees and their family members to be vaccinated without violating the EEO laws, especially the ADA and GINA? (5/28/21)

Employers may provide employees and their family members with information to educate them about COVID-19 vaccines, raise awareness about the benefits of vaccination, and address common questions and concerns.  Also, under certain circumstances employers may offer incentives to employees who receive COVID-19 vaccines, as discussed in K.16 – K. 21.  As of May 2021, the federal government is providing vaccines at no cost to everyone ages 12 and older.

There are many resources available to employees seeking more information about how to get vaccinated:

·        The federal government’s online vaccines.gov site can identify vaccination sites anywhere in the country (or https://www.vacunas.gov for Spanish).  Individuals also can text their zip code to “GETVAX” (438829) – or “VACUNA” (822862) for Spanish – to find three vaccination locations near them.

·        CDC’s website offers a link to a listing of local health departments, which can provide more information about local vaccination efforts.

·        In addition, the CDC offers background information for employers about workplace vaccination programs. The CDC provides a complete communication “tool kit” for employers to use with their workforce to educate people about getting the COVID-19 vaccine.  (Although originally written for essential workers, it is useful for all workers.)   See CDC’s Essential Workers COVID-19 Toolkit.  Employers should provide the contact information of a management representative for employees who need to request a reasonable accommodation for a disability or religious belief, practice, or observance or to ensure nondiscrimination for an employee who is pregnant.

·        Some employees may not have reliable access to the internet to identify nearby vaccination locations or may speak no or limited English and find it difficult to make an appointment for a vaccine over the phone. The CDC operates a toll-free telephone line that can provide assistance in many languages for individuals seeking more information about vaccinations: 800-232-4636; TTY 888-232-6348. 

·        Some employees also may require assistance with transportation to vaccination sites. Employers may gather and disseminate information to their employees on low-cost and no-cost transportation resources available in their community serving vaccination sites and offer time-off for vaccination, particularly if transportation is not readily available outside regular work hours.

General

K.4.  Is information about an employee’s COVID-19 vaccination confidential medical information under the ADA?  (5/28/21)

Yes.  The ADA requires an employer to maintain the confidentiality of employee medical information, such as documentation or other confirmation of COVID-19 vaccination.  This ADA confidentiality requirement applies regardless of where the employee gets the vaccination.  Although the EEO laws themselves do not prevent employers from requiring employees to bring in documentation or other confirmation of vaccination, this information, like all medical information, must be kept confidential and stored separately from the employee’s personnel files under the ADA.

Mandatory Employer Vaccination Programs

K.5.  Under the ADA, may an employer require a COVID-19 vaccination for all employees entering the workplace, even though it knows that some employees may not get a vaccine because of a disability? (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

Yes, provided certain requirements are met.  Under the ADA, an employer may require all employees to meet a qualification standard that is job-related and consistent with business necessity, such as a safety-related standard requiring COVID-19 vaccination.  However, if a  particular employee cannot meet such a safety-related qualification standard because of a disability, the employer may not require compliance for that employee unless it can demonstrate that the individual would pose a “direct threat” to the health or safety of the employee or others in the workplace.  A “direct threat” is a “significant risk of substantial harm” that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.  29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r).  This determination can be broken down into two steps: determining if there is a direct threat and, if there is, assessing whether a reasonable accommodation would reduce or eliminate the threat.

To determine if an employee who is not vaccinated due to a disability poses a “direct threat” in the workplace, an employer first must make an individualized assessment of the employee’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.  The factors that make up this assessment are: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential harm.  The determination that a particular employee poses a direct threat should be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge about COVID-19.  Such medical knowledge may include, for example, the level of community spread at the time of the assessment.   Statements from the CDC provide an important source of current medical knowledge about COVID-19, and the employee’s health care provider, with the employee’s consent, also may provide useful information about the employee.   Additionally, the assessment of direct threat should take account of the type of work environment, such as: whether the employee works alone or with others or works inside or outside; the available ventilation; the frequency and duration of direct interaction the employee typically will have with other employees and/or non-employees; the number of partially or fully vaccinated individuals already in the workplace; whether other employees are wearing masks or undergoing routine screening testing; and the space available for social distancing.

If the assessment demonstrates that an employee with a disability who is not vaccinated would pose a direct threat to self or others, the employer must consider whether providing a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, would reduce or eliminate that threat.  Potential reasonable accommodations could include requiring the employee to wear a mask, work a staggered shift, making changes in the work environment (such as improving ventilation systems or limiting contact with other employees and non-employees ), permitting telework if feasible, or reassigning the employee to a vacant position in a different workspace. 

As a best practice, an employer introducing a COVID-19 vaccination policy and requiring documentation or other confirmation of vaccination should notify all employees that the employer will consider requests for reasonable accommodation based on disability on an individualized basis.  (See also K.12 recommending the same best practice for religious accommodations.)

K.6. Under the ADA, if an employer requires COVID-19 vaccinations for employees physically entering the workplace, how should an employee who does not get a COVID-19 vaccination because of a disability inform the employer, and what should the employer do?   (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

An employee with a disability who does not get vaccinated for COVID-19 because of a disability must let the employer know that he or she needs an exemption from the requirement or a change at work, known as a reasonable accommodation.  To request an accommodation, an individual does not need to mention the ADA or use the phrase “reasonable accommodation.” 

Managers and supervisors responsible for communicating with employees about compliance with the employer’s vaccination requirement should know how to recognize an accommodation request from an employee with a disability and know to whom to refer the request for full consideration. As a best practice, before instituting a mandatory vaccination policy, employers should provide managers, supervisors, and those responsible for implementing the policy with clear information about how to handle accommodation requests related to the policy.

Employers and employees typically engage in a flexible, interactive process to identify workplace accommodation options that do not impose an undue hardship (significant difficulty or expense) on the employer.  This process may include determining whether it is necessary to obtain supporting medical documentation about the employee’s disability.

In discussing accommodation requests, employers and employees may find it helpful to consult the Job Accommodation Network (JAN) website as a resource for different types of accommodations.  JAN’s materials about COVID-19 are available at https://askjan.org/topics/COVID-19.cfm.  Employers also may consult applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) COVID-specific resources.  Even if there is no reasonable accommodation that will allow the unvaccinated employee to be physically present to perform his or her current job without posing a direct threat, the employer must consider if telework is an option for that particular job as an accommodation and, as a last resort, whether reassignment to another position is possible. 

