Last week, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of The Salvation Army by the District Court in Columbus where the plaintiff job applicant alleged that he was denied a job after he responded to a question his job interview about whether he was taking any medications by describing the psychotropic medications he was taking. Doe v. Salvation Army, No. 07-3822 (7/1/08). The Court found that there was a factual dispute for the jury to resolve about whether the plaintiff was “disabled” under the Rehabilitation Act and whether he was rejected for employment based solely on that disability.
According to the Court’s opinion, the plaintiff “suffers from paranoid schizophrenia disorder. From 1995 through 2005, because of his condition, he was hospitalized or lived in various group homes. In 2005, still under medical supervision, Doe began working with job developer Cordell DeGraw at the Center of Vocational Alternatives (COVA) in Columbus, Ohio. Sometime in May 2005, DeGraw contacted Charles Snider, the supervisor of the Salvation Army’s Adult Rehabilitation Center (ARC) warehouse and arranged for Doe to be interviewed for a truck driver position with the Salvation Army.” When the plaintiff “arrived for the interview, Snider instructed Doe to fill out an application and . . . Doe responded that he could not work on Fridays because, “[he] had to see [his] doctor, and . . . pick up [his] medicine.” Snider asked Doe “what kind of medication” he took, and Doe responded, “psychotropic medicine.” According to Doe, at that point, Snider “stopped the interview and said that his insurance would not cover me.” Doe offered to obtain a letter from his doctor, but Snider refused to reconsider.” According to the Salvation Army, “Snider testified that he ended the interview saying, “[w]hat I’ll have to do is have this checked out,” meaning apparently, that he wanted to determine whether the ARC’s insurance policy would cover a driver using psychotropic medication. However, Snider never pursued an investigation into the insurance coverage and later hired nine other drivers.”
The plaintiff argued that he was covered by the Rehabilitation Act because he was a person with a record of an impairment which limits a major life activity. “Doe submitted numerous doctor reports and evaluations to support his claim that he has a record-supported history of paranoid schizophrenia disorder, which caused substantial limitations to his major life activities of self-care, thinking, learning, and working.” While a person with only a record of a disability (in contrast to a present disability) would not require a reasonable accommodation, the Court determined that they were still protected from discrimination by the Rehabilitation Act.
The District Court determined that there was insufficient evidence that the Salvation Army was aware that Doe had a disability. However, the Court of Appeals noted that there was evidence that COVA informed the Salvation Army that “[w]e are an agency that works with people that have disabilities.” There was also evidence that the Salvation Army “was aware that COVA’s mission is to help individuals with disabilities and other challenges.
Nonetheless, the Rehabilitation Act only prohibits discrimination “solely” on the basis of the disability. “The Salvation Army argued, and the district court agreed, that Snider rejected Doe for safety concerns, not for reasons solely based on Doe’s disability. However, it was immediately after Doe revealed his specific medications that Snider abruptly ended the interview. Snider testified that he ended the interview stating, ‘I did not say flat out no,’ but rather, ‘I’ll have to check [the insurance] out.” As we now know, he did not do so.”
“An employer may not base a hiring decision on a perceived notion that the applicant’s disability renders him incapable to perform the job. See Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2000). The district court stated that “[c]ourts have unanimously held that an individual with a disability ‘cannot perform the essential functions of a job if his handicap poses a significant risk to those around him.’” But in May 2005, Snider ended Doe’s interview not because he concluded that Doe’s employment as a driver would pose a risk to others, but because Snider “wasn’t going to take a chance” on Doe. The Rehabilitation Act’s implementing regulations state rather remarkably, to be sure, that potential employers may not ask questions “to determine whether the applicant is an individual with handicaps or the nature or severity of a handicap.” 24 C.F.R. § 8.13(a). Snider testified that he inquired as to what types of medications Doe was taking. . . . We think it supports, although it does not necessarily prove, Doe’s claim that the Salvation Army violated the Rehabilitation Act.
Insomniacs may read the full decision at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/6th/073822p.pdf.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts could lead to different results. Information here can change or be amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you should consult with or retain an employment attorney.