According to the Court’s lengthy
opinion, the plaintiff was hired in 1998 as a yard worker at the lumber
company. When he began experiencing
vision difficulties in Spring 2002, his driving duties were eliminated. When he was then placed on lifting
restrictions that Fall, he was transferred to a retail counter position part of
the time and yard work (without heavy lifting) part of the time. The employer claims that he had very poor
customer and communication skills and never mastered the cash register,
etc. However, none of these performance
issues were documented. The employer
regularly laid off employees during the slow winter months, but had previously
recalled the plaintiff without requiring him to re-apply. The plaintiff suffered kidney failure in
December 2002 and was released to return to work in January 2003 with heavy
lifting restrictions and a regular dialysis schedule. He was then informed that he was being laid
off because of economic conditions. After some period of time had passed, the
defendant manager finally admitted that he was not being recalled and the
plaintiff testified that the manager specifically mentioned his dialysis
schedule.
The manager contended that heavy
lifting was an essential job function of a yard worker, although there was
contrary testimony and no job description. In addition, the manager failed to list heavy
lifting as a job requirement when completing the EEOC’s questionnaire. While workers may help each other out with
heavy items, that was not always possible if they were busy with other
customers. He also testified that sales employees sometimes also have to lift
heavy items and need to have an additional
customer service skill set, which the plaintiff lacked. He and another witness testified that the
plaintiff needed to be repeatedly coached on his communication skills. The plaintiff was laid off during the slow
season and told him to reapply in the future.
The manager denied telling the plaintiff that he would be recalled to
work when the economy improved in 2003.
The Court refused to hold the
plaintiff to his SSI application where he claimed to be disabled because of his
lifting restrictions because the SSI application does not consider reasonable
accommodations that could be provided.
“[n]either application for nor receipt of social security
disability benefits is by itself conclusive evidence that an individual is
completely incapable of working.” Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating &
Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 429 (6th Cir.2014). “[O]ne may, in fact, be
totally disabled under Social Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”)
application guidelines, but nevertheless be capable of performing the essential
functions of one’s job. This is so because the focus of SSDI is distinct and
does not consider, for example, the effect of a reasonable accommodation on the
ability to do work.”
The plaintiff produced evidence of
a number of accommodations – “such as rollers, dollies, sliding
boards, flatbed carts, and handheld scanners that allow for pricing items
without removing them from a cart or dolly” that might have helped him perform
his job. Moreover, he showed that he had
worked for several months with his duties split between yard work and inside
sales while he had a similar lifting restriction.
The Court also found a factual dispute
to exists as to whether repeated heavy lifting was an essential function of a
sales position. Similarly, a factual
dispute existed as to whether the plaintiff could perform either the yard
worker or sales position with a reasonable accommodation. There were no job descriptions and was
conflicting testimony about the necessity of heavy lifting on those jobs.
In addition, the Court also found
that the plaintiff was not required to request an accommodation because he had
never been informed that his employment was being terminated on account of his
physical limitations. Instead, his
termination was attributed to “seasonal cutbacks.” When the plaintiff visited the store several
times after his termination to see if he could return, he was not told about
concerns with his physical limitations. There
was no discussion about any possible accommodations or limitations. Finally, the plaintiff claimed that he was
told that he was told the real issue was his dialysis schedule.
Nonetheless, the Court affirmed
the dismissal of his emotional distress claim (i.e., intentional infliction of
emotional distress). The plaintiff felt
distressed that his manager mislead him about his eligibility to return to
work.
Although Mr. Price argues that Mr. Collins told him “numerous
lies * * * about rehiring him in the Spring,” he failed to present evidence of
any affirmative statements that Mr. Collins made in which Mr. Collins actually
promised to rehire him. At best, Mr. Price set forth evidence that Mr. Collins
implied he would have a future with the company. Even viewing that evidence in
a light most favorable to Mr. Price, however, we cannot agree that it created a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Any false sense of hope that Mr.
Collins might have given to Mr. Price and his wife at a time when they were
mentally and financially vulnerable was morally reprehensible. We cannot say,
however, that it was legally actionable.
NOTICE: This summary is designed merely to
inform and alert you of recent legal developments. It does not constitute legal
advice and does not apply to any particular situation because different facts
could lead to different results. Information here can be changed or
amended without notice. Readers should not act upon this information without
legal advice. If you have any questions about anything you have read, you
should consult with or retain an employment attorney