The ADA requires that employers offer an available accommodation if one exists that does not pose an undue hardship, meaning a significant difficulty or expense. See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(p).  Employers are advised to consider all the options before denying an accommodation request.  The proportion of employees in the workplace who already are partially or fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and the extent of employee contact with non-employees, who may be ineligible for a vaccination or whose vaccination status may be unknown, can impact the ADA undue hardship consideration.  Employers may rely on CDC recommendations when deciding whether an effective accommodation is available that would not pose an undue hardship.

Under the ADA, it is unlawful for an employer to disclose that an employee is receiving a reasonable accommodation or to retaliate against an employee for requesting an accommodation.

K.7.  If an employer requires employees to get a COVID-19 vaccination from the employer or its agent, do the ADA’s restrictions on an employer making disability-related inquiries or medical examinations of its employees apply to any part of the vaccination process? (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

Yes. The ADA’s restrictions apply to the screening questions that must be asked immediately prior to administering the vaccine if the vaccine is administered by the employer or its agent.  An employer’s agent is an individual or entity having the authority to act on behalf of, or at the direction of, the employer.  

The ADA generally restricts when employers may require medical examinations (procedures or tests that seek information about an individual’s physical or mental impairments or health) or make disability-related inquiries (questions that are likely to elicit information about an individual’s disability).  The act of administering the vaccine is not a “medical examination” under the ADA because it does not seek information about the employee’s physical or mental health.  

However, because the pre-vaccination screening questions are likely to elicit information about a disability, the ADA requires that they must be “job related and consistent with business necessity” when an employer or its agent administers the COVID-19 vaccine.  To meet this standard, an employer would need to have a reasonable belief, based on objective evidence, that an employee who does not answer the questions and, therefore, cannot be vaccinated, will pose a direct threat to the employee’s own health or safety or to the health and safety of others in the workplace.  (See general discussion in Question K.5.)  Therefore, when an employer requires that employees be vaccinated by the employer or its agent, the employer should be aware that an employee may challenge the mandatory pre-vaccination inquiries, and an employer would have to justify them under the ADA.

The ADA also requires employers to keep any employee medical information obtained in the course of an employer vaccination program confidential.

Voluntary Employer Vaccination Programs

K.8.  Under the ADA, are there circumstances in which an employer or its agent may ask disability-related screening questions before administering a COVID-19 vaccine without needing to satisfy the “job-related and consistent with business necessity” standard?  (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

Yes.  If the employer offers to vaccinate its employees on a voluntary basis, meaning that employees can choose whether or not to get the COVID-19 vaccine from the employer or its agent, the employer does not have to show that the pre-vaccination screening questions are job-related and consistent with business necessity.  However, the employee’s decision to answer the questions must be voluntary.  (See also Questions K.16 – 17.)  The ADA prohibits taking an adverse action against an employee, including harassing the employee, for refusing to participate in a voluntary employer-administered vaccination program.  An employer also must keep any medical information it obtains from any voluntary vaccination program confidential. 

K.9.  Under the ADA, is it a “disability-related inquiry” for an employer to inquire about or request documentation or other confirmation that an employee obtained the COVID-19 vaccine from a third party in the community, such as a pharmacy, personal health care provider, or public clinic?   (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

No.  When an employer asks employees whether they obtained a COVID-19 vaccine from a third party in the community, such as a pharmacy, personal health care provider, or public clinic, the employer is not asking a question that is likely to disclose the existence of a disability; there are many reasons an employee may not show documentation or other confirmation of vaccination in the community besides having a disability.  Therefore, requesting documentation or other confirmation of vaccination by a third party in the community is not a disability-related inquiry under the ADA, and the ADA’s rules about such inquiries do not apply.

However, documentation or other confirmation of vaccination provided by the employee to the employer is medical information about the employee and must be kept confidential.

K.10.  May an employer offer voluntary vaccinations only to certain groups of employees?  (5/28/21)

If an employer or its agent offers voluntary vaccinations to employees, the employer must comply with federal employment nondiscrimination laws.  For example, not offering voluntary vaccinations to certain employees based on national origin or another protected basis under the EEO laws would not be permissible.   

K.11. What should an employer do if an employee who is fully vaccinated for COVID-19 requests accommodation for an underlying disability because of a continuing concern that he or she faces a heightened risk of severe illness from a COVID-19 infection, despite being vaccinated? (5/28/21)

Employers who receive a reasonable accommodation request from an employee should process the request in accordance with applicable ADA standards. 

When an employee asks for a reasonable accommodation, whether the employee is fully vaccinated or not, the employer should engage in an interactive process to determine if there is a disability-related need for reasonable accommodation.  This process typically includes seeking information from the employee's health care provider with the employee’s consent explaining why an accommodation is needed. 

For example, some individuals who are immunocompromised might still need reasonable accommodations because their conditions may mean that the vaccines may not offer them the same measure of protection as other vaccinated individuals.  If there is a disability-related need for accommodation, an employer must explore potential reasonable accommodations that may be provided absent undue hardship.

Title VII and COVID-19 Vaccinations

K.12.  Under Title VII, how should an employer respond to an employee who communicates that he or she is unable to be vaccinated for COVID-19 (or provide documentation or other confirmation of vaccination) because of a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance? (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

Once an employer is on notice that an employee’s sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance prevents the employee from getting a COVID-19 vaccine, the employer must provide a reasonable accommodation unless it would pose an undue hardship.  Employers also may receive religious accommodation requests from individuals who wish to wait until an alternative version or specific brand of COVID-19 vaccine is available to the employee.  Such requests should be processed according to the same standards that apply to other accommodation requests.

EEOC guidance explains that the definition of religion is broad and protects beliefs, practices, and observances with which the employer may be unfamiliar.  Therefore, the employer should ordinarily assume that an employee’s request for religious accommodation is based on a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.  However, if an employee requests a religious accommodation, and an employer is aware of facts that provide an objective basis for questioning either the religious nature or the sincerity of a particular belief, practice, or observance, the employer would be justified in requesting additional supporting information. See also 29 CFR 1605.

Under Title VII, an employer should thoroughly consider all possible reasonable accommodations, including telework and reassignment.  For suggestions about types of reasonable accommodation for unvaccinated employees, see question and answer K.6., above.  In many circumstances, it may be possible to accommodate those seeking reasonable accommodations for their religious beliefs, practices, or observances.

Under Title VII, courts define “undue hardship” as having more than minimal cost or burden on the employer.  This is an easier standard for employers to meet than the ADA’s undue hardship standard, which applies to requests for accommodations due to a disability.  Considerations relevant to undue hardship can include, among other things, the proportion of employees in the workplace who already are partially or fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and the extent of employee contact with non-employees, whose vaccination status could be unknown or who may be ineligible for the vaccine.  Ultimately, if an employee cannot be accommodated, employers should determine if any other rights apply under the EEO laws or other federal, state, and local authorities before taking adverse employment action against an unvaccinated employee

K.13.  Under Title VII, what should an employer do if an employee chooses not to receive a COVID-19 vaccination due to pregnancy?   (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

Under Title VII, some employees may seek job adjustments or may request exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination requirement due to pregnancy. 

If an employee seeks an exemption from a vaccine requirement due to pregnancy, the employer must ensure that the employee is not being discriminated against compared to other employees similar in their ability or inability to work.  This means that a pregnant employee may be entitled to job modifications, including telework, changes to work schedules or assignments, and leave to the extent such modifications are provided for other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work. Employers should ensure that supervisors, managers, and human resources personnel know how to handle such requests to avoid disparate treatment in violation of Title VII

 

GINA And COVID-19 Vaccinations

Title II of GINA prohibits covered employers from using the genetic information of employees to make employment decisions.  It also restricts employers from requesting, requiring, purchasing, or disclosing genetic information of employees. Under Title II of GINA, genetic information includes information about the manifestation of disease or disorder in a family member (which is referred to as “family medical history”) and information from genetic tests of the individual employee or a family member, among other things. 

K.14.  Is Title II of GINA implicated if an employer requires an employee to receive a COVID-19 vaccine administered by the employer or its agent? (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

No.  Requiring an employee to receive a COVID-19 vaccination administered by the employer or its agent would not implicate Title II of GINA unless the pre-vaccination medical screening questions include questions about the employee’s genetic information, such as asking about the employee’s family medical history.   As of May 27, 2021, the pre-vaccination medical screening questions for the first three COVID-19 vaccines to receive Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) from the FDA do not seek family medical history or any other type of genetic information.  See CDC’s Pre-vaccination Checklist (last visited May 27, 2021).  Therefore, an employer or its agent may ask these questions without violating Title II of GINA.

The act of administering a COVID-19 vaccine does not involve the use of the employee’s genetic information to make employment decisions or the acquisition or disclosure of genetic information and, therefore, does not implicate Title II of GINA.

K.15.  Is Title II of GINA implicated when an employer requires employees to provide documentation or other confirmation that they received a vaccination from a doctor, pharmacy, health agency, or another health care provider in the community? (12/16/20, updated 5/28/21)

No.  An employer requiring an employee to show documentation or other confirmation of vaccination from a doctor, pharmacy, or other third party is not using, acquiring, or disclosing genetic information and, therefore, is not implicating Title II of GINA.  This is the case even if the medical screening questions that must be asked before vaccination include questions about genetic information, because documentation or other confirmation of vaccination would not reveal genetic information.  Title II of GINA does not prohibit an employee’s own health care provider from asking questions about genetic information. This GINA Title II prohibition only applies to the employer or its agent. 

Employer Incentives For COVID-19 Voluntary Vaccinations Under ADA and GINA

ADA:  Employer Incentives for Voluntary COVID-19 Vaccinations

K.16.  Under the ADA, may an employer offer an incentive to employees to voluntarily provide documentation or other confirmation that they received a vaccination on their own from a pharmacy, public health department, or other health care provider in the community?  (5/28/21)

Yes.  Requesting documentation or other confirmation showing that an employee received a COVID-19 vaccination in the community is not a disability-related inquiry covered by the ADA.  Therefore, an employer may offer an incentive to employees to voluntarily provide documentation or other confirmation of a vaccination received in the community.  As noted elsewhere, the employer is required to keep vaccination information confidential pursuant to the ADA.

K.17.  Under the ADA, may an employer offer an incentive to employees for voluntarily receiving a vaccination administered by the employer or its agent?  (5/28/21)

Yes, if any incentive (which includes both rewards and penalties) is not so substantial as to be coercive.  Because vaccinations require employees to answer pre-vaccination disability-related screening questions, a very large incentive could make employees feel pressured to disclose protected medical information. As explained in K.16., however, this incentive limitation does not apply if an employer offers an incentive to employees to voluntarily provide documentation or other confirmation that they received a COVID-19 vaccination on their own from a third-party provider that is not their employer or an agent of their employer.

GINA:  Employer Incentives for Voluntary COVID-19 Vaccinations

K.18.  Under GINA, may an employer offer an incentive to employees to provide documentation or other confirmation that they or their family members received a vaccination from their own health care provider, such as a doctor, pharmacy, health agency, or another health care provider in the community? (5/28/21)

Yes.  Under GINA, an employer may offer an incentive to employees to provide documentation or other confirmation from a third party not acting on the employer’s behalf, such as a pharmacy or health department, that employees or their family members have been vaccinated.  If employers ask an employee to show documentation or other confirmation that the employee or a family member has been vaccinated, it is not an unlawful request for genetic information under GINA because the fact that someone received a vaccination is not information about the manifestation of a disease or disorder in a family member (known as family medical history under GINA), nor is it any other form of genetic information. GINA’s restrictions on employers acquiring genetic information (including those prohibiting incentives in exchange for genetic information), therefore, do not apply. 

K.19.  Under GINA, may an employer offer an incentive to employees in exchange for the employee getting vaccinated by the employer or its agent? (5/28/21)

Yes.  Under GINA, as long as an employer does not acquire genetic information while administering the vaccines, employers may offer incentives to employees for getting vaccinated.  Because the pre-vaccination medical screening questions for the three COVID-19 vaccines now available do not inquire about genetic information, employers may offer incentives to their employees for getting vaccinated.  See K.14 for more about GINA and pre-vaccination medical screening questions.

K.20. Under GINA, may an employer offer an incentive to an employee in return for an employee’s family member getting vaccinated by the employer or its agent? (5/28/21)

No.  Under GINA’s Title II health and genetic services provision, an employer may not offer any incentives to an employee in exchange for a family member’s receipt of a vaccination from an employer or its agent.   Providing such an incentive to an employee because a family member was vaccinated by the employer or its agent would require the vaccinator to ask the family member the pre-vaccination medical screening questions, which include medical questions about the family member.  Asking these medical questions would lead to the employer’s receipt of genetic information in the form of family medical history of the employee.  The regulations implementing Title II of GINA prohibit employers from providing incentives in exchange for genetic information.  Therefore, the employer may not offer incentives in exchange for the family member getting vaccinated.  However, employers may still offer an employee’s family member the opportunity to be vaccinated by the employer or its agent, if they take certain steps to ensure GINA compliance. 

K.21. Under GINA, may an employer offer an employee’s family member an opportunity to be vaccinated without offering the employee an incentive? (5/28/21)

Yes.  GINA permits an employer to offer vaccinations to an employee’s family members if it takes certain steps to comply with GINA.  Employers must not require employees to have their family members get vaccinated and must not penalize employees if their family members decide not to get vaccinated.  Employers must also ensure that all medical information obtained from family members during the screening process is only used for the purpose of providing the vaccination, is kept confidential, and is not provided to any managers, supervisors, or others who make employment decisions for the employees.  In addition, employers need to ensure that they obtain prior, knowing, voluntary, and written authorization from the family member before the family member is asked any questions about his or her medical conditions.  If these requirements are met, GINA permits the collection of genetic information.

 

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

 

Tuesday, February 23, 2021

Rush to Termination and Sloppy Documentation Cost Employer a Summary Judgment in an ADA Case

 

Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit reversed a summary judgment granted to an employer in an ADA lawsuit brought by the EEOC.  EEOC v. West Meade Place LLP, No. 19-6469 (6th Cir. 2-8-21).  The employee suffered from anxiety attacks six months after being hired when new co-workers were rude to her and she requested intermittent FMLA leave.  After informing the plaintiff that she was not eligible for FMLA leave and that any leave would be unpaid, her manager told her that she would be terminated if she was unable to work, but that she could not return to work without a medical release.  The Court found that there were disputed facts and credibility issues as to whether the employee’s termination two days later was based on the manager’s perception that the plaintiff was disabled.  “[T]he ADA requires only that there was a perceived impairment, not necessarily that the employer perceived the disability to limit a major life activity.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the Nashville employer requested a voluntary medical history related to her ability to work from the plaintiff three days after she started work (instead of between her conditional job offer and start date).  She reported taking prescription drugs for anxiety.  When her new co-workers became rude to her, she reported their misconduct and called off work or leave early because of panic attacks.  She then sought FMLA leave.  The doctor’s statement indicated that she would need it for a few days a few times each year because of the panic attacks, but her managers reported that she insisted that she was entitled to twelve consecutive weeks with pay.   After being denied paid FMLA leave, the plaintiff sought to return to work immediately, but was told that she would need a medical release.

There are then three different versions of what transpired.  The plaintiff alleged that she told her doctor that she required a medical release or she would be terminated the next day.  The medical office called the employer and indicated that it was told the next day that she needed to be reassessed and then released to return without any medical restrictions or emotional distress.   In particular, the manager could not understand why she could require FMLA one day and then the next was ok to return to work.  The plaintiff was fired later that day for not being able to perform her job duties.

According to the manager, the plaintiff had initially shown her a note indicating that she needed to be off work for 12 weeks.  After FMLA leave was denied and she was told that she required a medical release to return to work, the plaintiff brought such a release the next day (which then disappeared from her personnel file).  When the employer called the physician to confirm, it learned that the doctor had not released the plaintiff to return to work and did not intend to do so.   The doctor also claimed to be operating a pain clinic.   The manager completed paperwork indicating that the plaintiff was terminated for being unable to work (so that she would get unemployment), but claims that she told other managers about the falsification of the medical release.  Nothing about the document falsification was relayed to the EEOC when the plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination.

The termination documents indicated that the plaintiff was unable to perform her job duties.  However, they also indicated that the plaintiff had relied on a physician in Indiana where her sister worked (which the plaintiff disputed).   The notes indicated that the physician’s office had refused to release the plaintiff to return to work without a reassessment.  When the manager relayed this to the plaintiff, she claimed to have called her physician’s office and obtained their consent for her to return to work.  She asked her manager to call a particular telephone number and ask for a particular person, who turned out to be the plaintiff’s sister.  (The plaintiff apparently admitted that she brought her sister into the discussion in order to better explain the plaintiff’s FMLA rights.). The manager then called the physician again to re-confirm that he would not release the plaintiff to return without a new evaluation.  After that, the manager lectured the plaintiff about falsifying medical releases.   When no release was provided, the employee was terminated. 

Remarkably, despite the FMLA request and reason for her termination, the employer argued that there was no evidence to show that it knew or perceived the plaintiff as disabled.   In particular, they point to the fact that the plaintiff stated that she wanted to immediately return to work as soon as she was informed that any leave of absence would be unpaid.  The Court had no difficulty finding that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that plaintiff may suffer a disability even if it was transitory.  (The employer apparently never raised the affirmative defense that any impairment was minor and transitory).   Notably, the medical office records reflect that the manager had specifically said that the medical release must state: “no emotional distress can happen.”  Also, it was disputed whether the plaintiff was motivated to return by the unpaid leave or by the undisputed denial of FMLA leave.  Thus, it was factually possible that the employer perceived her as disabled.   

Although—as West Meade argues—Jarvis may not have considered an anxiety disorder to constitute a disability, a “regarded as” claim under the ADA requires only that there was a perceived impairment, not necessarily that the employer perceived the disability to limit a major life activity. . . .

Additionally, as documented, Jarvis terminated Kean because Kean was “unable to do her job,” with no evidence that she was inhibited from doing her job by anything but her anxiety disorder. “To be sure . . . [the employer’s] knowledge of [Kean’s] medical issues—alone—is insufficient to carry the day,” . . . . but this perspective supports the EEOC’s argument not only that Jarvis was aware of Kean’s impairment, but also that Jarvis believed it would inhibit Kean from fully performing her job duties. This contradiction in Jarvis’s testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact.

The EEOC argued that the evidence showed that “but for” the employee’s admission of having an anxiety disorder and requesting an accommodation (i.e., a medical leave of absence), the employer would not have terminated her.  The employer relied on the evidence about the falsification of the medical release (i.e., either the missing note or the sneaky request to speak with the plaintiff’s sister). 

The Court indicated that the jury could interpret the conflicting evidence any number of ways and, therefore, only the jury could ultimately resolve whether the employer was motivated by the plaintiff’s anxiety or by the unusual events surrounding the plaintiff’s attempt to obtain a medical release in order to return to work.   

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Tuesday, October 13, 2020

Sixth Circuit Rejects First Amendment Retaliation Claim Based On Employee's Firing for Single Use of Racial Slur on Facebook

 Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial verdict of $25K which found that a Trump-supporting employee was unlawfully retaliated against in violation of the First Amendment when she had been fired for using racist slang a single time on a Facebook post on election night 2016 even though she had deleted the entire post the next day.   Bennett v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, No. 19-5818 (Oct. 6, 2020).  The Court found that the plaintiff’s use of the racist term in responding to the exact same language posted by a stranger was not constitutionally protected and justified her termination.  While her comment did reflect on a matter of public concern, it was not entitled to the highest level of protection as other comments might have been and was outweighed by the disruption created by her comment within her workplace and in the public’s trust of her department.  It was particularly problematic that her Facebook posts were public, that she identified her employer and department, that she failed to disclaim that her personal opinions were her own and not that of her employer, that she had direct contact with the public in her job, that she failed to consistently express remorse or accountability, and that many of her co-workers were deeply offended and upset by her use of the word.  The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s defense asserting that the City had caved to a single heckler’s veto.  While the decision was unanimous and there was a majority court opinion, each judge wrote a separate opinion explaining the outcome.

According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff employee stayed up until 3 a.m. on election night and posted an image of the electoral map when Trump had been declared the winner.  A stranger quickly posted a comment on her public page indicating that Trump had been elected by “rednecks” while “niggaz and latinos states vot[ed] for hillary.”  She responded using his same language, ““Thank god we have more America loving rednecks.  . . . Even niggaz and latinos voted for trump too!”  Several friends notified her the next morning that they were offended by her language and she deleted the entire post that afternoon.   In the meantime, the City’s HR Department, the union and the Mayor’s office received a few complaints about her Facebook comments.  One person  (allegedly a disgruntled former employee) who had viewed her post had then made screen shots of it and may have been sharing it on his Facebook page while accusing the City of being racist.   The City became especially concerned because the plaintiff had identified herself as both an employee of the City and its police department.   However, by the time they telephoned her to request that she remove the post, she had already done so.

When she met with the City before her shift the following morning, she initially showed no remorse or understanding of how inappropriate her comment had been.  She felt that she had simply made a sarcastic response to the initial comment and that objectors were not really all that offended.  When she realized that this was becoming a disciplinary issue, she offered to apologize to the offended employees, but objected to apologizing to the entire staff at roll call.  Accordingly, she was sent home on administrative leave pending further investigation.  The union reported increasing tension within the department where the plaintiff worked as a result of her Facebook comment.  The City also decided that diversity training in that department would be appropriate and to have a counsellor come in and speak with employees who were offended.

Following the investigation, the City

determined that [the plaintiff’s] conduct violated three policies of the Metropolitan Government Civil Service Commission: (1) her behavior “reflect[ed] discredit upon [her]self, the department, and/or the Metropolitan Government,” (2) her conduct was “unbecoming of an employee of the Metropolitan Government,” and (3) her Facebook profile disclosed that she was a Metro employee but failed to include a disclaimer that her “expressed views are [hers] alone and do not reflect the views of the Metropolitan Government.”

A letter was sent to the plaintiff explaining

that “[t]o advance the mission [of ECC], it is vitally important that all department employees conduct themselves in a manner free of bias, demonstrate unquestionable integrity, reliability and honesty,” and that “[t]he success of [the] agency can be measured by the perception and confidence the public has in the employees representing the agency.”

The City felt that

the charges were appropriate, first, because she felt that inclusion of a particularly offensive racial slur in a public social-media post was objectionable because it did not reflect Metro policy or the beliefs of people who worked there. Further, she thought such racially charged language would bring discredit to the office and testified that “the public that we serve is very diverse, and it’s my expectation that when someone calls[,] regardless of who they are or where they’re from, that they’re going to receive the appropriate service.” Donegan also concluded that Bennett’s behavior warranted discipline because of the disruption it caused: employees were upset at work, counselors needed to be involved, and stress levels increased for the agency as a whole.

At some point, the plaintiff took FMLA leave and was notified of her pre-disciplinary hearing upon her return and was placed back on administrative leave pending the hearing.  In the meantime, she had written a letter of apology expressing her embarrassment and humility, but she did not express any of those sentiments at the hearing, where she instead defended and explained her conduct. 

[S]he did not exhibit concern for her colleagues’ feelings, called them hypocrites, and indicated that she would not apologize because someone else took something the wrong way—indeed, she believed her colleagues should instead apologize to her.

Concerned with the lack of remorse, accountability or acknowledgement of poor judgment, the decision was made to terminate her employment in order to avoid a repeat of the incident and promote healing within her department.

The plaintiff sued under §1983 and the First Amendment retaliation claim was tried to a jury, which indicated in the jury interrogatories that it found that her Facebook post “was not reasonably likely to impair discipline by superiors at ECC, to interfere with the orderly operation of ECC, or to impede performance of” her duties.  However, the jury also found that her Facebook post was “reasonably likely to have a detrimental impact on close working relationships [within her department] and undermine the agency’s mission, that [the City] terminated Plaintiff ‘[f]or using the term ‘niggaz’ when expressing her views regarding the outcome of a national election on Facebook,’ and that doing so violated the three charges outlined in Bennett’s termination letter.”  Upon receiving these jury interrogatory responses, the trial court ruled that the balancing factors weighed in the plaintiff’s favor and the jury awarded her $25K in damages.

In reversing, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in balancing the factors in determining whether the plaintiff’s speech was constitutionally protected.

To establish a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a public employee must show that: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected speech or conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; [and] (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by his protected conduct.

In order to find that a government employee’s speech is constitutionally protected, a court must first determine whether the employee was speaking as a private citizen or public employee in the course of employment (which was not an issue in this case) and then,

determine whether the statement in question constitutes speech on a matter of public concern.   . . .  Then, if it does, we apply the Pickering balancing test to determine whether the Plaintiff’s “interest in commenting upon matters of public concern . . . outweigh[s] the interest of [Metro], as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”

The Court began its analysis by determining the degree of protection to give the plaintiff’s comments based on “the level of importance the speech has in the community” and its context.  The City conceded that the plaintiff’s comments were political in nature, but argued that her comments were not “purely political” and thus, not entitled to a heightened level of constitutional protection.  While the plaintiff asserted that her comments had been purely political, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she had been terminated in response for supporting Trump.  She had admittedly posted prior comments supporting Trump and suffered no adverse employment action.    Further, the jury had been given multiple choice options for answering the jury interrogatories and had not selected the option that she was terminated for expressing her opinion about the results of the election.  It also rejected the options about workplace disruptions or lack of accountability.   Instead, it selected the only option which quoted the language that she used on Facebook.

The Court reasoned that the First Amendment does not merely focus on the speaker’s interest, “but also with the public’s interest in receiving information.”  Her comments on a matter of public interest on which she had no special insight was not entitled to the same level of protection of, for instance, discussing the lawful operation of the city government.  Clearly, the public would be more interested in the latter than the former.

It is true that the speech in question was couched in terms of political debate, made in response to and repeating back the words of another person, and used a more casual version of an offensive slur.  Still, Bennett’s speech does not garner the high level of protection that the district court assigned to it, and the balancing test requires less of a showing of disruption and other factors than the district court would require.  . . . In any event, the evidence of disruption caused by the language in Bennett’s Facebook post was substantial.

We apply the Pickering test “‘to determine [whether] the employee’s free speech interests outweigh the efficiency interests of the government as employer.’”  . . . . The test considers “the manner, time, and place of the employee’s expression.” . . . . The “pertinent considerations” for the balancing test are “whether the statement [(a)] impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, [(b)] has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, [(c)] impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise,” id., or (d) undermines the mission of the employer.  . . . The consideration of the employee’s performance, impaired discipline by superiors, harmony among co-workers, and undermining of the office’s mission is “focuse[d] on the effective functioning of the public employer’s enterprise.”  . . .

Consideration of the first factor of the Pickering test, whether the speech impaired discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, weighs heavily in favor of Metro. The record makes clear that the harmony of the office was disrupted, and the district court erred in discounting the importance of harmonious relationships at ECC. Employees testified that Bennett’s post prompted a “nonstop conversation” in the office that lasted for days, and for as much as three weeks to a month after Bennett’s comment, there was a need for a counselor to address the office.

While nothing about the plaintiff’s comment impaired discipline among management, “it is possible that any inaction on [management’s] part in the face of Bennett’s derogatory speech could have been seen as an endorsement of the speech and impaired future discipline of similar derogatory statements.”

The Court also found that the second Pickering factor weighed heavily in favor of the City because the jury had found that the speech had a detrimental impact on the close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary.  Employees had expressed concern about whether they could work again harmoniously with the plaintiff in an already stressful environment.

“The third factor, whether Bennett’s speech “impede[d] the performance of the speaker’s duties or interfere[d] with the regular operation of the enterprise,” is a close call.”  The jury found that there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s ability to perform her duties would be impacted, but the Court noted that it was also possible that her damaged relationships with her colleagues could adversely affect her work and job performance.

Finally, Bennett’s comment detracted from the mission of ECC, weighing again in favor of” the City. “When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to an agency’s effective operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency’s effective operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain her.”  The jury concluded that her comments had undermined her department’s mission, but the trial court had discounted this finding in error.

Had Bennett’s profile been private, or had it not indicated that she worked for Metro, Metro’s argument for terminating Bennett would not be as strong. But the relevant Civil Service Rules support the idea that public perception is central to ECC’s mission. Bennett’s public comments discredited ECC because they displayed racial bias without a disclaimer that the views were hers alone. This court and several others “have recognized the interest of a governmental entity in preserving the appearance of impartiality.”

In rejecting the trial court’s weighting of this factor, the Court stated that “we consider the role and responsibilities of the employee and, when the role is public-facing, whether the danger to successful functioning of the office may increase.”

In Rankin, the employee was not in a public contact role, and thus, concerns about public perception were too attenuated to limit the free speech rights of the employee.  . . .. Here, however, Bennett was in a public-facing role and used the slur in a public forum from a profile that implicated not only Metro Government but also the Metro Police Department. This situation is exactly the type that Rankin warned could warrant a higher level of caution for public employees’ choice of words. Id. at 390 (stating that if the employee is in a “confidential, policymaking, or public contact role,” the danger to the agency’s successful functioning may be greater).

Second, the district court determined that because the record contained evidence of only one member of the public expressing concern, the fear of the post “going viral” was not a sufficiently substantial justification. But, although we have not addressed the issue directly, other circuits have held that a reasonable prediction that the public perception will impact the government’s operations is sufficient. . . . Grutzmacher acknowledges that speech on social media “amplifies the distribution of the speaker’s message.”  . . . . Although this situation, in some respects, “favors the employee’s free speech interests,” it also “increases the potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental disruption, thereby favoring the employer’s interest in efficiency.”

Third, the district court “view[ed] it as highly speculative that even if an African American were familiar with Plaintiff’s Facebook comment and was offended by it, such African American would be deterred from calling in an emergency.” The concern, however, was not that African Americans will no longer call for emergency service, but rather—as Metro explains— that “damaged public perception can lead to many ills” for an agency that serves the public directly. The Second Circuit has effectively captured the importance of public trust in such relationships:

The effectiveness of a city’s police department depends importantly on the respect and trust of the community and on the perception in the community that it enforces the law fairly, even-handedly, and without bias. If the police department treats a segment of the population . . . with contempt, so that the particular minority comes to regard the police as oppressor rather than protector, respect for law enforcement is eroded and the ability of the police to do its work in that community is impaired. Members of the minority will be less likely to report crimes, to offer testimony as witnesses, and to rely on the police for their protection. When the police make arrests in that community, its members are likely to assume that the arrests are a product of bias, rather than well-founded, protective law enforcement. And the department’s ability to recruit and train personnel from that community will be damaged. . . . .

The district court’s reference to Bennett’s use of “niggaz” as “the mere use of a single word” demonstrates its failure to acknowledge the centuries of history that make the use of the term more than just “a single word.” The use of the term “evok[es] a history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination.” . . . . It “may appear innocent or only mildly offensive to one who is not a member of the targeted group, but be intolerably abusive or threatening when understood from the perspective of a [person] who is a member of the targeted group.” Id. “The use of this word, even in jest, could be evidence of racial apathy.”

The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument about a “heckler’s veto” by giving a hostile mob control over determining what political speech is protected when, up to the time that she had been terminated, only one member of the public had complained about her Facebook post.   

A heckler’s veto involves burdening or punishing speech “simply because it might offend a hostile mob.”  . . . We have not addressed a heckler’s veto in this context, but the Ninth Circuit has held that those concerns are not applicable to the “wholly separate area of employee activities that affect the public’s view of a governmental agency in a negative fashion, and thereby, affect the agency’s mission.”  . . . The Second Circuit has taken a similar view, finding that “members of the African American . . . communities whose reaction . . . the defendants legitimately took into account . . . cannot properly be characterized as ‘outsiders seeking to heckle [the plaintiffs] into silence.’”  . . . Because effective emergency service “presupposes respect for the members of those communities,” such agencies are permitted to account for the possible reaction of the public when disciplining their employees. Id. The public—as the consumers of ECC’s services—and Bennett’s colleagues with whom she must work collaboratively can hardly be said to be “a hostile mob.”

Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the employer’s workplace investigation was superficial because she had the opportunity to present additional evidence and witnesses at her pre-disciplinary hearing.  “The question in this case is not whether members of the judiciary would have made the decision to terminate Bennett for using a racial slur in this instance. The question is whether Bennett’s language was sufficiently protected for the court to interfere in our proclivity for ‘affording government employers sufficient discretion to manage their operations.’”

Because Bennett’s speech does not occupy “the highest rung” of public concern, less of a showing of disruption is required.  Several factors weigh heavily in favor of Metro. Although there are factors weighing in favor of Bennett, sufficient disruption was shown to tip the Pickering balance towards Metro. Based on the above analysis and in light of the discretion we must grant leadership at Metro, its interest in maintaining an effective workplace with employee harmony that serves the public efficiently outweighs Bennett’s interest in incidentally using racially offensive language in a Facebook comment.

NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.

Thursday, June 11, 2020

EEOC Issues New Pandemic Guidance on ADA, Title VII and ADEA issues


This morning,  the EEOC updated its guidance on complying with the ADA and other employment laws during the pandemic and has even included FAQ about issues employers will encounter.   Here are the new FAQ added on this morning:



D.13.  Is an employee entitled to an accommodation under the ADA in order to avoid exposing a family member who is at higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19 due to an underlying medical condition? (6/11/20)

No.  Although the ADA prohibits discrimination based on association with an individual with a disability, that protection is limited to disparate treatment or harassment.  The ADA does not require that an employer accommodate an employee without a disability based on the disability-related needs of a family member or other person with whom she is associated. 

For example, an employee without a disability is not entitled under the ADA to telework as an accommodation in order to protect a family member with a disability from potential COVID-19 exposure. 

Of course, an employer is free to provide such flexibilities if it chooses to do so.  An employer choosing to offer additional flexibilities beyond what the law requires should be careful not to engage in disparate treatment on a protected EEO basis.

E.3.  How may employers respond to pandemic-related harassment, in particular against employees who are or are perceived to be Asian? (6/11/20)

Managers should be alert to demeaning, derogatory, or hostile remarks directed to employees who are or are perceived to be of Chinese or other Asian national origin, including about the coronavirus or its origins.

All employers covered by Title VII should ensure that management understands in advance how to recognize such harassment.  Harassment may occur using electronic communication tools – regardless of whether employees are in the workplace, teleworking, or on leave – and also in person between employees at the worksite.  Harassment of employees at the worksite may also originate with contractors, customers or clients, or, for example, with patients or their family members at health care facilities, assisted living facilities, and nursing homes.  Managers should know their legal obligations and be instructed to quickly identify and resolve potential problems, before they rise to the level of unlawful discrimination.

Employers may choose to send a reminder to the entire workforce noting Title VII’s prohibitions on harassment, reminding employees that harassment will not be tolerated, and inviting anyone who experiences or witnesses workplace harassment to report it to management.  Employers may remind employees that harassment can result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.

E.4.  An employer learns that an employee who is teleworking due to the pandemic is sending harassing emails to another worker.  What actions should the employer take? (6/11/20)

The employer should take the same actions it would take if the employee was in the workplace.  Employees may not harass other employees through, for example, emails, calls, or platforms for video or chat communication and collaboration. 

G.6.  As a best practice, and in advance of having some or all employees return to the workplace, are there ways for an employer to invite employees to request flexibility in work arrangements? (6/11/20)

Yes.  The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act permit employers to make information available in advance to all employees about who to contact – if they wish – to request accommodation for a disability that they may need upon return to the workplace, even if no date has been announced for their return.  If requests are received in advance, the employer may begin the interactive process. An employer may choose to include in such a notice all the CDC-listed medical conditions that may place people at higher risk of serious illness if they contract COVID-19, provide instructions about who to contact, and explain that the employer is willing to consider on a case-by-case basis any requests from employees who have these or other medical conditions. 

An employer also may send a general notice to all employees who are designated for returning to the workplace, noting that the employer is willing to consider requests for accommodation or flexibilities on an individualized basis. The employer should specify if the contacts differ depending on the reason for the request – for example, if the office or person to contact is different for employees with disabilities or pregnant workers than for employees whose request is based on age or child-care responsibilities.

Either approach is consistent with the ADEA, the ADA, and the May 29, 2020 CDC guidance that emphasizes the importance of employers providing accommodations or flexibilities to employees who, due to age or certain medical conditions, are at higher risk for severe illness.

Regardless of the approach, however, employers should ensure that whoever receives inquiries knows how to handle them consistent with the different federal employment nondiscrimination laws that may apply, for instance, with respect to accommodations due to a medical condition, a religious belief, or pregnancy.

G.7.  What should an employer do if an employee entering the worksite requests an alternative method of screening due to a medical condition? (6/11/20)

This is a request for reasonable accommodation, and an employer should proceed as it would for any other request for accommodation under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.  If the requested change is easy to provide and inexpensive, the employer might voluntarily choose to make it available to anyone who asks, without going through an interactive process. Alternatively, if the disability is not obvious or already known, an employer may ask the employee for information to establish that the condition is a disability and what specific limitations require an accommodation. If necessary, an employer also may request medical documentation to support the employee’s request, and then determine if that accommodation or an alternative effective accommodation can be provided, absent undue hardship.

Similarly, if an employee requested an alternative method of screening as a religious accommodation, the employer should determine if accommodation is available under Title VII.

H.1.  The CDC has explained that individuals age 65 and over are at higher risk for a severe case of COVID-19 if they contract the virus and therefore has encouraged employers to offer maximum flexibilities to this group.  Do employees age 65 and over have protections under the federal employment discrimination laws? (6/11/20)

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employment discrimination against individuals age 40 and older.  The ADEA would prohibit a covered employer from involuntarily excluding an individual from the workplace based on his or her being 65 or older, even if the employer acted for benevolent reasons such as protecting the employee due to higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19.

Unlike the ADA, the ADEA does not include a right to reasonable accommodation for older workers due to age.  However, employers are free to provide flexibility to workers age 65 and older; the ADEA does not prohibit this, even if it results in younger workers ages 40-64 being treated less favorably based on age in comparison. 

Workers age 65 and older also may have medical conditions that bring them under the protection of the ADA as individuals with disabilities.  As such, they may request reasonable accommodation for their disability as opposed to their age.

I.1.  If an employer provides telework, modified schedules, or other benefits to employees with school-age children due to school closures or distance learning during the pandemic, are there sex discrimination considerations? (6/11/20)

Employers may provide any flexibilities as long as they are not treating employees differently based on sex or other EEO-protected characteristics.  For example, under Title VII, female employees cannot be given more favorable treatment than male employees because of a gender-based assumption about who may have caretaking responsibilities for children.

J.1.  Due to the pandemic, may an employer exclude an employee from the workplace involuntarily due to pregnancy? (6/11/20)

No.  Sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act includes discrimination based on pregnancy.  Even if motivated by benevolent concern, an employer is not permitted to single out workers on the basis of pregnancy for adverse employment actions, including involuntary leave, layoff, or furlough.

J.2.  Is there a right to accommodation based on pregnancy during the pandemic? (6/11/20)

There are two federal employment discrimination laws that may trigger accommodation for employees based on pregnancy.

First, pregnancy-related medical conditions may themselves be disabilities under the ADA, even though pregnancy itself is not an ADA disability.  If an employee makes a request for reasonable accommodation due to a pregnancy-related medical condition, the employer must consider it under the usual ADA rules.   

Second, Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act specifically requires that women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions be treated the same as others who are similar in their ability or inability to work.  This means that a pregnant employee may be entitled to job modifications, including telework, changes to work schedules or assignments, and leave to the extent provided for other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work.  Employers should ensure that supervisors, managers, and human resources personnel know how to handle such requests to avoid disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.   



In case you missed it, the EEOC also added other questions in May:


G.4. The CDC identifies a number of medical conditions that might place individuals at “higher risk for severe illness” if they get COVID-19.  An employer knows that an employee has one of these conditions and is concerned that his health will be jeopardized upon returning to the workplace, but the employee has not requested accommodation.  How does the ADA apply to this situation? (5/7/20)

First, if the employee does not request a reasonable accommodation, the ADA does not mandate that the employer take action.

If the employer is concerned about the employee’s health being jeopardized upon returning to the workplace, the ADA does not allow the employer to exclude the employee – or take any other adverse action – solely because the employee has a disability that the CDC identifies as potentially placing him at “higher risk for severe illness” if he gets COVID-19.  Under the ADA, such action is not allowed unless the employee’s disability poses a “direct threat” to his health that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.

The ADA direct threat requirement is a high standard.  As an affirmative defense, direct threat requires an employer to show that the individual has a disability that poses a “significant risk of substantial harm” to his own health under 29 C.F.R. section 1630.2(r) (regulation addressing direct threat to health or safety of self or others). A direct threat assessment cannot be based solely on the condition being on the CDC’s list; the determination must be an individualized assessment based on a reasonable medical judgment about this employee’s disability – not the disability in general – using the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence. The ADA regulation requires an employer to consider the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood that the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm.  Analysis of these factors will likely include considerations based on the severity of the pandemic in a particular area and the employee’s own health (for example, is the employee’s disability well-controlled), and his particular job duties.  A determination of direct threat also would include the likelihood that an individual will be exposed to the virus at the worksite.  Measures that an employer may be taking in general to protect all workers, such as mandatory social distancing, also would be relevant.

Even if an employer determines that an employee’s disability poses a direct threat to his own health, the employer still cannot exclude the employee from the workplace – or take any other adverse action – unless there is no way to provide a reasonable accommodation (absent undue hardship).  The ADA regulations require an employer to consider whether there are reasonable accommodations that would eliminate or reduce the risk so that it would be safe for the employee to return to the workplace while still permitting performance of essential functions.  This can involve an interactive process with the employee.  If there are not accommodations that permit this, then an employer must consider accommodations such as telework, leave, or reassignment (perhaps to a different job in a place where it may be safer for the employee to work or that permits telework).  An employer may only bar an employee from the workplace if, after going through all these steps, the facts support the conclusion that the employee poses a significant risk of substantial harm to himself that cannot be reduced or eliminated by reasonable accommodation. 

G.5. What are examples of accommodation that, absent undue hardship, may eliminate (or reduce to an acceptable level) a direct threat to self? (5/5/20)

Accommodations may include additional or enhanced protective gowns, masks, gloves, or other gear beyond what the employer may generally provide to employees returning to its workplace.  Accommodations also may include additional or enhanced protective measures, for example, erecting a barrier that provides separation between an employee with a disability and coworkers/the public or increasing the space between an employee with a disability and others.  Another possible reasonable accommodation may be elimination or substitution of particular “marginal” functions (less critical or incidental job duties as distinguished from the “essential” functions of a particular position).  In addition, accommodations may include temporary modification of work schedules (if that decreases contact with coworkers and/or the public when on duty or commuting) or moving the location of where one performs work (for example, moving a person to the end of a production line rather than in the middle of it if that provides more social distancing).  

These are only a few ideas.  Identifying an effective accommodation depends, among other things, on an employee’s job duties and the design of the workspace.  An employer and employee should discuss possible ideas; the Job Accommodation Network (www.askjan.org) also may be able to assist in helping identify possible accommodations.  As with all discussions of reasonable accommodation during this pandemic, employers and employees are encouraged to be creative and flexible.